Photography, facebook and virtualisation of resistance in Nigeria by Agbo, George Emeka
   
   i 
 
 
 
 
PHOTOGRAPHY, FACEBOOK AND 
VIRTUALISATION OF RESISTANCE IN NIGERIA 
 
BY GEORGE EMEKA AGBO 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in History 
University of the Western Cape 
 
November 2016 
 
Supervisor: Professor Patricia Hayes  
 
    
   i 
 
DECLARATION  
I declare that Photography, Facebook and Virtualisation of Resistance in Nigeria 
is my own work and has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any 
other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated 
and acknowledged by complete references.  
 
 
 
George Emeka Agbo                                                              11 November 2016  
 
 
Signed................................   
 
    
   ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Nigerian post-independence history (1960 to the present date) is steeped in socio-
political upheavals. The majority of the citizens are frustrated with the injustice, 
inequality and fraudulent politics that pervade the country. The central argument of 
this thesis is that these conditions are critiqued through the photographic practices 
produced on Facebook. Through the circulation of photographs and the 
conversations around them on the social media platform, Nigerians demand social 
change. The sociality that underpins the visuality of social networking is explained 
by Ariella Azoulay’s notion of “civil discourse,” which theoretically organises the 
thrust of this thesis. The formulation suggests that the photograph is an outcome of 
the interaction among many individuals. It is a site of exchange, a process which I 
have argued to be reinforced by digital and internet technology. For five years, I 
have followed the visual social production on Facebook in the context of virtual 
participant observation, downloading photographs and the comments that go with 
them. A number of the photographs and the accompanying comments are analysed 
with semiotic tools to understand the key concerns of Nigerians. To explain how 
the agitation is presented, and the efforts invested in the production, I have 
reflected on the related questions of technological mediations and appropriations. 
A network of digital infrastructure conditions the creation and editing of the 
photographs and their dissemination and meaning-making processes on Facebook. 
Again, the Nigerian example demonstrates how state failure fuels activism, 
insurgency and counter-insurgency, all of which are actuated by digital 
photographic production. In this situation, the photographic image is burdened 
with the task to produce violence and to counter it. What ultimately emerges are 
complex relations among people, photography and technology. I conclude that the 
virtual movement presents possibilities for socio-political transformation in 
Nigeria. From the perspective of photography, this thesis contributes to the debates 
in social media activism and how it is shaping politics in Africa. It demonstrates 
the possibility of reading the tensions in an African postcolony through the 
connected digital, visual and social practices of the ordinary people. We are 
prompted to acknowledge the influence of digital infrastructure in the political use 
of the image. 
    
   iii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Akin to how photographic meaning is treated in this study as constitutive of the 
views of many, the project is itself an outcome of the relations among different 
individuals and institutions. Professor Patricia Hayes did more than supervise this 
work. She taught me that there are critical ways to think, to read and to write. And 
she patiently led me through these processes. She linked me to many intellectuals 
by sharing my research with them, facilitating my attendance at scholarly events 
and literally buying me books. For those rare dispositions, I will ever be grateful to 
her.  
I am also indebted to Professor Premesh Lalu, the Director of the Centre for 
Humanities Research (CHR), the platform on which this project was funded. 
Professor Lalu, Professor Ciraj Rassool, Professor Leslie Witz, Professor Suren 
Pillay, Professor Uma Dhupelia-Mesthrie, Professor Andrew Bank (the Head of 
History Department), Dr. Heidi Grunebaum, Dr. Paolo Israel, Dr. Nicky Rousseau, 
Dr. Ruchi Chaturvedi, Dr. Marijke du Toit, Dr. Annachiara Forte, and Dr. Noёleen 
Murray gave me immense intellectual support. Apart from her connection to the 
Ivan Karp and Corinne Kratz Fund that also gave me funding, Emerita Professor 
Corinne Kratz of Emory University USA provided me with a lot of scholarly 
materials. So did Professor Richard Vokes. Kratz and Professor Ismail Qadri of the 
University of Minnesota (UMN) read through some chapters and gave useful 
feedback. I am grateful to them, and to the management of and friends at the 
Interdisciplinary Centre for the Study of Global Change (ICGC), UMN: Professor 
Karen Brown (Director of the centre), Professor Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, 
Virgil Slade, Janeke Thumbran, Jess Farrell, Elliot James, Paul Vig, and Gabriale 
Payne. Their assistance enabled me to participate in the International African 
Studies Conference held in April 2016 at UMN where a paper drawn from this 
thesis won the best student paper prize. ICGC and CHR funded my participation in 
the event. 
My interaction with a number of other fellows and students at the University of the 
Western Cape was useful to me: Dr. Aubrey Graham, Dr. Paige Sweet, Dr. Maurits 
    
   iv 
 
van Bever Donker, Dr. Isabelle de Rezende, Dr. Ross Truscott, Dr. Philip Abidoye, 
Dr. David Mwanza, Dr. Kate Highman, Riedwaan Moosage, Mwayi Lusaka, 
Alberta Whittle, Mary Mbewe, Bianca van Laun, Aidan Erasmus, Lovisa Nampala, 
Michelle Smith, Wilton Schereka, Luvuyo Ndvuzo, Lauren va De Rede, Nokuthula 
Zinyengere, Tigist Shewarega, Stanley Mutetwa, Kudzai Mugadza, Comfort 
Mtotha, Anthony Ambe, Emmanual Ogbuabo, and Kenechukwu Ikebuaku.   
Administratively, Lameez Lalken of the CHR offered me the kind of assistance I 
never experienced in my career. At times, she would sort out my registration, 
flight, accommodation, stipend, and other logistics even before I asked for help. I 
will thank her all my life. I also appreciate the assistance of Hanifa Banderker of 
CHR, Villeen Beerwinkel of the Arts Faculty, and Jane Smidt and Janine Brandt of 
the History Department, UWC. Again, the following families cared for me 
throughout my stay in Cape Town: Mr. and Mrs. Simon Esiagu, Mr. and Mrs. 
August Engelbrecht, Mr. and Mrs. Andrew Booise, and Mr. and Mrs. Pascal 
Sandituma. I am thankful to them. 
I am also grateful to Associate Professor Okechukwu Nwafor of the Department of 
Fine and Applied Arts, Nnamdi Azikiwe Univeristy, Awka, Nigeria. “Big Brother” 
as I call him has been the lamp that lights the roadway of my international 
academic pursuit. Dr. Chidi Ugwu, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 
University of Nigeria Nsukka (UNN) gave me wonderful insights throughout the 
writing of this project. He is an amazing scholar. I sincerely thank him and my 
“ogas” and colleagues at UNN: Professor Krydz Ikwuemesi, Professor Okpan 
Oyeoku, Emeritus Professor Ola Oloidi, Emeritus Professor El Anatsui, Professor 
Vincent Ali, Professor Ozioma Onuzulike, Professor Damian Opata, Professor 
Nnanyelugo Okoro, Dr. Chijioke Onuora, Dr. Eva Obodo, Dr. Godwin Uka, Dr. 
Chukwuemeka Nwigwe, Dr. Greg Ezea, Dr. Ifeanyi Ezema, Dr. Boniface 
Ugwuishiwu, Dr. Ngozi Odo, Dr. Festus Abonyi, Engr. Samson Ugwu, Mrs. Ebere 
Ogbuabo, Uche Onyishi, Nnaemeka Egwuibe, John Kc. Ugwuanyi, Livinus Kc. 
Ngwu, Trevor Morgan, May Okafor, Chukwunonso Uzoagba, Iheanyi 
Onwuegbucha, Stella Elejere and Dr. Godson Diogu who did not live to see me 
return to Nsukka from this journey.  The list is long but cannot still accommodate 
    
   v 
 
many others, whose thoughts I needed, both offline and on Facebook, to think 
about the “Nigerian problem” on which my research is based. 
Joe Ike Ogugua allowed me to use his Patrick Ogugua Memorial Centre (POMEC). 
Although he did not live to see the outcome of the research, I am thankful to him 
and his family, Mrs. Ogugua and Ifechi Ogugua. I also thank the staff of the 
National Museum, Lagos, especially Mr. Pedro Austin Taye (the librarian), Lizzy 
Abbah and others in the library section for assisting me to find information. I was 
also given access to the library of the Centre for Contemporary Art, Lagos, where I 
found a lot of materials on photography in Nigeria. I thank Bisi Silva the director 
and Kemi Aderinto the librarian who assisted me. I am grateful to the staff of the 
African Artists’ Foundation, Lagos for providing me with some materials and for 
organising the exhibition in which my participation helped in the formation of this 
research idea. Again, thanks to all those whose online posts and interviews were 
used in this thesis.   
Meanwhile, I appreciate Fortune my wife, whom I fondly call Treasure, and my 
sons Agozie and Somto. They accepted a family split between Nsukka and Cape 
Town. Had they failed to understand, this dream would not have been realised. 
And I thank all those who assisted them in my absence: My mother Victoria, 
Christian Agbo (my cousin), Ebenezer Ezugwu (my friend and in-law), Mrs. 
Ifeyinwa Asogwa, Mr. and Mrs. Nnaemezie Asogwa, Mrs. Chinyere Ndubuisi, Mr. 
and Mrs. Stephen Iloabuchi, Mr. and Mrs. Stephen Ebubeogu (my in-laws), Mr. 
and Mrs. Damian Ogbuabo, Mr. and Mrs. Zebulum Achiuwa, Iheanyi Achiuwa, 
Jimmy Onyishi and Candidus Onyishi.   
Most importantly, I acknowledge the Centre for Humanities Research (CHR) of 
the University of the Western Cape (UWC) for the Andrew Mellon fellowship 
award that facilitated the execution of this project. The research was further 
supported by an Ivan Karp Doctoral Research Award through the African Critical 
Inquiry Programme, a partnership between CHR, UWC and the Laney Graduate 
School of Emory University, and funded by the Ivan Karp and Corinne Kratz 
Fund. I appreciate the generosity and thank the administration of the University of 
Nigeria, Nsukka for granting me study leave. 
    
   vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
Abstract................................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................. iii 
List of Figures ……………………………………………………………..…… ix 
Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………..  xii 
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………….……. 1 
Background ……………………………….…………………………..………… 1 
The problem …………………………………………………………..………… 2 
Objectives ………………………………………………………………………. 4 
The photograph …………………………………………………………………. 6 
Review of literature …………………………………………………………….. 8 
Theoretical directions ………………………………………………………….. 26 
Reflection on method……………………………………………………...…… 30 
Ethical issues ……………………………………………………………...…… 37 
Thesis structure………………………………………………………………… 38  
CHAPTER ONE 
ANALOGUE PRACTICES AFTER 1960: RESISTANCE READING  
OF THE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY IN NIGERIA ………….……. 42  
Introduction …………………………………………………………………… 42 
Resistance photography ………………………………………………………. 45 
The fine art of resistance ………………………………………………..… …. 47 
Printed news, printed activism ………………………………………….….…. 68 
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………… ….… 81 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE DIGITAL TROUBLE WITH NIGERIA ……………….………..….. 83 
Introduction ………………………………………………………………....… 83 
Corruption …………………………………………………………………….. 85 
Precarious spaces …………………………………………………………..…. 94 
The paradox of oil riches ……………………………………………....…….. 100 
    
   vii 
 
Infrastructural failure……………………………………………..……..…… 108 
Competition for power ………………………………………………………. 117 
Conclusion …………………………………………………………...……… 124 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE TECHNOLOGY OF VISUAL-DIGITAL ACTIVISM: 
APPLICATIONS, MEDIATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS ……...…. 126 
Introduction ……………………………………………………………….… 126 
The ubiquitous camera …………………………………………………….... 128 
Editing and the making of unique statements…………………………….…. 145 
Techno-appropriations………………………………………………...….…. 155 
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………..… 166 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ON THE STRUCTURE OF FACEBOOK………….……………………. 168 
Introduction ………………………………………………………….……… 168 
Content circulation and conversation practices…………………………..…. 170 
Historical development of Facebook……………………………………...… 183 
Facebook as archive.…………….……………………………………...…… 195 
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………..… 207 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DILEMMA OF THE IMAGE………………………….…….…....... 209 
Introduction ……………………………………………………….………… 209 
The emergence of Boko Haram…………………….……………….………. 211 
The image as perpetrator…………………………………………….…...…. 216 
Fighting back……………………..………….………………………...……. 224 
Conclusion ………………………………………………………….….…… 235 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE SHAPES OF TRANSFORMATION …………………….……..….. 236  
Introduction …………………………………………………………...….… 236 
Virtual public conscientisation…………………….…………………….….. 237 
    
   viii 
 
Between materiality and immateriality…………..…………………………. 244 
Localised agitations – global responses…….………………………………. 256 
Disturbing the structures of power………………………………………….. 271 
Conclusion …………………………………………………………….…… 283 
CONCLUSION..………………………………………………………..…. 285 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..…………………………………………………...…… 295 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
    
   ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
While most of the photographs examined in this thesis came from Facebook, some 
were taken from other online platforms (blogs and news media website), and a few 
from print newspapers and magazines. The majority of the filmic documents 
whose screen shots are analysed are Facebook and Youtube videos. 
Chapter 1 
Figure 1.1:  Brig. Samuel Ademulegun and his family in the 1960s ……... 53 
Figure 1.2: City dwellers living in squalor ………………………….…… 62 
Figure 1.3: Cover of Victor Politis’ photography exhibition catalogue,  
2008 ………………………………………………………..… 66 
Figure 1.4: Lieutenant Cornel Yakubu Gowon and Lieutenant Cornel  
Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu ……………………….… 71  
Figure 1.5: Laying the foundation stone of the Irolu town hall project in  
Ogun State ………………………………………………….... 74 
Figure 1.6: Cover page of 6 December 1993 Tell magazine ………….…. 78 
Figure 1.7: Protest against Abacha’s regime …………………………….. 79 
Chapter 2 
Figure 2.1: Portraits of 3 past Nigerian leaders: Alhaji Shehu Shagari  
(left), General Ibrahim Babangida (middle), and General  
Sani Abacha (right) ……………………………………...…… 86  
Figure 2.2: Portraits of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha ………………….……. 89 
Figure 2.3: Portraits of sleeping Nigerian police officers ……………...… 95 
Figure 2.4: The commissioning of a governor’s office in Kaduna State  
(2014) ……………………………………………………….. 103 
Figure 2.5: National Stadium Abuja at the job recruitment exercise by  
the Nigerian Immigration Services, 15 March 2014 ……..… 106 
Figure 2.6: The Port Harcourt International Airport ………………….… 110 
Figure 2.7: 2015 election campaign bill board and a flooded road at  
Nsukka in Enugu State ……………………........................... 114 
Figure 2.8: Chaos in the Nigerian parliament, 20 November 2014  
    
   x 
 
(video still) …………………………………………………... 118 
Figure 2.9: Pictorial comment on the Channels Television video on the  
chaos in the Nigerian parliament (20 November 2014)  
shared on Facebook by Abiyamọ ……………………… ....… 121 
Figure 2.10: Blood spill on the floor of the Rivers State House of  
Assembly (video still) in July 2013 ……………………..…... 123 
Chapter 3 
Figure 3.1: School children in the classroom ………………………..…... 132 
Figure 3.2: “Eyewitness” image of the snatching of ballot box in  
Zamfara State (Nigeria) in the 2015 gubernatorial election…..136 
Figure 3.3: Musa Yar’Adua’s son playing with money and rifle ……...… 141 
Figure 3.4: Musa Yar’Adua’s son in juxtaposition with an indigent man...142 
Figure 3.5: Major collage layouts as afforded by picture collage  
Applications ……………………………………….…….…... 148 
Figure 3.6: The image editing techniques and the resulting visual  
Statements ……………………………….………………..…. 149 
Figure 3.7: Political rally and people fleeing Boko Haram attack …….… 151 
Figure 3.8: Mutilated portrait of Goodluck Jonathan ………………....…. 153 
Figure 3.9: Portraits of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abubakar Shekau and  
Goodluck Jonathan …………………………………………... 154 
Figure 3.10: Generator-powered informal economy …………………........ 158 
Figure 3.11: A commercial mobile phone charging centre ……………..… 159 
Figure 3.12: Electrical installations by PDP (People’s Democratic Party)....162 
Chapter 4 
Figure 4.1: Spatial setting for Facebook posting ……………………….… 171 
Figure 4.2: The Facebook emoticons …………………………………..… 177 
Figure 4.3: BRT buses allegedly set ablaze in Lagos by the military  
in 2014 ……………………………………………………...... 179 
Figure 4.4: Thefacebook welcome page in 2004 …………………..…..… 184 
Figure 4.5: Spatial configuration of Facebook (for an individual page)..…199 
 
    
   xi 
 
Chapter 5 
Figure 5.1: “Suya” wrapped with a piece of newspaper that has the  
pictures of Abubakar Shekau and his fellow militants …….… 220 
Figure 5.2: The abducted Chibok school girls ………………………..….. 221 
Figure 5.3: The Boko Haram logo …………………………………….…. 221 
Figure 5.4: Portrait of Abubakar Shekau in life and in death 1 ……….…. 226 
Figure 5.5: Portrait of Abubakar Shekau in life and in death II ………...... 227 
Figure 5.6: Sheriff at the meeting between the presidents of Nigeria  
(Goodluck Jonathan) and Chad (Idriss Deby) in 2014 ……..... 232 
Chapter 6 
Figure 6.1: Queuing for fuel at the Oando Filling Station (Nsukka,  
Enugu State) ……………………………………………...…... 240 
Figure 6.2: Portrait of Dora Akunyili …………………………………..… 243 
Figure 6.3: Logos of different Occupy Nigeria Facebook groups …….….. 248 
Figure 6.4: The Occupy Nigeria protest by the Nigerian Bar Association  
(Warri Branch) …………………………………………….…. 252 
Figure 6.5: The body of Muyideen Mustapha who was shot on 3 January  
2012 during the Occupy Nigeria protest. It is also the profile 
photograph of the Facebook page set up in his honour: “R.I.P 
Muyideen Mustapha - A Hero of the Nigerian Revolution …... 255 
Figure 6.6: The first hashtag tweet of the BringBackOurGirls campaign….258 
Figure 6.7: Michelle Obama’s tweet of the photograph of herself holding  
the #BringBackOurGirls sign ………………………………… 259 
Figure 6.8: Malala Yousafzai holding the #Bringbackourgirls sign ……… 264 
Figure 6.9: Malala Yousafzai meets President Goodluck Jonathan in  
July 2014 ………………………………………………...…… 265 
Figure 6.10: Figure 6.10: “My Oga at the top (Full Interview of Lagos 
Commandant)” – video still ……………………………….…. 273 
Figure 6.11: Action against rigging of election ……………………………. 279 
Figure 6.12: Distribution of “stomach infrastructure” rice in Ekiti State in  
June 2014 …………………………………………………..…. 281 
    
   xii 
 
ABBREVIATIONS  
AG Action Group 
APC All Progressives Congress  
BRT Bus Rapid Transit 
DAA  Domestic Abuse Awareness  
ECONET Enhanced Communication Networks 
FIWON  Federation of Informal Workers’ Organisations of  
 Nigeria  
FRSC Federal Road Safety Corps 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
Glo Global Communications Limited 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communication 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
ICTs Information and Communication Technologies  
INEC Independent Electoral Commission  
ISIS  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
ISP  Internet Service Providers 
JAF  Joint Action Front  
JPEG Joint Photographic Experts Group 
MTN  Mobile Telephone Network 
NAFDAC National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and 
 Control 
NBA  Nigerian Bar Association  
NCC Nigerian Communications Commission 
NCJSP  National Coalition for Jonathan and Sambo Presidency 
NIPOST Nigerian Postal Services  
NIS  Nigerian Immigration Services  
NITEL Nigerian Telecommunications Limited  
NLC Nigerian Labour Congress 
NNPC  Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation  
NSCDC Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps  
    
   xiii 
 
PDP People’s Democratic Party 
POMEC Patrick Ogugua Memorial Centre 
PTF Petroleum Trust Fund  
SNG  Save Nigeria Group  
TUC Trade Union Congress 
UCC Ugandan Communication Commission 
UI User Interface  
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural  
 Organisation 
UNN University of Nigeria, Nsukka 
URL Universal Resource Locator 
Wifi  Wireless Fidelity 
WWW  World Wide Web
    
   1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background  
Contemplating Consequences – the title of a contemporary art exhibition in which 
I was to participate in Lagos in October 2012 – I became obsessed with the 
conditions of my practice as an artist working in Nigeria. My work which is 
located within the disciplinary convergence of photography and computer-aided 
graphics is impeded by the dearth of basic infrastructure, including electricity. I 
shared my predicament on Facebook. The response was enormous: a pool of 
photographic images corroborating critical comments in which many users linked 
Nigeria’s infrastructural failure to failed governance. Some other concerns – 
corruption, mediocrity, unemployment, poverty and insecurity – were expressed 
through the medium. The pictorial and typographical texts were appropriated as 
visual resources for the production of the artwork I showed in the exhibition.  
That experience whetted my appetite to investigate the complexities of the 
emergent practice of civil resistance in Nigeria. There is a growing intellectual 
interest in new media and how it shapes public opinions through the sharing of 
information among the people it brings together. The individuals “can challenge 
authority, such as that of the government … and (contribute) to changing … 
political practices, and (offer) new ideas for reaching people and facilitating 
political discourse.”1 Here I am interested in how these possibilities get produced 
through photography and visual technologies. This work is a historical inquiry that 
deploys an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the activist use of 
photography on Facebook.   
Through the practice, Nigerians document the turns in the country’s contemporary 
life. They bring their knowledge of the historical evolution of the country as a 
                                                          
1 Jarice Hanson, 24/7: How Cell Phones and the Internet Change the Way We Live, Work, and Play 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2007), 66. 
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postcolony to bear on the process. While paying attention to that historical 
dimension, this study explores the modalities of cyber-visual culture. These 
include the driving technology, the pictorial framing of public agitations and the 
possibilities of socio-political transformation these hold. In an age when politics 
and digital culture are intertwined, the research brings the Nigerian experience into 
the debates around the new global culture of civil engagement produced on social 
media. In so doing, it furnishes an important new perspective on photography as a 
political tool. Further, we encounter a new mode of producing the history of a 
postcolony – a process that involves public visual practices mediated by digital 
technology.  
The decision to anchor this investigation in Nigerian society was informed by two 
factors. First, I am fascinated with the vibrant online network formed by the 
citizens in the face of limited infrastructure. Digital resources, internet access and 
electricity are some of the facilities that are crucial to social media culture, but 
which are insufficient in Nigeria. It is amazing how these odds are managed. 
Secondly, despite the social construction of Nigerians as “resilient” people, the 
ordinary citizens show strong resistance to state authorities in their demand for 
accountability. In this work, the term “resistance” is used interchangeably with 
activism, protest, civil struggle and social movement. But it also does more. It 
connotes various forms of relation to power: confrontational and subtle, localised 
and broad, explicit and surreptitious. Again, it is not only about rebelling against 
power, but about what the rebellion tells us about power.2 Accordingly, the use of 
the word allows for unrestricted political reading of images and their 
accompanying semiotic codes to understand the Nigerian condition. 
The problem  
There is a growing research interest in how social networking re-enforces public 
demand for accountability in governance. Photography, however, has not been 
                                                          
2 Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through 
Bedouin Women,” American Ethnologist 17, no. 1 (1990). 
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significantly engaged in this regard. This research examines the photographs3 
circulated on Facebook in relation to socio-political tensions in Nigeria, to explore 
their underlying context of civil resistance. This enables a broader understanding 
of how new media has reconfigured social movement and the political use of 
photography, bringing the two together in intriguing ways. It adds to the literature 
on online activism, which has mostly concentrated on the following broad areas. 
First, the digital and cyber infrastructure of information dissemination is argued to 
be the driving force of the practice. It redefines the formation of political views and 
the communication between leaders and their subjects. It democratises access to 
information and facilitates civil movements through interpersonal networking.4 
Second, the virtual culture has been examined in terms of its offline 
materialisation. Manuel Castells uses the theoretical notion of “space of flows”5 to 
explain how the interaction among people is reconfigured in the “information age.” 
One of the implications of the idea is that social media mobilisation ultimately 
prompts the gathering of individuals in actual spaces for mass protest. Other 
researchers have focused on the logic of counter-resistance by the political 
organisations that have been challenged. They crack down on protesters, shut down 
online platforms or use the same to fight back.6 Still, there are studies that argue 
for the transformative power of social media regardless of the resistance against it.  
                                                          
3 The sense in which the term, “photograph” is used in this work is explained in the section, “the 
photograph.”  
4 Much scholarly work has been done on the impact of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) on civil activism. See for example Wim van de Donk et al, “Introduction: 
Social movements and ICTs,” in Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movement, eds. 
Wim van de Donk et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 1. Using case study approach, 
the edited volume evaluates “the implications of the use of ICTs (such as the internet) for citizen 
mobilization and the formation, activities, legitimacy and effectiveness of…social movements.” See 
also Stephen Coleman and Jay G. Blumler, The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, 
Practice and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); William Lafi Youmans and 
Jillian C. York, “Social Media and the Activist Toolkit: User Agreements, Corporate Interests, and 
the Information Infrastructure of Modern Social Movements,” Journal of Communication 62 
(2012); Bruce Bimber, “The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community, and 
Accelerated Pluralism,” Polity 31, no. 1 (1998); W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, “The 
Logic of Connective Action,” Information, Communication & Society 15, no. 5 (2012). 
5 Manual Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movement in the Internet Age (UK and 
USA: Polity Press, 2012), 56. 
6 See Sarah Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights,” Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 35, no. 1 (2012); Ahmad Shehabat, “The Social Media 
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In these intellectual engagements, photography has not been well explored. As is 
the case with Bonilla and Rosa’s essay on the #Ferguson protest enacted online and 
offline in 2014, the photographic image could be read closely by scholars, but is 
not central to the problematisation of the social movement in which it is situated.7  
The pictoral image is so crucial to protest, especially on social media, that it 
deserves to be more thoroughly examined as a mode of scholarly enquiry. This 
study brings the photographic image to the centre of virtual protest (on Facebook) 
using the Nigerian example. It analyses how Nigerians visually frame their 
obsessions. The dissemination of the images is guided by the notion that “there are 
knowledges attached to seeing,”8 and that important political decisions are made 
through the directing of people’s eyes to injustice.9 The production, distribution, 
meanings and effects of the images are analysed to bring out how they are 
conditioned by digital technology, and the promise of socio-political change they 
offer. 
Objectives  
In a general sense, the goal of this study is to examine how the circulation of 
images on Facebook constitutes an alternative mode of civil resistance in Nigeria. 
The specific objectives include first, to trace the history of photography in the 
country along the grain of civil struggle. It is an attempt to construct a different 
history from the dominant narrative of photography as a branch of art on the one 
hand and of the print media on the other. Granted, the research is centrally on the 
visual practices supported by a recent phenomenon – the new media. Through their 
contents and meanings constructed online, the images connect current national 
issues to the period spanning the second half of the 20th century. Given that 
                                                                                                                                                                
Cyber-war:  The Unfolding Events in the Syrian Revolution 2011,” Global Media Journal (2013); 
Albrecht Hofheinz, “Netopia? Beyond Revolution 2.01,” International Journal of Communication 5 
(2011). 
7 The #Ferguson protest was prompted by the shooting of Michael Brown in Missouri, USA, an act 
broadly understood in relation to racism. See Yarima Bonilla and Jonathan Rosa, “#Ferguson: 
Digital Proptest, Hashtag Ethnography, and the Racial politics of Social Media in the United 
States,” American Ethnologist 42, no. 1 (2015). 
8 Patricia Hayes, “Santu Mofokeng, Photographs: ‘The Violence Is in the Knowing,’” History and 
Theory 48 (2009): 37. 
9 Wim Wenders, The Act of Seeing: Texte und Gespräche (Frankfurt: Verlag der Autoren, 1992).  
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connection, it is appropriate to evaluate the political attributes of the photographic 
practices that predated the digital age. Ultimately, it becomes feasible to establish 
that since the end of colonial rule in Nigeria in 1960, photography has remained 
entwined with civil resistance. Analogue practices that filtered through 
professional, institutional, and commercial paradigms initiated an activist tradition 
that got transformed and democratised by the internet.  
Besides historical reading, the research examines the concerns of the online 
activists10 as they are framed in “placards” held up in virtual spaces in the form of 
electronic images. The current wave of protest across the world is generally 
perceived to be prompted by related demands, especially for more responsible 
government and socio-economic change. Yet, the activist organisations can better 
be understood in terms of how they are localised, and the grievances peculiar to 
individual societies. Social media images are analysed in this project with the 
intention to understand the anxieties that are specific to Nigeria.  In other words, 
the patterns of socio-economic and political concern of Nigerians are examined. 
Through the contents of the images and their accompanying comments, we 
understand the demands of the protesters. 
Furthermore, the underlying technological relations of the civil movement are 
evaluated by scrutinising the dynamics of production and circulation of the images. 
There is ever-increasing access to image-making devices – cameras, cell phones, 
tablets, computers – and image-editing applications that have made photography 
accessible to the public. On the other hand, Facebook supports multiple and 
complex ways of disseminating the images. As these infrastructural facilities 
operate with the logic of user-friendliness, the acts of taking, working and sharing 
photographs constitute a mass practice. The technological mediations that govern 
the online struggle are explained in terms of how they enable images to produce 
meanings and create desired visual representations. The dynamics of display and 
                                                          
10 The online activists or protesters are the internet-connected individuals who are disturbed by the 
injustice in Nigeria and remonstrate it on the cyber platforms. They may not be physically in touch 
with one another, but depending on proximity, they at times organise themselves in groups offline 
to enact protests in actuality.   
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circulation on Facebook are also analysed to understand the effects created by the 
virtuality and interconnectivities of the internet.  
Lastly, cyber activism in the Nigerian context is appraised in terms of its 
potentiality for socio-political and economic transformation. The Tunisian and 
Egyptian revolutions (2010-2011) largely organised online led to the overthrow of 
the holders of the highest political positions in both countries. As a result, the 
events are usually cited as examples of how social media activism is transforming 
Africa. One of the objectives set out at the beginning of this research is to make a 
case for a “Nigerian revolution” as experienced not in an explosive sense but in a 
variety of other intriguing ways. Also explored is the sense in which the image gets 
implicated in the virtual practice. All at once, photographs are put to uses that 
oppose each other: it is deployed to fight the same calamity it is used to create. 
The photograph  
It is crucial to explain how the term “photograph” is used in this study. To set in 
place certain histories of photography, the literature review section adheres to the 
stable notion of photography (in opposition to film) as the production of still 
images with the use of the camera. But in the rest of this work, “photograph” is 
used to also refer to two other kinds of images that overlap each other– video still 
and screenshot. These visual forms are not produced through the conventional 
mode of aiming the camera lens at an object in actual space and clicking the shutter 
button. Yet, in digital culture, they are photographs at other technical levels and in 
the way they are used.  
Historically and technically, cinema emerged from photography following late 
19th century experiments to create the illusion of motion with still images. So film 
is fundamentally a sequence of photographs. Some of the images I retrieved for 
analysis from Facebook are frames grabbed from videos of important events 
originally circulated on other media such as television. In a similar mode, I read a 
number of videos I found relevant as still photographs by grabbing the frames that 
would allow me access into the narratives of the videos. 
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The other kind of image that I have worked with – screenshot – is also a 
photograph in technical terms. It is taken through actual shooting of the screen of 
the device by itself. Facebook pages are replete with screenshots of web contents 
such as tweets and other Facebook posts which may be composed of typographical 
or pictorial signs, or both. Video still and screenshot are taken through the same 
process of grabbing what is displayed on the screen of the digital device such as 
the computer and smart phone. But while video still is the photograph of another 
experienced in motion, I use screenshot to refer to anything other than a playing 
video photographed by the device on which it is displayed. What I read as 
photographs in this work – video stills, screenshots and conventional photographs 
– were selected becaue they possess semiotic codes that offer an understanding of 
the Nigerian condition that I analyse.  
Meanwhile, I cannot end the discussion of my notion of “photograph” without a 
note on first, the importance of captions in setting the thematic focus of the images, 
and second, the fact that most of the photographs are portraits. The assertion that 
photographs make sense through “textual contextualization and references to other 
pictures”11 is particularly pertinent to images that circulate on social media. By 
“caption,” I mean the “note” with which the photograph is posted on Facebook 
before other users begin to make their comments. Given that it is not suitable to 
have a long paragraph or a whole passage as the caption of an image, I take the 
first line as caption in the instance of a long accompanying note. The caption 
comes in form of rhetorical question, sarcasm, or what I refer to as “plain 
descriptive statement” that directly reflects the event depicted in the image. While 
plain descriptions usually accompany images with self-evident depiction of 
particular social problems, interrogative and sarcastic captions serve to 
thematically recontextualise photographs to draw attention to issues which may not 
be originally related to the image. 
                                                          
11 Lasse Heerten, “‘A’ as in Auschwitz, ‘B’ as in Biafra: The Nigerian Civil War, Visual Narratives 
of Genocide, and the Fragmented Universalization of the Holocaust,” in Humanitarian 
Photography: A History, ed. Fehrenbach Heide and Davide Rodogno (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 252. 
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Caption is therefore capable of transmitting political critique in the photographic 
practices produced on Facebook. Raoul Birnbaum writes that “inscriptions provide 
a further element of power that is added onto the photographic image.”12 Birnbaun 
makes this assertion in an attempt to bring a Chinese photographic tradition into 
the reading of portrait photography in Africa. So, strong statement is made through 
the depiction of the face and the inscription on the image. This holds true for the 
visual production on Facebook, where most of the images I have analysed in this 
thesis are incidentally portraits of people. Nigeria has a long-standing tradition of 
studio portrait photography through which we encounter the politics of self-
presentation and identity construction. But in the more public context – from the 
analogue print media photography to citizen photography in a soial media era – 
portraits produce political effects. Portraits of political elites are captioned and 
circulated in ways that enable political critique of the Nigerian postcolonial 
condition.      
Review of Literature 
There is a wide range of scholarly work on the key issues with which this research 
engages: photography, digital imaging, social media activism, and socio-political 
issues in Nigeria. This categorisation accordingly defines how the examination of 
the relevant literature is structured. 
I begin with photography and my discussion here is guided by the question of how 
Nigerians see photographs in the context of their postcolonial situation. I first 
emphasise how the medium has been situated within truth-telling and evidentiary 
paradigms. Those regarded as the inventors of photography in the 19th century 
worked within these and other frameworks that would influence the use of the 
medium in different societies and periods. Louis Daguerre of France and Henry 
Fox Talbot of England undertook independent experiments that culminated in two 
different photographic processes announced publicly in 1839. Daguerre’s was 
                                                          
12 Raoul Birnbaum, “Foreword,” in Portraiture and Photography in Africa, ed. John Peffer and 
Elisabeth L. Cameron (Bloomington and Indianapolis Indiana University Press, 2013). 
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named “daguerreotype,”13 and Talbot’s, “calotype” or “photogenic drawing.”14 
Each technique sought to establish photography as the objective picturing of the 
world by nature itself.  Talbot’s understanding in particular had implications for 
the way photography would later be placed within the discourses of evidence. The 
note he made on his photograph of ceramic wares published in The Pencil of 
Nature is that should the wares be lost to theft, the photograph if presented in the 
court would be used as evidence against the thief. The Nigerian activists who post 
photographs on Facebook work with the consciousness of the evidentiary 
understanding of photography. But they construct the “evidence” through different 
forms of technological mediation of the image.  
Meanwhile, the truth-telling and evidentiary frameworks were not the only way 
photography was seen. Exploring the technological dimension of the medium, 
Felix Nadar who worked between 1853 and 1910 voiced a certain ambivalence 
through his argument that the camera is magical and the image potentially 
“homicidal”.15 Nadar’s concern underlines the questions, disagreements and 
ambiguities presented by photography in its early days and which persists to the 
present date. For instance, in relation to the Boko Haram insurgency examined in 
chapter 5 of this work, there is a profound instability of the photograph. The 
militants, the Nigerian army, the media and the networked individuals are all 
simultaneously image brokers pursuing different agendas but deploying 
evidentiary discourses, resulting in what I call “dilemma of the image.”  
While Nadar was ambivalent, Walter Benjamin whose scholarly work appeared in 
the 1920s and 1930s was concerned with the dangers of reproduction offered by 
the technologies of his time including photography. Mechanical reproduction 
undermined the “aura” of the image. But more importantly, it had ominous 
political implications for photography as the German fascists who controlled the 
means of visual production and representation used the medium to pursue their 
                                                          
13 Louis Daguerre, “Daguerrotype,” in Classic Essays on Photography, ed. Alan Trachtenberg 
(New Heaven: Leete’s Island Books, 1980), 13. Daguerre worked in collaboration with Nicéphore 
Niépce until his (Niépce’s) death in 1833. 
14 Henry Fox Talbot, The Pencil of Nature (London: Longman, 1844), 9. 
15 Felix Nadar, Gaspard Felix Tournachon and Thomas Repensek, “My Life as a Photographer,” 
October 5 (1978). 
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egotistic agenda.16 But we are now in a different age where the masses are deeply 
involved in making images, re-working them and constructing their meanings. So, 
unlike the German audiences of Benjamin’s time where the masses were theorised 
as consumers or targets of fascist propaganda, the Nigerian Facebook users are 
themselves mass producers in a new era of visual literacy. They have access to 
image production and circulation devices and platforms that have transformed 
photography into an even more significant aspect of “mass culture” with strong 
political effects.  
In the rest of the 20th century, much critical writing on photography has emerged. 
Roland Barthes is one of the most often cited. He offers to photography theory the 
concepts, punctum, the “element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an 
arrow, and pierces me, and the studium, which is culturally informed.17 I do not 
deploy these concepts because they are not pertinent to the interpersonal relations 
of the photographic image which is my concern in this thesis. I find Susan Sontag 
more useful. The practices of image editing associated with Facebook activism 
constitutes a particular way to understand her argument about photography’s 
capacity to create new realities. Again, in On Photography, Sontag argues that the 
medium is empowering, allowing “people to take possession of space” and to 
dominate others.18 It is thus a particular kind of “weapon” where the camera and 
the gun share operational attributes and the capability of domination.19 Sontag in a 
sense talks about the power that filters through the control of the means of visual 
reproduction and representation. The analogue framework within which Sontag 
worked has been largely replaced by digital photography where visual practices 
have become a mass affordance. Everything from the production of the image to its 
reconstruction and circulation can be undertaken by the common people. This 
enables ordinary Nigerians to rock the fraudulent political sphere in which they 
live. 
                                                          
16 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illustrations, 
ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schochen Books, 1969), 221. 
17 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1982), 26-27. 
18 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977), 177. 
19 Ibid. 
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There are other bodies of work that have been indirectly useful to this study, 
exploring a variety of questions about ethnographic relations and the construction 
of colonial knowledge. Christopher Pinney and Elizabeth Edwards examine the 
medium as a means of knowing which turns its subject into an object of gaze. To 
defend that position, each of them juxtaposes photography with anthropology in 
certain ways. Pinney argues that the two disciplines have “parallel histories.” They 
emerged in the 19th century as an outcome of the Western curiosity for 
observation, drawing “their representational power through nearly identical 
semiotic procedures.”20 In fact, photography came to be absorbed into 
anthropological method of fieldwork. This is demonstrated in Photography in 
Africa: Ethnographic Perspectives edited by Richard Vokes. Examples of 
fieldwork in parts of Africa are used to examine the relational dimension of 
photography that allows the ethnographer not only to observe but to participate.21 
Thus, Elizabeth Edwards argues that photographs are ethnographic objects which 
through museum and archival practices shape how histories are interpreted and 
how peoples are perceived.22 It is within the framework of ethnographic gaze and 
domination that photography’s relation to colonialism is understood. We are 
prompted to ask what happens to these questions if we take them out of the 
analogue domain and pose them in relation to the digital. Social media activism is 
a cultural production into which ethnographic method allows us to gain critical 
insight. This approach as demonstrated in this study is called “virtual ethnography” 
or “netnography” and involves observing while participating in the online 
interaction around photographs on Facebook. The difference between earlier 
ethnography and the kind I have undertaken is located in the relation with power. 
While the former is employed for domination (in the colonial context for instance), 
the latter is about challenging the dominant power that became established after 
colonialism in Nigeria.  
                                                          
20 Christopher Pinney, “The Parallel Histories of Anthropology and Photography,” in Anthropology 
and Photography, ed. Elizabeth Edwards (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1992), 74. 
21 Richard Vokes, ed., Photography in Africa: Ethnographic Perspectives (Woodbridge: James 
Currey, 2012). 
22 Elizabeth Edwards, Raw Histories: Photographs, Anthropology and Museums (Oxford and New 
York: Berg, 2001). 
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The colonial question constitutes one of the earliest important perspectives in the 
debates around photography in Africa. This has been extensively explored by a 
number of scholars whose work is based on the Southern African colonial 
experience. For instance, drawing on the Namibian example, The Colonising 
Camera edited by Jeremy Silvester, Patricia Hayes, and Wolfram Hartmann 
examines how photography served the colonial project in different capacities. With 
its performative elements, photography was at the heart of the ethnographic 
investigations through which the coloniser came to know the colonies, to be able to 
dominate them.23 It is in this context of domination that Paul Landau argues that as 
“photography became a concrete tool of empire,” images drove colonial 
administrations.24 Drawing on Sontag, Landau also has a useful formulation about 
the camera and the gun, which becomes relevant in this study in relation to the 
tactics of Boko Haram. The image for the insurgents assumes significance as a 
means of and in fact perpetrator of violence.  
Elsewhere, Hayes as well as other scholars has explored portraiture and 
documentary photography in relation to the African colonial encounter, 
anticolonial movements, and other issues in the postcolonies. In relation to anti-
apartheid struggle in South Africa, Hayes draws attention to how one can view 
documentary and photojournalism outside the stable, realist notion of exposing 
brutality. She writes about Santu Mofokeng whose documentary photographic 
work in the 1980s did not conform to the dominant tradition of showing apartheid 
violence by activist photographers. Insisting that “the violence is in the knowing, 
not in the seeing,”25 he pursued the mundane, the spiritual, and to use his words, 
“shadows” – “something that refuses to be photographed.”26 The way this literature 
engages questions of violence is suggestive for postcolonial political violence. 
                                                          
23 Jeremy Silvester, Patricia Hayes and Wolfram Hartmann, eds., The Colonising Camera (Cape 
Town: UCT Press, 1998). 
24 Paul S. Landau, “Empires of the Visual: Photography and Colonial Administration in Africa,” in 
Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, ed. Paul Landau and Deborah 
Kaspin (California: University of California Press, Ltd., 2002), 142. 
25 Patricia Hayes, “Santu Mofokeng, Photographs: ‘The Violence Is in the Knowing,’” History and 
Theory 48 (2009): 34. 
26 Santu Mofokeng, “The Black Photo Album,” in Anthropology of African and Indian Ocean 
Photography, ed. Revue Noire (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1999), 74.   
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Some of the injustices challenged by photographers in colonial times are still 
pertinent after independence, except that the perpetrators are constituted 
differently. Besides, the colonial powers controlled the means of photographic 
representation in their time while the Nigerian post-independent leadership has no 
control over the digital visual regime that challenges its legitimacy. 
Portraiture which comes up in unexpected ways in my reading of protest 
photography in Nigeria is particularly crucial to the history of photography in 
Africa. In much of the writing on particularly West and East Africa, portraiture 
serves the purposes of self-presentation, harming and healing, social belonging, 
and much more. Both Corinne Kratz and Heike Behrend deployed ethnographic 
methods to conduct research in East Africa. About studio photography, Behrend 
writes that studio backdrop painting allowed Likoni photographers in Kenya in the 
1990s to produce an imagined space for their customers to inhabit “a world from 
which in actuality they are excluded.”27 On the other hand, Kratz is concerned with 
the stereotype against Okiek people in Kenya by their fellow Kenyans. The Okiek 
are portrayed as poor, uncivilised people who share a habitat and physical 
attributes with beasts. Kratz undertook prolonged ethnographic photographic 
research that allowed her to use portrait exhibitions and scholarly writings to 
challenge the Okiek stereotype.28 She also developed a model of how audiences 
relate to the photographic image. There are two ends to the audiencing, each 
associated with responses that are directly opposite to those of the other. On the 
one side, we have objectification, othering, alienation, and disconnect. On the 
other, we have identification, affiliation, and connection.29 That model formulated 
within the analogue framework is still pertinent but has also shifted with the digital 
turn. The distance between the photographer and the photographed and between 
the image and the audience has to some extent been bridged. Nigerians now have 
                                                          
27 Heike Behrend, “Imagined Journeys: The Likoni Ferry Photographers of Mombasa, Kenya,” in 
Photography’s Other Histories, ed. Christopher Pinney and Nicolas Peterson (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003).   
28 Corinne Kratz, “Okiek Portraits: Representation, Mediation, and Interpretation in a Photographic 
Exhibition,” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 36, no 141/142 (1996).   
29 Corinne Kratz, The Ones that Are Wanted (California: University of California Press, 2002). 
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access to technologies of visual production and distribution. They have a stake in 
the use and construction of the meaning of the image on the digital platforms.  
To return to the analogue discourse, this time in the West African context, the 
literature on photography is among other things about illusory presentation of the 
self. It is associated with socio-cultural identity, social status, solidarity and 
friendship. In the 1970s, Stephen Sprague used Ila-Orangun town as an example to 
explicate local aesthetics of photographic self-presentation among the Yoruba of 
South-western Nigeria. He brought to the fore the ways in which the visual 
medium shaped and was shaped by Yoruba political and cultural experience. The 
Yoruba used the medium to construct their identity and how they wanted to be 
perceived. On the reverse side, the cultural sensibilities impacted on the 
conventions of posing, camera angle and symbolic signification that became 
integrated into the frame.30  
Liam Buckley’s study of studio photography in Gambia reveals something of 
inserting the self into an imagined world as explored by Behrend. But in Gambia, 
the utopia is created not only with painted backdrops but with accessories – 
imported props “associated with fashionable living.”31 In this way, there is a 
fashioning of the photographic subject into a person far removed from the “real 
person.” In Hudita Mustafa’s work on Senegal, women produce themselves as 
affluent and prestigious by taking photographs in expensive dresses.32 In Lagos, 
Nigeria, as studied by Okechukwu Nwafor, dressing in uniform (aso ebi) during 
social functions serves as a means of solidarity and belonging that enters the circuit 
of photographic production.33 Nwafor’s work further brings the question of the 
digital into the discourse of representation in Nigeria and in ways that show how 
the ideas explored by Sprague, Buckley and Mustafa have changed. In fact, 
                                                          
30 Stephen F. Sprague, Yoruba Photography: How the Yoruba See Themselves, African Arts 12, 
no.1 (1978). 
31 Liam Buckley, “Self and Accessory in Gambian Studio Photography,” Visual Anthropology 
Review 16, no. 2 (2000): 71.   
32 Hudita Nura Mustafa, “Portraits of Modernity: Fashioning selves in Dakarois Popular 
Photography,” in Images and Empire: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, ed. Paul 
Landau and Deborah Kaspin (Berkeley: University of California Press).   
33 Okechukwu Charles Nwafor, “Photography and the Spectacle of Aso ̣Ebì in Lagos, 1960-2010” 
(PhD diss., University of the Western Cape, 2011). 
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Nwafor is the one whose work has brought me to the research I am doing on digital 
photography, though my own focus is on the political possibilities produced by 
that visual digital culture. 
To explore the political question, I have worked with some of the above 
photography theories. But I have drawn more extensively on the work of Ariella 
Azoulay, WJT Mitchell, Allen Feldman, Allan Sekula, John Tagg, Martin Hand, 
and new work on digital photography edited by Martin Lister, and by Jonas Larsen 
and Mette Sandbye. 
Creation, circulation, and interpretation of photographs on Facebook constitute a 
visual practice through which ordinary Nigerian citizens seek to transform the 
socio-political conditions of the country. This argument finds theoretical grounding 
in Azoulay’s work on civil discourse. Although her approach has been criticised as 
somewhat antagonistic and long-winded, she has helped to break the divide 
between aesthetics and politics. Situating photography at the core of the analysis of 
political upheavals, she draws attention to how the visual practice brings people 
together in the quest for a better world. In the Civil Contract of Photography, she 
develops the idea of “citizenship of photography” to explain how the visual 
medium constitutes a citizenry that exists outside the sovereign state.34 The citizens 
in this sense may be spatially distanced from one another, but they are brought 
together to interact on account of the photograph.  
The interaction which Azoulay refers to as the “event of photography” results in 
the construction of the meaning of the image with the involvement of the 
photographer, the photographed and the viewer.35 Azoulay’s work does not 
however extend to the digital domain which has reshaped the eventness she 
theorises. The contribution of my study is therefore to bring the digital into some 
of her arguments. The digital photograph posted on Facebook becomes a site of 
                                                          
34 Ariella Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography (Zone Books: New York, 2008).  
35 Ariella Azoulay, Civil Imagination: Political Ontology of Photography (London: Verso 2012). 
Azoulay offers us two ways to understand photography as an event: “the event of photography” and 
“the photographed event.” The event of photography is the infinite series of encounters that ensue 
in relation to the image, or the camera (with the mere knowledge or suspicion of its presence, 
arrival or use). The photographed event is the aspect of the encounter that is caught in the frame.  
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interaction through commenting, sharing, tagging, and liking, by users of the 
platform. A large citizenry of photography has emerged on account of the socio-
political situations in Nigeria as people from across the world respond in various 
ways to the country’s crisis potrayed through the photographic practices on 
Facebook.  The responses constitute a civil struggle to change the Nigerian 
condition.  
But the political use of photography in Nigeria did not start with the digital turn. I 
have engaged in political reading of Nigeria’s analogue-era art photography, 
photojournalism and social documentary – the genres with the most outstanding 
public face in the country. The print media portraits of the Nigerian military heads 
of state especially Sani Abacha and Ibrahim Babangida in the 1980s and 1990s 
present the opportunity for a certain way of reading Sekula’s engagement with 
portraiture. Sekula identifies two forms of representation that photographic 
portraiture allowed in the 19th century. One is “honorific,” as in the case of 
portraying “the bourgeois self.” The other is “repressive,” connected to 
instrumental applications such as in legal practice and police work with the 
criminal body as the object of state photographic scrutiny. Even at the height of 
military dictatorship in Nigeria, the print media represented the heads of state not 
in an honorific but in a repressive sense as dictators and corrupt officials. In that 
way, the citizens imaged the representatives of state power as icons of state crime, 
thus inverting the order of representation in Sekula’s formulation.   
In the new media age, there are new forms of inversion associated with 
photographic representation and political violence in a democratic Nigeria. One of 
them is the inversion of Feldman’s idea of close proximity of being seen to being 
killed, a formulation that emerged from his study of the Northern Ireland conflicts 
(1960s-1980s). The instrumentality and operationalisation of vision for violent 
purposes which Allan Sekula has also theorised with his notion of “the 
instrumental image” created a fear of the camera among the populace in Northern 
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Ireland.36 In the case of the deadliest example of violence in Nigeria’s recent 
history – the Boko Haram insurgency – the militants want to be seen. Rather than 
being killed by their photographic visibility, it allows them to terrorise the viewers 
and declare the coming of destruction, a declaration that hardly fails. Feldman later 
offers us another perspective of vision and violence, one that involves politics of 
the image. In the Archive of the Insensible, he reads selected archives and specific 
events to engage with state concealment, normalisation, and justification of 
violence. These among other things happen through the constitution of assemblies 
where memory is manipulated to foist certain narratives of democratic sensibilities 
while ignoring the violent histories that informed the gatherings in the first place.37 
The fight against Boko Haram is predicated upon the narrative of crushing a rebel 
group that threatens the Nigerian sovereignty. But the state fails to acknowledge its 
complicity in the mayhem (chapter 5 discusses this in detail). 
Although the foregoing theories are useful to me, none of them deals directly with 
the digital – the domain in which my work is located. This need is addressed by 
Mitchell, Hand, and a few other scholars who have written on digital photography. 
In 2015, Mitchell published Image Science: Iconology, Visual Culture, and Media 
Aesthetics which allows him to recapitulate the thrust of his work over the decade. 
And that is, the call to scritinise the image, its production and use in contemporary 
life, in a way that collapses the divide between the human and natural sciences. 38 
Cloning Terror for instance reads into the politics of digital imaging that 
                                                          
36 Allen Feldman, “Vision and Violence: The Prosthetics and Aesthetics of Terror,” Public Culture 
10, no. 1 (1997); Allan Sekula, Photography against the Grain (Canada: The Press of the Nova 
Scotia College of Art and Design, 1984). 
37 Allen Feldman, Archive of the Insensible: Of War: Photopolitics and Dead Memory (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
38 W.J.T. Mitchell, Image Science: Iconology, Visual Culture and Media Aesthetics (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2015). The four key elements of the “image science” formulation are 
“the pictorial turn,” the “image/picture” distinction, “metapictures,” and “biopictures.” Pictorial 
turn refers to the emergence of the image “as a topic of special urgency in our time, not just in 
politics and mass culture…but also in the most general reflections on human psychology and social 
behaviour, as well as in the structure of knowledge itself.” For Mictchell, the difference between 
image and picture is that while “an image is what appears in a picture,” “the picture is a material 
object.” As noted earlier, I use the terms interchagably in my work, not in Mitchell’s sense. “In a 
metapicture, “an image in one medium…enframes an image in another.” Lastly, biopictures are 
images that are digitally given the attributes of living organism as exemplified by animations. (see 
pages 13- 21).   
    
   18 
 
accompanied the War on Terror during the George Bush administration in USA. In 
the 2010s, the ethical questions around cloning as a biological scientific enterprise 
was at its height in USA when War on Terror was launched. Mitchell analyses the 
two as involving digital image creation, mirroring, mutation, multiplication and 
destruction.39 Thus, the formulation “cloning terror” is about war to which image 
production and circulation are central. The same can be said of the Boko Haram 
insurgency. It is a war, not only of shooting and bombing, but of images where the 
militancy and the counter efforts are produced in pictorial terms and circulated 
especially on social media platforms. 
In the volume, The Photographic Image in Digital Culture edited by Martin Lister 
in 2013, the idea of online image circulation is examined along with a range of 
other concepts. In the introductory essay, Lister engages with the notion of 
“network,” emphasising how “we…routinely affix ‘networked’ to ‘digital 
image.’”40 He is talking about the complex form of sociality performed in various 
ways and enabled by different elements of digital infrastructure. One such element 
is the JPEG (the Joint Photographic Experts Group), a file format with a high 
possibility of image compression. In “The Rhetoric of the JPEG,” Daniel Palmer 
reads JPEG as the structure of the image that allows it into the circuit of networked 
people and devices, and offers a democratised viewing experience. It is built into 
camera devices, computers and operating systems, image-viewing and editing 
applications, online image-sharing platforms, printers and scanners, and even 
more. 41   
Another element of the digital infrastructure is the hardware – the image-taking 
devices such as digital cameras, laptops, iPads, tablets, and smart phones. The 
unprecedented access to these gadgets has prompted what Martin Hand calls 
“ubiquitous photography.” The way the devices are synchronised with the internet 
reduces the time between the taking of the image and its appearance in the public 
                                                          
39 W.J.T. Mitchell, Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to the Present (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011). 
40 Martin Lister, “Introduction,” in The Photographic Image in Digital Culture Second Edition, ed. 
Martin Lister (New York: Routledge, 2013), 4. 
41 Daniel Palmer, “The Rhetoric of the JPEG,” in The Photographic Image in Digital Culture 
Second Edition, ed. Martin Lister (New York: Routledge, 2013), 149. 
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domain of the cyber world. Hand’s work informed my own use of “ubiquitous 
camera” as a concept to explore how the pervasive presence of camera devices 
allows ordinary Nigerians to observe the conduct of the political elites. In The 
Burden of Representation, John Tagg writes about how photography in the 19th 
century got diffused into the infrastructure of state power which Foucault had 
earlier identified to include for example the school, the hospital and the prison. 
Disrupting the direction of the gaze produced for instance in the construction of the 
criminal body, ordinary Nigerians use the ubiquitous camera to observe state 
officials and to represent them as dubious.  
Such photographic practice operates as surveillance, but also as citizen 
photojournalism. Stuart Allan argues that the line that demarcates the latter from 
professional photojournalism has been blurred. With reference to particular events 
such as the South Asian tsunami of 2004, Allan examines how the proliferation of 
camera devices enables those who are not trained as photojournalists to report eye 
witness events with the camera.42 Such photographic reports become so important 
that they are taken up by the mainsream media in their news productions. Citizen 
photojournalism in Nigeria operates in an activist context, that is, to bring attention 
to incidents that expose the failure of the state. 
Patricia Hayes evaluates the idea of “exposure” in the context of anti-apartheid 
struggle. In the 1980s, documentary photography among black South Africans was 
underpinned by the notion of truth so that most photographers sought to depict the 
violence of apartheid.43 The political use of the ubiquitous camera in Nigeria and 
the online circulation of the resulting images are driven by the similar quest to 
expose the corruption of state officials. But this visual production is everything 
Sekula says about the realist understanding of documentary, namely the “folklore 
of photographic truth.”44 “The same picture,” he asserts “can convey a variety of 
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messages under differing presentational circumstances.”45 On Facebook which is 
the main site of Nigeria’s activist culture investigated in this work, photographs 
acquire meanings that differ from what they previously had. The presentational 
circumstances include the editing of the photographs and their multiple 
recirculation on Facebook where they attract various comments.  
These digital dynamics are theorised by Manovich through his five principles of 
the new media under which digital photography is subsumed: numerical 
representation, modularity, automation, variability and transcoding. While new 
media objects are composed of binary codes of ones and zeros (numerical 
representation), they have components with individual identity (such as pixels in 
images) and can be combined to make larger objects. Manovich describes the 
combination of the components as modularity. The forms can be created 
automatically, and easily manipulated (automation), and exist in different versions 
(variability). Transcoding refers to how the media materials influence the way we 
live and represent ourselves. 46   
Those principles are manifest in the production of digital photography, in the 
operations of social media, and ultimately in the convergence of the two for civil 
resistance. It is thus imperative to string these elements (digital photography, social 
media and activism) together in an intellectual framework. This will give insight 
into one of the ways contemporary life is affected by photography, an aspect of the 
new media to which Manovich refers, and whose influence he calls “transcoding.” 
Drawing on the Nigerian example, this project responds to that problem. Some 
important scholarly writings on the photographic production of sociality on social 
media ignore the activist dimension. Those that engage with activism overlook 
either photography or the networked sociality. Consider the following examples. In 
Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change, Zachariah Mampilly 
and Adam Branch examine forms of contemporary unrest on the continent and 
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their historical and regional underpinnings. 47 The cover of the book shows a 
flipped and colour-edited copy of Akintunde Akinleye’s photograph of protesters 
in the 2012 Occupy Nigeria movement, where the closest figure to the camera 
holds a mobile phone.48 The authors dedicated a chapter of the book to the Occupy 
Nigeria protest, but overlooked the photographic and social media dimension of 
the uprising which the cover picture directly indexed.  
Other texts dwell on photography and social movements, but leave out the online 
component. For instance, Photography as Activism: Images for Social Change 
engages with the history and philosophy of photography with attention to how 
photographic practices have been configured to challenge social inequality. Among 
other things it shows that activist photographers use their work to mobilise 
resources to ameliorate the harsh human conditions to which they direct the eyes of 
the public.49 Nonetheless, this book published in 2012 – when the world had begun 
to experience the organisation and enactment of protests on social media – is silent 
about the networked mobilisation.  
In other scholarly work, photography is the overlooked element. Such is the case 
with Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and Social Movements published in 2004. 
It critically assesses how Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
shape civil struggle.50 While the relevance of ICTs and the internet in democracy is 
broadly acknowledged, they produce spaces in which world democracies are 
challenged. Drawing on the study of diverse cases, the essays in the anthology 
evaluate the deployment of multimedia applications, email, databases and some 
other websites in the organisation and implementation of protest movements. 
Towards the end of the 2000s, they argue, the ICTs-social struggle relation found 
more expression in the use of social networking websites especially Facebook, 
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Twitter and YouTube. These platforms were important in the famous uprising that 
raged between 2010 and 2011 in parts of North Africa and Middle East. They 
helped to maintain a structure of communication that surpassed the mainstream 
media.51 The literature on this subject offers a new set of descriptive vocabulary 
and signs – “Twitter revolution,” “Facebook revolution,” “YouTube war” and hash 
(#) tag formulations – that underscore the centrality of social media in the new 
forms of resistance.  
The notion of revolution in this context is however contested. Some consider it 
“overly techno-deterministic” and “techno-utopian,” where the counter 
applications of social media and its failures are downplayed. 52 Albrecht Hofheinz 
questions the so-called “Twitter revolution” whose origin and popularity connect 
to the role of Twitter in the upheaval that followed the 2009 Iranian general 
election. His argument is that Twitter only allowed media users to receive and 
forward updates of unfolding events. It could not topple the regime, which clung to 
power and used internet evidence such as YouTube videos and Facebook posts to 
identify and arrest opposition activists.53 Apparently, Hofheinz is one of the 
detractors of social media activism. Others in this camp include Evgeny Morozov 
and Malcolm Gladwell. They insist that online-based activism is a weak form of 
mobilisation and does not have any remarkable effect on society.54 On the 
opposing side are the supporters such as Clay Shirky and Juris Jeffrey who 
believe that social media movement has the power to transform society.  
Observing as a participant in the #Occupy Boston protest of 2011, Juris Jeffrey 
notes the contribution of Facebook and other social networking websites “to an 
emerging logic of aggregation in the more recent #Occupy movements – one that 
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involves the assembling of masses of individuals from diverse backgrounds within 
physical spaces.”55 That has been the case in Nigeria. For example, as argued in the 
6th chapter of this thesis, the above-mention Occupy Nigeria protest was 
conceived and co-ordinated on Facebook, and involved heavy deployment of 
photographs. Bringing photography and social media activism together, I diagnose 
the Nigerian socio-political upheavals in a new kind of way. 
The scholarly appraisal of the Nigerian problem began long before the 
development of digital technology. With a strong sense of trepidation about what 
had happened to the country within two decades after independence (1960), 
Chinua Achebe published The Trouble with Nigeria (1983). The expectation of a 
great politically independent country was marred by a number of ills. He identified 
and analysed them: tribalism, poor leadership, false selfhood, lack of patriotism, 
injustice, mediocrity, indiscipline and corruption.56 Shortly before his death in 
2013, Achebe revisited the Nigerian problem in There Was a Country (2012). To 
do this, he turned to historical interpretation of a personal account woven around 
the secessionist state of Biafra. The climax of the conflict that developed in Nigeria 
in the 1960s and continued through the 1970s was the demand for self-rule by a 
part of the country that felt mistreated and politically marginalised. About the root 
of the crisis that has dogged Nigeria for more than half a century, Achebe 
concludes: “Africa’s postcolonial disposition is the result of a people who have lost 
the habit of ruling themselves. We have also had difficulty running the new 
systems foisted upon us at the dawn of independence by our ‘colonial masters.’”57 
That remark suggests that poor leadership is at the core of Nigeria’s system failure. 
Soyinka corroborates that idea with his critique of General Sani Abacha’s regime 
in The Open Sore of a Continent. He gives a critical analysis of the dictatorship of 
Abacha and his predecessors. With brutality, intimidation, deception, and 
exploitation, the military rulers thwarted the hope with which Nigerians received 
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the end of colonial rule.58 The hope which was rekindled following the 
enthronement of democracy in 1999 was again lost to violent power struggles.  
Election in Nigeria is marked by fraud and violence.59 Once the foundation of 
leadership is flawed, other vices get entrenched in the system. Corruption is the 
most studied of them. 
For some scholars, leadership and corruption in Nigeria are intertwined and cannot 
be treated separately. For others, corruption is diffuse, practiced by both the rulers 
and the ruled. It has also been explained with the cause and effect approach. The 
contributions to the book Corruption in Nigeria: Critical Perspectives (2002) 
expound these views. Anthropologist P-J Eze argues that “corruption in Nigeria 
reflects stunted transformation from traditional to the postcolonial metaethnic 
social system.” He likens the failure to efficiently operate the received social and 
political systems to “mother-tongue interference in second language learning.”60 
Hence both military and civilian systems of government have been marked by 
high-scale corruption which anti-corruption agencies have failed to tackle. For 
Daniel Jordan Smith, corruption is not exclusively practiced by the political elites. 
He notes that “ordinary Nigerians can be, paradoxically, active participants in the 
social production of corruption even as they are also its primary victims and 
principal critics.”61 This argument is made in the book, A Culture of Corruption: 
Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria. The ethnographic study 
portrays corruption as a condition whose knowledge of its consequences brings the 
expression of discontent about it. Yet, the citizens are not deterred from taking part 
in its production. Part of what my research explores is how photography’s truth 
claims (however constructed) are used to challenge political corruption. 
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Historically, certain genres of photography, such as documentary, emerged from 
the quest to resist the problem of political deception. 
Meanwhile, the effects of corruption in Nigeria are enormous. The most widely 
researched are poverty, infrastructural failure, and insurgency. Michael Watts has 
studied Nigerian oil politics, addressing questions of ecology, struggle for resource 
control, looting and the economy of violence. Drawing on Paul Collier’s work – 
The Bottom Billion – he establishes a relation between resource wealth and poor 
economic performance, bad governance and civil conflict. What emerges is a 
paradoxical rich-land-poor-people scenario that makes one think of the oil wealth 
as a “curse.”62 Insurgency as an upshot of corruption and system failure is critiqued 
by many in terms of how it is precipitated by dissatisfaction with how Nigeria is 
run. For instance, Ojochenemi, Asuelime and Onapajo argue strongly that Boko 
Haram is motivated by socio-economic factors. They include a “high level of 
unemployment, galloping poverty, economic underdevelopment and inequality, 
and low level of education.”63 Similarly, Don Adeniji uses Ted Robert Gurr’s 
“grievance theory” to argue that Boko Haram was engendered by extended 
frustrations which at some point could no longer be contained.64 Thus, they 
“exploded.”  
Insurgency, corruption, poor governance and other forms of crisis experienced in 
Nigeria collectively constitute a threat to national unity. In Nigeria since 
Independence: Forever Fragile? J.N.C. Hill buttresses that point. He argues that 
some causes – prominent among them, “federalism, oil and the armed forces”65 – 
produce conditions that fuel the tendency towards Nigeria’s disintegration. 
Federalism for Hill encompasses the political practices and structure of the state. 
Oil connotes the wealth of the nation. The power of the armed forces is felt 
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through “its operations and activities.” 66 Dissatisfaction with the operations and 
distribution of the three things identified by Hill, and the state’s failure to provide 
for the citizens, contribute significantly to the conflicts in the country. 
Paradoxically, the same factors combine to counter insurgency and to prevent 
political disintegration. As Hill puts it, “they are promoting ideas of nationhood 
and inculcating in the population a loyalty to the nation.”67 The angry citizens are 
persuaded “that they have more to gain from Nigeria remaining intact than they do 
from it breaking up.”68 
In the scholarly examination of these tensions, researchers have neglected how 
they are shaped by digital technology, the internet, and the photographic practices 
that help to visualise the problems. This project responds to that state of 
knowledge. Drawing on the Nigerian experience, it brings together photography, 
digitality and civil resistance. It investigates a new mode of social movement that 
involves a cyber-based photographic practice where pictures enter the virtual 
public domain of the Facebook website. The users appropriate the communication 
potentials of the visual and cyber technologies to articulate their demands in 
pictorial form.  
Theoretical directions 
The body of literature reviewed above presents the key debates around 
photography, social media, civil struggle and socio-political issues in Nigeria. The 
thoughts that emerge from the debate are synthesised to chart theoretical directions 
that situate this study in a broader intellectual context. At various points, I draw 
from different theoretical and conceptual resources. Still, the work is centrally 
framed with the civil discourse theory proposed by Ariella Azoulay. Below is an 
explanation of how I have worked with the theory while recognising its limitations 
that prompted the adoption of other (supplementary) approaches. The approaches 
are evaluated in relation to the research questions they help to address. 
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To begin with civil discourse, Azoulay challenges the ontological model of reading 
a photograph in its own terms. For her, such a framework tends to ignore other 
factors that come into play in constructing the meaning of an image. She opposes 
the perception of photography as a mere technology of imaging where the 
photographer uses the camera to photograph what is positioned before the lens and 
claims a sovereign point of view over the produced image. She considers 
photography as an event, an encounter that brings many individuals together. A 
photographic image may result from the event. In some cases, images may not be 
produced in the end, yet what she terms “the event of photography” continues 
infinitely. The endless encounter is in relation to the photographer, the 
photographed, the audience of the produced image and all others who will work 
with it. All these participants are involved in the construction of the meaning of the 
image. Azoulay began to pursue this view in The Civil Contract of Photography 
published in 2008. She explains the relations among the individuals involved in the 
event as regulated by “mutual trust,”69 “a tacit agreement,” 70 not a signed one. She 
further projects the concept, “citizenship of photography” where through 
photography, people encounter the living conditions of others. They come “to 
share a common world”71 regardless of belonging to different times and spaces. In 
a later writing, she advances her argument by proposing a political ontology of 
photography:  
A political ontology… of the many, operating in public…an ontology bound 
to the manner in which humans exist – look, talk, act – with one another and 
with objects… an ontology of a certain form of human beings with others in 
which the camera or the photograph is implicated.72 
The human and material elements involved in the relations combine to produce the 
meaning of the image. There is no such thing as singularity in the interpretation of 
a photograph, neither does a particular individual have a sovereign view about it. It 
is a transaction.  
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In the digital age in which we live, the transaction is profound. Through the 
circulation of pictures on Facebook, Nigerians and others from elsewhere who 
constitute the citizens of photography share the knowledge of socio-political 
developments in Nigeria. In the online space, the photographer, the photographed, 
the image and its viewers are brought together to interact. Through the exchange, 
multiple interpretations of the photographs emerge. We come to understand the 
concerns that drive the use of the platform, the resulting chain of events and the 
forms of political communications enabled.    
Azoulay’s theorisation of photography as an encounter is relevant to the study of 
visual practices on Facebook. But the impacts of digital and cyber technologies are 
ignored in the formulation. Yet they govern different facets of the relations made 
possible with the image. They are central to the production, circulation and display 
of the photographs. They structure how the grievances that fuel the online activism 
are represented. They give the image the double status as a tool to perpetrate 
violence and to counter it. To be able to engage with these technology-related 
issues, conceptual ideas are drawn from various works on digital media. 
To answer the research question of image production and transformation, the 
concept of digital editing is engaged with here. Editing is most often read in 
relation to film. Soviet filmmaker, Sergei Eisenstein, popularised the concept 
montage to intellectually articulate the centrality of editing in film production. 73 
Even before Eisenstein, Lev Kuleshov (one of the pioneers of Soviet cinema) held 
that film is born with the editing of the shots, but in a way that differs from the 
theatre performance-oriented method of continuity editing. Montage, for 
Eisenstein, arises from the collision of independent shots that could even have an 
oppositional relation with one another. Breaking the confines of space and time, 
the editing juxtaposes different images to produce new meanings.74 The 
photographic practices on Facebook are marked by a wide range of digital editing. 
More broadly, the anthropology of infrastructure offers a set of resources to help 
understand how the visuality is produced.   
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Regarding the forms of exchange supported by the technology, conceptual 
resources are taken from the literature on the digital notion of information 
production, communication, space, textuality, archivisation and so on. Manuel 
Castells’ theory – space of flows – explains how these elements are configured to 
produce social relations. It lays emphasis on connection and interaction. These are 
made possible by “technological infrastructure” that supports networks operated by 
“social actors.” Castells distinguishes “space of flows” from “space of places” 
which is defined by “territorial contiguity.”75 Still, he acknowledges the interface 
between the two. The interface is crucial to our reading of how photographic 
practices on social media connect with offline enactments. 
The public agitation in Nigeria – whether online or offline – is a reaction to harsh 
living conditions occasioned by failed governance. The failure is most often 
blamed on the arrogance of the political elites. They have a certain kind of attitude 
to public resources, policy-making and implementation. The government tends to 
lose control of certain crucial forces that have direct implications for the economy. 
A set of ideas are drawn from political theories to explain these circumstances as 
inscribed in the photographs deployed in online resistance. The issue of 
“government failure” has in itself been broadly theorised.  Scholars are drawn to it 
because it is historically behind a lot of human conflicts.76 Tullock, Brady and 
Seldon interrogate government failure with the notion of public choice. Premised 
on the application of economic models to the explanation of political issues, public 
choice analyses how “collective action is modeled with individual decision-makers 
using the political process to further their self-interests.”77 It is used along with 
other relevant concepts to examine the state failure about which Nigerians protest 
on Facebook. The image is important in the way it enables interaction among the 
individual protesters despite their geographical dispersion. 
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These theoretical directions help to set an agenda for engagement with the 
Nigerian postcolonial struggle in which digital photography plays a key role. They 
tie together the different elements of the study and frame its pursuit. They are also 
important to the formulation of the research methodology. 
Reflection on method 
Netnographic and archival methods were deployed for this study. Netnography 
which also refers to virtual or digital ethnography, was coined by Robert Kozinets 
to define “a form of ethnographic research adapted to include the internet’s 
influence on contemporary social worlds.”78 It is suitable for “exploring the 
relations of mediated interaction,”79 such that occurs on social media. Participant 
observation and interviews are the key elements of netnography deployed in the 
course of this research. In 2012, I began to follow the Facebook conversations 
about the many challenges confronting Nigeria. My interest in Facebook was 
prompted by its ranking as the most widely used social networking website by 
Nigerians. Recent statistics show that the number of monthly users is up to 16 
million, constituting a segment of the considerably literate population that inhabits 
mainly urban and semi-urban centres.80 This number includes students,81 
academics, civil servants, business people and those employed in the informal 
sector of the economy. Although marked by demographic divergence, this 
population of users is brought together by the experience of harsh living conditions 
in Nigeria. It was consequently possible to deploy social media in the organisation 
of Occupy Nigeria (2012), the largest mass protest in the country since the current 
democratic dispensation that commenced in 1999.  
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As I followed the virtual discussions, I found it difficult to ignore the massive 
deployment of photographs. The images first appealed to me as visual resources 
for artistic production. Further, I was drawn to the interface between the visual and 
digital technology on the one hand, and the ensuing social relations and meaning-
making on the other. Virtual participant observation allowed me to keep track of 
the fleeting moments on Facebook and to vent my own frustration with the 
situation in Nigeria.  
I was born a Christian in Nsukka, South-eastern Nigeria where the Biafra-related 
agitation (that partly led to the civil war in 1967-1970) is ongoing. The religious 
and ethnic tensions that predated the war continue to intensify the struggle for 
power, political corruption, insurgency, and dilapidation of public infrastructure 
that have left majority of Nigerians impoverished. I have been a witness to these 
circumstances, and have followed the public agitation against them in other media 
such as music and newsprint. I began to use the internet in 2001, joined Facebook 
in 2011, and began in 2012 to follow the conversations as digital facilities had 
structured them. The social media interaction helped me to reflect on my current 
position as a subject working under poor conditions in a university art department. 
I studied in ill-equipped educational institutions, and have no access to quality 
medical care, regular electricity and good roads. Police harassment and extortion, 
kidnapping, and armed robbery attack are common experiences of which I have 
been a victim. Given my close proximity to this state of affairs, my research 
became an activist project in its own right. 
I joined two major Facebook protest groups involved in massive deployment of 
images. The first is the Nigerian Global Awakening Day Protest initiated in 
October 2011 by Marian Awolowo. The foundational goal was to mobilise 
Nigerians from across the world against corruption and state failure in Nigeria. The 
other is the Nationwide Anti-Fuel Subsidy Removal: Strategies and Protests 
created on 2 January 2012 by Gimba Kakanda, Jeff Unaegbu and Richard Ali. The 
purpose was to protest against the Nigerian government’s removal of fuel subsidy 
announced on the previous day. These groups were important to me, but my study 
was not limited to them. Many Nigerians at home and in the diaspora, including 
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their non-Nigerian online friends, take part in the conversations around the turmoil 
in Nigeria. I expanded my own network of Facebook friends to access more posts 
on my timeline, but also studied relevant posts by users outside my network. 
Nigerian government officials also use Facebook, but I am particularly interested 
in the users who perceive themselves as outside the circuit of the Nigerian state 
power and challenge the political elites. I refer to them as “ordinary Nigerians” 
(when they are Nigerian citizens) and “online protesters or activists.” They 
constitute the geographically unbound population connected to one another 
through social media and by the common goal of demanding better living 
conditions in Nigeria via image production and circulation. We cannot make sense 
of the activists in any homogeneous structures. Some are organised in clusters 
where the group page is managed by an administrator who ensures that the posts 
comform to the activist goal of the group. Others are active individual users of the 
site who are commited to the circulation of politically strong materials. Yet, some 
other protesters are organisations whose activities on Facebook are the extension of 
other activist projects. Of course, prior to the emergence of digital media, 
Nigerians critiqued the state through other means: music, literature, jokes, 
cartoons, film, print media and its photographic practices. These have not 
disappeared, and have taken on a digital modality which allows their convergence 
in certain ways on social media sites.  
Where Facebook groups or individual users with Nigeria-related activist 
undertakings are outside my own network of friends, the search field of Facebook 
was used to locate their pages. Similarly, Facebook conversations on relevant 
subjects were found through Google search. In all, I have used visual materials I 
found political and relevant to this study irrespective of the Facebook pages to 
which they were posted.  
Meanwhile, participation in the online exchange required that I not only follow and 
comment on the posts of others. I too posted images and comments aimed at 
initiating conversations. The approach allowed me to elicit the views of the online 
activists. It was for me a kind of group interview “moderated” with my intermittent 
comments to chart the direction of the dialogue. In doing this, I had my research 
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objectives in mind. I took advantage of the extemporaneous attributes of the group 
interview to which Russell Bernard refers in his Research Methods in 
Anthropology: 
Sometimes, you just find yourself in an interview situation with a lot of 
people. You’re interviewing someone and other people just come up and 
insert themselves into the conversation. This happens spontaneously all the 
time in long-term fieldwork ... take advantage of the situation and just let 
the information flow.82 
Although Bernard writes with the face-to-face mode of group interview in mind, it 
was applicable to my virtual approach. As the conversations progressed, the 
pictures were copied along with their accompanying comments, pasted on the 
Microsoft Word window and saved on the computer hard disc in Word document 
format. The files were stored according to the thematic categories of the contents. 
The retrieval date and URL (Uniform Resource Locator) were indicated in the 
documents for citation purposes.  
Other forms of interview were conducted to retrieve information about the images 
that were not readily available in their accompanying comments. I use the term 
“one-on-one” to make it distinct from the group interview described above. I 
requested the Facebook activists as individuals to comment on the images they 
circulated in relation to questions of infrastructure and motivation for the civil 
struggle. Virtual and face-to-face approaches to one-on-one interview were 
adopted.  
The decision to employ virtual interviews was made at the outset, as the project 
was already entwined with virtuality. Online research itself presents some gains to 
the contemporary researcher. An aspect of the condition that favours online 
movement in Nigeria is the anonymity under which the social media users “hide” 
in order to express themselves with some level of freedom.83 The virtual interview 
aligns with this circumstance while taking advantage of the same internet 
technology that shapes the project, to reach respondents regardless of their spatial 
                                                          
82 H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2006), 232. 
83 Anonymity in this context can be illustrated with the use of fictitious names and profile 
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distances. Interestingly, the virtual interview is no less an effective method than the 
face-to-face interview. Knorr, Bronack, Switzer and Medford remark that given 
how virtual world technology is being increasingly used as a social and 
communication medium, the virtual interview is emerging as a tool that qualitative 
researchers may consider, either to supplement or to replace face-to-face 
interviews. Following the research they conducted to compare the two, they report: 
“No significant difference in meaning units was found in the coded transcripts of 
virtual world environment interviews and face-to-face interviews. Results suggest 
that virtual worlds may offer advantages over face-to-face interviewing in terms of 
efficiency, without sacrificing reliability, validity, or complexity.”84 Again, it 
offers flexibility where the interviewee chooses to be interviewed via email or 
conversed with in the chatroom provided on the Facebook website. 
However, the virtual interview has some limitations. Some online activists 
accepted neither my “friend’s request” on Facebook nor to participate in my 
research even when we were members of the same protest group. It suggests that 
although social media activism has a lot of influence, it does not often guarantee 
intimate friendship among the online “friends.” Secondly, infrastructural failure 
(part of what fuels online protest) affected my virtual interviews with Facebook 
users who live in Nigeria. Interviews conducted in Facebook chatroom were 
disrupted by electric power cuts and poor internet access. In such a case, I resorted 
to email communication. But the sense of instant interaction was lost. These 
circumstances prompted the consideration of face-to-face interviews. In my field 
trip to Nigeria, I interviewed some active Facebook protesters offline. 
Although Facebook is my main research site, images from Twitter, YouTube, 
blogs, websites of citizen journalism, online television channels and newspapers 
are examined where they are important to the subject analysed. Besides, given the 
logic of hypertextuality that governs digital culture, sharing of links to other 
websites is one of the ways through which media contents find their way to the 
Facebook page. Most of the links appear in photographic thumbnails which when 
                                                          
84 See Ronald Knorr, Stephen Bronack, Deborah Switzer and Lienne Medford, “Methodology of a 
Novel Virtual Phenomenology Interview Technique,” Journal of Virtual Worlds Research 3, no. 3 
(2011): 3. 
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clicked direct the user to the source website. Through this process, I followed 
media discussions of events as they unfolded in Nigeria as much as I did on 
Facebook. Relevant videos were also included, but not read as filmic documents. 
Although subjected to general description, the playing video would be paused to 
freeze particular frames using the keyboard command, FN+ PRTSC or SHIFT+ 
PRTSC. Then they would be analysed as still photographs. The freezing of moving 
images is informed by my treatment of still and moving pictures as components of 
photography in this project. As stated earlier, the variability of new media objects 
as theorised by Manovich is in full manifestation in social media activist visuality. 
The enormous forms of editing undergone by the images circulated on Facebook 
blur the boundary between still photographs and videos in terms of how they are 
presented.85   
The online circulation of the visual materials took place mainly from the late 2000s 
to 2015. While social media emerged in the beginning of the 2000s, its application 
in civil movements among Nigerians began towards the end of that decade 
following the disappointment that came with the formation of democratic 
government in 1999. The expectation of a better Nigeria never materialised and the 
2015 general election brought a new kind of beginning. The People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) that had been in power since 1999 was overthrown.  Once 
Mohammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC) was sworn in as 
president on 29 May 2015, the intensity of online protest dropped considerably. 
Many Nigerians “waited” to see the “change” promised by the new administration. 
The retrieval of online documents for this study stopped at that period of 
“waiting.”86  
For more insight into the history of the visual materials, secondary literature such 
as books and journal articles was consulted. The historical dimension was further 
explored by tracing the activist contours of the evolution of photography in 
                                                          
85 Manovich, The Language of New Media. 
86 Nonetheless, the “waiting” did not last long. A government sworn in on 29 May 2015 had in the 
beginning of 2016 come under intense criticism as it increased electricity tariff and completely 
removed fuel subsidy, resulting in high cost of petroleum products. Insurgency escalated. By the 
middle of 2016, the Nigerian economy had plunged into recession. The renewed online visual 
activism would be the subject matter of another project. 
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Nigeria. This prompted the use of archival research method. Old newspapers, 
magazines and exhibition catalogues that bore the traces of photographic practices 
in Nigeria over the decades (from the 1960s) were consulted at archives and 
libraries. The institutions I visited include Nnamdi Azikiwe library, University of 
Nigeria, Nsukka (UNN), the departmental library of Fine and Applied Arts (UNN), 
the Patrick Ogugua Memorial Centre (POMEC), Nando, Anambra State. Others 
are the Centre for Contemporary Arts, African Artists’ Foundation, and National 
Museum, all in Lagos. 
Once the retrieval of online visual and related contents, as well as the interviews 
and archival research were completed, the methods of analysis were worked out. 
The adopted methods include semiology and what I refer to as “audience 
interpretation,” drawn from Gillian Rose’s discussion of audiencing as important 
in critical visual methodology. She uses the idea of “critical visual methodology” 
to explain the research procedure for projects with a heavy reliance on visual 
documents. She draws attention to three sites at which the meanings of images are 
made: production, the image itself, and audiencing. She suggests that each of these 
have three modalities: technological, compositional and social modalities.87 For the 
study of the activist use of photography on Facebook, all the sites with their 
modalities are worth exploring. “Semiology,” as Rose puts it, “offers a very full 
box of analytical tools for taking an image apart and tracing how it works in 
relation to broader systems of meaning.”88  
In this study, it is suitable for engagement with the production site and the image 
itself. It is complete with concepts for analysis of images in terms of how they are 
composed, the components and what they signify, their technologies of production 
and display, and their socio-political contexts. On the other hand, as the research is 
based on social media – a space marked by interpersonal interaction – audiencing 
draws us to how the users of the platform make sense of and interpret the images. 
The posting, liking and sharing of photographs, and the making of comments on 
them are crucial to the audiencing. These are the ways in which Azoulay’s concept 
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88 Ibid., 69. 
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of civil discourse manifests in the digital realm. Interpretation of the image shows 
itself as a process over which no single individual claims absolute power. This is a 
meeting point between the theoretical framework of this study and its 
methodology. Meanwhile, as social media research is still in its emergent stage, the 
methodological issues raise certain other questions such as those associated with 
ethics.  
Ethics issues 
Social media culture carries with it a range of concerns including issues associated 
with privacy and the so-called reliability of information. As a result, the research 
that relies on the images circulated on the platform is at the frontier of new ethical 
questions. The process of addressing the ones raised in the course of this study 
became for me an important facet of the project. As an online-oriented research, 
the conventional methods of gathering primary documents and the procedures of 
seeking the consent of research participants were not often appropriate. It was not 
practicable to treat informed consent as the precondition for collection of contents 
circulated on Facebook. This is because it is difficult to predetermine the user of 
the forum who would share materials that would be useful to the study. Given the 
fleeting nature of content dissemination on Facebook, I resolved to follow and 
download images and their accompanying comments as the interactions unfolded. 
At the outset, I proposed the adoption of “retrospective consent” to use the visual 
materials found relevant to my research after they had been downloaded. This 
approach raised a number of issues. First, some of the Facebook users gave their 
consent during interview sessions carried out orally, or via email communication 
or Facebook chat. But they avoided the formal aspect of signing the consent form. 
They were sceptical about appending their signatures, as that would undermine the 
anonymous stance from which they engaged in the online struggle. Others failed to 
respond to my messages through which I sought to get them involved in the 
research.  For many more, their posts (whether pictorial and typographical) are 
public materials, the use of which requires no consent. After all, some contents 
appear on many Facebook pages at the same time so that it is difficult to trace their 
roots. Considering these circumstances, ethical questions raised by Facebook 
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research are somewhat tricky. Nevertheless, the issues are considerably resolved 
by the fact that just like email communication, social media platforms are now 
cited as “sources” by scholars. To enable me provide adequate citation of any 
Facebook content used in this work, I noted the username of the one who posted it, 
the web address of the post, date posted, and date accessed. Each URL is active so 
that on a mouse click, one is taken to the page from which the material was 
retrieved.   
I lastly remark that other Nigerian activist users of Facebook did not show 
suspicion about my dual role as a researcher who was also involved in circulating 
and commenting on photographs on the platform. Interviews with my research 
participants revealed a broad reception of my work as crucial to the civil struggle 
to which many Nigerians have contributed in different capacities including literary 
work, music, cartoons, film, and much more. 
Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured into six chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. The 
introduction begins with how the research idea grew out of a visual art project that 
relied on Facebook posts to interpret the socio-political condition of Nigeria. In 
this study, the central theoretical approach to the engagement with the 
photographic practices was chosen to treat images as mediated sites of interaction. 
The research methodology with the attendant ethical issues is shaped by the 
mediations enabled by digital technology. Through the review of literature on 
digital photography, activism, and the Nigerian crisis, the contribution made by 
this study is foregrounded. It shows how digital photographic production on 
Facebook constitutes a means of civil resistance. 
After the introduction, the first chapter turns to the historical development of 
photography in Nigeria. The intention is to understand how the notion of civil 
activism drove photographic practices in the country before the advent of digital 
technology and the internet. The investigation covers between 1960 when Nigeria 
gained independence and the 1990s that saw the development of the internet. The 
photography of this period in Nigeria has most often been read within the purview 
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of art and journalism. No attention is given to its characteristic civil relations. In 
the chapter, it is argued that there is a civil resistance history of photography in 
Nigeria. It disturbs the dominant reading based on art for art’s sake and print media 
for news dissemination. 
Taking a cue from Chinua Achebe’s The Trouble with Nigeria, the harsh living 
conditions of Nigerians as deduced from the photographs circulated on Facebook 
are examined in chapter 2. Achebe’s work published in the beginning of the 1980s 
is part of the foremost critique of the crisis in the post-independence Nigeria. Much 
has even changed since then. Some of the issues raised in the book (poor 
leadership for example) have been intensified. Others, such as insurgency, emerged 
at later times. The chapter focuses on the photographic representation and 
interpretation of such concerns.  
In chapter 3, it is argued that the political use of photography on social media owes 
a great deal to technological affordances. The ubiquity that marks the visual 
medium results from the multiplication of image-taking devices. The gadgets 
support software applications used to perform various forms of editing on the 
image. Those who cling to the idea of photography as representation of reality 
would mistrust editing. But I argue that it rather enables the construction of 
representations that are relevant to the activist context that informs them. What 
follows the visual transformation is their circulation on the virtual platforms where 
they get deeply engaged in transactions of meanings. And internet technology is 
behind this possibility. Meanwhile, electricity and the internet which constitute the 
key infrastructure are not in adequate supply in Nigeria. The chapter also examines 
how the technological odds are addressed. The forms of improvisation and 
appropriation that sustain cyber activism in Nigeria are themselves treated as 
activist expressions.   
Insight into the impacts of technology on the social movement enacted on 
Facebook is further gained through the study of the structure of the site itself. The 
interface of the website supports spectacular modes of content circulation and 
dialogue among users. The development of Facebook is read as a kind of struggle 
in its own right. It is a contested virtual space that has evolved into an influential 
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site of civil resistance. The contents disseminated on Facebook and the ways in 
which the structure of the site enables their ordering constitute a certain form of 
archival production that however has its own limitations. The analogue archive is 
in most cases used as a tool for the exercise of power by dominant constituted 
authorities. As opposed to that, the Facebook archive gives the ordinary citizens 
some agency. They get actively involved in documenting and challenging the 
upheavals in the society in which they live. The scale at which these engagements 
occur in the digital realm surpasses the possibilities in the analogue archive. 
Chapter 4 engages with these issues as they specifically connect with Facebook as 
a structure.  
The intercessions of technology have direct implications on the image itself. In a 
time of violent uprisings – which constitute one key concern Nigerians discuss on 
Facebook – the image faces a kind of dilemma. It is used for purposes that 
contradict each other – to perpetrate mayhem and to counter it. The Boko Haram 
example is used to make this argument. The insurgents circulate still pictures and 
videos as part of their jihadist agenda. They assault the masses with gruesome 
depictions of their cruel acts. Apart from the generated feeling of fear, the people 
become convinced that they live in precarious situations. The paradox is that the 
state and the virtually connected individuals fight back with images too. The 
Nigerian government through the military uses images to make claim of victory 
over militancy. Through the same medium, social media activists challenge the 
state’s attitude to the insurgency. By re-circulating the ghastly images created and 
disseminated by Boko Haram militants, the protesters seek to return the 
traumatising gaze to those who produced it. This complex entanglement of vision 
and violence is the thrust of the 5th chapter.  
In chapter 6, the Nigerian experience is put in the context of the growing 
conviction that virtual activism offers possibilities of socio-political 
transformation. With the aid of online mobilisation, the forcible overthrow of 
prominent political figures in Tunisia and Egypt was possible in the early 2010s. 
Nigeria has not had such a revolutionary case. Nonetheless, online activism has 
made some difference in the country. It has called international attention to the 
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social, economic and political crises that plague Nigeria, prompting some 
interventions from across the world. Although the interventions have their own 
peculiar problems, they indicate that the cry for social change in Nigeria is heard 
internationally. On the other hand, certain important decisions and alterations in 
the structure of power have ultimately been made in the country. 
As a way of recapitulation, the conclusion highlights the key issues in 
understanding how the relation between photography and Facebook inspires a new 
form of civil resistance. Drawing upon the research findings, the Nigerian example 
reflects the manner in which visuality and virtuality produce a new way to read the 
history of the postcolony. To be sure, digital technology that drives the visuality 
only emerged in the 1990s. But photography, the visual form itself, is much older. 
The contemporary digital scale helps to make it more obvious that all along, 
photography in Nigeria has had a close relation to social movements.
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Introduction 
Lauri Firstenberg has argued that the most remarkable value of photography is its 
social and political use. She writes: 
From Europe to Africa to Asia and the Americas, photography introduced a 
new visual trope that was then put into use in various contexts: advertising, 
propaganda, social and political documentary, and art. But the most 
enduring aspect of the uses of photography, rather than the graphic mark of 
its artistic operation, has been its powerful social and political value.89 
Firstenberg’s assertion finds corroboration in the activist photographic practices 
among Nigerians on Facebook as explored in this project. But in this chapter, the 
history of analogue photography in Nigeria is read to explore the political use that 
has characterised the medium even before the digital turn. Given that I am 
interested in the Nigerian post-independence history as opposed to the colonial, I 
look at the period beginning from 1960 when Nigeria became a sovereign state. I 
draw particularly on art photography and photojournalism, but this is not to suggest 
that other genres are not important to the history of photography in Nigeria. The 
earlier cited work of Stephen Sprague on Yoruba photography in the 1970s is an 
example of portraiture, a genre that dates back to 1880 when the first photography 
studios were established in Lagos.90 The medium later spread to other parts of 
Nigeria. Although I make reference to portraiture, street photography and other 
genres, I concentrate here on photojournalism and art photography. This is because 
they have the kind of public face strongly connected to the political, which is the 
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main thrust of this thesis. Meanwhile, I do not reject the validity of other uses of 
photography, but wish to draw out new ways of connecting older analogue to the 
digital through an emphasis on the political. The analogue practices that I examine 
spanned from 1960 to the 1990s which saw the emergence of internet technology. 
But they stretched even further to the 21st century as the digital age did not 
terminate analogue production.  
Photographs published in exhibition catalogues, newspapers and magazines 
sourced from libraries and archives are studied with attention to the periods and the 
circumstances in which they were produced and circulated. Then, they are 
subjected to two analytical methods. First, given that the image itself has its own 
effects, it is examined as an object whose visual composition, content and theme 
hold important visual clues as to its activist potential. Secondly, the social and 
economic practices that define the production and dissemination of the 
photographs are examined in terms of the civil relations they constitute. Certain 
factors account for the privileging of the image itself, its circulation platform and 
use, over more intimate methods of eliciting personal information from 
photographers. The overarching theoretical framework of this study opposes 
placing the photographer in a privileged position in constructing the meaning of 
the photograph. In the writings in which Ariella Azoulay presents that model, she 
draws from the works of prominent scholars such as Benjamin and Arendt, and 
examines photographic images and their various sites of meaning making. But she 
gives no attention to individual photographers.91 That model works well for the 
kind of history of photography in Nigeria written in this chapter. Some 
photographers work across genres. They could for instance be practicing as artists, 
showcasing their photographs as works of art while working with media 
institutions as photojournalists. Therefore, particular photographs could make 
multiple appearances on different platforms where they have varied effects and 
meanings that transcend the creator’s intent. With such mobility, the boundaries 
between certain genres become significantly unstable. For example, in reading the 
resistance history of photography in Nigeria, the line demarcating art photography 
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from documentary is so blurred that I collapse the two into one category. Such a 
move enables me to have a better grasp of the political implications of the blur.   
A set of findings emerges from these methodological approaches. The various 
genres of photography in Nigeria have existed at the same time. But they are 
associated with different processes, effects, and use of the image, prompting us to 
read their political impacts as dissimilar. Some photographic practices and projects 
have obvious activist undertakings defined as such at their inception. For others, 
the political engagement lies behind the institutional definition of their modes of 
production, as is the case with photojournalism routinely perceived in the context 
of news illumination.  
The notion of “resistance photography” that forms the first segment of this chapter 
is employed to weave together the forms of photographic production analysed 
here. It is a conceptual grounding of how different photographic genres converge 
to engage with the political. The second part on “the fine art of resistance” 
examines the historical development of aesthetic practices of artists doing their 
photographic work, to understand their political directions. At the outset, artists 
were obsessed with technical experimentation with the medium; so the political 
attribute of their work has to be carefully drawn out. Later in the beginning of the 
20th century, they came to define their work as fundamentally political, making 
that self-evident in the compositionality of the image. In the last section, we turn to 
the print media to see how much of the history of civil struggle in Nigeria could be 
retrieved from what was presented as news. In the guise of news presentation, 
newspapers and magazines reflect radical ways of challenging the state with 
photographs. Apart from the logic of selecting certain images for publication and 
leaving out others, the images could appear unconnected to the body texts they 
ostensibly illuminate. Thus, they could be read in their own terms. The genre also 
takes on a documentary mode and follows unpleasant events to any length. The 
directions pursued in this chapter provide an important dimension overlooked by 
scholars in writing the history of photography in Nigeria. It demonstrates how to 
think with Azoulay’s argument (which is the approach I adopt in this chapter) that 
the political element of the image can be drawn out even when it is not self-
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evident. As she puts it, “curators and writers motivated to seek out the political in 
art will indeed do so even in places where it is not obviously apparent.” 92 
Resistance photography 
“Resistance” as a term readily evokes the notion of liberation movement that 
dominates anti-colonial discourse. In that context, photography constitutes part of 
the cultural production that includes prints, graffiti and painting, invested in the 
struggle. Rather than take that direction, resistance as used in this work denotes 
activism or civil movement on one level. But beyond that, it suggests the 
complicated ways of relating with power. It is about how power is overtly or 
covertly challenged, and at the same time relates to the thought offered by Lila 
Abu-Lughod who asks: “What are the implications of studies of resistance for our 
theories of power?” To answer this, she suggests that we do not only think of 
resistance in terms of challenging the expressions of power. We should consider 
how acts of resistance can help us to understand the various ways power 
operates.93 So, in the context of my study, resistance photography as a formulation 
is first about the activist use of the photographic image. It is on the other hand 
about the insight which that use allows us into the political history of the sovereign 
state, Nigeria. 
To dwell for a moment on the crucial elements that constitute resistance as a 
concept, there are questions around the actor, target, intent and recognisability. 
Conflicting perceptions of these components have marked resistance as a 
contentious term. In a project that involves the review of a broad range of scholarly 
writings published on resistance as a social phenomenon, Hollander and 
Einwohner carefully unpack the debate. While they recognise that the views of 
various scholars find commonality in “action” and “opposition” as the core 
elements of resistance, the dissonance is rooted in “whether resistance must be 
intended by actors and whether it must be recognized by targets and/or 
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observers.”94 For me, to hold the view that resistance must be intended and 
perceptible, is to ignore the variability of its mode and the ensuing multiple 
relations among its elements.  
Despite the critique of his weak-powerful dichotomy as one that ignores the 
possibility of individuals to be “simultaneously powerful and powerless within 
different systems,”95 James Scott has offered us a way to think resistance outside 
the open, aggressive actions that characterise mass protest and others similar to it. 
According to him, the “powerless” engage in everyday informal resistance and 
avoid direct confrontation.96 Hence, in as much as resistance can be 
confrontational, it can be subtle. When constituted as a response to a condition 
perceived as unacceptable, resistance is usually a way to condemn the status quo 
and demand for change. Individuals and human groups try different strategies to 
realise this goal, whether they are overt or covert, strident or persuasive, 
recognisable or unnoticeable. To return to Patricia Hayes, many South African 
photographers of the 1980s held that the use of the camera to expose the cruelty of 
apartheid was an effective resistance strategy.97 In this context, the concept of 
exposure helps to expound how the photographic image becomes a site for 
questioning and rejecting existing power relations, proclaiming as would 
participants in a mass protest: “This is unacceptable; there must be a change!”  
Hence, resistance photography is in this sense photography of denunciation. It is a 
kind of civil engagement that involves the freezing of sights and moments that 
reflect injustice, and to show them as things that have to be corrected. 98 Following 
Robert Gallately’s reading of “denunciation as a subject of historical research,” the 
concept operates in an interesting way in relation to photography in Nigeria. 
Gallately analyses denunciation as a system of surveillance where the citizens 
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bring deviant behaviours of other citizens to the attention of the state.99 The 
complication with the Nigerian context (and in fact other parts of Africa) is that the 
deviants are the very functionaries of the state. As there is no higher platform to 
report their misconduct, the masses resort to activism. Following Abu-Lughod, the 
activism in its photographic form helps us to understand how the Nigerian political 
elites have handled power since independence from colonial rule.  
Meanwhile, I read photographs as a potential call for social change regardless of 
who created them, the original purpose for which they were produced, and the 
format and framework in which they are disseminated, consumed and their 
meanings negotiated. Such concurs with the political reading advocated by 
Azoulay as noted earlier. It is against this backdrop that the history of photography 
in Nigeria is traced. In the country, many of the analogue photographic practices 
with a significant public outlook are located within the realm of visual art and 
journalism. Thus, construction of a photography history along the grain of civil 
resistance demands that such purpose guide the engagement with photographs that 
may have been produced as artworks and print news items. In other words, besides 
the examination of the referents of specific images, the resistance reading is drawn 
from “the contexts, practices, institutional forms, within which the work(s are) 
set.”100 
The fine art of resistance  
Photographic practices within the ambit of art are predicated upon firstly, finding 
in the medium the artistic engagement comparable with those of drawing, painting, 
sculpture, among others.101 In the light of this, individuals driven by creative 
interest take up photography whether they have formal training in art or not. 
Second, through the notion of display in art exhibitions, galleries, museums and art 
publications, photographs acquire equal status with other works of mainstream 
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art.102 Also important to the definition of art photography is the very idea of 
institutionalisation. Academic and creative institutions include photography in their 
programmes and practices. In this segment, photographic practices undertaken in 
Nigeria within these frameworks are treated as art photography whether they are 
strictly documentary, arbitrary representation of social experiences or creative 
experimentation with the medium. Its aesthetic pursuit can be examined to 
historicise photography in Nigeria as a tool for civil resistance. Thus, there is a fine 
art of resistance. Art publications that centre on photography, namely magazines, 
books and exhibition catalogues, provide us with photographs whose 
compositionality, time and context of production allow for activist readings.  
The examination of such publications reveals remarkable interest by photographers 
to document socio-cultural and political life in Nigeria following independence 
from colonialism in 1960. Electrified by the euphoria of independence, that mode 
of photographic practice was invested in the celebration of political freedom and 
the cultural diversity of the new nation as it were. At the same time, photographers 
documented the political tensions that climaxed in the first military coup in Nigeria 
(1966) and later the Nigeria-Biafra war (1967-1970). In the 1970s, the discovery of 
oil brought with it the hope of economic revival. To address the aftermath of the 
civil war, the government created art and cultural initiatives which were however 
problematical in some ways. Again, military rule set up stringent living conditions 
especially from the 1980s. In these circumstances, resistance photography 
produced within the paradigm of art as defined in this section was subtle in its 
approach.   
But beginning from the 2000s, an army of photographers sprang up. In an 
unprecedented manner, they turned aggressively to the state in ways that reflect 
disappointment with the democracy that returned to Nigeria in 1999. The projects 
undertaken by many of them address state and infrastructural failure, poverty, 
environmental chaos and insecurity. It was an extension of the wide social and 
artistic engagement in Africa in the 1980s – the democratic movement described 
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by Branch and Mampilly as the “second wave” of protest.103 Lastly, using the 
camera, photographers who visit Nigeria have lent their voices to the public outcry 
against injustice and misrule.  
In the 1960s, photographic practices informed by the allure of aesthetics, and the 
quest to document socio-cultural and political life in Nigeria can be viewed within 
and outside the fine art institutional context. Art photography was not a significant 
part of the beginning of formal art practice that came to be called “modern 
Nigerian art,” pioneered by Aina Onabolu before independence.104 But the radical 
beginning of formal art would later impact on photographic practices within art 
institutional frameworks. In the spirit of the anti-colonial struggle that made its last 
push in the 1950s, students of the art schools whose founding began in Nigeria at 
that time challenged the Western art pedagogy. They argued that it ignored 
Nigeria’s indigenous creative resources over which knowledge from elsewhere was 
privileged. Ulli Beier puts it thus: 
(In 1958), at the College of Arts, Science and Technology (now Ahmadu 
Bello University) in Zaria, Demas Nwoko and Uche Okeke led a student 
revolution against the very conventional course in “fine art.” Ignoring the 
life classes, the anatomy classes, and European art history, they derived 
their inspiration from their own traditions and became the pioneers of 
modern art movement.105 
The demand to rather merge the Western and the Nigerian artistic elements 
articulated in the concept of “natural synthesis” stimulated a vibrant creative 
experimentation.106  But none of the exponents of the Zaria resistance concentrated 
on photography. Their areas of focus were mainly drawing, painting, printmaking, 
sculpture and architecture. In 1961, the Mbari club which comprised writers and 
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artists including some of the Zaria “rebels” was formed.107 It became a lively 
centre for artists of different genres to work together. The Mbari project inspired 
similar ones in Enugu, Lagos, Benin and Oshogbo. These centres bustled with art 
activities: workshops, exhibitions, musical and stage drama performances. 
Incidentally too, photography was rarely part of the movement.  
Some of the Zaria graduates took up teaching appointments in the art departments 
(with photography programmes) established in some of the academic institutions 
founded after independence. The Zaria-born experimentalist approach to art 
inspired art schools to pay attention to experimentation with photographic 
production processes. To illustrate, photography has been part of the graphic 
design programme of the University of Nigeria Nsukka’s Department of Fine and 
Applied Arts founded in 1961. The studio was equipped with analogue cameras, 
films, tripods, and a darkroom complete with developers, baths, enlargers, paper 
amongst other things. Access to these facilities allowed students to take shots, 
develop the films, print the images and engage in darkroom experiments. Projects 
assigned to students were articulated to challenge them to apply the possibilities 
offered by the technology in the production of creative images. In other words, 
such experimentation is premised on the use of photographic technology to pursue 
the “ideals associated with the rhetoric of art.”108 The concept of 
“compositionality” drawn from painting is used to theorise the photographer’s 
making of creative decisions as to what is composed within the frame of the 
camera lens.109 Similarly, “pictorialism” which Paul Sternberger replaces with the 
word “antiphotographic” underlines the production of effects to inscribe in the 
image the traces of human intervention – the very markers of creativity pursued by 
                                                          
107 Ibid. The founding of the group was fostered by the after-Nigerian-independence intervention by 
Martin Luther King’s Congress for Cultural Freedom. In response to that “gesture of goodwill” by 
the organisation, Ulli Beier suggested a club for creative young literary and visual artists who were 
already organising themselves for propagation of African art. The “Mbari Club” – a name 
suggested by Chinua Achebe was inaugurated in Ibadan in 1961. The founding members include 
Wole Soyinka, Chinua Achebe, Christopher Okigbo, John Pepper Clark, Frances Ademola, Demas 
Nwoko, Uche Okeke, Ezekiel Mphahlele of South Africa and Ulli Beier. 
108 Sternberger, Between Amateur and Aesthete, xiv.  
109 Ibid. See also Aaron Scharf, Art and Photography (USA: Penguin Books, 1974). 
    
   51 
 
fine art.110 Similarly, Aaron Scharf writes: “Just as some artists were beginning to 
distort the ‘inviolable’ image of nature, some photographers were working in the 
same direction.”111 He alludes to Louis Ducos du Hauron’s “transformism” 
premised on the distortion of photographic form “to enhance its aesthetic 
character.”112  
It can be argued that the photographic experimentation in art institutions illustrated 
above was an attempt to understand the medium more holistically. This quest 
moved some individuals to seek “professional” training in photography even 
outside Nigeria. For instance, Sunmi Smart-Cole trained in Foothill College, Los 
Altos, California in the 1970s and became an artist and photographer by formal 
training.113 Don Barber completed his photography course in the United Kingdom 
in 1992. George Osodi studied business administration in Nigeria but later 
obtained a diploma in documentary media production from the United Kingdom 
too. With formal or informal training, local and international exposure and 
networking, a good number of photographers emerged in in the beginning of the 
21st century. They radically changed photography in Nigeria into something 
overtly political. While I will return to this, social documentary practices outside 
the academic-institutional paradigm in Nigeria have been governed by high 
aesthetic sensibilities since the 1960s.  
Consider the work of J.D. ’Okhai Ojeikere. Through informal tutelage, he learnt 
basic photographic skills after purchasing a camera in 1950 at the age of 20. By 
1953, his technical prowess had earned him a job as darkroom assistant in  the 
department of photography, Ministry of Information in the then Midwestern 
Nigeria. In 1961, he was employed as a television studio photographer and 
between 1965 and 1975 worked for the Lintas advertising firm. He later opened a 
personal studio that allowed him to undertake freelance practice.114  Throughout 
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those years, he engaged in self-sponsored photographic documentation of women’s 
hairstyles and traditional dances at festivals. He also produced photographs of city 
architecture and portraits with a profuse constitution of the trappings of traditional 
dressing. The images which form part of some important collections across the 
world were taken in the context of documentary with an eye on highly artistic 
compositional quality. As Offodu-Okeke puts it, Ojeikere had the “drive to collect 
timeless visual ornaments of crafted African fashion.”115 The term “ornament” 
with overtones of beauty suggests finding the camera “capable of producing 
pictures of aesthetic merit” comparable to painting. 116  Yet, they were a careful 
study and documentation of the socio-political organisations, economic activities, 
and cultural identities of Nigerians. Ojeikere’s work fits into the studio practices, 
street photography, and portraiture (of the individual, family, and kingdom) that 
intensified after Nigerian independence.    
These forms of photographic representation have a strong feeling of artistic 
sensibility, construction of social status, admiration of the self and cultural identity. 
Yet they can be subjected to a political reading. At the time of the debate around 
the separation of aesthetics from politics, Lisa Bloom edited an anthology in 1999 
that offers ways to read works of art outside the controlled disciplinary boundary 
of art history. In the introductory essay, Bloom talks about the reading of artworks 
where “a spectator can place herself in a position of agency through a more 
embodied subjective viewing process that takes into account questions of 
difference, sexuality, and power.”117 
The photograph in figure 1.1 is an archetype of the photographic convention of 
self-presentation in the 1960s. A young family presents itself to the camera, 
wearing middle class appearance suggested by the modern attire and hale and 
hearty look of the subjects. But the image is more complicated than that. It is 
loaded with the political upheavals into which Nigeria plunged shortly after 
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independence, and which have had looping effects up to the present date. The man 
in the picture is Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun – the commander of the 2nd 
Brigade, Nigerian Army, Kaduna – in his early forties in the beginning of the 
1960s.  
 
Figure 1.1: Brig. Samuel Ademulegun and his family in the 1960s. 
Retrieved from: Punch, 16 July 2016, contained in the article, “The First 1966 
Coup: Though Painful, I’m Happy I Witnessed the Killing of My Parents – 
Ademulegun-Agbi.” 
URL: http://punchng.com/first-1966-coup-though-painful-im-happy-witnessed-
killing-parents/ 
Retrieval date: 17 September 2016 
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The woman (his wife) was a nurse in her late thirties. In the 15 January 1966 
military coup in Nigeria, the man and his spouse were murdered in the presence of 
their children when the girl (Solape) in the picture was only 6 and the boy (Kole) 
about 8. In 2016 at the age of 57, Solape (now Mrs. Solape Ademulegun-Agbi) 
shared the photograph with the Punch newspaper to which she granted an 
interview on the killing of her parents.118 The gruesome account is a microcosmic 
representation of the intense struggle for power that has stayed with Nigeria for 
more than half a century. 
The above kind of analysis is important especially when the image is not obviously 
political. Throughout this thesis, I have worked with the ideas of content, 
circulation, and socio-political milieu of the production of the image as what offer 
the understanding of the photograph as political. The three do not always go 
together for every photographic production or image. For Solape’s photograph, 
circulation – movement from personal archive to online newspaper – is what draws 
out its political meaning. There is a broad visibility on the online platforms that 
analogue family archives do not enable. In what follows, I examine a visual 
production whose political significance consists of the prevailing societal 
conditions of its time which it fails to include in content. 
The art and culture publication, Nigeria magazine, constitutes an outstanding 
example of photographic production whose political elements are not obvious, but 
which can be read as political. Overseen by the Cultural Division of the Nigerian 
Ministry of Information, Nigeria began in 1933 as Nigeria Teacher. It became 
Nigeria in 1936 and kept publishing till 1990.119 Printed in England, it came heavy 
with photographs predominantly in black and white. Included in the subject matter 
of the images were structures such as buildings, mines and railways that tended to 
show how the imperial expansion had transformed the colony. Other subjects were 
art exhibition events, rituals, religious practices, dances, game, economic activities, 
performances at festivals, and many more. Nigeria was centrally conceived as a 
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surrogate for travel through the art and cultural landscape of Nigeria. An 
advertisement page in the April 1969 issue of the publication asks readers: “Have 
you discovered art in Nigeria?” and urges them: “Read ‘Nigeria’ magazine.”120 
Until 1960, the magazine was edited by the expatriate historian Michael Crowder, 
assisted by L.O. Ukeje and Onuora Nzekwe. The said ‘discovery’ is nothing more 
than the colonial representation of Nigeria to the world as a society with an 
unmediated social order and the infrastructural presence of a benevolent power 
from elsewhere. Nigeria pursued selective representation; it claimed to portray the 
beauty of the colony, but remained silent about colonial violence and political 
subjectivities.  
This was also the case with the creative projects Nigeria undertook as an 
institution. In 1962, it sponsored a photography exhibition entitled Nigeria and 
Her Neighbours. The display featured portraits and photographs of architecture 
taken by Michael Crowder when he travelled through a number of Francophone 
West African countries, Sierra Leone and Liberia.121 Nigeria shared Crowder’s 
fascination with the faces of colonial subjects and mud houses he found striking. 
Crowder relinquished his position as editor of the magazine in 1960, leaving it 
under the control of Nigerians. Still, it could not break free from romanticisation of 
the Nigerian experience and the colonial imagination that underpinned the framing 
of the exotic. No wonder, it was generally silent about Nigeria’s political crisis that 
began on a broad scale with the coup referenced above, reaching its tipping point 
in the civil war. The turmoil continued throughout the lifespan of Nigeria and even 
beyond. In a sense, identification of such is itself a political reading. Certain events 
are so crucial that their political attributes ought to be more visually perceptible.  
The decade after the war saw a mix of the aftermath of the conflict, the discovery 
of crude oil, a couple of military coups and the emergence of the second republican 
government in 1979. These circumstances had a mixed impact on art and 
photography. The untold hardship resulting from the war especially in the defeated 
secessionist Biafra constituted the key subjects addressed by certain artists in the 
                                                          
120 See Nigeria, April 1969, 363. 
121 “Art Reviews,”Nigeria, March 1962, 71. 
    
   56 
 
beginning of the decade. Others would not pursue such a politically engaged 
representation in an overt manner. It is argued that they were careful not to 
undermine the government’s efforts to address the ethnic divisions that had torn 
the young nation apart.122 But I suggest that it was more complicated than that. 
Although the oil boom would later turn out to be problematic, it boosted the 
economy at the outset and gave Nigeria the resources for ambitious projects aimed 
at rebuilding the country. In 1977 for instance, the second world Festival of Black 
Arts and Culture (FESTAC) was sponsored by and held in Nigeria. It was an effort 
towards national cultural harmony and an expression of hope in Nigeria as an 
entity.123 So, most artists would not be harsh towards a government perceived to be 
investing in national integration. In the light of these developments, photography 
whose mode of representation is much more life-like would implicate artists more 
directly. But I argue that such caution was rather more importantly motivated by 
fear of military resistance to criticism. The FESTAC project did not address the 
ruthlessness of military government of the 1970s. Politically obvious photographic 
productions during military tyranny became a risk in the literal sense of it. It was a 
“tough” undertaking which only a few could pursue. The next section of this 
chapter will examine the how and the outcome of such risk-taking in the context of 
photojournalism. 
Meanwhile, the experience of the 1980s shows that the political force of 
photography can also be found in the socio-economic and political conditions that 
motivate individuals to take pictures whose compositionality may not be overtly 
political. This decade saw a major economic downturn in Nigeria. The condition 
was mainly attributed to the country’s over-reliance on oil, resulting in the neglect 
of other sectors of the economy such as agriculture and industry.124 Besides, 
successive military coups, general political instability and obnoxious government 
policies resulted in inflation, unemployment, job loss, and severe economic 
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hardship. Consequently, many unemployed youths took to the street as 
photographers. Far from the conventional context of the protest march (which 
other Nigerians did organise), it marked the emergence of a new culture of street 
photography imbued with a different form of civil resistance. An economic 
survival strategy of “wait-and-take” portrait (passport) photography became 
common in city centres.125 The notion of “survival strategy” underscores the 
presence of the “grim reality of economic collapse” to which “Nigerians showed 
great resilience and adjustment.”126 Beyond the entrepreneurial framing, the 
conversion of the street into open-air studios with all the attendant environmental 
chaos was a constant reminder of what prompted this turn in the visual economy.  
While the commercial survival-street photography flourished, a number of 
photographers (some of whom had already started working in the 1970s) came into 
the spotlight in the 1980s. A crop of professional photographers moved into the 
creative industry of advertising, where photography had weakened the reliance on 
older modes of hand-drawn illustration.127 The most notable of the photographers 
of the period are Sunmi Smart-Cole, Don Barber, Ibi Sofekem, Philip Trimnel, 
Ginselle Adetona, Ade Idowu, Pat Olear, Demola Odukoya, Jide Adeniyi Jones 
and Rotimi Fani-Kayode. I use a few of them to explain the forms of photographic 
civil resistance in the era characterised by a harsh military response to criticism.  
First and foremost, in 1984 during his regime as the Nigerian Head of State, 
General Mohammadu Buhari constituted Decree No. 4 which was severely 
criticised as a legal articulation against freedom of expression.128 General 
Babangida who took over power from Buhari was also hostile to critics of his 
regime. Thus, the political atmosphere was marked by utter intolerance that made 
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open criticism literally deathly. Fela Kuti was one of the fearless few who would 
not keep silent. He used his music to speak against military brutality. Sunmi Smart-
Cole the photographer was Fela’s friend. While Smart-Cole did various jobs in 
different times – running a barber shop, working as a photo editor for Guardian 
newspaper and playing different instruments with musical groups including Fela’s 
– he clung to photography which in turn drew ideas from these experiences. 
Exploring the aesthetics of visual textuality and play with light, he photographed 
musicians and musical performances. He engaged in street photography, nature 
studies and portraiture. He depicted environmental degradation and landmark 
political events. He displayed his works in solo and group exhibitions, and 
published them in book form. His broad thematic focus and multiple contexts of 
practice enabled him to showcase politically charged photographs among a pool of 
others that were less politically explicit. This for me is a subtle way to speak out at 
a time of military censorship. 
But it is surprising that while the military in the 1980s guarded against the 
exposure of its brutality, it endorsed the establishment of the National War 
Museum, Umuahia, in 1985. It was founded in memory of the Nigeria-Biafra war, 
where photographs are extensively used to relate the horrors and devastating 
effects of the conflict: hunger, displacement, material loss, disease and death. The 
museum additionally contains a photographic history of military interventions in 
Nigerian politics with all the coups and how they connect to the war. However, 
there are no clues as to the producers of the images or how they were collected. 
Although museums allow such absences, they intensify the difficulty of writing the 
history of photography in Nigeria. It is, in the words of Okechukwu Nwafor, a 
“chequered history” which “is in itself a victim of the institutional 
dysfunctionalities which have their origin in the political dilemmas of Nigeria, a 
situation which has engendered the erosion of institutions that might have housed 
the potential visual archives.”129  
This chapter traces the history of photography in Nigeria as a medium that has 
been used to challenge the very power relations behind the “chequeredness.” In the 
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first three decades after independence, the activist use of art photography was 
mainly subtle. But in the 1990s, there was a new breed of photographers prepared 
to be confrontational in their political use of the camera. The period was a 
transition between the older subtly activist photographers and the new radical ones. 
Don Barber is one of the key photographers through whose practice we understand 
the transition. Between 1987 and 1992, he studied photography in institutions in 
the United Kingdom. As soon as he returned to Nigeria, he established an 
independent photography studio. Through photography workshops, public lectures 
and other forms of training, he taught a number of artists, instilling in them the 
sense of urgency to address socio-political issues with the medium.130 As Offodu-
Okeke puts it, “his photo documentaries of Nigeria’s legacy of economic 
mismanagement provided a template for these photographers and soon a new 
group of Nigerian photographers emerged.”131 Kelechi Amadi-Obi and Uche 
James-Iroha are the most notable ones among them. Other members of the new 
group, some of who were not directly influenced by Barber, are George Osodi, 
Adolphus Opara, Kunle Ogunfuyi, Andrew Asiebo, Unoma Numero, Emeka 
Obanor, George Esiri, Tam Fiofori, Tuoyo Omagba, Aderemi Adegbite, Toyin 
Sokefun-Bello (Ty Bello) and Afolabi Sotunde. Others such as Akinbode Akinbiyi 
started their photographic practices earlier but became prominent as they identified 
with the activist movement of the 21st century. From the 2000s to date, the 
photographers have intently directed their camera lenses to the state of affairs in 
Nigeria. They frame everything from acts of negligence by the government to 
economic hardship, poor infrastructure, environmental degradation, insecurity, 
urbanisation and its attendant challenges. Enactments of civil resistance against 
these conditions also constitute important subjects for them. It can be claimed that 
the eloquence of the photographers derives from the relative freedom allowed by 
the democracy which returned to the Nigerian polity in 1999, as opposed to the 
tyranny of military rule. In turn, the aggression with which they use the camera to 
make politically charged statements is actuated by a feeling of disillusion with the 
same democracy. 
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Most of the photographers live in Lagos, others in different parts of Nigeria. But 
they have found it important to organise themselves in groups, pull their energies 
together, and question the state of things in Nigeria and more broadly in Africa. 
Such organising allows them to collaborate in photographic projects such as 
exhibitions, publications, workshops, conferences and seminars. In 2001, a set of 
Nigerian photographers took part in the fourth photography biennale in Mali 
tagged The Bamako Encounter. At the end of the event, some of the Nigerians 
constituted the Depth of Fields (DOF) collective. The initiator, Uche James Iroha, 
insists that it is imperative for the photographers who work in the country to 
interrogate social issues with their work.132 This position can be illustrated with his 
butchery series of 2004.133 The photographs cast light on the neglected economic 
context of urban Lagos where open-air slaughtering and processing of animals for 
food constitute environmental and health issues ignored by the government.  
Similar concerns have kept driving photographic projects in Nigeria so that their 
political turn has become somewhat normalised. Whether they are individual, 
group or institutional creative projects, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
ignore the chaotic life lived in Nigeria and the forces that condition it. During 
Nigeria’s golden jubilee (2010), Chukwuemeka Bosah and George Ezozie 
produced a publication entitled A Celebration of Modern Nigerian Art: 101 
Nigerian Artists. The development of formal art practice in the county as 
chronicled in the compilation interfaces with the national history of political 
independence.134 But rather than dwell on any romanticised story of freedom from 
colonial rule, the selection of photographers included in the collection is made to 
incorporate younger ones whose work is centrally activist.135 This helps to raise the 
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question of how Nigeria has fared since independence. Selected images include 
those of photographers who are obsessed with environmental issues in the country. 
George Osodi is an outstanding example. His photograph entitled “Utorogu Gas 
Flare” is taken from his “Oil Rich Niger Delta Series” of 2006. Osodi has worked 
extensively on the region. In 2011, he did the documentary, Delta Nigeria: The 
Rape of Paradise, a project that pictures the Niger Delta oil crisis in an 
unprecedented and comprehensive manner. It is about “environmental neglect and 
degradation, neglect of human capital and the emergence of deviant behaviours 
that they now sponsor.”136 
Like Osodi’s Niger Delta projects, a lot of other photographic undertakings were 
specifically conceived to expose state failure and the resulting conflicts. The 2005 
Glendora publication – Lagos: A City at Work – was initiated precisely to 
challenge the government for the degeneration of socio-economic life in Lagos. 
The project team is upfront in announcing this objective: 
 
We are searching…for suitable ways of capturing the frenzied energies of 
survival, intense anxieties, and recalcitrant resilience that pervade the 
subcultures of this modern metropolis. Our concerns were diverse and 
disturbing, typical of most conversations about Lagos – the deep 
frustrations evoked by the general state of neglect and rapid collapse of 
infrastructure, the corruption of the political class, insecurity, the 
privatization of public services, religious fanaticism and failing traditions – 
basically a seeming interminable continuum of problems and 
contradictions.137  
 
They found creative use of photography suitable for the kind of statement they 
desired to make. Apart from body texts inserted at certain intervals into the pages 
of the publication, the predominantly photographic production is enhanced through 
other strategies of image-text layering. To illustrate, figure 1.2 reflects a graphic 
design approach where descriptive texts constitute another kind of picture laid in as 
an extension of the image they illuminate. In the black and white photograph, we 
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see a group of youths who appear as if caught unawares by the camera. Distributed 
in different poses in a cramped room, each looks lost in thought and seems to be 
ignorant of the presence of others. As viewers try to figure out the kind of space 
represented in the photograph, its annex –the seemingly hand-drawn blue texts on 
yellow background – defines more clearly the picture of a living space. It is typical 
of the “houses” to which many “city dwellers” “slush through the floods to get 
to.”138 In the last few years, flooding has been a recurring catastrophe in Lagos and 
other parts of Nigeria. It is the outcome of poor waste management system and a 
way in which the engineering problem of the cities and towns respond to the global 
changing climatic conditions. The environmental and urban crises – the floods, the 
traffic congestions that last for hours, the teeming hawkers and malnourished 
homeless beggars along the roads – are issues which “rules and rulemaking could 
have obviated.”139 In other words, they are indications of failed governance.   
 
Figure 1.2: City dwellers living in squalor 
Reproduced from Lagos: A City at Work (pages 90-91) 
Unlike the Lagos: A City at Work project, other photographic initiatives in Nigeria 
are conceived as the response to particular socio-political developments. During 
the 2012 nationwide protests on the removal of fuel subsidy, Aderemi Adegbite – 
“an angry young man”140 according to his exhibition catalogue – participated 
through the use of the camera and documented certain moments in parts of Lagos. 
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The project is said to be the “adventure of an artiste-participant in a struggle.”141 
His photographs depict the enactment modes of the protest (such as occupation and 
burning of tyres), the participating public figures (including well-known activists 
Femi Kuti and Gani Fawehinmi), the demands of the protesters as inscribed in 
placards, and other disparate elements in the struggle. It can be claimed that in 
relation to civil resistance, photography is assigned a double task. While it resists 
inequality by exposing it, it shows protest movements enacted in real spaces.  
At this point, it is important to re-state that in terms of content and framing, the 
line between documentary, photojournalism and what I have read in this section as 
art photography is blurred. But I treat them separately in recognition of the 
differentiation in their practices, institutional configurations, and modes of 
circulation, which have different effects. The photographic productions discussed 
so far in this part of the chapter are much like documentary, but created in the 
context of art. 
Similar platforms were set up in an artistic framework with the intention to 
periodically bring together photographers whose work is politically forceful. Since 
2010, the African Artists’ Foundation based in Lagos has organised the annual 
Lagos Photo Festival featuring indoor exhibitions, large-scale outdoor displays, 
competition, creative design, seminars, conferences, workshops and performances. 
Yearly, in theme or content, the event has been crafted to enable photographers to 
engage with a variety of issues in Nigeria and Africa. For instance, in 2011, the 
theme – “What’s Next Africa? The Hidden Stories” – was formulated with balance 
of representation as its goal. It was intended to direct attention to stories other than 
the stereotypical portrayal of Africa as ravaged by hunger, disease, poverty, 
political conflicts and wars. Still, the photographers could not avoid the depiction 
of issues relating to these, given their anxiety about “where the African continent is 
going with all its problems.”142 Lagos Photo has to date had an activist 
underpinning. 
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Another such politically-packed project is the annual Photo Africa – a subsidiary 
of the Life in My City Art Festival (LIMCAF) which commenced in 2007 with 
Enugu as its nerve centre. LIMCAF – one of the most important art events in 
Nigeria, comprising exhibition, competition and performances – allows artists to 
share their experiences of living in Nigeria. Photography is one of the preferred 
media. In 2012, Photo Africa was created to enable exclusive deployment of 
photography in addressing the LIMCAF theme. Once that was done, the Nigerian 
participants turned their cameras towards the socio-political questions that have 
engaged the majority of art photographers in 21st-century Nigeria. 
It is also crucial to examine the production of resistance photography in Nigeria in 
the context of travel. James Clifford theorises travel as a denotation “of spatial 
practices that produce knowledge, diaries, stories, books and other forms of 
expression.”143 While photography constitutes a form of knowledge produced in 
the travel context, it could serve as the sole purpose of organised tours. In either 
case, Crawshaw and Urry’s interrogation of travel photography as a form of 
resistance applies. Their argument as presented within the broader discourse of 
tourist marketing is about its disruption of the romanticising effect of tourist 
imagery.144 An important aspect of art photography in Nigeria is the notion of the 
study tour in which the visual medium is used, not to romanticise the story about 
Nigeria, but to lay bare its internal tensions.  
The “Invisible Borders: The Trans-African Photography Project” founded in 
Nigeria in 2009 was formulated for cross-national movement of photographs in 
Africa and for picturing the continent under travel conditions. Seeking “to change 
society by talking about Africa from Africa,”145 participants in the project are 
obsessed with the concern about the upheavals in African societies. Within the 
purview of the tours, Nigerian photographers have shared the stories of the 
country’s distress with the other Africans while learning about theirs. It is also 
                                                          
143 James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
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Transformations of Travel and Theory, ed. Chris Rojek and John Urry (London: Routledge, 1997). 
145 Jiménez, “Encountering Otherness,” 136.  
    
   65 
 
important to note that the photographers can belong to multiple groups at the same 
time. Meanwhile, Invisible Borders is not unique in this experience. In a journal 
article, I have noted that the project was inspired by the Pan-African Circle of 
Artists (PACA) founded by Krydz Ikwuemesi in Nigeria in 1991.146 PACA was 
created for the networking of Artists in Africa. In 2001, it initiated the Overcoming 
Maps study tour undertaken by road for the understanding and amelioration of 
African problems. The travelling camera is thus a medium through which Nigerian 
artists bring the perils of their society into conversation with those of other parts of 
the continent. 
It is important to explain the unified sense in which I use “Nigeria” to examine 
group projects undertaken in particular locations, especially in Lagos. The 
photographers live in different parts of Nigeria. But a range of institutional forms 
provide them with ways of working together. Study tour for example involves the 
photographers travelling together in person. Exhibitions entail the movement and 
convergence of not only the individuals but their works. Collective projects are 
therefore travelling practices in which the camera pictures the sores of the ailing 
society as it moves.   
The travelling camera operates in yet another perspective. In the 21st century 
marked by intensified resistance photography in Nigeria, individuals from 
elsewhere contribute to that visual culture. They find it difficult to ignore the 
markers of socio-economic and political upheaval they witness. So, they frame 
them with the camera. This can be illustrated with the 2008 project by Victor 
Politis – a Greek New York-based business traveller and photographer. Between 
2005 and 2008, Politis toured some of the Nigeria’s major cities – Lagos, Port 
Harcourt, Abuja, Kano, Sokoto, Akure and others. Starting with a point-and-shoot 
camera to a digital SLR with 16mm to 200mm lenses, he created photographs 
depicting the struggle by ordinary Nigerians to eke out their daily living.147 From 
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24 October to 6 November 2008, the images were exhibited in Didi Museum, 
Lagos, as works of art and accompanied by a rich catalogue in full colour print.  
  
Figure 1.3: Cover of Victor Politis’ photography exhibition catalogue, 2008 
Credit: Centre for Contemporary Art library, Lagos 
The cover image of the publication (figure 1.3) portrays a candy hawker in his 
profile view looking into the space in front of him. He carries on his head the 
commodities stocked in and around the walls of a thick paper box. The photograph 
is a microcosmic view of the rest in the inside pages. They are mainly images of 
street hawkers comprising adults and children, squalid precincts peopled by the 
poor, passengers loaded like fishes into rickety vehicles. The title of the 
publication, Nigeria Through the Eyes of a Passerby, Volume I stands for the 
euphemistic approach adopted by the photographer in order to throw some punches 
at the political elites of his host country. Politis is careful not to draw criticism to 
himself from the high-profile Nigerians and governments with whom he did 
business. The pathetic images are not titled, which might signal his intent. As if 
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asking the viewers to draw out the meanings by themselves, he has only indicated 
the place where each photograph was taken. In the introductory part of the 
publication, he announces that he is not a professional photographer.  
But other sources reveal him as a “Greek photographer” who has won many 
awards in photography competitions.148 Inserting the claim to be “nobody” in 
photography, he adds that he only photographs what strikes him. “The dignity and 
survival skills of the people of Nigeria”149 are what fascinated him. He was not 
thrilled by the “beautiful homes” to which he was invited by “Leaders of Industry 
and Government,” or ostentatious “traditional weddings and executive suites.” 
These would rather present a romanticised image of Nigeria. Politis turned his 
camera to the street where he found the majority of the Nigerian population. And 
he produced images that countered the ones that would be shown to him by his 
elite friends. In my view, the project is that of a documentary activist photography. 
He took the images over the period of 5 years (beginning from around 2004) 
during which he “travelled to Nigeria more than fifty times.”150 So he was not a 
“passerby” after all.   
 Politis’ work and other major art photographic projects undertaken in Nigeria in 
the past one and a half decades had obvious political force. That was not 
previously the case. In the first forty years after independence, artists’ use of the 
camera in response to socio-political upheavals in the country was not explicit. I 
have demonstrated a possible way of analysing photographs as political when they 
are not obviously so. The approach is to investigate the events that marked the time 
of producing the image. This way, the living conditions that motivated the taking 
of the photograph or that eluded depicton in the image are cues to the political 
reading. From the turn of the 21st century, overt activist photography within the 
framework of art was intensified and the practice has continued till the present 
date. Unlike art photography, photojournalism began early to respond openly to 
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political issues in Nigeria and has sustained the intensity of the struggle over many 
years. The next section sheds light on how it constitutes the nation’s resistance 
history of photography. 
Printed news, printed activism 
Print journalism is one of the earliest platforms for the public encounter with 
photographs in Nigeria. The images are normatively understood to operate in 
special relation to written words, precisely for the illumination of news stories. But 
beyond that context, photojournalism (as the visual practice is termed) constitutes a 
fascinating form of civil resistance. Through engagement with the photographic 
practices in print news media, this section presents a history of photography in 
Nigeria contextualised as a mode of civil struggle. Images from selected 
newspapers and magazines published between 1960 and 2000 – Daily Times, Daily 
Star, New Nigerian, Newswatch, Tell, and others –are analysed to support the 
claim. Selection of images from the historical press archive was guided by 
considerations concerning their semiotic signification in relation to the explanation 
of the cases for which they are deployed. I considered how each photograph would 
help me to illustrate analytical points. Attention is also given to the various ways 
photographs are used beyond news illustration to challenge inequality and 
injustice. Selection of publications was determined by their operational consistency 
over long periods, and the chosen time frame is important given that it covers the 
analogue age preceding online migration of print news outlets. Again, I considered 
magazines and newspapers known to be at the forefront of the political struggle.  
Through the analysis of the images in terms of compositionality and socio-political 
context of production and circulation, we gain insight into some of the ways 
photojournalism produces its political effects. First, in certain instances, 
photographs make political impacts by virtue of their appearance on newspaper 
and magazine pages, independent of written articles. Secondly, in the mode of 
documentary photography, the journalistic camera follows crucial societal 
developments over extended periods to draw attention to and challenge them.  
Also, state failure is confronted through the use of portraiture to link public 
upheavals to the political class. These epistemological directions are important 
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because they allow us to do something different with photojournalism. From this, 
we retrieve a history not of the genre itself but of the visuality of civil struggle in a 
postcolony.  
In Nigeria, the deployment of the print media and its visual practices in the context 
of resistance dates back to the colonial era. Rich in cartoon drawings, The West 
African Pilot, a newspaper founded in 1937 by Nnamdi Azikiwe, was at the 
forefront of anti-colonial struggle. Following the attainment of political 
independence in 1960, a number of media outlets emerged to frame as news stories 
the imaginary of an anticipated new Nigeria.151 The exciting moment that followed 
the so-called liberation was however short-lived. Nigeria soon manifested the traits 
that have been argued to be incidental to postcolonial nationalism.  Colonies 
mobilised forces against their dominating powers and secured self-rule for 
themselves. But once that was achieved, the dreamt-of nationhood became elusive. 
In Culture and Imperialism where Edward Said deals extensively with the 
paradoxes of nationalism, he argues that the end of colonialism is as much about 
replacement of its political order as with a new class of leaders. Given that the 
individuals are themselves products of colonialism, they replicate the structure that 
produced them.152 The Nigerian experience is summed up by Said’s formulation. 
Whereas art photography did not respond immediately to this political overturn in 
an overt manner, photojournalism did. The anti-colonial visuality of the press gave 
way to strategic use of gray-scale photographs to call attention to emerging 
conflicts. That prompt response could also be attributed to the fundamental role of 
the press as the watchdog of society. Daily Times is one of the national dailies 
whose life spanned the pre- and post-independence periods. It started publishing in 
1926 and attained prominence that reached its peak in 1977. That year, the Federal 
Government took over Daily Times. Soon, its reputation waned due to political 
pressure and mismanagement. Its revitalisation process began in the turn of the 
21st century, leading to its online migration in 2011.153 The collapse of the 
newspaper under the government is a confirmation of the very culture of 
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unaccountability it began to resist a few years after independence. Photography 
was central to the resistance. Peter Obe and Akin Adedayo worked with Daily 
Times as photojournalists. Whereas only a few of Adedayo’s photographs are 
found in the publications, Obe’s are numerous.154 Obe became famous and earned 
a reputation as “the doyen of Nigerian press photographers.”155 Most writings on 
him make reference to his documentation of the political tensions – ethnic rivalry, 
massacre, and military coup – that gripped Nigeria in the mid-1960s, climaxing in 
a civil war (1967-1970).  
The historical events as chronicled in Daily Times are presented in the journalistic 
context but in a way that reflects documentary photography and its reformist 
project.156 Obe’s work – which was not limited to Daily Times given that he also 
worked with Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters – destabilises one major 
claim of what sets photojournalism apart from documentary. Kratochvil and 
Persson contend that the images taken by the photojournalist operate in a kind of 
one-off mode amidst daily deadline requirements to bring together and illuminate 
news events. In that case, pictures are mainly supplementary to texts. They 
conclude that this mode of operation does not allow for visual engagement with 
issues over time in the manner that documentary does.  
While I do not suggest that there is no demarcation between the two genres, I argue 
that Kratochvil and Persson’s critique does not apply to Nigeria. Even as Daily 
Times published photographic reports of other issues that did not have to be 
followed over time, it covered the various dimensions of the war, from start to 
                                                          
154 There is no consistency in indicating the names of photographers in the short descriptions of the 
photographs published in the newspapers and magazines studied in this section. Many of the 
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social reform. Drawing on the American example, Peter Szto writes that before the invention of 
photography, visual modes of representation (such as drawings and graphs) in the print media were 
found effective in drawing public attention to social problems and mobilising resources to address 
them. So, photography emerged as a gain for the reformist project due to its foundational truth 
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finish. Images depicting the eruption of political violence in parts of the country 
had begun to appear on the newspaper pages following the earlier-mentioned first 
military coup in January 1966. (A counter-coup took place in July same year). 
When the war broke out the following year, the photographic reporting became a 
regular facet of published daily news. In the Daily Times of 30 December 1967, the 
photograph below (figure 1.4) appeared alongside the article: “1967 – A Bad Year 
for Hopes and Dreams.”  
 
Figure 1.4: Lieutenant Cornel Yakubu Gowon and Lieutenant Cornel 
Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu   
Reproduced from: Daily Times, December 30, 1967, pp 6-7. 
In the photograph, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon (left) and Lieutenant 
Colonel Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu (right) are depicted in a handshake at 
the meeting held in Aburi, Ghana, from 4 to 5 January 1967. Since the coups of the 
previous year, the power tussle between the Northern-controlled Federal Military 
Government led by Gowon and the Eastern Nigeria governed by Ojukwu had 
deepened. To settle the conflict and avert an impending war, the members of the 
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Supreme Military Council met at Aburi, Ghana. Besides the fact that the military 
leaders were invited to the meeting by the Chairman of the Ghanaian National 
Liberation Council, Lieutenant General Ankrah, the choice of venue in a foreign 
country highlights the high level of suspicion that marked the struggle. As the toll 
of the massacre of easterners in Northern Nigeria was on the increase, Ojukwu and 
his delegates were concerned about their safety should the meeting be held 
anywhere within Nigeria.157  The photograph with all the expressions of 
friendliness – the handshake and the smile on the faces of the subjects – is a visual 
irony. What followed the depicted scene were the splitting of the regions into 12 
states by Gowon, the declaration of Biafra, and a war that forever changed the 
history of Nigeria. As Baptiste puts it, these were the outcomes of “conflicting 
interpretations” of the Aburi accord by Gowon and Ojukwu.158  
The article accompanying the above image outlines the major conflicts 
experienced in Nigeria from the 1966 coups to the end of 1967, the first year of the 
war. Throughout the three-year war period, the unfolding of events was brought to 
public view in photographic form by the press. The depicted dimensions include 
armed attacks, protests by civilians, internal displacement and the international 
movement of Nigerian refugees. The Ghanaian government that sought to prevent 
the war in 1967 had in 1969 driven away Nigerian refugees and other foreign 
nationals who did not possess resident permits. Obe followed the repatriation with 
his camera. His work brought to the pages of Daily Times the disturbing images of 
the horrible journey undertaken homeward by Nigerians, to meet the same 
situation they had fled. French photographer Gilles Caron also covered the conflict. 
His work helped to bring the attention of the West to the war. Claude Cookman 
writes of Caron’s project as a call to assist the victims of the strife. His argument is 
“that his (Caron’s) humanistic vision helped persuade Western readers that the 
Biafrans were not merely pitiable, but deserving of help; that his thorough 
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approach detailed the multiple dimensions of this complex political and 
humanitarian crisis…”159  
An example of the humanitarian assistance received by the victims of the war 
(although not from the West this time) is portrayed in a photograph published in 
the Daily Times of 4 September 1969. Doctors from Algeria arrived at Lagos 
airport, carrying their suitcases. They came to replace another medical team that 
had cared for war casualties for several months. Besides the content of the image 
itself, its lack of connection with the surrounding body texts is striking. Rather than 
illustrate any article, it stands alone with its own story. Only guided by a short 
description, viewers are invited to contemplate the wounded body by watching the 
photograph of those who came to care for it.  
The history of Nigerian print journalism is replete with diverse uses of photographs 
independent of written essays. Apart from the above example, photographs could 
be given a full page or even more. They could be used to form a pictorial story on a 
particular subject or as thumbnails of different issues brought together. The 
newspapers of the 1970s are filled with these forms of representation. The covered 
subjects include social events such as weddings, naming ceremonies and birthday 
parties. Others present a collage of news on political developments gathered from 
across the country. The picture below was cut out from the “Week-end Events in 
Pictures” page of the April 1977 New Nigerian newspaper. The page is composed 
of seven photographs on four specific events: installation of the Emir of Fika, 
Alhaji Muhammadu Ibu Idrissa in Borno State, budget presentation in Anambra 
State, familiarisation tour of the Military Governor of Bauchi State, and the 
foundation stone-laying ceremony of the Irolu town hall project in the Ijebu Remo 
area of Ogun State (figure 1.5). The image is isolated because it stands in for the 
rest in the interpretation of the political climate of the 1970s.  
Following the end of the war in 1970, the Nigerian government took actions 
intended to produce cathartic results. It initiated the policy of “3Rs”– 
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation, and declared “no victor, no 
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vanquished, but victory for common sense and the unity of Nigeria.”160 The policy 
denotes the rebuilding of a destroyed structure of societal life, the improvement or 
restoration of normal living conditions, and reunification after a broken 
relationship.  Figure 1.5 constitutes a visual symbolisation of that denotation. 
 
A Permanent Secretary – Mr. O.A. Osibogun – on behalf of the Ogun State 
Military Governor is frozen in a squatting pose. Apparently surrounded by other 
government functionaries who watch intently, he lays a block in the ground. 
The evocation of government’s commitment to the transformation of Nigeria after 
the war as found in the picture permeates the photographic imagery of the press in 
                                                          
160 Abraham Nabhon Thomas, “Beyond the Platitude of Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and 
Reconciliation in Nigeria: Revolutionary Pressures in the Niger Delta,” Journal of Sustainable 
Development in Africa 12, no.1 (2010): 55.  
Figure 1.5: Laying the  
foundation stone of the  
Irolu town hall project  
in Ogun State 
Reproduced from: New 
Nigerian,  
April 13, 1977, p3. 
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the 1970s. Certain depictions of political elites became rampant: signing of 
contracts for public projects, inspection of ongoing projects, commissioning of 
completed ones and touring of political constituencies. Photography also became 
important in the articulation of ethnic reconciliation. The images published on the 
same page with figure 1.5 fit into this framework. For example, on the Emir of 
Fika’s installation in Northern Nigeria, we are shown among other moments the 
dance performance by a group from the southern part of the country. 
The clear message is that peoples torn apart by ethnic and religious rivalry could 
now live in harmony. The same is implied in the four full pages of the Weekly Star 
newspaper of 30 January 1977 given to photographic coverage of the FESTAC 
event. The project and the visual narration of it are all about the same notion of 
reintegration. Nonetheless, this national ambition was never a complete success.  
In The Politics of Post-War Demobilisation and Reintegration in Nigeria, 
Olukunle Ojeleye evaluates the reintegration programme, drawing on the policy of 
3Rs. He argues that it “was not inclusive as it excluded the Biafran secessionists 
whose interest was not adequately catered for in the relatively ‘winner-takes-all’ 
approach of the federal forces.”161 The government could not create the structure 
that would lead to sustained peace and development. Through the photographic 
production of the print media, attention was brought to the sad realities that 
attended the government’s reintegration exercise.  Dilapidation of public 
infrastructure, fuel scarcity, inimical labour relations, educational and industrial 
backwardness, power tussles and killings became common. The ways these ills 
were presented through the practices of photojournalism set the genre apart from 
art photography in the early history of postcolonial Nigeria. In the three decades 
after independence, the cameras of artists were not used in an obvious manner 
against the state. As for photojournalism, it began early enough in open resistance 
against misrule. That is not to say that all media platforms in Nigeria are involved 
in the civil struggle. Government-controlled outlets are unsurprisingly out of it. 
They are in constant defence of the state, the very structure they serve. Even under 
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severely cruel political conditions, the government is challenged not by its own 
media platforms but those that operate outside its influence. Beginning especially 
from the 1980s, military dictatorship coupled with political corruption grew to an 
unprecedented level in Nigeria. As if naturally reacting to the development, press 
criticism was intensified. Portraiture provides us with visual accounts of the 
intensified struggle. 
The photographic portraits of Nigerian political elites have since independence 
appeared on the faces of newspapers and magazines. But it can be argued that the 
disruption of their “honorific” framing, to use Sekula’s term again, became most 
profound beginning from the 1980s.162 The body especially the face rose to 
symbolise power struggles, state corruption and brutality. In Portraits and 
Persons: A Philosophical Inquiry, Cynthia Freeland writes: “Artists (and I add, 
photographers) who create portraits have often tried to convey aspects of their 
sitters’ moral character, emotional life, and personality in their depictions.”163 This 
ambition is historically rooted in the belief that the inside and the outside of a 
person operate in close relation. Freeland traces the history from Descartes and Le 
Brun (16th -17th century) to the birth of phrenology and physiognomy (18th 
century), the works of Charles Bell and Charles Darwin (19th century) and of the 
20th and the 21st centuries psychologists of the face such as Paul Ekman.164 
The 1980s and 90s saw the most remarkable combination of military tyranny and 
high-scale corruption in Nigeria. Those who controlled the political space and their 
exploits made headlines in the print media. Their words were presented in inverted 
comas to highlight their recklessness in the handling of power. Their portraits 
appeared for the public observation of Nigeria’s doom. The portrayal of the images 
was striking in the way they were strategically placed on the pages of the 
magazines and newspapers. They could for instance appear on front pages 
alongside evocative headlines. Phrenology pioneered by Joseph Gall but 
popularised by Johann Spurzheim would ask us to read the bumps on the head to 
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gain insight into the behaviour of the represented persons. For Johann Caspar 
Lavater, the champion of physiognomy, and Descartes and Le Brun who came 
before him, the face is privileged as the bearer of the semiotic codes.165 The way 
these ideas were later dropped motivates us to consider Freeland’s concluding 
coinage, “the paradox of portraiture.” She posits that the whole project of 
portraiture is “strange” and wonders how “a material object (could) be used to 
capture or convey a person, who is a subject.”166 In relation to the activist history 
of photography in Nigeria, my view is that portraiture plays an important role. It 
enables the making of various forms of connection with regards to knowing the 
represented person. Its portrayal of the inner being hinges on shared awareness of 
the individual’s character. While the serious facial looks of the depicted persons 
remind viewers of their cruelty and abuse of power, friendly appearances tend to 
veil the vices.  
Consider the portraits of the military heads of state Generals Ibrahim Babangida 
(1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998). Their predominantly serious-looking 
photographs on the pages of the print news media of their times are constant 
reminders of their much-criticised regimes. The Newswatch magazine – one major 
platform through which the media resistance is understood – was itself a victim of 
state violence. In October 1986, the Babangida-led government reacted to its 
activist journalism by allegedly masterminding the assassination of its first editor-
in-chief, Dele Giwa. At the first anniversary of the death, legal practitioner Olu 
Onagoruwa, himself an activist, remarked: “The police have not found who killed 
Dele Giwa, because they know who killed Dele Giwa.”167 In a similar inventive 
use of words, Fela Kuti asked through his music, “Who killed Dele Giwa,” and 
mentioned “Baba,” adding that his listeners could use their discretion to make it up 
with “Ngida,” thus Babangida. 
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Figure 1.6: Cover page of 6 December 1993 Tell magazine 
Credit: Joe Ike Ogugua of Patrick Ogugua Memorial Centre (POMEC),  
Nando, Anambra State 
Abacha took over power in November 1993. A month later, the Tell magazine 
came out with a cover bearing his portrait with a seemingly feigned smile along 
with two striking headings: “More Facts about Abacha’s Coup” and “Now Nigeria 
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is Finished” (figure 1.6). The proclamation made in the second line is reinforced by 
the general’s image on the 10th page of the magazine. Pictured in a standing pose 
apparently delivering an address, he is said to be playing to Babangida’s script. 
The description is an apt articulation of the commonality between Babangida and 
Abacha’s regime. Both were marked by dictatorship and an unprecedented scale of 
looting.  
 
Figure 1.7: Protest against Abacha’s regime  
Culled from: New Nigerian, 23 March 1998, p. 12. 
Credit: Joe Ike Ogugua of Patrick Ogugua Memorial Centre (POMEC), Nando, 
Anambra State 
Undeterred by Abacha’s demeanour, the protest against his government was 
intense on the pages of print media and in public spaces. In figure 1.7, a group of 
protesters hold up a banner demanding the dictator’s overthrow. The individuals 
organised themselves as the United Action for Democracy group. The 23 March 
1998 issue of Tell magazine in which the photograph was published came with a 
page in the “Graffiti” cartoon series that conveys the concerns of the masses: “No 
work, no school, no sleep, no water, no light, no fuel, no road, no money, no 
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life.”168 The sense of frustration elicited by these “nos” took on a normalised 
association with Abacha’s portrait. In other words, his image became a reminder of 
the crimes against the citizenry committed by his regime.  
To refer to phrenology and physiognomy once again, Allan Sekula connects them 
with photography and crime in the 19th century. Phrenological science aided by 
photography was deployed by the French penal system. Portraits of prison inmates 
were documented along with the descriptions of their criminal behaviour and 
phrenological analyses. Through this method, the state had insight into the 
characters of those who constituted a security threat to other citizens.169 There has 
never been such a system in Nigerian history and phrenology ultimately failed. Yet 
a certain element of what is described by Sekula applies to Nigeria in reverse. The 
portrait photograph of Sani Abacha acquired an indexical signification of state 
crime. With the wide circulation of the image and those of other political figures in 
Nigeria, the masses contemplate the criminalities of their leaders. 
The death of Abacha in June 1998 ended the protest against his regime and led to 
the developments that climaxed in the constitution of a democratic government in 
1999. The emergence of the new political order coincided with the advent of the 
internet which changed journalism, as well as its photographic and activist 
practices. But as shown in this section, the four decades after independence 
constitute an era during which photojournalism flourished within the bounds of 
analogue technology. The genre is important in understanding the history of 
photography as a mode of civil protest in Nigeria. It began very early to respond to 
political upheavals in the country. The photojournalists might not have seen their 
work as political protest. But I have argued that we see it as such. Through the 
appropriation of documentary and portraiture within the paradigm of news 
production, their practice brought attention to injustice.  
                                                          
168 Franklin Oyekusibe was the cartoonist for Tell. A lot of other cartoons created by him were 
published in the magazine along with the “Graffiti” which became a regular feature.  
169 Allan Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” in The Contest of Meaning: Critical Histories of 
Photography, ed. Richard Bolton (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the history of photography in Nigeria from the activist 
perspective. I have drawn on what I broadly categorised as art photography and 
photojournalism to account for the relatedness on the one hand and institutional 
differences on the other between various practices. Within the paradigm of 
analogue production (which is our concern here), the two genres have coexisted. 
But they constitute different modes of engagement with the camera, producing 
diverse effects. For some decades following Nigerian independence, the 
photographic practices which I have read as art were not overtly activist. They 
were dominated mainly by technical questions of experimenting with the medium 
and documentation of socio-cultural life while paying attention to the aesthetic 
qualities of the image. The central idea of this chapter is framed by the 
understanding that aesthetics cannot be separated from politics. The political 
attributes of the photograph can be searched out even when they are not apparent. 
My approach in this regard is to examine the socio-political circumstances at the 
time of the creation of the photograph, to see how they connect. The point of 
connection could be the content of the image or its underlying production 
practices. Beginning from the 2000s, artists’ photographic engagement with the 
political became more obvious. The considerable level of freedom of expression 
that came with democracy, and its failure to meet the expectations of the people, 
moved artists to aggressively face the state with the camera.  
Photojournalism on the other hand was forceful from the outset. Considering the 
strategic use of photographs on the newspaper and magazine pages, we come to the 
conclusion that beyond the notion of illumination of body text, they make strong 
political statements. In some instances, they carry with them their own stories, 
detached from those written in words. In other cases, they take on the documentary 
mode that is in itself rooted in the reformist pursuit of a subject with the camera 
over time. The idea of resistance photography encompasses these various relations 
of the image with politics. Insight into the history of socio-political tensions in 
Nigeria can be gained through the examination of photographs and their production 
practices. I have deliberately concentrated on analogue practices to assert that 
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photographic activism (which is the core of this study) did not start with the 
emergence of digital technology and the internet. But the new media supports 
intriguing practices that command our attention. The sociality, the amorphous 
nature of the cultural production and the sense of inclusion that underlines the 
practices are fascinating. These are explored in the remaining chapters of this 
thesis. We begin with how Nigerians visually and digitally define their frustrations 
with living as a nation in trouble.
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Introduction 
Despite its slim volume, Chinua Achebe’s The Trouble with Nigeria (1983) is one 
of the earliest and boldest intellectual attempts to confront the afflictions of post-
independence Nigeria. Each chapter is dedicated to a particular national question 
and how it impedes socio-political and economic advancement. The issues include 
corruption, poor leadership, tribalism, lack of patriotism, indiscipline, 
marginalisation, social injustice and mediocrity.170 Three decades later, Achebe’s 
book can be said to have given us only a glimpse of still greater troubles to befall 
Nigeria. In a project like this one invested in the analysis of photographs from 
social media, the idea of “digital trouble” suggests that the digital domain allows a 
broader engagement with Nigeria’s distress as a sovereign state. The chapter 
argues that as digitality reshapes our understanding of civil struggle, digital 
photographs bear the semiotic codes of the challenges confronting Nigeria.  
The images are used in an evidentiary context, that is, as a means to establish the 
existence of injustice and inequality. This is rooted in the foundational notion of 
photography as “mute testimony” 171 to use Talbot’s formulation, or as Sekula puts 
it, “a silence that silences.”172  It is a witness that lacks the capacity to talk, yet it 
implicates the criminal body when presented in the court. Facebook is not a court, 
but similar to it in the way it constitutes a space for the use of the image to bear 
witness to the unaccountable manner in which the Nigerian state is run. But this 
does not imply the use of photography in an unmediated sense. While Facebook is 
a presentational space which allows interactions and contestations around the 
                                                          
* Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (London: Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1983).  
170 Ibid. 
171 Talbot, The Pencil of Nature, 19. 
172 Sekula, “The Body and the Archive,” 6. 
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image, the image itself is a constructed representation. But these conditions help to 
tease out the complexities of the trouble with Nigeria.    
Drawing on the debates around the evidentiary claims of photography, the chapter 
covers five key examples of the troubles as Nigerians engage with them on 
Facebook: corruption, insecurity, poverty, infrastructural failure and power tussles. 
These themes were selected because they are the most prevalent concerns 
discussed by Nigerians on Facebook. Again, I worked with themes that account for 
the focus of my study on the critique of state functionaries by those they represent, 
and not the other way round. From the pool of images retrieved from Facebook, I 
have examined those that illuminate the selected themes well not only in content 
but in the comments they generate.  
Political corruption in the country is sustained by impunity and affected by ethnic 
sentiment, making the vice difficult to be combated. In the second section, the 
enormity of insecurity is said to be located not only in the weak response of the 
country’s security officials to crime, but in their participation in it. Criminals frame 
their acts, first, as resistance against the general duplicity of government officials, 
and second, as a means of sustenance in a society with limited economic 
opportunities. While I do not support such forms of rationalisation, they help us to 
make sense of the depth of the mess in Nigeria. There is also agitation about 
poverty, which is considered a paradox, given the huge revenue Nigeria has 
generated over the decades from oil. Poverty is created and maintained by the 
political elites through diversion of public funds to personal use and investment in 
white elephant projects. Programmes designed to combat poverty are rather used 
by the privileged few to further enrich themselves and to defraud the poor for 
whom the programmes are supposedly created. In the section on “infrastructural 
failure,” social amenities are examined as sites of politics. As a result of 
corruption, public facilities are left unattended; they are ill-equipped. Projects are 
awarded but abandoned uncompleted. The political elites are accused of 
contributing to the dilapidation, but they deny it and fruitlessly try not to be 
affected by the unpleasant outcomes. In the last section of the chapter, the struggle 
for power is examined as one of the ways that failure of leadership in Nigeria 
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manifests itself. It reveals the egotism of government officials who express 
animosity against one another on the basis of belonging to different political 
groups. In their inordinate power tussles, they act irrationally, violently, and 
literally engage in physical combat. The Nigerian activists consequently liken their 
leaders to beasts. 
The issues addressed in this chapter are not in themselves new. But the deployment 
of photography and online-related approach offers a new way to understand the 
socio-political problems. Let us start with corruption.  
Corruption 
The literature review in the introductory part of this work highlights the directions 
of the research centred on corruption in Nigeria. Daniel Smith for instance takes us 
through the various modes of the phenomenon: internet scams, fraud in 
development work, in the judiciary, among the political class and the ordinary 
citizens. He concludes that corruption is diffused across the different social strata 
of Nigerian society.173 In a sense, he re-echoes Jean-François Bayart’s words that 
“contrary to the popular image of the innocent masses, corruption and 
predatoriness are not found exclusively among the powerful.”174 I do not dispute 
that position, but in the context of civil resistance as explored in this study, the 
corruption of the masses is not part of the focus. I am rather interested in the 
reactions of the ordinary people to high-profile corruption. Again, it is crucial to 
explore how else to think about corruption by deploying a different method of 
inquiry, namely the reading of photographs and the dialogues they produce on 
Facebook. This methodological strategy brings three important issues to the fore. 
First, the networked Nigerians use images to historicise corruption. This historicist 
approach allows them to read corruption as an infectious social problem 
transmitted from one generation to another. Secondly, they argue that there is a 
sense in which corruption is officially celebrated, producing some kind of 
                                                          
173 Smith, A Culture of Corruption.  
174 Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (New York: Longman, 
1993), 238 
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immunity for its culprits.175 Lastly, the Facebook conversations reveal what can be 
termed “ethnicisation of corruption” – the understanding of social ills based on 
ethnic sentiments.  
 
Figure 2.1: Portraits of 3 past Nigerian leaders: Alhaji Shehu Shagari (left), 
General Ibrahim Babangida (middle), and General Sani Abacha (right). 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 19 November 2014, posted by George Agbo with the 
text, “Some of the progenitors of the Nigerian political philosophy…”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=740330899382094&set=a.1900348610
78370.47852.100002155738514&type=1&theater. 
Retrieval date:  20 November 2014. 
The images analysed to understand the issues raised above were circulated recently 
(in the 2010s), but delineate a long-standing history of political fraud. Figure 2.1 
appeared on Facebook in 2014 at the height of the political corruption that brought 
severe criticism of the Goodluck Jonathan administration. There were cases of 
missing funds from government coffers, embezzlement of counter-insurgency 
funds, and private jet scandals among state functionaries. In the set of photographs, 
we see portraits of Shehu Shagari in civilian attire (left) and Ibrahim Babangida 
(middle) and Sani Abacha (right) in military uniforms. These modes of dressing 
are indexical to the individuals’ political status. Babangida and Abacha were army 
                                                          
175 Corruption alongside the question of impunity is currently being addressed by the Mohammadu 
Buhari administration, but this is being criticised for being selective. In any case, this research only 
covers what occurred before Buhari came on board. 
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generals and served as heads of state at different times, while Shagari was a 
civilian president. Even as they served under different forms of government, the 
inscription – “the portraits of corruption” – at the bottom of the image suggests a 
shared trait. This more broadly implies that various systems of government in 
Nigeria have failed to tackle political corruption. Nigerian Facebook protesters 
deploy photographs within the evidentiary framework to demonstrate a clear 
understanding of the trajectory of corruption in Nigeria. Thus, they can take an 
informed position that any effort to tackle corruption should begin with 
investigating the factors that have sustained it over the years.  
Alhaji Shehu Shagari was the president in the second republic from 1979 to 1983. 
General Ibrahim Babangida assumed office as the head of state following the 1985 
coup and remained in the position till 1993 during which Ernest Shonekan became 
the interim civilian president. In November same year, another army general, Sani 
Abacha took over power from Shonekan. The collective story told by these men is 
of the advancement of state robbery whose foundation was laid even before them. 
After independence in 1960, the very first republican government under Nnamdi 
Azikiwe and Tafawa Balewa (1960 and 1966) was replete with cases of financial 
mismanagement. The first military coup of 1966 that dethroned Azikiwe and 
Balewa was claimed to be a benevolent attempt to take power from “corrupt” and 
“incompetent” civilians and to restore “accountability” and “transparency” in the 
nation’s politics.176 Yakubu Gowon took over power, but did not dethrone 
corruption. 
Shagari’s government in the second republic (1979 to 1983) was marked by 
financial unaccountability, electoral violence and international money laundering. 
It was to be probed by the Muhammadu Buhari military regime which took over 
power in 1984. But Buhari was overthrown by the coup that installed Babangida as 
head of state in 1985.177 Apart from grand-scale looting, a lot of other crimes were 
                                                          
176 Daniel Agbiboa, “Between Corruption and Development: The Political Economy of State 
Robbery in Nigeria,” Journal of Business Ethics, no. 108 (2012): 331.  
177 During Buhari’s short regime as the head of state from 1984 to 1985, he tackled corruption head 
on. So when he was deposed, many Nigerians viewed it as a lost opportunity for Nigeria to 
“eradicate” corruption. This is part of why he commanded enormous support in the 2015 election 
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associated with Babangida’s regime: bribery, deceit, drug trafficking, assassination 
and “godfatherism.”178 In 1993, he annulled the election won by Moshood Abiola 
and ensured the continuation of military rule. When General Sani Abacha took 
over power in 1993, he maintained the high level of corruption till he died in 1998. 
He looted an estimated sum of 2 to 5 billion dollars.179 Since the death of Abacha, 
his legacy as a former Nigerian leader is marked by the struggle to recover his loot. 
The recovery efforts go pari passu with more looting and give an impression of 
political corruption in Nigeria as a viral infection transferred from the body of one 
regime to another. Impunity is the key factor that helps to sustain the phenomenon. 
It is tied to other circumstances such as disruption and prolongation of trials, 
ineffective prosecution of culprits, 180 and what can be referred to as “forgiving and 
forgetting.” These ideas are explained below. Let us begin with the scam that 
greeted the fourth republic during the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-
2007).  
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha became the governor of Bayelsa State in 1999. Against 
the Nigerian law prohibiting public officers from ownership of assets abroad (of 
which many top politicians have been found guilty), he had accounts with banks in 
the United Kingdom. He claimed that the moneys were donations made by his 
well-wishers towards the education of his children.181 In September 2005, he was 
                                                                                                                                                                
that brought him back to power as a “civilian” president. One of his campaign promises was to 
tackle corruption and in keeping with that, the fight is ongoing. Its accomplishments and failures 
are broad and can better be investigated in a further research project. 
178 In the Nigerian context, “godfatherism” is a political ideological concept rooted in the fraudulent 
exercise of influence. It describes the power wielded by an individual to affect important political 
processes such as elections and appointments to elevated positions. Babangida used state resources 
to acquire his status as a godfather, offering “generous” gifts in the form of cars, literal cash and 
other material things. 
179 Scott Pegg, “Introduction: On the 20th Anniversary of the Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa,” The 
Executive Industries and Society 2 (2015): 612. It is difficult to keep track of the exchange rate 
between naira (the Nigerian currency) and the United States dollar (the currency with which many 
internationally can relate). The rate is always on the increase. Due to the economic recession that 
struck Nigeria in 2016, the rate as I write is up to 300 naira to a dollar. In this work, I have used that 
rate to give my reader a sense of what the amounts of money quoted in naira would mean. Hence, 
Abacha looted between 600 billion and 1.5 trillion naira. 
180 Agbiboa, “Between Corruption and Development,” 332. 
181 Emile van Does de Willebois et al., The Puppet Master: How the Corrupt Use Legal Structures 
to Hide Stolen Assets and What to Do About It (Washington DC: The International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2011). 
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arrested at Heathrow Airport, London, on allegations of money laundering and 
detained for a few weeks by the police. He was granted bail on a number of 
conditions: to provide surety in monetary form and to appear daily before the 
Metropolitan Police in whose custody he would also leave his passport. 
   
Figure 2.2: Portraits of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 22 November 2014, posted by George Agbo with the 
text, “Do you remember who this couple is?”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/occupy.naija/permalink/845268662184501/. 
Retrieval date:  24 November 2014. 
Alamieyeseigha forged identity documents, disguised himself and fled to Nigeria. 
In his portraits posted on Facebook a couple of months before his death in 2015, 
we see him in two sets of attire (figure 2.2). The one on the left shows 
Alamieyeseigha the man in his regular mode of dressing with a hat on his head. In 
the other photograph, he appears disguised, wearing women’s headgear, necklace, 
earrings and upper garments made of lace material. As the world pondered that 
dramatisation of corruption, the Bayelsa State House of Assembly responded 
    
   90 
 
quickly by impeaching the fraudulent governor. This action was lauded as it 
signaled the promise of confronting corruption in the new democracy. But not only 
was it a rare example of action against high-profile corruption for the next 15 
years, Alamieyeseigha was granted a state pardon in 2014 by the Jonathan-led 
administration to facilitate his return to the country’s politics. The majority of the 
comments elicited by Alamieyaseigha’s portraits on Facebook reflect a sense of 
disappointment with the government for making that move. For example, Simon 
Akhaine comments: “An embodiment of corruption and deceit. Yet he aspires to 
become a Senator of the Fed. Rep. of Nigeria because values have become elusive 
and impunity thrives.”182  
The pardon that prompted Alamieyeseigha’s aspiration to rejoin politics fits into 
the larger frame of what can be regarded as a “celebration of corruption.” It 
connotes how criminal records get suppressed in the Nigerian political memory. 
Not only are culprits of corruption let off the hook, the way they are subsequently 
allowed to take part in national politics suggests a form of “forgiving and 
forgetting.” The late General Sani Abacha who defrauded Nigeria of billions of 
dollars received the Centenary Award posthumously from the Goodluck 
administration in 2014. It was said to be in recognition of his “patriotism and 
promotion of unity and national development.” In defense of the action, the 
government claimed that the “award was not a test of sainthood” and should not be 
taken as complicity in official crime.183 
As the controversy surrounding the award raged on Facebook, the online protesters 
brought up a related case. Jonathan’s People’s Democratic Party had nominated the 
son of Sani Abacha – Mohammed Abacha – to contest for the gubernatorial 
position in Kano State in the 2015 general elections. The Sani Abacha looting 
scandal is a family story in which his wife and son are implicated. Mohammed’s 
case was in the court for 446.3 billion Naira (some 1.48 billion dollars) 
                                                          
182 Simon Akhaine, November 23, 2014 (12:41 a.m.), comment on George Agbo, “Do you 
remember who this couple is?” Facebook, November 22, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/occupy.naija/permalink/845268662184501/. 
183 Scott Pegg, “Introduction: On the 20th Anniversary of the Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa1,” The 
Executive Industries and Society 2 (2015): 612. 
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embezzlement charges connected to his father’s regime. In June 2014, the Federal 
Government ordered that the case be withdrawn.184 Such a legal decision and the 
presentation of a man with crooked antecedents as a governorship candidate 
suggest a kind of celebration of corruption, entrenchment of impunity, and another 
example of forgiving and forgetting.  
From the foregoing, the photographs, the comments that accompany them to 
Facebook and those made by other users corroborate the public knowledge of the 
historical evolution of corruption in Nigeria. The image is in this sense a means of 
affirming historical sensibilities. Christopher Pinney may argue that the 
understanding of the image should not be reduced to mere validation of knowledge 
gained “by other means” – an idea he traces to Carlo Ginzburg.185 His position is 
that the work of the image is more complicated than that. As a full-fledged means 
of knowing, it can be torn apart with a set of methodological tools to produce 
knowledge that transcends the mere validation of what is already known.186 I agree 
with Pinney, but also argue that the corroborative level of meaning making is 
important in some contexts. It is crucial in the evidentiary framework of 
photographic production on Facebook where Nigerians use the image to assert 
their knowledge of how the socio-political upheavals in Nigeria have evolved and 
the individuals involved. In any case, this paradigm does not make affirmation for 
photographic truth claims. The Facebook site is a space of photographic 
mediations as exemplified by the possibilities of commenting on images, 
reorganising, recirculating and retrieving them for some other kinds of use. 
Besides, the images are edited in various ways to heighten their effects and 
expressiveness. For instance, the feminine attire of Alamieyeseigha in the above 
set of portraits (figure 2.2) is only but one of the various depictions of the 
disguised dressing. In another picture, he is dressed in a different headgear, and 
                                                          
184 Nicholas Ibekwe and Bassey Udo, “Nigerian Government Acted Right in Dropping Corruption 
Charges Against Abacha – Adoke,”Premium Times, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/163976-nigerian-government-acted-right-dropping-
corruption-charges-abacha-adoke.html. 
185 Christopher Pinney, “Things Happen: Or, from which Moment Does that Object Come?” in 
Materiality, ed. Daniel Miller  (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 260. 
186 See Pinney, “The Parallel Histories of Anthropology and Photography” and Edwards, Raw 
Histories. 
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elsewhere in hijab. The editing practices of images circulated on Facebook are 
addressed more fully in chapter 3. 
Meanwhile, the interactions photographs create around corruption prompt us to ask 
what it means in the Nigerian context. We can no longer claim that there is a 
homogeneous understanding of corruption as a repudiated social condition. Among 
politicians, political interest forecloses proactive agenda against corruption. On the 
other hand, ethnic sentiment shapes how it is perceived by many other Nigerians. 
Individuals tend to be sympathetic of culprits of corruption with whom they share 
family or ethnic identity. In this case, the protest against corruption even among 
the users of social media becomes contested.   
In 2014 Lamido Sanusi, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, raised alarm 
about 20 billion dollars (some 6 trillion naira) missing from the state account. It 
was due to non-remittances by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC). The accusation implicated the Minister of Petroleum Resources Mrs. 
Diezani Alison-Madueke. Rather than investigate the allegation, the then President 
Jonathan sacked Sanusi. On the page of a prominent Facebook protest group,187 
Sanusi’s portrait (accompanied by a long comment) appeared as the thumbnail of 
Adam Nossiter’s article on the saga published online by the New York Times. The 
comments elicited by the post illustrate the ethnicisation of corruption in Nigeria. 
Some are sympathetic to Alison-Madueke’s Niger Delta and Igbo identity, and ask 
us to dismiss the claim made by Sanusi – “the Fulani-Hausa man (who) has his 
(own) load of sins…”188 That statement suggests that ethnic background matters in 
the way acts of corruption in Nigeria are perceived. People tend to defend corrupt 
politicians with whom they have a family or ethnic relationship. It is claimed that 
Jonathan defended Alison-Madueke due to their common ethnic identity. Both 
were born in the Niger Delta region while Alison-Madueke is Igbo by marriage.  
                                                          
187 Named Nigerian Global Awakening Day Protest, the group as mentioned in the methodology 
section is crucial for this research. Many of the images analysed in the chapters were retrieved from 
the group’s page. 
188 Akinwumi Komolafe, February 21, 2014 (06:15 p.m.), comment on Marian Awolowo, “The 
Reality that Will Befall Ordinary Poor Nigerians,” Facebook, February 21, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/7334640033397
61/. 
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Buhari’s current fight against corruption is criticised as guided by the same kind of 
ethnic motivation. He has been challenged for defining the Abacha loot, not as 
such, but as money “illegally taken from Nigeria” during Abacha’s regime.189 This 
defense is interpreted by many Nigerians as prompted by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic 
connection between Buhari and Abacha. The renowned Niger Delta ex-militant, 
Asari Dokubo demonstrated the same attitude before the 2015 general election. 
Dokubo threatened to cause chaos if Jonathan did not return to power for a second 
tenure. In a television interview, he is asked what would happen should Jonathan 
refuse to contest the election. In a threatening tone, he replies that he dare not 
refuse, stressing that Jonathan is the first Ijaw man (from Niger Delta) to serve as 
Nigeria’s president. It is an opportunity that must be fully exploited. 190 Dokubo 
ignores the criticism of the administration of his clansman as one with a high level 
of corruption. His sentiment is explained by the fact that politics in Nigeria is 
“based less on reason and more on communal solidarity, less on principle and more 
on affiliation.”191 These sentiments also organise the understanding of corruption 
in the country. P-J Ezeh likens the political entity, Nigeria, to game in the sense of 
unregulated hunting activities. Political positions are perceived as the opportunity 
to hunt down the animals in the wilderness called “Nigeria” and take them home, 
in this case, one’s clan or ethnic group.192 This is precisely what Garrett Hardin 
articulates in his theory, “the tragedy of the commons.” Hardin asks us to “picture 
a pasture open to all… (where) each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.”193 The 
egotistic desire for maximum exploitation by the many users of the shared 
resources (the commons) leads to a tragic situation:  depletion of the resources.  
In the foregoing, political corruption has been examined as itself a tragedy with 
which Nigeria has lived for more than half a century. There is something 
                                                          
189 Nnanna Ochereome, “Abacha Never Stole,” Vanguard, May 9, 2016, 
www.vanguardngr.com/2016/05/abacha-never-stole/. 
190 Silverbird Television, “Asari Dokudo Dares President Goodluck Jonathan Not to Contest in 
2015,” YouTube video, 1: 59, April 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxHAUAnLOmk. 
191 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 
5, no 1 (1997): 1. 
192 P-J Ezeh, personal communication with the author, January 2016. 
193 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no 3859 (1968): 1244. 
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significant about the analysis made through the lens of photographs on Facebook.  
As a site of civil struggle, Facebook allows for the divergent interpretation of the 
image as proposed by Ariella Azoulay. No single individual has the sovereign 
power to dictate the meaning of the photograph. Through the interaction around 
pictorial Facebook contents, we understand the evolution of corruption in Nigeria. 
Hence, photographs serve an evidentiary purpose of a kind. They are used to affirm 
that the online protest is informed by the people’s broader awareness of the 
histories and intricacies of the conditions they challenge. Through the 
dissemination of images and the interaction around them, the protesters insist that 
the tendency to celebrate rather than punish perpetrators of corruption sustains the 
social crime. Again, corruption is ethnicised. The conversation it engenders on 
Facebook is also ethnicised. This affirms that there are contestations even among 
the individuals organised on Facebook against social ills. Still, through the same 
logic of interaction that produces the controversy, the online activists strive not to 
reproduce the human condition against which they protest. They insist on a 
perception of corruption from which sentiments are divorced. 
Precarious spaces 
Life in Nigeria is marked by continually evolving precariousness, despite the 
existence of different security forces, as well as paramilitary and law enforcement 
agencies.194 Various forms of harassment and ways of dying, including robbery, 
kidnapping, and bombing, evolve in different organisational structures. The visual 
depictions and conversations around these predicaments on Facebook bring out 
fascinating insights into the failure of the Nigerian state. The term “failure” is not 
only about how the inefficiency of security institutions is foregrounded.  It is also 
about the complicity or outright involvement of the security personnel and the state 
in crime. From another perspective, crime presents itself as a mode of protest 
against the state for the injustices it perpetrates. For some individuals, armed 
criminality is somewhat the last resort for survival in an economically 
disenfranchising society. Generally, the users of social media direct their 
                                                          
194 The security institutions include the army, the air force, the navy, the police, the Nigeria Security 
and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC). 
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frustration about these conditions to the political elites for their complicity and the 
failed leadership that fuel them. The activists remind them that they do not live 
outside the precarious space. They are directly affected by the insecurity. 
 
Figure 2.3: Portraits of sleeping Nigerian police officers. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 30 May 2014, posted by Ifeyinwa Asogwa with the 
text, “Tiii.” While the texts suggests a kind of laughter, the photograph was 
circulated at the start of the #BringBackOurGirls movement.  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=765366646827883&set=a.2153637084
94849.58822.100000636643021&type=1&theater. 
Retrieval date:  31 May 2014. 
The above photograph (figure 2.3) contains visual cues to the security situation in 
Nigeria, and how the public relates to the attitude of the security personnel. Three 
members of the Nigerian Police Force are caught in sleeping poses by the camera. 
Above the portraits is the inscription: “Looking for the abducted school girls.” 
Then, “NRi” and “www.nigerianfm.com” appear in watermark underneath, and 
further down we see, “Nigerian Police – una well done.” On the denotative level, 
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the security officials can be said to be sleeping due to fatigue following long 
working hours. But the evidentiary use of photography for activism on Facebook is 
not premised on objective picturing of the world. It rather has much to do with 
what Sekula calls “presentational circumstances” in his explanation of how 
photographs produce diverse meanings in different contexts.195 The circumstance 
in which the picture of police officers was presented is indicated in “Looking for 
the abducted school girls?” It was circulated on Facebook in the wake of the April 
2014 abduction of schoolgirls by Boko Haram insurgents at Chibok, Borno State 
(the incident is more fully examined in chapter 5). In this circumstance, the 
photograph’s possible meaning as security workers resting or taking a nap during 
break is flipped to portray them as sleeping on duty. Hence, the inscription, 
“Nigeria Police - una well done” is sarcastic. At a time of serious security 
challenges, sleep is visually articulated to portray the unpreparedness of the state to 
protect its citizens. Through the photograph and the comments it generates, we 
gain insight into the rot in the Nigerian police force: the harassment, extortion, 
bribery and corruption. In the essay, “The Dialectic of Police Reform in Nigeria,” 
Alice Hills notes that the reform efforts initiated in the mid-2000s was an attempt 
to sanitise what had emerged as the most corrupt institution in the country. But the 
effort failed, producing only organisational change. The concept of “community 
policing” which signaled the enhancement of police services through community-
based collaborations ended as a mere adaptation of the international language of 
police work. The public abhorrence of the police rather continued to grow due to 
the persistence of power abuse, maltreatment, illegal apprehension, dishonesty, 
unlawful tolls and extortion by the police personnel.196   
The picture that emerges here is that of the state as complicit with crime. The 
complicity manifests in the way security agents themselves perpetrate crime 
through connivance with criminals. The criminal career of Lawrence Anini in the 
1980s and the Boko Haram insurgency can be used to buttress this point. Anini the 
criminal gang leader became an iconic figure of armed robbery, car hijacking and 
                                                          
195 Sekula, “Reinventing Documentary,” 683. 
196 Alice Hills, “The Dialectic of Police Reform in Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 
46, no. 2 (2008). 
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rape in Edo State (known then as Bendel State). In 1986, more than 80 police 
officers were accused of colluding with Anini’s group. The only punishment they 
received was relocation from Bendel to other locations in Nigeria. Otwin Marenin 
argues that Anini’s collision with the police was the key factor that aided his reign 
of terror. He opposes the popular belief that Anini had the magical power to 
disappear and reappear.197  The mystification merely created the impression that it 
was impossible to arrest him so that the police feared him too. It could be reasoned 
that the police took advantage of the propaganda and allowed more time for his 
reign and therefore more opportunities for the transactions with him.  
In the case of Boko Haram, state complicity in the militancy is found in different 
ways. The army has been accused of harassing and killing members of the civilian 
population in the course of counter-insurgency. While the soldiers complain about 
the inadequacy of ammunitions, there are high-profile cases of embezzlement of 
funds earmarked to address the problem. For example, there is an ongoing trial of 
Bambo Dasuki, the security adviser to former President Jonathan in connection 
with misappropriations in an arms deal involving billions of dollars. Boko Haram 
developed in the first place with different forms of support from members of the 
Nigerian political elites. A member of the group served in the cabinet of Ali Modu 
Sheriff’s administration (in Borno State) in 2003. The appointment was part of the 
deal between the two parties although they would later break up.198 The subsequent 
strain on the relationship made the militant sect to turn to Sheriff’s government and 
more broadly the Nigerian state as its enemies, accusing them of corruption. The 
accusation became the organising principle for the war against Nigeria by Boko 
Haram. This development offers us a different way to read the issue of insecurity 
in Nigeria: the framing of crime as a mode of resistance against the state. For more 
than a decade, Boko Haram has presented itself as a group that resists official 
injustice through violence that feeds on jihadist ambition.  
                                                          
197 Otwin Marenin, “The Anini Saga: Armed Robbery and the Reproduction of Ideology in 
Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 2 (1987).. 
198 Freedom Onuoha, “Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria,” in Boko 
Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, ed. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de 
Montclos (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014). 
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Many decades earlier, Anini had similarly described his attack on the police as 
resistance against their exploitation and that of political class in general.199 What 
he called exploitation ironically grew out of his collaboration with the security 
personnel. He perceived it as deceit when his gang members were prosecuted after 
he had bribed the police not to do so. The police could have interpreted it as 
patriotism, for failing to allow their acceptance of a bribe to interfere with their 
civic duties. But for Anini, it was betrayal. The police officers consequently 
became the targets of his bullets. This framing of crime as protest can further be 
illustrated with the Niger Delta militancy which began in the context of struggle 
against marginalisation.  
The discovery of oil in the region brought with it environmental devastation in the 
form of oil spillages, gas flares, and so on. While these disable economic activities 
such as fishing, grazing and growing of crops, the region is neglected in terms of 
infrastructure – health care services, electricity, schools and roads. In the 1960s, 
the people of the region began to peacefully agitate to have “all laws relating to oil 
exploration and land ownership abrogated,” to exercise control over the oil 
resources, and to pressure for a solution to the “developmental and environmental 
problems associated with oil exploration” in the Niger Delta. 200 The peaceful 
protests later developed into guerilla war against the government, such as the one 
led by Isaac Adaka Boro in February 1966. As the group defeated the police in the 
fighting, the military intervened and conquered the militants.  The encounter which 
was tagged the “twelve-day revolution” marked the beginning of militancy in the 
oil struggle and the government’s use of force to suppress it. Following the failure 
                                                          
199 Marenin, “The Anini Saga.” 
200 Nseabasi Akpan, “Kidnapping in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An Exploratory Study,” Journal of 
Social Science 24, no. 1 (2010): 37. The Niger Delta struggle has been led in different times and 
capacities by people like Ken Saro-Wiwa, Tompolo (also called Government Ekpemupolo), and 
Asari Dokubo. The militants have organised themselves under such organisations as Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP). During the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua administration in 2009, the Nigerian government 
granted the militants amnesty. The programme has been hit by maladministration and 
mismanagement of funds. In 2016, a new militant group called Niger Delta Avengers emerged in 
the aftermath of total removal of fuel subsidy by the Buhari administration. The organisation 
primarily demands for a secession of the Niger Delta region, maintaining that its people have been 
denied of adequate benefits from the wealth in their land. 
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of the Nigerian state and the multinational oil companies to amicably address the 
issue, the Niger Delta people “opted for hostage taking, hijacking and kidnapping 
of expatriate oil company workers and the demand of ransom, and the repeated 
invasion and blockading of oil installations.”201  
The Niger Delta popularised kidnapping with its economic underpinning typified 
by the idea of ransom that was conceived to fund the struggle. This mode of crime 
also developed in other parts of Nigeria as an alternative form of employment in a 
country with a high rate of joblessness. What Nigerians coined as “kidnap-
worthiness” became applicable to everyone including low-income earners and 
children. The sum demanded as ransom would depend on the economic status of 
the kidnapped or their families. In that case, the wealthy public officers become 
even more vulnerable. They are more kidnap-worthy and many are angry with 
them for their failure to bring good governance. Following the kidnapping of the 
former Petroleum Minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke’s sister in October 2014, the 
central reaction of the Facebook activists was that the family deserved no 
sympathy. The users of the platform vented their anger on the then minister for the 
allegations of corruption against her, such as the 20 billion dollars scandal 
discussed in the previous section. The vulnerability of the political elites becomes 
even more evident when they themselves fall victim to violent crime. For example, 
when Chris Ngige was governor of Anambra State, he was abducted in July 2003. 
However, his case gives further credence to the criminal tendency of the security 
system and its use by the state to fight against itself. The Ngige kidnapping was an 
attempt to oust him from office when he fell out with his political godfather, Chris 
Uba. Uba had sought to control the setting up of Ngige’s cabinet and demanded 2.5 
billion naira as the reward for funding the governor’s political career.202 The 
central involvement of the Nigerian Police – a state institution – in a crime against 
a government functionary has a two-fold implication. The state is not only 
involved in violent crime, it does so at times against itself. 
                                                          
201 Ibid. 
202 O. Akinola Adeoye, “Godfatherism and the Future of Nigerian Democracy,” African Journal of 
Political Science and International Relations 3, no. 6 (2009). 
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The angry Nigerians connected on Facebook ask the people of the country, both 
the leaders and the led, to understand insecurity as a condition that affects them all. 
That is the starting point for transforming the precarious space into a safer one. 
Before arriving at that conclusion, the photograph of sleeping policemen has been 
used to think about the insecurity in Nigeria. The country’s security agencies are 
weak, but active in their complicity in crime. The criminals outside the echelons of 
state power define their acts in two distinct ways, first, as protest against misrule, 
and second, as a means of economic sustenance. While these are no justification 
for crime, they open up the wider question of state failure. In this chapter, that 
question is examined through the lens of the five key concerns of the Nigerian 
Facebook activists. The next to be analysed is poverty.   
The paradox of oil riches 
In a painting class, an art student of the University of Nigeria creates a striking 
representation of the theme, “rich land, poor people.” In the piece executed in 
gouache on paper, we see a body of water with predominantly parched surrounding 
vegetation and scanty green pastures. In an oral presentation of the artwork, its 
maker asserts that he has painted Nigeria. Even at the peak of dry season in West 
Africa when the vegetation dries up and becomes vulnerable to bush burning, 
plants beside fresh waters remain ever lush. The painting is thus a visual paradox. 
It is an effective way to depict Nigeria, a rich country by virtue of its oil wealth, 
but simultaneously among the “bottom billion”203 – the poorest of the world. The 
artist goes on to say that while the dry vegetation in his painting symbolises the 
teeming majority of Nigerians living in poverty, the few plants with lush green 
foliage stand for the small privileged class. This disparity fuels the anger of the 
Nigerian Facebook activists. Circulating photographs online to protest against the 
inequality, they contend that the political elites create and sustain poverty in the 
country. These happen through the mismanagement of public funds. The lack of 
genuine concern for the poor also manifests in the ways public officials use their 
                                                          
203 Paul Collier uses the concept of “bottom billion” to describe the poor people and nations that 
constitute the major percentage of the world’s population. See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: 
Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
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positions to rather extort money from desperate job seekers. Hence, many live in 
poverty in an oil-rich Nigeria. 
Let us first examine the idea of “rich Nigeria.” The 1970s saw what came to be 
known as the “oil boom.” In a world where oil rose to remarkable economic 
importance, the term came with the signification of “blessing” – immense wealth – 
for the countries to which “nature” had given the resource. Nigeria is one of such 
“blessed” countries. By the 1950s, oil exploration had begun in commercial 
quantities. So, when the boom came, Nigeria was already disposed to make a 
fortune from oil. The oil economy recently began to decline, beginning especially 
from 2014. But before the downturn, Nigeria had generated astounding revenue 
from the commodity since the oil boom. It is estimated that more than 600 million 
barrels were produced between 1960 and 1973, amounting to about 128,205 
daily.204  The production capacity rose continually and by the mid-2010s, the peak 
of 1.46 million barrels daily was reached at the average price of about 100 dollars 
per barrel.205 Hence, some 146 million dollars (4.38 trillion naira) was realised 
daily from oil in Nigeria in the second quarter of 2014 alone. It was on this account 
that the country hit the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 510 billion dollars (1.5 
quadrillion naira), emerging then as the largest economy in Africa. It was a giant 
stride which was however reported with some doubt by leading media 
organisations such as the London-based newspaper, The Economist.206  
The skepticism is rooted in the age-long co-existence of the oil riches with poverty 
in Nigeria. Incidentally, that accomplishment however contested it was could not 
be sustained beyond 2015. This is because while the Nigerian economy depends 
heavily on oil, the price has continued to depreciate in the international market. 
Besides, there is a resurgence of militancy accompanied by the bombing of oil 
infrastructure in the Niger Delta region. So, Nigeria’s status as a rich nation by 
                                                          
204 Michael Watts, “Oil, Development, and the Politics of the Bottom Billion," Macalester 
International 24, no. 1 (2009). 
205 “External Sector Development Report, Volume 5 Issue 2,” Central Bank of Nigeria, 
http://www.cenbank.org/documents/quarterlyreports.asp. 
206 “Nigeria: Africa’s New Number One,” The Economist, April 12, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600685-nigerias-suddenly-supersized-economy-indeed-
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virtue of what it earns from oil is now in question. But what remains 
unquestionable is that majority of the Nigerian population has remained poor 
during the decades of large earnings from oil.      
That paradox has been theorised by Paul Collier in the book, The Bottom Billion: 
Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. He 
argues that most countries that are rich in mineral resources are usually poverty-
stricken. So, the “blessing” rather turns into a “curse.” This “resource-rich 
poverty”207 is caused by first, concentration on certain resources while others are 
neglected. Second, the abundant wealth is easily caught up in financial 
mismanagement by the ruling elites. And third, the “natural resource trap” 
consequently develops into the “conflict trap.”208 These principles play out 
perfectly in Nigeria. The first section of this chapter has examined how the 
country’s oil wealth is looted by the powerful while the rest of the citizens live in 
poverty. Oil exploration breeds conflict as the people of the oil-rich Niger Delta 
take to insurgency to protest against their marginalisation. Over-dependence on oil 
has hindered the development of other sectors of the economy so that employment 
opportunities are too meagre for the population. These are major issues which can 
further be broken down to understand how the Nigerian state keeps its citizens 
impoverished. 
Let us begin with Collier’s observation that “resource-rich democracies … 
(undertake) too many white-elephant projects.”209 Robinson and Torvik have 
proposed “white elephants” as a theory that explains government’s “investment 
(in) projects with negative social surplus.”210 The projects are initiated for the 
selfish end of building political prestige rather than adding value to the economic 
life of the people.   
                                                          
207 Collier, The Bottom Billion, 39. 
208 Ibid., x. “The conflict trap…shows how certain economic conditions make a country prone to 
civil war, and how, once conflict has started, the cycle of violence becomes a trap from which it is 
difficult to escape.” The Niger Delta region of Nigeria where the majority of the oil wells are 
located has been a site of conflict. 
209 Collier, The Bottom Billion, 44. 
210 James A. Robinson and Ragnar Torvik, “White Elephants,” Journal of Public Economics 89 
(2005): 197. 
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Figure 2.4: The commissioning of a governor’s office in Kaduna State (2014). 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 29 October 2014, posted by Marian Awolowo with the 
text, “24 hours after medical students protest against lack of teaching hospital, 
Jonathan commissions 9 billion naira governor’s office.”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/marianiyabode.awolowo/posts/10202658692535259. 
Retrieval date:  30 October 2014. 
The Nigerian government at various levels finds it fashionable to undertake such 
white elephant projects. Figure 2.4 depicts the meeting of the Federal Government 
of Nigeria and the Kaduna State Government in 2014 to celebrate a project 
conceived with no regard for the interest of the common people. In the bottom 
right image, we see former President Goodluck Jonathan (left), Governor Mukhtar 
Yero of Kaduna State (middle), Alhaji Shehu Idris, the Emir of Zazzau (right) and 
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others. As shown in the top image, they are gathered for the commissioning of a 
governor’s office (bottom left photograph) claimed to be constructed with more 
than 9 billion naira (about 30 million dollars) in Kaduna State. The social media 
activists who commented on the set of photographs offer us a “Nigerianised” 
perspective to the white elephant theory.  
Robinson and Torvik conclude that the underlying “political motivation behind 
white elephants” is mainly to win the loyalty of electorates for success in 
elections.211 Due to electoral crimes, the people’s votes do not necessarily 
determine election results in Nigeria. So, former Governor Yero could not have 
undertaken the project to win the 2015 election. The Facebook users insist that 
from at least a cursory view of the building, it is not commensurate with the 
amount claimed to be spent on it. They imply that white elephants in Nigeria are 
driven by the embezzlement opportunities they offer. This view is elaborated by 
establishing a link between the governor’s office project and the condition of the 
Kaduna State University medical school.  
The group of photographs analysed above were posted on Facebook with the 
comment: “24 hours after medical students protest against lack of teaching 
hospital, Jonathan commissions 9 billion naira governor’s office.”212 The medical 
students were agitating for the establishment of a functional medical school in the 
institution. The state government had earlier sent a set of 29 students to Uganda for 
three-year clinical courses at the cost of 255 million Naira. The protesting students 
argued that the sum would have been enough to raise the school to an operational 
status. Much more would be achieved should the money spent on the Governor’s 
office project be put into the medical school.  This kind of dialectical engagement 
with issues on Facebook is common among Nigerians. As fully examined in 
chapter 3, images taken in different times and locations are brought together to 
produce particular ways of seeing and challenging socio-political realities.   
                                                          
211 Ibid., 209. 
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The connection between corruption and white elephant projects in Nigeria can be 
explored further. It is possible to argue that even when the government initiates 
programmes to combat poverty, misguided spending exposes the underlying 
insincerity of such initiatives. Since the 1960s, the Nigerian government has 
introduced one programme after another to address the menace of poverty.213 But 
the implementation is usually marred by mismanagement of funds, preferentialism, 
and sectionalism. They offer public officers more money to throw about at the 
expense of the target poor masses. As Governor of Bayelsa State in 2006, 
Goodluck Jonathan spent 150 million naira (equivalent to .5 million dollars but 1 
million dollars at that time) from the state’s poverty alleviation fund to host Jay-Z 
and Beyoncé in a music festival in Lagos. In his report in Mail Online, Alex Ward 
cites a blogger’s description of the frivolous act as “an example of the country’s 
economic elite ‘blowing its money on bling puffery while most of the country 
suffers.’”214 It also illustrates how the political class helps to maintain the poverty 
it claims to address.  
While the above illustrates the diversion of resources meant to assist the poor, the 
story behind the image in figure 2.5 is partly of extortion from the poor citizens by 
a government agency. At times, employment vacancies in state institutions become 
an avenue to “rob” desperate job seekers. The photograph was circulated online 
after the job recruitment exercise organised on 15 March 2014 by the Nigerian 
Immigration Services (NIS). The event depicted in the photograph is one of 
desperation, extortion, and tragedy. The description with which it appeared online 
                                                          
213 Some of the programmes include the Farm Settlement Scheme (1960s), Operation Feed the 
Nation and Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (1970s), the Green Revolution (1980s), 
Structural Adjustment Programme (1986), the Agricultural Credit Guarantees Scheme (ACGS), 
The Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs), National Directorate of Employment (NDE), 
Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), Better Life for Rural Women, 
Family Support Programme, Community Action Programme for Poverty Alleviation (CAPPA) 
1997, Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) 1997, Mass Mobilization for Social 
Justice and Economic Reconstruction (MAMSER), Poverty Alleviation Programmes (PAP), 
National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria 
(YouWin), Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P). 
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meant-poverty-stricken-country-star-studded-festival-featuring-Beyonc-Jay-Z.html. 
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identifies it as the National Stadium Abuja, one of the four venues for the 
recruitment test. The space took more than its 60,000 seating capacity. The failure 
to properly co-ordinate the crowd resulted in a stampede that led to loss of lives 
and left many injured. In all four venues across the country, there was a similar 
uncontrollable movement of people and collective death toll that numbered nearly 
twenty.  
   
Figure 2.5: National Stadium Abuja at the job recruitment exercise by the Nigerian 
Immigration Services, 15 March 2014.  
Retrieved from: Bella Naija (blog), 16 March 2014, published in the article 
entitled: “Which Way Nigeria? Tragedy Strikes As Stampede at the Nigerian 
Immigration Service Recruitment Test Centres Claims More than 10 Lives | 
Minister Reportedly States ‘Impatience’ as Cause.” 
URL: https://www.bellanaija.com/2014/03/which-way-nigeria-tragedy-strikes-as-
stampede-at-the-nigerian-immigration-service-recruitment-test-centres-claims-
more-than-10-lives-minister-reportedly-states-impatience-as-cause/. 
Retrieval date:  6 January, 2015. 
The evidentiary role of photography in the above account returns us to my earlier 
argument. In some instances, we should take seriously how the image functions at 
the level of validating what is already known. The validation transcends the mere 
establishment of the actuality of the event depicted in the photograph. Instead, it 
helps to accentuate the failure and tragedy that have brought the event into scrutiny 
on an online activist platform. While the picture helps us to make sense of the 
crowd that attended the NIS exercise, it elicits something else about the event. It is 
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something we come to know through the experience of those with more intimate 
relation to the incident. The comments on the image by some participants in the 
exercise reveal eyewitness accounts of the stampede, the death, and the causative 
acts of negligence on part of the NIS authorities. Further, they make an 
unequivocal claim that the Nigerian government “toyed” with the lives of youths 
and “extorted” money from them. About 520,000 applicants were cramped in 4 
venues with no adequate preparation for crowd management. The Nigerian 
Immigration Services, a para-military organisation entrusted with the control of 
movement of people at the country’s borders could not adequately co-ordinate its 
recruitment exercise to avert catastrophe.  
Some of the Nigerian online activists insist that the poor organisation of the 
exercise suggests that the immigration agency was not keen about any actual 
recruitment.215 It was apparently more interested in the monetary returns from the 
exercise. For only about 5000 job vacancies, the immigration agency tapped into 
the desperation of un(under)employed Nigerians to make 520 million naira (about 
1.7 million dollars). The applicants paid 1000 naira (equivalent to 3.3 dollars) each 
as a registration fee. The federal government through the lower chamber of the 
parliament claimed to have warned the agency of the illegality of charging job 
applicants.216 Still, neither the authorities of the Nigerian Immigration Services nor 
the Ministry of Interior were sanctioned by the then government of Goodluck 
Jonathan.217 This gives one room to argue that the recruitment scam was state-
endorsed. 
It can be concluded that Nigeria is a conflation of paradoxical realities. One of the 
world’s richest in oil production is among the poorest of the nations. Although the 
oil economy has in recent times experienced a downturn, the resource has over the 
                                                          
215 Indeed, actual recruitment did not eventually take place. The federal government cancelled the 
exercise. 
216 Andrew Ajijah and Ibanga Isine, “Nigeria: Immigration Pockets N520 Million from Job Seekers, 
as Interior Minister Blames Applicants for Deaths at Recruitment Centres,” Premium Times,  March 
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217 The Minister of Interior Patrick Abba Moro was only arrested after his tenure during the 
Mohammadu Buhari administration. 
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years generated enough revenue to sustain Nigeria through a long period of 
economic depression. But the mismanagement of the wealth has enriched few and 
left the majority of the citizens impoverished. Heavy dependence on oil inhibits the 
development of other sectors of the economy, resulting in a high rate of 
unemployment. It is also a paradox that the government officials take advantage of 
the poor under the pretext of providing employment opportunities. The policies 
formulated to address poverty do not always benefit the poor. They rather enrich 
the political elites further. The networked Nigerians argue that in these ways, 
poverty is produced and maintained by the Nigerian state. Photography is used 
within the evidentiary framework to challenge these paradoxes. The image 
becomes a means through which the online protesters demonstrate their knowledge 
of the duplicities that underline the government’s so-called efforts to tackle 
poverty. 
Infrastructural failure 
The state of infrastructure in Nigeria is pitiable. To help bring out the depth of the 
dilapidation, I delimit my use of the term “infrastructure” to basic amenities such 
as electricity, transport, and health facilities. The photographic practices and 
Facebook conversations around these facilities reveal them as sites of intense 
politics. The centrality of the question of infrastructure in election manifestos 
affords us a way to begin the thinking about the politics. The promise of basic 
amenities is perpetually the core of political campaigns because the lack itself 
tends to be perpetual. Politicians present themselves as agents of change by 
painting pictures of utopian hope, citing the failure of their predecessors to provide 
infrastructure. But they inherit the failure, subsequently bequeath it to their 
successors and re-inherit it in a political culture marked by the recycling of leaders. 
A set of images retrieved from Facebook are analysed to understand the nature, 
scope, and effects of infrastructural failure in Nigeria. Then we examine how the 
condition is challenged, the response of the political elites and what these forms of 
exchange reveal about politics in Nigeria. 
The infrastructural failure in Nigeria is self-evident. It is discernible in the 
electricity supply that is in Nigerian parlance “epileptic”– irregular and 
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unpredictable like the medical condition associated with epilepsy. Pipe-born water 
system is virtually a bygone engineering. The phrase, “Nigerian road” bears the 
understanding of the road network in the country as generally deteriorated. It 
conjures up the imageries of potholes, poor drainage, waterlogging, and flooding, 
especially in high rainfall regions. In most rural areas, the Nigerian road is not 
tarred; so, the villagers seem to be disconnected from the rest of the world. 
Airports, public hospitals, academic institutions, and other government facilities 
are replete with obsolete and non-functional equipment. Nigeria is in Collier’s 
words one of “the countries at the bottom (that) coexist with the twenty-first 
century, but their reality is the fourteenth century.”218 In the civil exchange 
involving the use of images by Nigerians on Facebook, the feeling of living behind 
time is a recurring theme. The activists bemoan what they call “backwardness.”  
The health sector reflects the backwardness in a way that brings out very important 
issues. First, the nonchalance of public officials towards infrastructural 
development in Nigeria is precipitated by the thinking that they can afford the 
amenities at the personal level. They can afford generators for regular electricity, 
private jets for travel, overseas education and medical care. But for a certainty, and 
this is the second point, it is difficult to live absolutely outside the unpleasant 
realities occasioned by the infrastructural deterioration. In 2014, the Indian 
Ambassador to Nigeria announced the plan to establish Indian hospitals across 
Nigeria, to reduce the rate at which Nigerians travel to India for medical care. A 
newspaper article on the subject shared on a Facebook protest group page sparked 
a conversation centred on corruption and infrastructural decay in Nigeria. India is a 
developing economy like Nigeria. But its status as a medical tourist destination for 
Nigerians suggests that Nigeria has been left behind. It is estimated that every year, 
Nigerians (the majority of them public officials) spend 1 billion dollars (300 billion 
naira) on medical treatment in India.219 Rather than invest the funds in the local 
health system, it is put into the economies of India and other countries in Europe, 
America and the Middle East.  
                                                          
218 Collier, The Bottom Billion, 3. 
219 R. Srivastava, “Indian Society for Apheresis and Apheresis Tourism in India – Is There a 
Future,” Transfusion and Apheresis Science 34 (2006)142. 
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Ironically, that the Nigerian government functionaries can afford medical treatment 
abroad does not exempt them from the frustrations associated with poor local 
medical infrastructure. Immediacy and proximity to clinical facilities are crucial to 
health care. When the former Nigerian president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua took ill in 
2010, he was flown to Saudi Arabia. His long absence from office and eventual 
death abroad generated a lot of tensions. Nigerians felt deceived by the 
concealment of the demise so that for some time, Yar’Adua officially retained his 
political position at death. Although there was no indication that he died in transit, 
it is not out of place to think that immediate quality medical attention would have 
made a difference. At the time of Nelson Mandela’s failing health, his proximity to 
good medical facilities in South Africa ensured that he was regularly checked on 
medically until his death in December 2013. So, in whatever facet of life, 
infrastructural failure goes with a price which all Nigerians pay irrespective of 
status.  
 
Figure 2.6: The Port Harcourt International Airport. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 11 June 2014, posted by Marian Awolowo with the 
text, “Of course Jonathan and their latest recruits have changed tone.”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/798
985113454316/?comment_id=798994036786757&offset=0&total_comments=2. 
Retrieval date:  3 July, 2014. 
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Reading the group of photographs in figure 2.6, we notice the same evocation of 
backwardness, but other themes also emerge. In the first two images (top), we see a 
similar architectural structure in the background. But the one on the left is fenced 
off, and the foreground occupied by cars. In the other, the image of a plane is 
shown. The lower pictures are close shots in which one shows non-functional toilet 
facilities (signalled by the covered urinary basin and the inscription “PLEASE DO 
NOT USE”) and the other a dilapidated exterior of a building. The airplane and the 
tarmac on which it rests are signs that the photographs are different views of an 
airport. It is the Port Harcourt International Airport as further deciphered from the 
comments with which the images appeared on Facebook. The user who posted 
them writes from a first-hand position. When she arrived in Port Harcourt by Arik 
Air Boeing B737-200 (apparently shown partly in one of the pictures) in mid-2014, 
she was shocked at the look of the airport. The immediate response was to use the 
camera, an act that foregrounds the photographic evidentiary impulse which has 
been useful to us in this chapter. There is an unprecedented alertness among 
Nigerians to take photographs tendered on Facebook as evidence of the poor state 
of infrastructure in the country. This camera-readiness operates in a kind of 
forensic mode. Thomas Keenan has told us that “forensics is not simply about 
science in the service of law or the police but is, much more broadly, about objects 
as they become evidence, things submitted for interpretation in an effort to 
persuade.”220 
Facebook is a site where photographs are presented and interpreted as indexical 
signs of Nigerian state failure that manifests in various facets of national life 
including infrastructure. Differentiation is one outstanding interpretive approach in 
this regard. In the accompanying comment of the above set of images, the Port 
Harcourt International Airport is compared with Heathrow London to highlight its 
level of backwardness. It is on the other hand likened to the “Lungi International 
Airport in war-torn Sierra Leone.”221 War is a fitting context that would explain the 
                                                          
220 Thomas Keenan, “Counter-forensics and Photography,” Grey Room 55 (2014): 68. 
221 Marian Awolowo, “Of course Jonathan and their latest recruits have changed tone,” Facebook, 
June 11, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/7989851134543
16/?comment_id=798994036786757&offset=0&total_comments=2. 
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nature and scale of infrastructural collapse in Nigeria. The abundance of moribund 
facilities, the poor maintenance culture, the level of disrepair, and the abandonment 
of projects halfway are better imagined in war conditions than in peace. The 
photographs under analysis reflect these elements, and give us clues as to the 
broader politics with which the question of infrastructure is intertwined in Nigeria. 
In the first image (upper left), the fence made of corrugated sheets suggests that 
some reconstruction is ongoing. The absence of the fence in the adjoining 
photograph could imply a completion of the repair work in that part of the airport. 
But reading the two lower pictures along with the comment accompanying the 
post, we conclude that the reconstruction work has been stopped. The site has 
become one of the countless abandoned projects that dot the Nigerian landscape. 
The idea of “abandoned projects” speaks of a conflation of lobbying, contract 
breaking, kickbacks, and embezzlement as the factors behind infrastructural 
dilapidation in Nigeria. Related to these are poor execution and finishing, and lack 
of maintenance if the project is ever completed. Brian Larkin explains the politics 
that frames these practices. Drawing on Mbembe, he writes:  
…often the function of awarding infrastructural projects has far more to do 
with gaining access to government contract and rewarding patron-client 
networks than it has to do with their technical function. This is why roads 
disappear, factories are built but never operated, and bridges go to 
nowhere.222  
To fit more appropriately into the Nigeria context, I would add that this is why 
projects are abandoned uncompleted but declared completed in the state-controlled 
media. And the contractor is not brought to book, because the contract could be a 
deal between the client and the contractor. At times, the public officials award 
contracts to their personal or nonexistent companies. The use of media deceit as a 
cover-up is an attempt to claim that campaign promises are fulfilled. The Port 
Harcourt airport photographs were posted on Facebook to remind the networked 
activists of the “transformation agenda” of the Jonathan administration.  The 
promise to remodel the airport as included in that policy was never fulfilled. Hence 
                                                          
222 Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” The Annual Review of Anthropology 
42 (2013): 334. 
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photography with its transactional meaning on Facebook constitutes a way in 
which the citizens evaluate their leaders’ attitude to infrastructure-related electoral 
manifestos. The practices also help us to understand how the politicians respond to 
the criticism against their stewardship. The Facebook user who posted the set of 
photographs analysed above made the comment that she had the opportunity to 
meet the then governor of Rivers State, Rotimi Amaechi. She asked him why the 
airport in the capital city of his state was in that condition: 
For answer, he pointed at my friend, Ross seated across the table, who 
happens to be a member of the PDP; and said: 'Ask him, he knows better.' 
The Governor then went on to say that the airport is even better now than it 
used to be. He accused the Federal Government of deliberately thwarting 
his development efforts because of politics.223 
Two major issues arise from these lines. First, they open up a larger question of 
infrastructure as a site of politics in Nigeria. The dilapidation of the Port Harcourt 
airport exposes the inter-party power tussle that became intense in Nigeria in the 
mid-2010s.224 As the 2015 general election drew near, Amaechi’s All Progressives 
Congress (APC), the then opposition party, was at loggerheads with President 
Jonathan’s ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The struggle between the 
parties affected a lot of things in the country including infrastructural development 
and the response to insurgency. Secondly, we come to understand how the political 
elites respond to the criticism against them. Ameachi’s reaction suggests self-
exoneration strongly connected to a sense of self-promotion. He asks us to 
acknowledge the efforts he has made to transform the airport before the disruption 
by more influential powers. It is crucial to ponder how power struggle translates 
into infrastructural deterioration. But the self-exoneration through which the 
individual government functionaries seek the sympathy of the masses implicates 
them all the more. Consider the second image in figure 2.7 which first appeared 
alone on Facebook.225  
 
                                                          
223 Awolowo, “Of course Jonathan and their latest recruits have changed tone.” 
224 The next section examined power tussle in detail. 
225 Chidi Ugwu, “O Dinno Egwu,” Facebook, September 10, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/chidi.ugwu.7/posts/10201412150784871. 
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Figure 2.7: 2015 election campaign bill board and a flooded road at Nsukka in 
Enugu State. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 13 September 2014, posted by Chris Onyishi with the 
text, “ANYI EJEBE NSUKKA (Part 1)?”   
URL: https://www.facebook.com/chris.onyishi/posts/10203472362827664. 
Retrieval date:  3 July, 2014. 
The photograph was taken from the interior of a vehicle, the bonnet of which 
occupies the picture’s foreground. We see other vehicles (a minibus and a car), 
motorcyclists and pedestrians trying to negotiate their way through a flooded road. 
It is a major road at Nsukka where the University of Nigeria is located. The 
flooding depicted in the photograph is a yearly experience during the heavily rainy 
period of July to September. It reflects the failure of urban engineering and the 
laissez-faire attitude of those in power. The administrator of the Nsukka Local 
Government is the one to whom the people would direct their concern about the 
state of public infrastructure in the municipality. But when the image was shared 
on Facebook, he quickly made a comment, asking what the University of Nigeria 
was doing about the road.226 He also stressed how indiscriminate waste disposal 
affects the roads.227 His own approach to self-exoneration is to shift the 
government responsibility under his jurisdiction to an academic institution. 
Besides, he has the power to enforce a healthy culture of environmental sanitation 
in that part of the country under his oversight. But a sarcastic comment directed to 
                                                          
226 Anthony Ugwu, September 10, 2014 (03:47 p.m.), comment on Chidi Ugwu, “O Dinno Egwu,” 
Facebook, September 10, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/chidi.ugwu.7/posts/10201412150784871. 
227 Ibid., September 10, 2014 (03:50 p.m.). 
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him remarks that the local government authority does not pay attention to such. Its 
power is registered more in its revenue collection mechanism (which include acts 
of extortion) than in the maintenance of public infrastructure.  
These conversations are relevant to one of the crucial questions posed by this 
research, and that is whether the political elites care about the online protest 
against them. The answer has begun to emerge. They care. They really care in the 
way they join in the dialogues and strive to exonerate themselves. The interactions 
and the broader activist framework in which we read them have a lot to tell us 
about the form of politics in Nigeria. Here we return to Abu-Lughod. Following 
her study of the Ali Bedouin women’s resistance in Egypt in the late 1980s, she 
asks us to think in reverse the famous Foucauldian formulation that “where there is 
power, there is resistance.” Her proposition is that we consider what resistance 
reveals about the operations of power.228 A few days after the image of the flooded 
road was posted on Facebook, it was reposted in juxtaposition with a photograph 
of an election campaign billboard.229 Such assembling of different photographs 
illustrates Sekula’s earlier-cited argument that documentary (and in fact any realist 
mode of photographic representation) constitute a “folklore of photographic 
truth.”230 My position all along is that the use of photographs by Nigerians as 
evidence in the activist movement on Facebook does not adhere to any realist 
convention. Instead, it is much about visual construction achieved through editing 
(as will be fully examined in chapter 3). Such construction enables the creation of 
relationships between visual codes taken from different times and locations, but 
which when combined produced activist effects.   
In the campaign billboard photograph, we see the then Nigerian President Jonathan 
(left) and Sullivan Chime, the governor of Enugu State standing on the right. The 
smaller portrait on bottom right is that of Dan Anike, the chairman of the Enugu 
State chapter of the National Coalition for Jonathan and Sambo Presidency 
(NCJSP).  NCJSP was a major PDP campaign organisation with branches across 
                                                          
228 Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance.” 
229 Chris Onyishi, “Anyi Ejebe Nsukka (Part 1)?” Facebook, September 13, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/chris.onyishi/posts/10203472362827664. 
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the country. Its goal was to win support for the second tenure of Jonathan, and for 
PDP at the state level. Billboards were crucial in the diffusion of the party’s 
message to the grassroots through the visual production of the hierarchy of power. 
The inscriptions on the centre of the design elucidate the hierarchicisation. And the 
social media activists understand its import. The images were posted online with a 
long comment whose title – “Anyi ejebe Nsukka (Part 1)” – repeats part of the 
inscription on the bill board. The interaction with the post on Facebook reveals a 
lot about politics in Nigeria.  
First, the sectionalism in the Nigerian politics transcends ethnicity. It is 
underpinned by interest restricted to even narrower spheres like the kindred group 
or village. “Anyi ejebe Nsukka,” meaning “we are moving to Nsukka” reverberates 
with the promise of Chime to install a man from the Nsukka province as the next 
governor of Enugu State.231  Although elections are organised and the politicians 
spend a fortune on campaigns, Nigerian democracy is not necessarily about 
elections. It is about the capacity of the powerful few to install leaders based on 
certain party-informed considerations that are closely connected to place. The 
hierarchicisation of power depicted on the billboard is a means of soliciting 
support by appealing to place-related sentiment. The next governor would be 
picked from Nsukka, but the people would reciprocate by endorsing Jonathan’s 
continuation as president. This is outrightly a political game, entangled in some 
ways with the agitation for improved infrastructure. The juxtaposition of the 
campaign image with that of a flooded road helps to draw out the question of 
infrastructure. In his 8 years as governor of the state, Sullivan Chime is said to 
have ignored the Nsukka people, only to remember them when the 2015 election 
campaign began. He is accused of concentrating infrastructural projects in Udi, his 
own community. Such skewed distribution of infrastructure is part of the Nigeria 
political culture. The deteriorating condition of the infrastructure stimulates civil 
agitations that expose the intricacies of the politics. 
The deplorable state of infrastructure in Nigeria is an outcome of political 
corruption. Ordinary Nigerians challenge the condition through the circulation of 
                                                          
231 He had completed his two tenures as the governor of Enugu State. 
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and interaction with photographs on Facebook. They bewail what they regard as 
living behind time and the adversity resulting from the circumstances they 
challenge. Involved in these conversations, the political elites respond to the 
protest by exonerating themselves. At another level, they strive to evade the 
consequential conditions of the infrastructural failure, but that is difficult. While 
health issues have been used to illustrate that, images associated with 
transportation are analysed to understand what the question of infrastructure 
reveals about politics in Nigeria. It opens up the broader discourse of sectarianism 
as the bane of Nigerian democracy.     
Competition for power  
The 16-17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes notes that power 
struggle is a product of human egotism, the innate tendency to strive for new forms 
of satisfaction.232 Although Hobbes has been criticised for his defensive relation to 
the absolutist political philosophy he expounds, this aspect of his thought explains 
the state of politics in Nigeria. The Nigerian democracy is characterised by 
acrimonious controversies among individuals, groups and institutions with 
different political ideologies and ambitions. The power tussles offer us another 
way to view the failure of leadership in Nigeria. The visual practices produced on 
Facebook bring to light the various ways political friction plays out in the country: 
exchange of verbal abuse, physical combat, militarisation of political processes, 
and other forms of violence. The social media activists insist that the Nigerian 
public officials are lawbreakers who have lost their “humanness” and taken on the 
attributes of beasts. The fracas in the National House of Representatives and the 
River State House of Assembly in 2014 and 2013 respectively inspired fascinating 
visual productions disseminated across the mainstream and social media. A 
selection of the images are examined to understand the form of the power tussle. 
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Figure 2.8: Chaos in the Nigerian parliament, 20 November 2014 (video still). 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 20 November 2014, posted by Abiyamọ with the text, 
“Oga Ade, well played. You have done it. You done did it. Kontunu.” 
URL: https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=638551976255389 
Retrieval date:  20 November, 2014.  
On 20 November 2014, videos of men climbing over a tall metal gate went viral on 
the internet. They were first brought to public view by television stations from 
which they were shared on social media. Figure 2.8 is a video still of the one 
produced by Channels Television Lagos whose logo is shown on the top left. We 
see three men climbing the gate to scale over it, and others clasping parts of the 
metal structure to do the same. They are richly and formally dressed, an indication 
that they are far from being athletes in physical training or children on a 
playground. The inscriptions, “National Assembly Fracas/House Members Scale 
Fence to Access Building” signal who they are. They are Nigerian 
parliamentarians in 2014, particularly members of the House of Representatives.233 
They are to meet for the then President Goodluck Jonathan’s request for the 
                                                          
233 At that period, Senator David Mark of then ruling People’s Democratic Party was the leader of 
the upper chamber of the parliament (House of Senate). Aminu Tambuwal of the then opposition 
party – All Progressives Congress – was the Speaker of the lower House (of Representatives). 
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extension of emergency rule on the three northeastern states (Borno, Adamawa and 
Yobe) hit most by the Boko Haram insurgency.  
The video is somewhat like a movie. Tambuwal, the speaker of the house arrives at 
the entrance of the National Assembly complex along with a group of people 
including other lawmakers and finds the gate locked and guarded by the police. As 
their attempt to break the gate fails, they climb over it and scurry into the 
parliament, undeterred by the tear gas released by the police. The solidarity song 
echoing as they gain entrance into the parliament indicates that majority of the 
stranded parliamentarians are members of APC. They begin to gather signatures to 
impeach Jonathan. But the move along with the plenary session over which 
Tambuwal is to preside is disrupted as the Senate President shuts down the 
parliament. 
What is played out here is the power tussle between the two major political parties 
– the then ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the opposition All 
Progressives Congress (APC). Inter-party acrimony in Nigeria has a long history. 
Apart from the ethnic formation of political parties that began even before the 
Nigerian independence of 1960, inter-party relations have been marked by 
bitterness and violence. In the second republic (1979-1983), instances of thuggery, 
arson, and clashes involving the use of dangerous weapons were common between 
parties.234 That trend has continued till date. The antecedence of the event in the 
above-described video exposes the egocentric underpinnings of the power struggle. 
The police defended their action at the National Assembly complex as a response 
to intelligence warnings against the likely invasion of the parliament by unknown 
persons. Tambuwal had in the previous month defected to APC from PDP. In a 
couple of days, the PDP-led federal government withdrew his security aides. The 
“unknown person” mentioned by the police would be the thugs recruited by 
Tambuwal as bodyguards. The actions of the key protagonists of the National 
Assembly incident can be argued to be motivated by self-centredness. 
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Bringing the idea of “public choice” into the domain of governance, Tullock, 
Brady and Seldon analyse the general conduct of government functionaries. 
Invoking the Hobbesian egocentrism and Machiavellian duplicity, they argue that 
the decisions made by state officials are hardly guided by public interest.235 The 
event at the parliament as shown in the video reveals the egoistic interests of the 
Nigerian political elites. The fury of the PDP-led federal government that withdrew 
Tambuwal’s security guards was prompted by the speaker’s defection to a rival 
party. This happened when the 2015 general election had drawn near, and when 
Tambuwal would be important to PDP and Jonathan’s bid for a second term. 
Defection, which became rampant in 2014, cannot be divorced from the question 
of selfish choice and rancorous politics. It automatically turns an individual into an 
enemy for the relinquished party and a hero in the other. On the other hand, its 
underlying purpose is more of egotism than the attraction to a better political 
ideology (if there is any such thing). Tambuwal’s interest in APC was the 
opportunity it offered him to contest for the governorship position in his home 
state, Sokoto. As I write, he is the governor of that state. 
From the foregoing, we see how the power struggle in Nigeria exposes the self-
centeredness of government officials. But there are yet other significant 
dimensions that emerge especially with the reactions of the social media activists 
to the video under discussion. Some commented on the video by posting other 
pictures. So in the context of Facebook protest, the photographic image doubles as 
the original post and the comment it elicits. Out of the sixty comments generated 
by the aforesaid video on the popular Facebook page, Abiyamọ,236 five are 
photographs. One of them offers a completely different way to read the 
competitive behaviour of the Nigerian politicians. Different moments in the 
episode at the parliament were frozen, organised in four panels and labelled “now.”  
 
                                                          
235 Gordon Tullock, Arthur Seldon and Gordon L. Brady, Government Failure: A Primer in Public 
Choice (Washington: Cato Institute, 2002). 
236 Abiyamọ is a conglomerate of online platforms – blog, Facebook, Twitter, and so on – that rely 
heavily on circulation of visual contents to bring attention to topical issues in Nigeria. It is one of 
the Facebook pages on which the National Assembly video first appeared with more than 13350 
views and shared by up to 420 users.    
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Figure 2.9: Pictorial comment on the Channels Television video on the chaos in the 
Nigerian parliament (20 November 2014) shared on Facebook by Abiyamọ 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 20 November 2014, posted by Muyinat Babatunde, 
with no additional text. 
URL: https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=638551976255389 
Retrieval date:  20 November, 2014.  
They are placed as a group in juxtaposition with the photograph of uniformed 
school children climbing a high wall (figure 2.9). Despite the poor resolution of the 
image (which is not necessarily a downside as argued in chapter 3), it resonates 
with a striking parallelism. As an element of rhetorics in philosophy, parallelism 
supports an argument by searching out similar semiotic codes and threading them 
together. If there is “parallelism of sound, syntax, and semantics (that) can 
epitomize an arguer’s claim that multiple instances belong to the same grouping,” 
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then there is visual parallelism.237 It is clearly inscribed in the composite 
photograph in figure 2.9: the inscriptions, “before” and “now,” adults and children 
climbing, the similarity of figural pose between the two groups of images. This 
visual rendering allows a particular critique of power frictions in Nigeria. In the 
inordinate quest for power, the Nigerian government officials can be childish in 
their conduct. They make thoughtless decisions that have devastating effects on the 
socio-political and economic life of millions of Nigerians.  
As the conversation unfolds, there emerges another reading, one that expresses 
frustration more strongly than the question of childishness. A comment on the 
video reads: “Nigeria is a disgrace, some times I am ashamed to say I am from dat 
country a place where d leaders behave like animals [sic].”238 A lot of ordinary 
Nigerians have lost their sense of pride in the country due to the ignoble behaviour 
of the political elites. Government functionaries in Nigeria and indeed in other 
parts of Africa display the loss of humanness, and act like beasts. Reading Matter 
and Memory, Suzanne Guerlac analysises Bergson’s definition of the difference 
between voluntary and involuntary actions: “The more complex the sensory system 
of an organism, the greater the zone of indeterminacy that surrounds the incipient 
action…This indeterminacy delays the automatic response, thereby opening up a 
horizon of choice.”239 In the struggle for power, the Nigerian political elites display 
the attributes of organisms with non-complex sensory systems. They are inclined 
to act automatically and irrationally in the parliament, exchanging verbal abuse, 
punches, slaps and engaging in outright fighting. In figure 2.10, the animalistic 
conduct is represented in the crudest possible sense.   
 
                                                          
237 Jeanne Fahnestock, “Verbal and Visual Parallelism,” Written Communication 20, no. 123 
(2003): 125. 
238 Mary Nosa Iyamu, November 20, 2014 (10:37 p.m.), comment on Abiyamọ, “Oga Ade, well 
played. You have done it. You done did it. Kontunu,” Facebook, November 20, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=638551976255389. 
239 Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (New York: Cornell 
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Figure 2.10: Blood spill on the floor of the Rivers State House of Assembly (video 
still) in July 2013. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 11 July 2013, posted by Dada Olaniyi with the text, “I 
can’t believe dis!.” 
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=10151774551931495&comment_id=296
61932&offset=0&total_comments=27 
Retrieval date:  27 November 2014. 
The image is a screenshot from a video on the scuffle at the River State House of 
Assembly in July 2013. Rotimi Amaechi of APC was then the governor of the 
state. What we see in red colour are droplets of blood, human blood that leaves the 
imprint of acrimonious politics in a democratic setup. The rancour between PDP 
and APC divided the parliament into two – the pro-Amaechi (APC) and anti-
Amaechi (PDP) factions. The five-person PDP group impeached the Speaker of the 
House and found a replacement from amongst themselves. Amaechi’s supporters 
composed of twenty-seven members responded with violence. One of them hit a 
member of the rival faction several times with the mace, breaking it on his head. A 
police official joined in the battering. The above image depicts the splash of blood 
from the wounded lawmaker. The use of the symbol of power in democracy – the 
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mace – by a legislator to inflict physical injury on a fellow civilian is incongruous, 
an extreme demonstration of brutality. The participation of a security official in the 
beastly act rather than quelling it, and the failure to discipline the parliamentarians, 
demonstrate a normalisation of violence in Nigerian politics. Drawing on Foucault 
in his analysis of violence in contemporary politics, Allen Feldman demonstrates a 
“linkage between violence and democracy.”240 He uses the concept, 
“photopolitics” to explain the instrumentality of light, visibility and also 
photography in the political violence he theorises. Aside from the violence meted 
out by the state against its citizens, the conflict in the Rivers State Parliament is an 
example of extreme form of violence by public officials against themselves. And 
photography helps us to visualise the brutality. 
Tussles for power are one of the ways the Nigerian state failure is produced. It is 
motivated by the self-centred ambitions of government officials. Inter-party 
bitterness becomes a political culture that breeds violence which includes thuggery 
and physical combat among the functionaries. Disappointed, the Nigerians 
connected on social media view themselves as hapless people ruled by hooligans 
who behave like beasts, having lost their sense of dignity.  
Conclusion 
In a general sense, this project is about the how of the social movement enacted on 
Facebook through photographic productions. This chapter has however focused on 
the what. It has examined the principal concerns of the online activists as presented 
in pictorial form. It can be likened to looking at the placards held up by 
conventional protesters to see what the protest is about. High-scale corruption can 
be seen from a vantage point. Through a systematic institution of impunity, 
corruption tends to have been established as a code of conduct among the 
privileged citizens who run the country. It destabilises every facet of life in 
Nigeria. It is linked to insecurity and explains why the political elites are at times 
complicit in violent crime. Other citizens also take to crime in reaction to the 
corruption of the leaders. The corrupt officials create conditions that leave the rest 
of the Nigerian population in poverty even when the country is officially rich. 
                                                          
240 Feldman, Archives of the Insensible, 70. 
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They run down the infrastructure and strive to live without being affected by the 
impact of the dilapidation. They are constantly in an aggressive struggle for power, 
to maintain their privileged positions. In so doing, they have lost the human sense 
of dignity and put on the attributes of beasts. In the rest of this work, I will pick up 
on the key elements discussed in this chapter as they apply in particular instances. 
This is to enable me explain the workings of photography in the context of civil 
struggle. In the next chapter, the technologies of the camera and of image editing 
and circulation are brought into conversation with those of electricity and the 
internet. These will be anchored in specific manifestations of the trouble with 
Nigeria. 
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Introduction 
Digital technology has altered the modes of photographic image production, 
transformation, display, circulation and use. In Nigeria where digital photographic 
practices have assumed political importance, the above processes are caught in 
complicated technological relations. This chapter explores how Nigerians negotiate 
the imperative of deploying digital infrastructure in social media activism in 
relation to the availability and inadequacies of the required facilities. A number of 
issues emerge from the forms of technological mediation and appropriation that 
come into play in the civil struggle. First, the civil movement is driven by the 
proliferation of and unprecedented access to user-friendly digital camera devices 
(that is, gadgets that have the capacity to take photographs). Secondly, the 
produced images undergo different forms of editing that transform them into 
unique activist expressions. In that context of activism, such expressiveness takes 
precedence over insistence on realistic representation. Lastly, Nigerians take these 
issues so seriously that they are given to various forms of improvisation to 
overcome the infrastructural paucity that impedes the visual-virtual struggle.  
To develop the argument, I examine a set of photographs and videos retrieved from 
Facebook, YouTube, and other online media platforms such as newspapers and 
television channels. They are analysed alongside their accompanying comments 
and interviews with the social media activists involved in the social relations they 
constitute.  Attention is given to what we make of the workings of technology from 
the compositionality of the image, its production and circulation, and other 
associated infrastructural elements connected to these. The analysis is situated 
within the framework of writings on the ontological conceptualisation of 
technology as it relates to the debates that trouble the realist understanding of 
photography. Clive Lawson thinks of technology as a constitution of the material 
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and the social.241 In relation to social movement in Nigeria, this dualism allows us 
to think through the human activities made possible by digital infrastructure 
without subscribing to technical determinism. The dialogue between technological 
ontology and photography will provide theoretical grounding for the idea that 
protest digital photography operates beyond the act of pressing the shutter button 
of the camera to take photos. It further casts light on the evidentiary impulse and 
its constructedness that organise Nigerians’ activist use of photographs on social 
media as I began to show in chapter 2.  
This chapter is structured into three parts to allow for close engagement with the 
issues it raises. First, “the ubiquitous camera” explains that the emergence of the 
digital mechanism of cameras combined with the mass access to them account for 
the traffic of images in social media spaces. These are also incidental to the use of 
the devices for purposes of civil resistance. The ubiquitous camera operates as a 
spy tool deployed by the citizens to expose the frivolities and duplicities of the 
holders of state power. It helps to destabilise the hegemonisation of knowledge and 
enables the ordinary people to reject the deceits of governance in Nigeria. The 
images taken with the ubiquitous camera are validated through their acceptance as 
news images by reputable agencies.  The processes of editing the photographs are 
analysed in the second section.  The working of images to create new 
representations is a product of technical configuration of hardware (the physical 
devices) and software (the immaterial applications). Rather than treat photographic 
editing with suspicion, it ought to be received as what allows the social media 
activists to articulate their messages in the way they want them presented.  The 
different approaches to the visual alteration are evaluated in relation to the forms of 
expressions they enable. Lastly, “techno-appropriations” engages with how the 
infrastructural limitations that impede the preceding processes are addressed. The 
key impediments include unstable electricity supply and poor internet connectivity. 
These conditions do not hinder the cause of civil resistance. Instead, they stimulate 
                                                          
241 Clive Lawson, “An Ontology of Technology: Artefacts, Relations and Functions,” Techné: 
Research in Philosophy and Technology 1, no. 12 (2008), 
https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v12n1/lawson.html. 
    
   128 
 
a fascinating economy of technological appropriations that sustain the online 
struggle despite all odds. 
The ideas advanced in this chapter are important at this time. They point to a new 
direction in the debate which the advent of digital technology has provoked around 
photography. We are asked to do something else with the disruption of the 
indexicality and evidentiality of the image.  
The ubiquitous camera 
If visuality is central to social media activism – which is part of the overarching 
thesis of this project – the camera is a crucial aspect of its technology. The 
contemporary time is marked by unprecedented public access to camera devices. 
But that is not the only condition upon which the notion of ubiquity is predicated. 
Important too is the digital mechanism of the camera and its link with the 
infrastructure of dissemination, itself also digital. In Nigeria, the camera is used 
surreptitiously or overtly to expose the failure of the state. In certain instances, the 
produced image may be of poor quality due to technical, human or situational 
circumstances. Yet, it does not detract from its force as a means of civil resistance. 
There are three ways in which the ubiquitous camera operates. First, it produces 
counter-propagandist images. The state’s claim of accountable governance is 
dislodged and shown as deceit. Secondly, the people use the camera devices to 
bear witness to events that portray acts of injustice. The ensuing photographs get 
validated through their appropriation as news content by the mainstream media. 
Lastly, the ubiquitous camera is deployed as a tool of surveillance, but in a way 
that interrupts our understanding of the concept. The Nigerian citizens use it to 
observe and police the political figures, framing them as deviants in relation to the 
laws of the state they ought to protect. Once the images enter cyberspace, those 
depicted in them are plunged into serious crises. 
To understand the workings of the possibilities outlined above, we have to examine 
the technological factors that constitute the very notion of ubiquity. In the 1990s, 
digital cameras were developed. What followed was a continued refinement of the 
technology so that besides taking still pictures, the device could record motion and 
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sound, and even transmit audio-visual impulses in real time. It came with user-
friendliness embedded in the automation of “many conventions of photography 
that were previously expected to be learned.”242 With the automatic control system, 
the digital camera offers itself to as many hands as possible. By the 2000s, more 
cameras had appeared in the form of laptops, iPads, mobile phones, and similar 
devices into which amazing forms of multifunctionality were built. Martin Hand 
notes that these devices constitute “interconnected technical artifacts”243 that are 
staggeringly pervasive. They are interconnected in many ways: through the logic 
of compatibility, sharing of software technology, and modes of taking, reading, 
storing, retrieving and sharing photographs. The camera devices are on the one 
hand interlinked, and on the other, connected to the global system of 
communication: telecommunication, social media, electronic news media, and 
other related outlets. We need to ponder the complexity of the interconnectedness. 
The proliferation of the camera phone, and the launching of Flickr and Facebook 
did not merely happen in the same period (mid-2000s). 244 Beyond telephony 
services, the camera phone would subsequently become the gateway to internet 
access and therefore to image hosting and sharing websites exemplified by Flickr 
and Facebook. In the words of Shanks and Svabo, to possess a networked device 
such as a mobile phone is to “carry a phone-cum-camera-cum-computer” that is 
linked to the internet.245 
Once the technological configuration comprising camera devices and the internet 
became accessible to the Nigerian public, a new social practice emerged. It is a 
digital-visual culture predicated upon sharing the daily anxieties of living in the 
postcolony. However, there are contentions about the practice, mostly associated 
with the quality of the image produced with the ubiquitous camera. It is described 
as “amateur,” “blurry,” or “grainy.” But this does not imply that ubiquitous 
                                                          
242 Martin Hand, Ubiquitous Photography (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012): 98. 
243 Ibid., 96. 
244 Martin Lister, “Overlooking, Rarely Looking and Not Looking,1” in Digital Snaps: The New 
Face of Photography, ed. Jonas Larsen and Mette Sandbye (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2014): 
3. 
245 Michael Shanks and Connie Svabo, “Mobile-Media Photography: New Modes of Engagement,” 
in Digital Snaps: The New Face of Photography, ed. Jonas Larsen and Mette Sandbye (London: 
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photography can only produce images of low quality. After all, “professional” 
practices (such as photojournalism and documentary) which are conventionally 
associated with high-quality photographic productions also fit into the ubiquitous 
paradigm. The idea of poor visual quality marks outs the conditions in which the 
pictures are taken. These include technical limitations of the camera device and the 
level of prowess or the disposition of the individual who handled it. Trained 
photographers usually worry that the availability of the camera to everyone and its 
simplicity of use rather trivialise the photographic medium.246 But such concerns 
are not new. The history of photography encompasses the anxiety about a 
perceived threat to its technical and professional attributes. For example, Walter 
Benjamin was critical of the very notion of mass production in the beginning of the 
20th century. The introduction of the dry-plate photographic process in the 19th 
century, the point-and-shoot camera in the 1970s, and the digital camera in the 
1990s are crucial developments that also came with anxiety.247  
In the present time, that concern is intensified by how the image itself gets 
implicated in the digital process of transformation necessary to meet certain 
technical demands. Daniel Palmer describes the JPEG image format as “the default 
mode by which we currently experience photographic images on-screen, from 
computer monitors to mobile devices.”248 So, JPEG – which took the name after its 
creator, the Joint Photographic Expert Group – is itself a ubiquitous file type. But it 
entails image compression that results in loss of quality.249  Yet, it is necessary for 
                                                          
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Daniel Palmer, “The Rhetoric of the JPEG,” in The Photographic Image in Digital Culture, ed. 
Martin Lister (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013): 151. 
249 Ibid., 154. Palmers’ treatment of the idea of “loss of visual quality” in relation to his “rhetoric” 
concept needs further explanation, lest it would be perceived as misleading. He remarks that “the 
rhetoric of the JPEG” (which happens to be the title of his essay), “is that of reducing an image’s 
size to the minimum while magically suppressing attention to that loss.” It sounds as if there is a 
singular size to which the process of compression reduces every image. And no matter how the 
compressed picture is viewed, the loss is not readily perceptible. My take is that the perceptibility 
of the effect of compression is dependent on the size in which the compressed image is viewed and 
the screen resolution of the viewing device. Take for instance a photograph compressed to 448 X 
336 px to make it lighter and faster for online upload from a low-capacity mobile phone. When 
viewed in full screen mode on a high-resolution 15-inch computer monitor, the image is bound to 
appear blurry. 
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immediacy and speedy upload on the internet, and for its compatibility with a 
range of devices, software and virtual platforms. Besides, reduction in the 
resolution of the image does not undermine the force of its political use examined 
below.250 
First, the image plays a counter-propagandist role. At the outset, the term 
“propaganda” was used in a neutral sense to suggest the persuasive ways of 
influencing the beliefs, attitudes, and views of others. However, beginning from 
the 20th century, the concept acquired a negative connotation as it was deployed as 
a tactic in the First World War. Colin Moore writes: “Now, it is a word with a poor 
image. Its message is unreliable. It calls up hidden persuasion, half-truths and 
distortions. The people who produce it are untrustworthy and unaccountable. Its 
ends are used to justify its dubious means.”251 The way constituted authorities in 
Nigeria strive to win the loyalty of the people fits into the tainted signification of 
propaganda described above. The government deploys different mediums to 
persuade the masses into accepting that their lives are being transformed through 
false or incomplete socio-economic facilities. The ubiquitous camera is an 
important means through which such claims are challenged. Analysis of 
photographs relating to the recent claim of educational transformation in Nigeria 
would be useful here.  
The Goodluck Jonathan administration (2010-2015) vigorously projected the idea 
of having overhauled the education sector. The claim was made with reference to 
the establishment of 12 universities sited across the country and 150 Almajiri 
schools in the north. 252 During the 2015 general election campaign, Jonathan’s 
party (People’s Democratic Party) held on to this as a great accomplishment that 
should be rewarded by voting it in for the second tenure. Previously, in 2013, the 
                                                          
250 However, JPEG’s continual deterioration is something structurally counter to the archival and 
historical value of the digital image. So, digital infrastructure has not solved the preservation 
problem confronting the archive.  
251 Colin Moore, Propaganda Prints: A History of Art in the Service of Social and Political Change 
(London: A&C Black Publishers Limited, 2010): 8.  
252The Almajiri are male Qur’anic school children who roam the streets of Northern Nigeria, 
begging for food. As students, they leave their families to live under the care of their teachers who 
unfortunately do not provide them with food. Therefore they live on begging.  
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university lecturers across the country had embarked on a six-month strike in 
protest against the rotten state of infrastructure and poor funding of research in the 
universities.  
 
Figure 3.1: School children in the classroom. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 1 August 2014, posted by Rotimi Aberuagba 
with the text, “Can you imagine a country that shares over 700 billion to its three 
tiers of Govt every month.”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/
831435550209272/ 
Retrieval date: 8 September 2014. 
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Following a series of negotiations between the government and the staff union, the 
industrial action was called off. With the substantial resolution of the controversy 
and the establishment of the said new universities and schools, the Nigerian federal 
government dwelt on the propaganda that it had revamped the educational system. 
But with the new media, propaganda increasingly shows itself as a form of 
exchange, a “reciprocal activity;” that does not have to be received passively. 253  
The ubiquitous camera produced counter-propagandist photographs to expose the 
continued decay in the Nigerian education sector. 
To illustrate the dilapidation using the state of infrastructure in the institutions, let 
us examine the picture of school children in an ill-equipped classroom (figure 3.1). 
The pupils use makeshift desks made of cement blocks. The room is poorly 
illuminated and the open section of the wall exposes the children to harsh weather 
conditions. The atmosphere is evidently that of physical discomfort which impedes 
learning. The pupils’ poses and the different directions of their faces indicate lack 
of concentration. The one in the foreground has a pen positioned on his book as 
one who intends to write but is distracted. The other pupil in the background folds 
his book with his arms resting on the block-made desk and gazes at the camera.  
The image was posted on the Facebook page of the Nigerian Global Awakening 
Day Protest group. It came with a comment whose tone is that of frustration about 
the poor state of academic institutions in oil-rich Nigeria. From the conversation 
around the image we learn that the said school is a public institution located in 
Abuja the country’s capital. The state of the school contrasts with that of its 
privately-owned counterparts in the same city to which the children of state 
functionaries are enrolled, and which the common citizens cannot afford. This 
illustrates how the neoliberal logic of privatisation impacts on the education sector 
in Nigeria. 
Failure in electricity supply and internet connectivity, environmental 
unsanitariness, ill-equipped libraries, laboratories, studios and workshops are some 
of the conditions that plague Nigerian schools and universities, especially the 
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public ones. The situation does not have much to do with lack of funding but its 
embezzlement. The fraud at times involves connivance between the same 
government that provides the funding and the authorities of the benefitting 
institutions.254 These indicate that the state’s claim of educational reformation is a 
mere deceit. As the older schools and universities cannot be maintained, the 
establishment of new ones for which Jonathan’s government sought to be extolled, 
is but propaganda with an underlying political interest. The ubiquitous camera 
destabilises the propaganda. 
Meanwhile, it must be acknowledged that apart from issues related to image 
quality, there are expressions of doubt about the validity of the photographs taken 
in the ubiquitous context. But that question is addressed by the contexts in which 
the images are circulated. Aside from social media sites, such as Facebook and 
Twitter, they are appropriated as news photographs by reputable mainstream media 
organisations. That way, the images get validated as bearers of witness to acts of 
injustice perpetrated by the political elites. The idea of bearing witness is at the 
heart of current debates in journalism. Those who were present when the 
devastating tsunami of 2004 struck in South Asia provided visual "eye witness" 
accounts of the tragedy. The mainstream media turned to the images in reporting 
the event. This form of practice came to be described with the concept of “citizen 
journalism.”  Related terms such as “citizen photojournalism” and “citizen 
photography” were also formulated.255 These ideas mark the placement of ordinary 
people in a position as news reporters, photojournalists or photographers. 
Consequently, the line between the professional and amateur categories is 
increasingly being blurred. But akin to the case in photography, the binary is a 
contentious issue in journalism. 
                                                          
254 Such fraudulent deals charaterised the so-called infrastructural expansion of the University of 
Nigeria in the first half of the 2010s for instance. See “Contract Splitting Fraud and Cover Up in 
University Of Nigeria Nsukka,” Sahara Reporters, August 22, 2011, 
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255 Stuart Allan, “Introduction: Photojournalism and Citizen Journalism,” Digital Journalism 3, no. 
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Working with the term “citizen witnessing,” Stuart Allan makes a useful 
contribution to the debates. He argues that the production of “firsthand” accounts 
by people who experience or who are present at the times of crisis constitutes an 
outstanding form of journalism. He considers it a robust practice, suitable for 
challenging the frivolities of democracy.256 Allan’s view is taken seriously in 
Nigeria. While some media outlets would incorporate “citizen witnessing” in their 
news production, others were primarily founded to deploy citizen journalism in 
civil resistance. Sahara Reporters is a case in point here. It is an online news 
platform based in USA, but founded by a Nigerian activist, Sowore Omoyele, and 
with Nigeria as one of its key targets. Disappointed with the failure of democracy 
that returned to Nigeria in 1999, Sahara Reporters began operations with a massive 
deployment of photography to challenge corruption and the abuse of power in the 
country and other parts of Africa. It thrives on eye-witness accounts of individuals 
concerned about the Nigerian and African conditions.257 Omoyele demonstrates 
awareness of how the ubiquitous camera is expanding the limits of journalism. It 
has the capacity to record significant events that may have eluded the trained 
photojournalist.  
Many of the publicly accessible images that expose the violence and failure of the 
2015 general election in Nigeria were taken by ordinary voters, not necessarily 
practising photojournalists. The images were broadly disseminated across social 
media and appropriated in the context of “citizen witnessing” by television 
channels, newspapers, and other news outlets. 
Citizen photographic reportage is common among news television channels in 
Nigeria. For instance, the “Eyewitness” of Channels Television, Lagos, asks 
members of the public to report events as they happen around them. They can do 
this by installing the Channels TV App on their smartphones. With the device, they 
can send in pictures and videos with title, description and location. Once they are 
received, the images become testimonial to the events they reference and are to be 
                                                          
256 Stuart Allan, Citizen Witnessing: Revisioning Journalism in Times of Crisis (Cambridge: Polity 
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257 Farooq Kperogi, “Webs of Resistance: The Citizen Online Journalism of the Nigerian Digital 
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reported as news items.258 Through the “Eyewitness,” the snatching of an electoral 
ballot box in Zamfara State was reported in the 2015 elections (figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2: “Eyewitness” image of the snatching of ballot box in Zamfara State 
(Nigeria) in the 2015 gubernatorial election.    
Retrieved from: Channels Television online streaming on 
www.channelstv.com/live. 
Retrieval date: 11 April 2015. 
A shaky video of what followed was also circulated on Facebook. INEC officials 
and other individuals, some of them armed, are found in the bush with the electoral 
materials. They open the ballot box, pull out the ballot papers and apparently do 
some doctoring and recording of figures. Once the job is done, they ride away on 
bikes. The subsequent announcement of the election result by the electoral body 
regardless of the widely circulated visual “evidence” of electoral crime sparked a 
                                                          
258 This reportorial model began to gain currency in the 2000s. In the aftermath of the earlier-
mentioned South Asian tsunami, the media dependence on eye witness reports of the event 
prompted BBC to reconsider its participatory modes of operation. It “launched a user-generated 
content hub as a three-month pilot project, recognizing…the pressing need to expand reportorial 
boundaries to find new ways to facilitate citizen involvement in newsmaking.” See Allan, 
“Introduction,” 468. 
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protest. Security forces however cracked down on this.259 All these adversely affect 
the attitude of numerous Nigerians to the nation’s electoral process, a point to 
which I will shortly return. 
While Channels Television received eyewitness photographs directly from their 
creators, Vanguard newspaper would go through social media. It retrieved images 
posted to Twitter by ordinary people who monitored the election with their 
cameras. By turning to Twitter, Vanguard affirms the assertion that the social 
media site is a quick place “to find first-hand news directly from the event as it 
happens.’’260 The images about the gubernatorial elections retrieved from the site 
were published online by Vanguard on 11 April 2015. The subjects depicted 
include the ethnic tensions underlining the exercise; thuggery; the carting away of 
ballot boxes; and the low turn-out of voters in some parts of the country. On the 
reverse side, other photographs suggest satisfaction with what is perceived as the 
smooth running of the election in some polling units.261 Foregrounded here is the 
ambivalence that frames the attitude of Nigerians to electoral matters. Many are so 
disappointed with the high rate of electoral malpractices in the country that they 
have stopped participating in elections. For others, self-alienation is not rational 
either.  
Outside thematic analysis which relates to the 2015 elections in Nigeria, there is 
something fascinating about technological interrelations that come into play above. 
The intersections between the ubiquitous camera, social media and news platforms 
illustrate how the “infrastructures of representation”262 evoked by Gürsel Zeynep 
get reconstituted in a digital age. Led into the depth of wire service photographic 
practices, we encounter the politics of news image brokering. We see the 
infrastructural setup through which people and agencies decide for the world the 
                                                          
259 “Gov. Yari of APC Re-elected in Zamfara,” Premium Times, April 13, 2015, 2015, 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nwest/181396-gov-yari-of-apc-re-elected-in-
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260 Shanks and Svabo, “Mobile-Media Photography,” 238. 
261 See Abiodun Alade, “Citizen Reports on Governorship Elections,” Vanguard, April 11, 2015, 
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images viewed as news. But digital technology has raised a new set of brokers, 
namely the members of the public who are armed with internet-ready cameras. 
They produce photographs and distribute them so that even the reputable news 
organisations on which we once relied for such visual feeds rather turn to them in 
their own work. A similar form of reversal arises with the use of the camera as a 
surveillance tool. The Nigerian citizens now haunt their leaders with picturing 
devices to expose their dubious lifestyles. 
According to Michel Foucault, the relations of state power filter through 
institutional mechanisms such as found in the prison, hospital, school, and asylum. 
The power exercised by the state in these set-ups is in turn produced through the 
act of seeing. As Foucault puts it: “Surveillance…becomes a decisive economic 
operator both as an internal part of the production machinery and as a specific 
mechanism in the disciplinary power.”263 Photography is important in this 
discourse of surveillance. It applies in a broad range of contexts: in legal practice, 
police work, official registration and identification, and related areas.264 The 
emergence of digital technology has also enhanced the workings of surveillance. 
We have become used to security cameras mounted by the state to monitor the 
movements and conduct of citizens in certain spaces.265 But the same technology 
that has intensified the state’s observation of the public has also enabled a reversal 
of the gaze. In the Nigerian context of public uprising against the government, the 
ubiquitous camera has made the observer the observed. It is used surreptitiously 
and tactfully to monitor the actions of the political elites, to expose their abuse of 
power, and to challenge it. The corrupt officials are consequently thrown into 
disarray. In that condition, they express some feeling of insecurity, the very 
emotional state experienced by the subjects of their failed government. These lines 
                                                          
263 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995), 175. 
264 See John Tagg, The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). Tagg takes on the multiple applications of 
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of thought can be illustrated with the experiences of Ali Modu Sheriff, the former 
governor of Borno State, Nigeria and the son of the country’s late President Umaru 
Musa Yar’Adua. 
In 2008, Sheriff was caught in a video and shown dancing with a female musician 
in Dubai, holding her and spraying cash on her.266 Although it is not a still 
photograph, it is possible to view the video through the prism of paparazzi 
photography. According to Jerslev and Mortensen, this kind of photographic 
practice “is characterized by an aesthetics and discourse of ordinariness: celebrities 
apparently caught unawares while engaged in everyday routines such as walking 
along the street carrying a cup of coffee, shopping, exiting the gym, passing 
through an airport, picking up their children from school, and so on.”267 The 
problem with that point of view is that it tends to excuse the image from being 
subjected to political reading. It also causes us to ignore the effect it would have on 
the photographed when they see themselves depicted in certain ways and published 
for public view.  
Carol Squiers is evidently mindful of these critical elements of paparazzi by 
thinking of it as an intersection of photojournalism, documentary, celebrity 
photography and surveillance photography.268 Jerslev and Mortensen disagree with 
that position and argue that surveillance photography should be removed from the 
list and street photography added to it.269 In my understanding, Sheriff’s video can 
be read as paparazzi and citizen photography from which the notion of surveillance 
cannot therefore be detached. It is a paparazzi economy against the excesses of the 
powerful. Ordinariness – the organising principle of paparazzi – underlines the 
depiction of Sheriff having fun like the human being that he is. On the other hand, 
                                                          
266 Saharatv, “Borno Governor, Senator Ali Modu Sherriff Dance,” YouTube video, 03:37, 
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the understanding of the video in terms of surveillance is informed by the context 
in which it is produced and disseminated. Through its description on YouTube 
where it is circulated, the video calls public attention to the frivolous life for which 
the political class is largely known in Nigeria. Consider the two key components of 
Sheriff’s conduct in the video.  
First, he dances with a woman, an act prohibited by the Sharia Law. As at the time 
of the event, he was the governor of Borno State, one of the Northern Nigerian 
states which following the return of democracy in 1999 began to institute Sharia 
law. Against the threat it posed for Nigerian unity and the ethnic and religious 
tensions it generated, the Northern elites (Sheriff apparently inclusive) argued 
strongly in favour of the law as the panacea for the corruption brought by 
democracy270 (chapter 5 shows how this rationalisation bred the Boko Haram 
insurgency). The ubiquitous camera caught Sheriff undermining the laws to which 
he had sworn allegiance. Secondly, he sprays cash on his dance partner, against the 
Nigerian regulation for the handling of currency passed into law in June 2007.271 
Meanwhile, due to the blurry quality of Sheriff’s video, the particular currency in 
question is not visually intelligible. But the short accompanying description 
identifies it as dollars. In my view, the fact that Sheriff sprayed dollars rather than 
naira does not exonerate him. It should be perceived as cross-border misconduct to 
which the ubiquitous camera has drawn our attention.  
Like Sheriff, those implicated by this visual production perceive their “unknown” 
colleagues as traitors for clandestinely taking their images and publishing them. 
But for the citizens involved in resistance against the power mongers, they are 
pleased to have among the political elites individuals who are in surreptitious 
opposition to the excesses of their colleagues. It is reasonable to trace the exposure 
of major scandals among Nigerian politicians to this mode of revealing. 
                                                          
270 Johannes Harnischfeger, Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria 
(Frankfurt: Campus, 2008). 
271 See “Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette,” Central Bank of Nigeria,  
http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/PUBLICATIONS/BSD/2007/CBNACT.PDF. 
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Sheriff’s example has been used to illustrate the surreptitious way the camera is 
deployed to observe the behaviour of the Nigerian political elites. But the 
surveillance operates in yet another manner. In some settings, the photographed 
voluntarily offer themselves to the camera, oblivious of the possible scandalous 
results. Consider the pictures of Musa, the son of former Nigeria’s President Musa 
Yar’Adua (figures 3.3 and 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.3: Musa Yar’Adua’s son playing with money and rifle. 
Retrieved from: Nairaland, 6 August 2008, posted by Nvmei with the text, “The 
era of a new celebrity. What are the morals in the picture, Musa Yar’Adua. Son of 
Umaru Yar’Adua.”  
URL: http://www.nairaland.com/157667/era-new-celebrity-musa-yar. 
Retrieval date: 10 March 2015. 
In figure 3.3, we see, as vividly described by Kperogi, “exclusive pictures of the 
president’s son bathing in a pile of cash and brandishing brand new guns.”272 
Given the different effects generated by the photographs on YouTube and 
Nairaland,273 their message transcends the exuberance of a wannabe. On YouTube 
the images along with others in the series appear in video format, displayed in the 
likeness of slide presentation with typographical and musical accompaniments.274  
                                                          
272 Kperogi, “Webs of Resistance,”38. 
273 Nairaland is a social networking site commonly used by Nigerians. It allows for the posting of 
images and sharing of comments on them. 
274 Nigerianvideos, “Musa Yar' Adua Son,” YouTube video, 02:00, November 26, 2008, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=--9-tk0VF1w&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
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Figure 3.4: Musa Yar’Adua’s son in juxtaposition with an indigent man. 
Retrieved from: Nairaland, 6 August 2008, posted by Nvmei with the text, “Musa 
posing for a short while the other is waiting for his pension underneath a bridge 
after working 35 years in government.”  
URL: http://www.nairaland.com/157667/era-new-celebrity-musa-yar. 
Retrieval date: 10 March 2015. 
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This well illuminates Manovich’s earlier-cited notion of “variability,” one of the 
concepts with which he theorises the logic of new media. By “variability,” he 
means that “a new media object typically gives rise to many different versions.”275 
The flexibility of media contents enabled by digital technology favours the 
mobilisation of civil resistance.  
It allows users to construct their messages the way they want them to be presented. 
The rendering of the still photographs of young Musa in audiovisual form allows 
for a critique of the ex-president’s conduct as a public figure. The text describes 
the young man as an irresponsible child whose character suggests poor parental 
upbringing. That implied failure at the micro level challenges Yar’Adua’s 
capability as the leader of a populous nation like Nigeria. The background tune 
taken from the work of the activist musician Fela Kuti rehashes “thief,” “rogue,” 
“robber,” and related expressions with which he described the military government 
of the 1980s. The music prompts us to query the stockpile of cash by Yar’Adua 
and the rationale behind making it (including the rifle) accessible to his apparently 
teenage child.  
From another perspective, young Yar’Adua, supposedly a minor and dependant, 
has access to such a large amount of cash. But many of his counterparts live in 
hunger with their indigent parents. This is one of the issues raised in the 
conversation around the images on Nairaland. In figure 3.4, Musa poses self-
confidently before the camera, dressed luxuriantly and relaxing in the comfort of a 
well-furnished house. Considering Musa’s pose and the way he looks into the 
camera, the photograph and the ones in figure 3.3 can be said to follow studio 
portrait conventions. But here, it intersects with activist use, especially given the 
context of circulation of the images. Again, they are juxtaposed with others that 
depict the reverse of Musa’s ostentatious life. 
For example, in the one that comes below Musa’s in figure 3.4, people living in 
poverty are shown. The man in the foreground looks lost in thought, in a posture 
that echoes Musa’s pose. One of the comments on the picture is striking: “Musa 
                                                          
275 Manovich, The Language of New Media, 56. 
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posing for a shot while the other is waiting for his pension underneath a bridge 
after working 35 years in government.”276 It cannot be guaranteed that the man in 
the photograph has actually worked as a civil servant. But it gives us a sense of 
how images and their accompanying comments on social media constitute a means 
through which Nigerians articulate their discontent. The images are used in the 
likeness of film editing where independent shots are integrated irrespective of 
where and when they were taken. Through such linking of photographs on social 
media, the public is made to contemplate how the harsh experiences of living in 
Nigeria connect with the follies of those in power.  
The use of the ubiquitous camera as examined in the foregoing has an enormous 
effect on politicians. It produces anxiety among them. To illustrate, Yar’Adua was 
amazed at the evolution of the scandal around his son’s photographs, from their 
production and appropriation in various contexts to their viral online circulation. 
His reaction was that of “anxiety about visual intrusion.” 277 The anxiety is 
apparently connected to the oath of secrecy he administered the same year (2008) 
to the staff of the People’s Democratic Party, the presidency and the National 
Assembly working directly under him. However, the move was severely criticised 
as a restriction on free circulation of information in a democracy. 278 This chain of 
events began with the application of the ubiquitous camera as a means of 
surveillance. With the picturing apparatus the public has been empowered to 
observe the representatives of state power and to challenge them. 
In the study of digital culture as a mode of civil activism, it is difficult to overlook 
the centrality of the camera and the visual production it enables. This argument 
aids our understanding of how digital technology has radicalised the way ordinary 
citizens express their discontent about the failure of the postcolony in Africa. The 
camera is ubiquitous not only in the sense of its availability to the masses, but the 
mechanism of production and circulation of images made possible by digital 
                                                          
276 Nvmei, “The Era of a New Celebrity Musa Yar' Adua (Yar' Adua's Son), Nairaland, August 6, 
2008, http://www.nairaland.com/157667/era-new-celebrity-musa-yar.  
277 Hand, Ubiquitous Photography, 11. 
278 R.O. Oji, Emmanuel C. Nwachukwu and Okechukwu Innocent Eme, “Oath of Secrecy in the 
Nigerian Public Service,” Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (Nigerian 
Chapter) 2, no. 8 (2014). 
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technology and the internet. Some of the photographs may lack good visual 
quality, yet they are powerful in their activist undertaking. At times, other media 
outlets rely on them to report as news the indices of inequality, asking us to take 
the images seriously. The state deploys various media to persuade the public into 
accepting that they are cared for. But the ubiquitous camera helps to counteract this 
propaganda by showing images that picture the reverse of the claims. The masses 
have become so suspicious of the political figures that they subject them to 
surveillance. This reversal interrupts our top-down understanding of surveillance 
as a means of power. The publishing of the resulting images on the internet and the 
ensuing processes of interpretation create chaotic moments for the individuals they 
criticise. So the leaders indirectly share in the anxiety produced by their dubious 
style of governance. These issues open up other critical questions around the 
political use of photography. It would be fascinating to further study how image 
editing impacts on digital-visual activism.  
Editing and the making of unique statements  
Photography is associated with a longstanding question of authenticity. This is 
informed by the initial reception of the medium as an innocent representation of 
“truth.” Daguerre and Talbot declared the photographic image as nature’s 
inscription, and early scholarship on the medium dwelt along that line of thought. 
For instance, in Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes invents an elaborate vocabulary to 
argue for an unmediated link between the photograph and reality. For him, the two 
are like “laminated objects whose two leaves cannot be separated without 
destroying them both.”279 He adds that “the photograph always carries its referent 
with itself.”280 Although this realist understanding would later be challenged, many 
cling to it today. In the digital age when alteration of the image has become more 
pervasive than ever, the adherents of realism worry that the photograph is robbed 
of its quality as a “teller of truth.” On the contrary, such anxiety is uncalled for. In 
the context of activism, what may be perceived as “uncanny” digital mutilations 
and suturing of the images circulated on Facebook should be read as a 
                                                          
279 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 6. 
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“visuatechnical” language for the making of inimitable statements about human 
conditions. Rather than distort the “truth,” the integration of visual elements from 
different photographs helps to generate new representations of socio-political 
realities.  
There are three major forms of editing undergone by the politically charged images 
Nigerians circulate on Facebook: collage, photomontage and poster. The processes 
require appropriate hardware and software selection. Computers, tablets, iPads and 
smartphones which constitute the hardware for editing are driven by image-
transforming applications designed in various modes to suit different devices. 
Deploying the technologies, images are edited to make three major kinds of 
representation: narrative, satirical, and comparative. We are drawn to these 
technological questions because they indicate the possibility of transforming the 
idea of image manipulation (as an object of anxiety) into a distinct visual language. 
The language is useful for the purpose of civil resistance. 
The image transformation techniques deployed in the photographic practices 
examined in this study produce spectacular effects. The first approach – collage – 
involves the layering of different images to make a unified whole. The 
juxtaposition is not arbitrary, but governed by aesthetic and semantic principles. It 
is imbued with the multiple-exposure-kind-of effect, reflecting symmetrical or 
asymmetrical organisation. The images are either shown in uniform sizes so that 
none is visually dominant, or in varying sizes to have emphasis placed on some 
photographs. As opposed to collage which involves the juxtaposition of multiple 
pictures, “photomontage” results in a composite image. Elements from different 
photographs are cut out and combined seamlessly to create a new image. 
Photomontage is traced back to the 19th century analogue photographic practice 
where the cuttings are put together, photographed as a single shot, developed and 
printed. But the term was coined later by the Berlin Dada artists during World War 
1.281 With digital devices, the whole editing process can be executed within the 
workspace provided by the software. The last mode of editing which I term 
                                                          
281 The artists include John Heartfield, Hannah Höch, George Grosz, and Raoul Hausmann 
deployed photomontage to critique the political condition occasioned by World War 1 in Germany. 
See Ades Dawn, Photomontage (London: Thames & Hudson, 1976). 
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“poster” relates to the two-dimensional graphic genre where design solutions are 
provided through the layering of images and types. Posters, handbills and editorials 
are examples of designs intended to communicate through this format. Once the 
pictorial and typographical forms are worked into unified whole, the resulting 
design is “rasterised” to take on the digital status of the image. Rasterisation turns 
the types in the design into pictorial signs to be read as such, and as an element that 
can no longer be separated from the photograph.  
There is a set of digital infrastructures that feed this photographic enterprise. 
Computers, which predate mobile gadgets as digital image editing devices, possess 
custom applications (such as Paint in Windows) that come with the operating 
system. They allow for editing of photographs and require “no training beyond the 
instructions that come with the software.”282 Besides the basic applications, more 
professional software has flooded the market. Adobe Photoshop for example is 
complete with tools that perform a broad range of tasks: cropping, stitching, 
blending, colour adjustment and many more. It was deployed in the execution of 
complex forms of editing (such as photomontage) analysed in this study. 
The scope of image transformation expands even more with the proliferation of 
mobile devices which emerged with new kinds of operating system and app 
technology. Gerard Goggin suggests that apps are central to the transformation of 
the cultural landscape brought by mobile media and the internet. “An app,” as he 
puts it, “can make it possible to imagine and do things with a mobile phone that 
were previously never associated with the technology.”283 To illustrate with the 
Facebook app, once installed on a smartphone, both instant upload of photos and 
receipt of notifications of ongoing conversations on the site are possible as long as 
the device is connected to the internet.  
Other apps, some of which are free on the internet and accessible on platforms like 
Apple Store and Google Play (Store), were built exclusively for the purpose of 
                                                          
282 Cori E. Dauber, Youtube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone and 
Photoshop on Every Computer (United States: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009): vii. 
283 Gerard Goggin, “Ubiquitous Apps: Politics of Openness in Global Mobile Cultures, Digital 
Creativity 22, no. 3 (2011): 151. 
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picture editing. Some of the ones employed by the Facebook users in Nigeria 
include Photo Grid, Pic Frame, PicsArt, and PicMix. They have a similar set of 
layouts that “prescribe” to users how to create compositions by giving them 
options beyond which they however, cannot go. This setting of boundaries can be 
explicated with the concept of affordances. James Gibson, a psychologist of visual 
perception uses it to explain the form of action-based relationship between an 
object or organism and its environment: “The affordances of the environment are 
what it offers the animal.” “The composition and layout of surfaces,” Gibson 
continues, “constitute what they afford.” 284 The virtual environments of the picture 
collage apps offer the layouts in which images can be organised by users. The 
Facebook timeline has been redesigned to automatically organise photographs in 
similar layouts. The photographs analysed in this study which reflect 
“juxtapositional editing” (collage) were organised in the layouts illustrated in 
figure 3.5. They reflect the workspaces of the apps and the ways Facebook displays 
group images. 
 
Figure 3.5: Major collage layouts as afforded by picture collage applications 
The various forms of editing discussed above allow those engaged in them to make 
unique visual statements. Rather than read this visual culture as a distortion of 
                                                          
284 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 
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reality, we ought to appreciate how it helps us to better understand socio-political 
realities in society. Pedro Meyer the documentary photographer who works with 
digital images would argue that it is the editing of photographs that brings out the 
real reality.285 This point can be traced back to Benjamin's rumination on Brecht's 
remark "that less than ever does the mere reflection of reality reveal anything about 
reality."286 Indeed, we learn a great deal of the harsh realities in Nigeria by 
studying the practice of photo editing among Nigerian Facebook users.  
 
Figure 3.6: The image editing techniques and the resulting visual statements 
I have categorised the kinds of expression made with the editing techniques into 
three, according to their visual effects and semantic patterns. They include 
narrative, satirical and comparative themes. Nevertheless, there are no clear-cut 
demarcations among both the editing methods and the thematic categories. The 
                                                          
285 Pedro Meyer, Truths and Fictions: A Journey from Documentary to Digital Photography (New 
York: Aperture, 1995). Also see Kevin Robin, “The Virtual Unconscious in Post-photography,” 
Science as Culture 3, no. 1 (1992). He suggests that we think of the image as a piece of information 
from which we can draw “more information” and “new meanings” through the processes of 
deconstruction and reconstruction. 
286 Walter Benjamin, "Little History of Photography," in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 
Volume 2 1927-1934, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 526. 
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boundaries are fluid, but needed to be carefully delineated where possible to enable 
us make sense of how virtual activists speak in subtly different ways through the 
visual practice. The diagram in figure 3.6 illustrates the nexus of the visual 
statements and the forms of the digital photographic editing. For each of the 
thematic categories, there is a set of editing techniques with which it is most often 
produced. In what follows, each theme is examined in relation to the effect it 
creates in the context of the civil struggle. 
Consider the narrative statement first. It is a visual story relayed mainly through 
two editing techniques: collage (of images only) and poster (combination of 
pictorial and typographical forms). The narrative theme draws from either a 
singular incident or various events that occurred in different times and locations. In 
both cases, the photographs are meant to call attention to the injustice that lies 
underneath. What I find remarkable is the approach which brings together 
incidents that are unrelated in time. It takes on the Eisensteinian technique of film 
editing that breaks the confines of space and time to create new representation. 
Consider for instance the collage in figure 3.7. It appeared on Facebook on 8 
November 2014, after a bomb explosion in Adamawa State allegedly attributed to 
Boko Haram. It was also a time during which the political campaigns for the 2015 
election were intense. The top image depicts one such rally by Nigeria’s ex-
President Goodluck Jonathan in Akwa-Ibom State.  
Jonathan is flanked by his Deputy, Namadi Sambo (left) and the then Akwa-Ibom 
State Governor, Godswill Akpabio (right). The other two photographs show people 
fleeing from the site of the Adamawa bombing. This juxtaposition of disparate 
events enables a politically forceful conversation set in motion by the comment 
accompanying the set of pictures: “In the same week…in the same country.”287 
The political rally led by Jonathan is criticised as an event with wrong timing. It 
speaks of the then president as insensitive to the plight of his followers. He is at a 
safe distance, campaigning for a second term as president, while many of the 
citizens in his first tenure have fallen into the hands of insurgents.  
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Figure 3.7: Political rally and people fleeing Boko Haram attack.  
Retrieved from: Facebook, 8 November 2014, posted by Emman Shehu with the 
text, “In the same week…in the same country.”  
URL: https://www.facebook.com/emman.shehu/posts/10152603498849317 
Retrieval date: 20 November 2014. 
Incidentally, I found out that these images were not taken at the same time. The 
campaign picture was produced three years earlier (that is 2011) before the general 
election that brought Jonathan to power. But in the juxtaposition, the events 
separated by time and space have been successfully strung together to make a 
striking statement. It illustrates James Monaco’s reflection on the idea of film 
montage. He asserts that its emergence in Russia in the early 20th century was 
predicated upon the desire for social transformation through the alteration of the 
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so-called reality, to produce new realities.288 The activist practice of picture editing 
among Nigerians is governed by this idea.  
Satire is the second form of expression produced through photo editing. It can be 
achieved with all the three techniques – collage, photomontage and poster. Visual 
satire is predicated upon the quest for social change through derision and humour. 
This understanding is affirmed by Henri Bergson’s work on laughter or the comic. 
He argues that whether in relation to performing art, visual art, photography or 
language, the comic has important social function. With corrective intent sought 
through humiliation, it highlights human follies, making “a painful impression on 
the person against whom it is directed.”289 
Pioneered by Akinola Lasekan, visual satire in Nigeria began with political 
cartooning that flourished in the light of anticolonial struggle.290 Once 
independence was achieved, a new form of domination was instituted by the post-
independence political elites. Their abuse of power produced a sense of 
disillusionment among the Nigerian masses who expected rapid transformation to 
come with the end of colonial rule. In the last five decades, visual caricature which 
remains integral to print media production has had the fraudulent political group as 
its key target. While it continues to flourish in the journalistic context, digital 
technology has expanded its scope, incorporating everything from computer-
generated cartoons to digital photographic montage, animations and filmed 
puppets. These forms of humorous, yet politically charged representation are 
widely circulated on Facebook to ridicule the political class. 
For example, the photomontage showing a mutilated portrait of former President 
Jonathan (figure 3.8) depicts him as coconut-headed.291 Through public criticism 
                                                          
288 James Monaco, How to Read a Film (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
289 Heni Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley Brereton and 
Fred Rothwell (n.p.: Temple of Earth Publishing, 1911): 60a. 
290 Oyin Medubi, “Cartooning in Nigeria: Large Canvas, Little Movement,” in Cartooning in 
Africa, ed. Lent A. John (Cresskill, New Jersy: Hampton Press, 2009). 
291 The large tropical nut, coconut, has a hard shell that protects a white edible soft substance which 
in turn forms an inner cavity. Given that the cavity has only but a liquid content which is at times 
lost in the process of breaking the nut, coconut in the Nigerian parlance suggests emptiness. To 
have a “coconut head” therefore implies lack of wisdom. 
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of his government, Jonathan was reduced to a tropical nut of low value. His failure 
to tackle insurgency, corruption and impunity which escalated during his 
administration combined to give him the image of a leader bereft of the skills of 
governance. He and many other public figures in Nigeria became objects of 
derision articulated in different formats and disseminated on various online 
platforms. 
 
Figure 3.8: Mutilated portrait of Goodluck Jonathan.  
Retrieved from: Facebook, 20 September 2014, posted by Marian Awolowo with 
the text, “RE: ‘Why PDP adopted Jonathan for 2015 election.’”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10202426146361750&set=a.10487511
45803.2008091.1436453705&type 
Retrieval date: 28 September 2014. 
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Figure 3.9: Portraits of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abubakar Shekau and Goodluck 
Jonathan 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 13 March 2015, posted by Yakub Aliyu with the text, 
“Something is wrong, somewhere.”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/
956718901014269/. 
Retrieval date: 15 May 2015. 
Whereas visual satire is grounded in humour and ridicule, comparative statements 
seek to establish the relations or shared attributes between different conditions. 
Harsh socio-political situations are criticised by tracing their connection with 
similar circumstances elsewhere or highlighting how they contrast with the ideal. 
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In figure 3.9, the portraits of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (top: Islamic State leader), 
Abubakar Shekau (bottom left: leader of Boko Haram) and Goodluck Jonathan 
(bottom right: then Nigerian President) are laid out in a striking juxtaposition 
characterised by uniformity of pose. Here, two rebel groups are brought into 
conversation with a sovereign state to claim a relationship of purpose among them. 
 Boko Haram’s declaration of allegiance to Islamic State in the first quarter of 
2015 raised public concern about the promise of strength it held for the Nigerian 
militant group. Whether in terms of funds, weaponry or intelligence, additional 
support for Boko Haram would mean a greater threat to Nigerian sovereignty. The 
dialogue around the image on Facebook indicates that the activists who use the 
platform are suspicious of the president’s attitude to the Islamic State-Boko Haram 
co-operation. They make connections between contradictory statements he made in 
different times. One is an earlier acknowledgement of possible financial and 
military relations between the rebel groups. The other is a later disavowal of the 
influence of Islamic State in Nigeria. The conclusion which the image helps to 
draw is that insurgency serves the interest of the Nigerian government in some 
ways. And actually, as shown in chapter 5 Boko Haram has had certain forms of 
friendship with Nigerian public officials. 
Digital transformation of images has been analysed above as a practice that is part 
and parcel of social media resistance. The way it operates aids our understanding 
of why the obsession for the “integrity” of the image as a representation of “truth” 
is pointless. Photographs are treated as structures of visual language which allow 
for generation of new meanings. The key editing techniques have been examined 
in relation to the digital technologies that enable them, and the kinds of visual 
statement enabled. At any rate, it must be acknowledged that in Nigeria, the digital 
cultural practice is hampered by infrastructural inadequacy. The next section 
examines how this situation is addressed.   
Techno-appropriations 
Besides the electronic gadgets deployed for photographic productions and internet 
access, electricity and internet connectivity constitute other crucial technological 
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requirements for the virtual activist practices. Sadly, these are problematical in 
Nigeria. But the ways Nigerians address the challenges are fascinating. The 
technological odds stimulate an economy of resourcefulness considered crucial in 
challenging the broader state failure under which the infrastructural crisis is 
subsumed. A close study of the photographs retrieved from their online platforms 
of civil engagement reveals the creative sensibilities of the public in negotiating 
the inadequacies of electricity supply and internet connectivity. Through 
interviews, we learn that individuals power their devices with inverters, generators 
and backup batteries. They also appropriate the car cigarette lighter socket system 
and use mobile phone chargers while on the move. For internet connection, some 
rely on institutional provisions to which they have access. For instance, school 
wifi, although not usually efficient, can be accessed by students in some 
institutions in Nigeria. Internet services provided by GSM (Global System for 
Mobile Communication) operators are also appropriated through subscription to 
data plans and utilisation of bonuses. These technological issues are deserving of 
attention as the emergent study of cyber culture has already rated Nigeria high 
among African countries in the use of the internet. We come to understand what 
accounts for this possibility amidst infrastructural failure. 
In their evaluation of the possibility of socio-political transformation in Africa 
through social media resistance, Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe dwell at length 
on how the promise is however underpinned by infrastructural variables especially 
internet connectivity. They remark that in spite of the daunting technological 
challenges, there is a record of high usage of the internet and social media (with 
Facebook as a case in point) in some of the African countries, Nigeria inclusive.292 
What they have failed to expound is how the individuals engaged in the online 
struggle manage to operate in the face of the technological odds. Granted, digital 
devices such as camera phones, iPads, tablets and computers are accessible to 
many Nigerians, but the use of the technology is confronted by a crisis that 
emanates from its heavy reliance on other technologies. The most crucial among 
them are electricity and internet connectivity. Brain Larkin describes the “ontology 
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of infrastructures,” by referring to them as “matter that enable the movement of 
other matter, for they operate on differing levels simultaneously, generating 
multiple forms of address.” “Electricity is the infrastructure of the computer,” he 
argues, and “the computer is the infrastructure of electricity supply…”293 So, 
technology operates as heterogeneous network. It is that technological 
interdependence that compounds the task of the social media activists in Nigeria. 
Still, it is the same connectedness of infrastructural operations that enables the 
appropriations without which the practices would not thrive.  
AbdouMaliq Simone has told us that creative infrastructural improvisations, 
appropriations and informal economic mobilisations are central to the urban social 
development of contemporary Africa. 294  Technology draws people together, to 
assemble their ingenuities, to transform their lives, and in Nigeria’s case, to 
challenge the power structure that impedes that transformation. Let us begin with 
the question of electricity. There is a sense in which its production has been 
“alternativised” in Nigeria. The state-managed power has become so unreliable 
that Nigerians search for ways to power their various forms of equipment, home 
and office appliances, including electronic devices. The alternative sources include 
inverters and generators, direct powering of mobile electronic gadgets with mobile 
chargers, the use of car cigarette lighter sockets, and possession of multiple 
batteries for devices. 
Inverters operate on the basis of energy conversion and storage where power from 
solar cells or public grid is tapped, stored in batteries and utilised in later times. 
The typology of inverters is mainly located in their variety in capacity, ranging 
from tens of watts to hundreds of kilowatts. Although they are available in 
different capacities and prices, they are used only by a few Nigerians. This is partly 
due to their connection with public power that is in itself unreliable. In various 
locations in Nigeria, the duration of what is more broadly known as “load 
shedding” is so long that the energy stored in the battery gets exhausted before the 
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next electricity supply. Also, some houses are entirely disconnected from the 
public grid so that there is no source from which to tap. The solar system is not 
common either. The alternative sources of power that take care of these conditions 
are generating sets. 
 
Figure 3.10: Generator-powered informal economy. 
Retrieved from: PlusNaija (blog), October 24, 2014. 
URL: http://www.plusnaija.com/nigerians-spend-n796-4bn-annually-fuel-power-
generators. 
Retrieval date: 15 May 2015. 
Generators have emerged as the most common way of sourcing electricity in 
Nigeria. As they come in various brands, sizes and costs, they are available to 
people and organisations of different economic status, to power their residential 
houses, small- and large-scale business establishments and other institutions. In the 
above photograph (figure 3.10), we see a number of generators with the wires 
through which they supply electricity to business outlets. Besides the group of 
tailors who apparently power their machines with the generators, other shops likely 
connected to the alternative power sources are suggested by the stairs leading up to 
them in the background, and the individuals who seem to have gone for shopping. 
The photograph reflects the pervasive presence of generators in Nigeria. It is rare 
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to find a household or organisation both in urban and suburban centres that does 
not possess at least one machine. Rural areas are also increasingly being 
penetrated.  
But it is difficult to ignore “the infrastructure of noise,” to borrow from Larkin, 
constituted by generator technology.295 Larkin studied the media, comprising radio, 
cinema, and video in Kano (Nigeria) to understand the forms of social and cultural 
relations they enabled in colonial and postcolonial Nigerian contexts. The noise 
associated with the said media – in the street and mobile music and video shops, in 
the cinema viewing and prayer centres, in passing vehicles and residential houses – 
is a painful reality.296 Larkin however does not say how the noise connects to the 
crisis of electricity in Nigeria. It is mainly through generators with their own 
inherent noise that the media are powered to produce their own noise. 
 
Figure 3.11: A commercial mobile phone charging centre. 
Retrieved from: PM News, April 14, 2014, part of an article entitled, “In Nsukka, 
Power Outage Makes Phone Battery Chargers Smile to Bank.” 
URL: http://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2014/04/14/in-nsukka-power-outage-
makes-phone-battery-chargers-smile-to-bank/. 
Retrieval date: 15 May 2015.  
                                                          
295 Brian Larkin, Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008). 
296 Ibid. 
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Whereas generators are used at homes and offices to power appliances including 
electronic devices, they have enabled a distinctive economy of commercial 
charging of cell phones in public places. So, while away from home or the office, 
one can charge one’s mobile phone in the manner in which drivers drive into fill-in 
stations to fuel their automobiles. With a generator and a plank to which sockets 
are nailed as pictured in figure 3.11, the business is set up. The entrepreneurial 
innovativeness does not only suggest the turning of infrastructural failure into a 
means of economic sustenance. The patronage it enjoys is an indication of people’s 
desire to stay in the world connected by the circuit of telecommunication on the 
one hand, and to maintain their presence in cyberspace on the other, given that it is 
the telecom technology that provides access to the internet on mobile devices. The 
charging of the batteries while they are detached from the devices as shown in the 
photograph is a pointer to another strategy of managing the power crisis. A lot of 
mobile phone owners have spare batteries so that while one is in use, the other is 
charged and kept as backup. The cigarette lighter sockets found in cars are also 
used with charging plugs while individuals are on the move. Mobile chargers are 
gaining popularity as well. Operating in the likeness of the inverter, it is charged 
with electricity, and the stored energy is used for charging of cell phones. The 
portability and mobile status of these accessories reduce the chances of people’s 
disconnection from the communication networks while in transit.  
Irrespective of the enormous impact of the facilities discussed in the foregoing, 
including others outside the concern of this project, the upsurge in their distribution 
in Nigeria is severely criticised. “Dumping ground” – an expression coined by 
Nigerians to describe the importation of “all” sorts of commodities into the country 
especially from China – is used by Olukoya Ogen to ask us think about China-
Nigeria economic relations beyond the notion of mutuality.  While Chinese 
manufactured goods are perceived to be lower in standard specifically for the 
Nigerian market, he argues that their proliferation in the country “has (wreaked) 
havoc on Nigeria’s infant industries and stifled the development of the Nigeria’s 
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indigenous enterprise.”297 That argument opens our minds to how neoliberalism in 
certain instances takes on an imperialist outlook so that infrastructures which 
constitute major part of the traded commodities become the terrain of politics. 
Drawing on the Soviet experience while working around the concepts of post-
socialism, neoliberalism and biopolitics, Stephen Collier too asks us to think what 
infrastructure can reveal about governance.298  
In Nigeria, the technopolitics are intense as already suggested in chapter 2. It is 
commonly believed that the failure to fix public electricity is partly a consequence 
of grand forms of lobbying by the few affluent merchants who deal in the 
importation of generators. For such ones, the stabilisation of power supply would 
collapse their business. The basic right of the rest of the masses is thus overridden 
by the self-interest of a select few. Yet the failure is turned around by politicians as 
a tool for the acquisition of public loyalty. Provision of infrastructure is treated not 
as the responsibility of the state but as a marker of the public-spiritedness of 
individuals or groups of politicians. The labelling of an electrical installation as 
what is offered by the PDP (People’s Democratic Party) is a case in point here 
(figure 3.12).  
The transformer is presented as a “gift” to the people by a magnanimous party. The 
presentation is usually a momentous event. The members of the community 
organise a grand reception for one of them representing them in the government 
and who has proven to be mindful of their needs. For the social media activists, 
this is an act of obsequiousness. It implies complicity in irresponsible governance 
or ignorance of what the state owes the citizenry. In my view, it suggests how else 
to understand the level of infrastructural failure in Nigeria. The masses have 
become so used to it that every simple gesture by the government comes as a 
surprise with commendation following it as a spontaneous response. But 
                                                          
297 Olukoya Ogen, "Contemporary China-Nigeria Economic Relations: Chinese Imperialism or 
South-South Mutual Partnership?" Journal of Current Chinese Affairs-China aktuell 37, no. 3 
(2008): 78. 
298Stephen J. Collier, Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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ultimately, installation and celebration of transformers do not translate into the 
stable power which the online public demands. 
 
Figure 3.12: Electrical installations by PDP (People’s Democratic Party). 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 16 March 2015, posted by Abiyamọ with the text, 
“PDP is using transformer to campaign in Cross River State, what do we call this?”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/Abiyamo/photos/a.371316862978903.1073741827.370
495769727679/698908856886367/?type=3. 
Retrieval date: 18 March 2015. 
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Online activism manages to thrive in Nigeria in spite the technological crisis 
examined in the foregoing. Internet connectivity – the other aspect of infrastructure 
crucial in the media practice – is also poor, but handled with considerable acuity. 
In the beginning of the 1990s when the internet began to be accessed in Nigeria, it 
was according to Adomi limited to an e-mail communication system, and telnet 
and gopher.299 The services were offered by a few technology industrialists 
including the Regional Information Network for Africa300 and Rose Clayton 
Nigeria Limited, both of which worked in collaboration with the Nigerian Postal 
Services (NIPOST).301 The period between 1996 and 1998 saw the emergence of 
the World Wide Web. A number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) obtained 
licenses to operate in the country, providing forms of internet access like dial-up 
connections and Wireless Fidelity (Wifi). What followed was the growth in the 
number of cybercafés where individuals could pay to use the internet for tens of 
minutes or hours.302 By early 2000s, media and business organisations, academic 
and financial institutions, and many other establishments had begun to use the 
internet in their operations. 
This is not to say that the internet became a “common commodity.” Many could 
not afford the cybercafé services and only used them sparingly. Again, only a small 
proportion of the Nigerian population had access to the internet in their workplaces 
and rural communities were completely out of question. Nonetheless, 2001 saw the 
advent of a technology that would in few years make internet access more 
affordable and accessible. It is the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) whose original service was to provide voice telephony.  That year, three 
operators were licensed by the Nigerian Communications Commission: Mobile 
Telephone Network (MTN), ECONET Wireless (now Airtel) and NITEL Plc.303 In 
                                                          
299 Telnet and gopher are the precursors of computer Operating System and Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) respectively. 
300 It was a UNESCO-initiated computer connectivity project. 
301 Esharenana E. Adomi, “Internet Development and Connectivity in Nigeria," Program 39, no.3 
(2005). 
302 Some cybercafés offered special services where the internet users would pay a little more to surf 
through the night, to the early morning hours. Such service was commonly known as “all-night 
browsing.”    
303 Adomi, “Internet Development and Connectivity in Nigeria," 262. 
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2002, Globacom (Glo) got its own license. Once they commenced operation, 
ownership of mobile phones began to grow in Nigeria.  
Before the end of the 2000s, GSM operators had begun to offer internet services. 
So, in addition to voice call and text messaging, subscribers could access the 
internet if their cell phones had the supporting features. The phones were internet-
ready once they had some minutes of talk time. Later, the concept of “data plan” 
was initiated where the “time” meant by default for voice call could be converted 
into bytes to allow for internet access. Ownership of cell phones with internet 
features is on the increase in Nigeria. So the number of GSM subscribers running 
into nearly 187 millions implies that a large population accesses the internet via 
mobile phone. They take advantage of the competition in the telecommunications 
industry that has made data bundles affordable, to subscribe for internet 
connectivity according to their financial status at any given time. A lot of the 
Facebook activists in Nigeria studied in this project rely on this technological 
provision. Each of the four GSM operators currently in Nigeria – MTN, Glo, Airtel 
and Etisalat – has its own data plans. Considering that Airtel304 has the lowest entry 
cost – 50 naira – for internet subscription, I use it to illustrate how 
telecommunications technology has to a certain level democratised internet access 
and in turn sustained the tempo of online activism among Nigerians. By dialling 
*141*11*9#, 50 naira airtime is converted into 4 MB of data which can allow one 
to quickly log on to Facebook to share some comments or images depending on the 
size.  
                                                          
304 The history of Econet from which Airtel derived helps us to read telecommunication technology 
in Africa beyond the idea of that which has come to leverage digital activism. It has in its own 
terms a history of political activism. From 1993 to 1998, Strive Masiyiwa was refused a license by 
the Zimbabwean government (under Robert Mugabe) to operate Econet. The refusal was linked to 
fear of the threat posed by the technology against the state and the longing to have its capital 
directed into the government’s coffers. Masiyiwa won the case against the government, and Econet 
was established. But Zimbabwe became politically tense following the loss of the referendum for 
constitutional reform by Mugabe’s government. The authoritarian atmosphere drove Masiyiwa 
away from Zimbabwe. Econet too expanded to other parts of Africa. See Jerry Goodstein and 
Ramakrishna Velamuri, “States, Power, Legitimacy, and Maintaining Institutional Control: The 
Battle for Private Sector Telecommunication Services in Zimbabwe,” Organization Studies 30, no. 
5 (2009); Sam Takavarasha and John Makumbe, "The Effect of Politics on ICT4D: A Case of 
Econet Wireless’s Struggle for a License in Zimbabwe," International Journal of E-Politics 
(IJEP) 3, no. 3 (2012). 
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Despite these possibilities, internet access in Nigeria has a lot of limitations as 
stated at the outset. There is periodical fluctuation of connectivity even on active 
data plan. Besides, the retail of data bundles at such a low price as 50 naira does 
not imply that the internet is inexpensive. Granted, 4MB can take one on a brief 
visit to Facebook, but it cannot allow for the upload of a picture or video that 
exceeds that size. Therefore, active participation in the online civil struggle entails 
material sacrifice. In the Airtel data plans, a bundle of considerable size (1GB for 
example) is retailed at 2000 naira (6.6 dollars). In spite of these conditions, the 
online struggle has been sustained in Nigeria. For many, it is worth investing in, 
both financially and in terms of appropriating available, but inefficient 
technological facilities. The staff and students of a certain university grapple with 
Wifi connectivity. The signal is found only in specific locations as against the 
promise by the university administration that it would reach all departments, 
offices and residences on campus. All through the day, they are found in groups 
with laptops, tablets and smart phones around the administrative block of the 
institution and a few other places where the internet signal is strong. There, they 
share their time between school work and virtual protest against injustice including 
the politics that bring them the discomfort of working outdoors, perching on car 
bonnets and motorbike seats. Other internet users exploit the bonuses offered by 
the telecom service providers. One shared his experience with the Glo Bounce 
tariff plan when it used to come with the bonus of 30 MB on every recharge of 200 
naira. As he usually recharged three times in a week, he received free 90 MB to do 
some work online, and participate in the virtual movement.  
Nigeria provides an example of how inefficient infrastructure is appropriated to 
challenge the broader state failure of which it is a major aspect. As the public 
supply of electricity is inadequate in the country, Nigerians source alternative 
means to power the electronic devices deployed in the online protest. For internet 
access, the various possibilities offered by the telecommunication technology are 
explored while the voiced telephony services are simultaneously put to use.   
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Conclusion 
Virtual activism stands in a convoluted relation with technology. It relies on 
technology for its production and effects. On the reverse side, the social practice is 
impeded by technological deficiencies. Yet, through innovative improvisation, the 
inadequacies are addressed. The visuality of social movements on Facebook can 
first be perceived as related to the ubiquitous presence of digital camera devices, 
infrastructural setups for alteration of the images and the virtual platforms for their 
distribution. The ubiquitous camera operates in a propagandist framework, to 
counter the false claim of accountable governance by the Nigerian state. It also 
functions as a means of surveillance on the political class by ordinary citizens. 
Through the infrastructure of circulation and appropriation by respectable media 
organisations, the images produced with the camera gain validation as testimonial 
to state violence and injustice. Meanwhile, to effectively carry out these functions, 
the images undergo a series of transformations, producing new representations. 
The idea of editing is challenged by those obsessed with the realist notion of 
photography. But I have argued that the integrity of the image is irrelevant in the 
context of civil struggle. Social movement is everything that Ariella Azoulay says 
of revolution. It is “a language… (and) is made of statements, practices, gestures, 
rules and civil grammar, grammar that precludes exclusion.” If photographs are as 
she adds “one type of this language’s component,” then their manipulation is part 
of the use of the language.305 Ahearn has theorised language as being immutable 
and mutable at the same time.306 The mutability of the photographic image allows 
it to make civil statements. The gadgets deployed for the photographic production 
and dissemination are technologies that are dependent on other technologies, 
namely electricity and the internet. Given that these are inefficient in Nigeria, a lot 
of improvisation is made to keep the visual-digital resistance sustained. Besides 
hardware devices, and the immaterial technologies of electricity and the internet, it 
is crucial to examine the online image display and circulation platform itself, that 
                                                          
305 The New School, “The Photographic Universe: Can Photographs Claim Rights? with Thomas 
Keenan and Ariella Azoulay,” YouTube video, 01:00:04, April 13, 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2FQi45Fwbs. 
306 Laura Ahearn, “Language and Agency,” Annual Review of Anthropology 30 (2001). 
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is, Facebook. It constitutes a different kind of infrastructure that operates in a 
fascinating way. 
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Introduction 
The structure of Facebook is worthy of critical examination. It is in structure that 
the power of the website as a technological space of social interaction is 
embedded. The emergent relation of Facebook to politics – everything in-between 
elections and uprisings – are enabled by the affordances of its User Interface 
(UI).307 This chapter analyses the structural elements of Facebook in relation to 
how they support the political use of media contents among Nigerians. The history 
of Facebook – which is itself fraught with narratives of resistance – is also read to 
understand how the platform evolved as a site of politics. Facebook activists in 
Nigeria were interviewed to ascertain how they make sense of the space provided 
by the website. With these and my own participant observation of the activist use 
of the forum, I read the Facebook timeline, the wall, the emoticons, the messaging 
system, the chatroom and other components as political tools. They support 
different modes of construction and presentation of civil expressions. To analyse 
these issues, I draw on the debates around the media with attention to the 
communicative possibilities and the political actions they enable. Effort is made to 
establish how digitality helps to reconstitute the conventional notions of media 
communication and broadens the scope of its relation to politics. The civil 
interactions in turn constitute a certain kind of archival production. We are thus 
prompted to read Facebook as archive. This is done by revisiting Achille 
                                                          
307 See Jessica Vitak et al., “It’s Complicated: Facebook Users’ Political Participation in the 2008 
Election,” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 14, no. 3 (2011); Okoro and Nwafor, 
“Social Media and Political Participation in Nigeria During the 2011 General Elections;” 
Ogundimu, “Facebook and Digital Activism;” and Ibrahim, “Nigerian Usage of Facebook During 
2012 Occupy Nigeria Protest.” These essays, some of which have been cited in the introductory 
chapter of this work show how Facebook is increasingly being used to construct political relations 
in Nigeria. 
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Mbembe’s work on the organising principles of the archive on the one hand, and 
its workings as a means of power on the other.  
Identified in the first segment of the chapter are the various ways contents are 
circulated on Facebook and the forms of interaction that take place around them. 
Contents arrive on the site through the initial appearance, that is, where they have 
not been previously seen on the internet. In the second instance, the posts could be 
shared by other Facebook users, a process I refer to as “re-posting.” Lastly, links to 
websites other than Facebook are shared on the platform. In the Nigerian context, 
these avenues allow the voices of the citizens to be publicly heard, uncensored, and 
with a high level of immediacy. With Facebook, it has also become possible for 
people to demand accountability from the political elites by communicating 
directly with them. Thus, the conversations on the platform could either be a public 
or two-user interaction, each of which produces distinct effects.  
In the second section, the history of Facebook is read in the context of its 
application in civil struggle. This political reading begins with the examination of 
the criticism with which Facebook has had to contend. The founder grappled with 
the accusation of breaking security encryptions and of “plagiarism” of 
programming codes in the early days of his invention. After it had jumped these 
hurdles, Facebook was criticised for the way it treated users’ privacy and used their 
profile pages as sites of advertisement. Despite these crises, the space became an 
important medium of civil movement as exemplified by the revolutions in Tunisia 
and Egypt which had an impact in North Africa and the Middle East (known 
broadly as the Arab spring). There were also instances from Nigeria. The specific 
history of the use of Facebook in Nigeria is mainly in relation to the political. 
Given that the effectiveness of the medium is no longer in doubt, it is censored by 
some repressive regimes and fraudulent democracies. Still, part of the whole 
discourse of online activism is the persistence of the practice through technological 
manipulations even in the event of crackdown. 
In the last part, the site is analysed as archive. The archival system of Facebook in 
some ways borrows from the conventional notion of the archive and challenges it 
in other instances. In terms of language, concepts, structure, and the documents its 
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holds, Facebook resembles the analogue archive except for a few differences. The 
User Interface constitutes the digital architectural structure of the site where the 
contents circulated by the online protesters are archived. The activists may not 
necessarily use the language of the archive to define their activities. But in my 
view, they are involved in the archivisation of collective memory born out of the 
resistance against harsh living experiences. The appearance and interpretation of 
the documents on the virtual archive are beyond the control of the state. In this 
case, Facebook archivisation reconfigures the conventional notion of the archive as 
a mechanism of power. However, the archival production on Facebook has its 
limits, with implications on digital photography as a means of civil struggle. 
Instances like the removal of photos from Facebook also prompt us to ponder the 
condition of the archive and its documents in the digital realm. The 
epistemological directions charted in this chapter allow me to reflect more 
generally upon the methodology of this study. As social media offers itself for 
intellectual examination, it is important to think about how its structural 
configurations shape the research process. 
Content circulation and conversation practices 
In developing their thesis, Katz and Lazarsfeld argue that mass media brings 
change through transmission of ideas and construction of opinions based on the 
ideas.308 Drawing on that argument, Clay Shirky identifies the processes behind the 
power of social media. He writes: “The internet spreads not just media 
consumption but media production as well.”309 This way, Shirky articulates the 
processes that give social media its force as an activist tool. It enables not only 
“access to information,” but “access to conversation.”310 The ways in which 
Facebook supports these processes have been identified through a close reading of 
the communicative features of the site and by “returning” to the pages from where 
I took the images and texts analysed in this study. Circulation of information on 
Facebook takes three key patterns – “standard posting,” “re-posting” and “sharing 
                                                          
308 Ibid. 
309 Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political 
Change,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-
12-20/political-power-social-media. 
310 Ibid. 
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of links to other websites.” These concepts have been coined with consideration for 
the language of Facebook whose semantic patterns take certain terms away from 
their dictionary meanings. Conversations on the platform occur mainly through the 
interactive relations of “liking,” “commenting,” “inboxing” and “chatting.” These 
processes have a lot of implications for photographic activism on Facebook and for 
research. As scholars are turning to social media to understand its construction of 
histories and social relations, it is crucial to closely examine how the virtual space 
of Facebook facilitates the process and at the same time places certain forms of 
restriction on it. 
 
Figure 4.1: Spatial setting for Facebook posting 
The idea of access to information on Facebook draws attention to how texts, 
photographs, videos and other forms of documents find their way on to the social 
networking website. Facebook is complete with buttons that bring contents into 
public view with a few clicks. The illustration in figure 4.1 depicts the spatial 
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configuration of the site that supports the inputting of thoughts by users.  A click 
on “Status” or “Update status” as the case may be, activates the input field 
underneath. A blinking cursor prompts one to type in what is on one’s mind. If the 
“Photo/Video” button is hit, folders and files stored on the memory of the device 
are thrown up for the user to search through and locate the photograph or video to 
post. Once the “Post” button is clicked, the document enters the public domain of 
the cyber world. 311 Yet, the blue button labelled “Public” suggests a different way 
of thinking the concept, but within the confines of the website.  The button 
presents the choice of who views the post – “Anyone on or off Facebook,” “Your 
friends on Facebook,” and so on. In this sense therefore, “Public” implies that the 
posted material is searchable on search engines such as Google Search.  
Although a lot of Facebook users give no attention to the button, most of the posts 
with activist undertones, and which were relevant to this research, targeted the 
public. The idea of “public” is a technological affordance that enables one’s voice 
to be heard by as many individuals as possible. If “public sphere is understood as a 
constellation of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of 
information, ideas, debates – ideally in an unfettered manner,”312 then, with 
Facebook and other social media platforms, it has been reconfigured. 
Consideration of nuanced forms of motivation to use the “post” button on 
Facebook will help us make sense of that assertion.  
Although Facebook is censored in different societies especially by repressive 
regimes, it provides space for freedom of expression in Nigeria. A certain regular 
user of the site works with a radio station where he hosts a programme on social-
political developments in Nigeria. The activist undertone of his analytical 
strategies has attracted certain forms of confrontation. He is criticised off-air by 
high-profile listeners as being too critical of the government. The situation is even 
aggravated by “various degrees of regulations from the editors and other concerned 
                                                          
311 It is important to note that Facebook does not have a homogeneous User Interface. It varies 
slightly from one form of user to another. For example, personal page is usually different from 
group page. Still, they have similar communicative features.   
312 Peter Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and 
Deliberation,” Political Communication 22 (2005): 148. 
    
   173 
 
staff especially when it (the broadcasting house) is state owned/sponsored.”313 He 
consequently turns to Facebook to express himself without being censored. The 
scenario gives a sense of him burning with the desire to pour out the feelings 
associated with living in a chaotic society. It can be “sickening” to bottle up such 
emotions.314 The cathartic motivation is even more pronounced with the posting of 
images. Equipped with image-taking devices such as smartphones, many Nigerians 
take photographs and videos of incidents that reflect how the world should not be. 
Through the act of posting them on Facebook, they relieve themselves of their 
emotional burdens while demanding change.  
Media dissemination on Facebook also calls attention to what can be termed 
“collision of immediacy.” Like other social networking platforms, Facebook 
“grants access to unfiltered information related by any person affected by an event 
who chooses to share the story” 315 as it happens. The production of photographs 
which constitute one of the key media contents disseminated on Facebook is itself 
understood in terms of immediacy. It involves the freezing of the world in a matter 
of a split-second. The collision of the immediacy of social media and of 
photography rocks the Nigerian political sphere. Electoral fraud for instance has in 
recent years been strongly challenged with instantaneous uploading of related 
photographs and of figures from different polling units following voting and vote 
counting. The public can thus follow the development of the exercise and make 
informed projections as to what the overall election results would be.    
With the reconfiguration of the public sphere as illustrated in the foregoing, the 
communication between citizens and the state has been reconstituted. Let us dwell 
for a moment on the notion of the Facebook “wall” and see how the 
communication reflects activist resonance. The social networking site allows users 
to post on their own walls or on those of others. There is something spectacular 
about these options. To post on someone else’s wall is to confront them while 
                                                          
313 Nnaemeka Amadi, online interview (Facebook inboxing) by the author, August 2015. 
314 Chidi Ugwu, face-to-face interview by the author, Nsukka, August 2015. 
315 Sarah Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights,” Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 35, no. 1 (2012): 153-154. 
    
   174 
 
portraying oneself as “an aggressive social crusader.”316 I interviewed an active 
Facebook user who related the experience of his interaction with a senator 
representing his constituency. The construction of a road connecting the senator’s 
town with others had begun but was abandoned once it reached his house. In a 
post, the senator asked Nigerians to pray for the country. Rather than comment on 
the post, my interviewee posted on the senator’s wall. He remarked that the most 
effective prayer would be to complete the aforementioned road – a project sited in 
a part of the country under his oversight. That approach substituted for a physical 
march with placards, or the execution of protest inscriptions and graffiti on the 
actual walls of the senator’s house. After the above incident, the road construction 
was resumed, but later suspended again. The activist believes that while other 
factors could be responsible for the resumption of work, his “confrontation” with 
the senator might have had some impact. 
Besides what I have termed “standard posting” whose related practices have been 
examined above, sharing the posts of others is an important method of information 
circulation on Facebook. The spectacular way in which the process supports public 
access to media materials is rooted in the vastness and amorphous shape of user 
networking on Facebook. Users are usually connected to multiple networks of 
virtual friends. Standard posting enables the circulation of a post among the 
individuals in the network of the user who originally posted it. When the post is re-
posted or shared by a member of the network, it is circulated among friends who 
have other friends among whom they could share it. This way, the document goes 
viral. A good number of photographs and videos analysed in this project came to 
my Facebook timeline through this cyclical movement. I accepted a lot of friends’ 
requests and reached out to many others so that through the complex networking, I 
could have access to numerous images and conversations associated with civil 
resistance in Nigeria.   
Meanwhile, within the boundaries of the analysis made in this part of the chapter, 
the interchangeable use of “posting” and “sharing” (which the standard use of the 
English Language could have allowed) is avoided. It should be acknowledged that 
                                                          
316 Ugwu, face-to-face interview. 
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cyber technology has not only introduced to us new practices, but new forms of 
language. On Facebook, to post is to hit the button labelled as such, in the case of 
which the document makes it initial appearance on the public domain of the 
website. Once it is posted, three buttons – “Like,” “Comment” and “Share” – 
appear below it. From the initial application as a way to “endorse,” the “Like” 
button as graphically represented with the thumb-up icon has evolved into a means 
of expressing a range of emotions.317 If you click “Comment,” you are taken to the 
field where you can type in your thought on the posted material. If you “share” it, 
you have “re-posted” it in the likeness of retweeting on Twitter.  To share 
another’s post on Facebook is to take part in its wider dissemination. Further, in 
the activist context, it is an act of drawing the attention of others to socio-political 
issues considered important. As this project is also about the comments that 
accompany relevant photographs to the virtual platform, I was drawn into tracing 
the various Facebook pages where a particular image or set of images had 
appeared. This offered me more user comments to think with while doing the 
visual analysis. 
It is a rather different undertaking when the content shared on Facebook is a link to 
another website. While different organisations have Facebook accounts, their 
websites are linked to this and other social media outlets. So, when they have web 
contents intended for free public consumption, they typically appear with social 
media icons. Visitors to the sites are prompted to share the contents with the social 
networking websites of their choice by clicking the appropriate icons. The links 
shared on Facebook include contents from other social networking sites and online 
news outlets. Social media has been broadly acknowledged as an alternative means 
of news broadcasting, not only through the notion of news feed but of sharing of 
links by users.318 As Nigerians use Facebook for activist purposes, they share links 
to news contents that support the struggle. A lot of YouTube videos, articles, and 
photographs from activist platforms such as Sahara Reporters, are shared. The 
contents from these and other sources are taken as “facts” that should be relied on 
                                                          
317 I will return to this transformation and read it in relation to civil struggle. 
318 Alfred Hermida, et al., “Share, Like, Recommend: Decoding the Social Media News 
Consumer,” Journalism Studies 13, no. 5-6 (2012). 
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to understand the failure of the Nigerian state. Although the sharing is underpinned 
by selective approach, reliance on them is rooted in the users’ ascription of 
evidentiary power to the image. The activists also leverage the fact that lots of the 
online outlets (whose contents are shared on Facebook) are themselves mediums of 
resistance fundamentally designed for that purpose. To share links to them is akin 
to direct quotation of text by a writer rather than paraphrasing it. It is through this 
practice that activists validate their claim about the existence of unfavourable 
socio-political conditions in Nigeria.  
On the Facebook timeline, a shared link most often appears as a thumbnail 
(photograph) or as a keyframe with a “play” button for video contents. Below it is 
the URL (Universal Resource Locator) which when clicked takes the user to the 
website where the content is originally published. In this study, I have followed 
such links to read the full-length articles, watch the videos or view the images. 
After I have got the gist, I return to the conversation around the content on 
Facebook. In what follows, the fundamental modes of conversation on the platform 
are discussed in two categories. They include more public forms of interaction 
(“liking” and “commenting”) and more closed modes that involve two individuals 
(“chatting” and “inboxing”).319   
Consider “liking” first. As noted earlier, the “Like” button is one of the visible 
features of every Facebook post and the comment it generates. Liking does not 
involve the typing of thoughts. The button is a statement prepared in a preset 
mode, ready to be released through the act of clicking the button. It evolved with a 
controversy that makes us appreciate how powerful it is within the conversational 
framework of Facebook. Previously a singular button symbolised with the thumb-
up icon, “Like” was taken by some Facebook users as exclusively a means of 
expressing admiration or approval. As a result, they found it repugnant when a 
photograph depicting disaster was liked on Facebook. The liking of the image of 
                                                          
319 Writing on the social capital of Facebook, Yoder and Stutzman adopted a similar classificatory 
approach – “third-party visible interactions” and “one-to-one communication.” But they avoided 
creating a distinction between what I have in this section mapped as modes of “content circulation” 
on the one hand, and of “conversation” on the other. For them, everything from dissemination of 
information on Facebook to the conversation about them is a form of interaction. See Christian 
Yoder and Fred Stutzman, "Identifying Social Capital in the Facebook Interface, CHI (2011): 585.     
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an accident scene once generated a heated conversation. Some argued that it 
suggested lack of sympathy for the victims of mishap. For others, the idea of 
circulating the image was liked, not the image itself or the misfortune it portrayed. 
With the dissemination of the sad news, people could reach out to the victims with 
relief aid.320 Towards the end of 2014, Zuckerberg the founder of Facebook 
responded to the debate. He acknowledged users’ uneasiness with “pressing the 
‘like’ button in response to sad news.” He expressed the intention to do something 
about it.321 By the beginning of 2015, Facebook had welcomed users with a group 
of six buttons labelled “Like, Love, Haha, Wow, Sad and Angry” (figure 4.2). 
Readily visible among them is the “Like” button which retains the thumb-up 
symbol with which we are already familiar. It can be said to be the key button, not 
only due to that visibility but because the rest of the buttons are revealed and used 
only when the mouse pointer is allowed to hover over it.  
 
Figure 4.2: The Facebook emoticons 
Furthermore, “liking” entails prompt and effortless communication that likely 
awakens the broader debate about social media activism and the possibility of 
                                                          
320 May Okafor, personal communication with the author, August 2015. 
321 Andrew Griffin, “Facebook Dislike Button Might Be on Its Way, Says Zuckerberg,” The 
Independent, December 12, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/facebook-dislike-button-might-be-on-its-way-says-zuckerberg-9920955.html. 
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political transformation. The position of the skeptics (prominent among them, 
Malcolm Gladwell who gave us the concept, “slacktivism”) is that social media 
rather weakens the force of activism. For him, “real” activism such as led by 
Martin Luther King, Jr in the United States of America in the 1950s requires the 
willingness to take risks and to make sacrifices. He asserts that “Facebook activism 
succeeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but by motivating them 
to do the things that people do when they are not motivated enough to make a real 
sacrifice.”322 His argument suggests “that liking something on Facebook…requires 
no effort,” 323 and is therefore not forceful enough to bring socio-political change. 
In my view, Gladwell’s position indicates a refusal to ponder how social media has 
contributed to the mobilisation of mass protests in different parts of the world (as 
more deeply examined in the next section). Regardless of the so-called 
effortlessness associated with Facebook liking, it is an important means of 
communication in virtual activism. It helps to notify the activists that their posts 
and the comments made on them have been seen by other users of the platform, 
and reacted to in particular ways. With the addition of more emoticons to the like 
button as illustrated in figure 4.2, the response can be represented in diverse ways.  
Meanwhile, commenting on posts is most widely understood as a mode of public 
conversation on Facebook. The practice – which is a “third-party visible 
interaction” just like “liking” – supports the formation of political opinions through 
negotiations around posts.324 Facebook allows visual contents to be posted 
simultaneously with comments. In this case, users are privileged to initiate the 
conversations around their own posts thereby setting their directions. The 
implication is that a photograph for instance shared on Facebook from another 
website may not maintain the context in which it is originally published online. 
This again illustrates Sekula’s idea that a photograph is bound to take on different 
meanings in different “presentational circumstances.”325 Commenting is an actant 
                                                          
322 Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will not be Tweeted,” The New 
Yorker, October 4, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-
gladwell. 
323 Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change and Human Rights,” 150. 
324 Yoder and Stutzman, "Identifying social capital in the Facebook interface." 
325 Sekula, “Reinventing Documentary,” 683. 
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in recontextualising the meaning of images on Facebook. To illustrate, the 
photograph below (figure 4.3) is a thumbnail of an article that appeared on the 
online news outlet, Premium Times. It is the report of a road traffic accident in 
which a soldier was knocked down in July 2014 by the BRT326 bus in Lagos. In 
spite of the plea by the passengers and by-standers, the soldier called on his 
colleagues who out of irritation for their wounded fellow set six BRT buses 
ablaze.327  
 
Figure 4.3: BRT buses allegedly set ablaze in Lagos by the military in 2014 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 4 July 2015, posted by Moshood Emeka with the text, 
“They can destroy tax payers sweat but can't fight insurgents.” 
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/
812264545459706/ 
Retrieval date:  6 July 2014 
                                                          
326 BRT which stands for Bus Rapid Transit is a bus transport system with dedicated lane, 
conceived by the state government to surmount road traffic congestion in Lagos, Nigeria.    
327 “Nigerian Army Says Soldiers Caught on Camera Vandalizing Lagos Buses Are ‘Area Boys,’” 
Premium Times (n.d.), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/164366-breaking-rampaging-
soldiers-destroy-lagos-brt-buses.html. 
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A member of the Nigerian Global Awakening Day Protest group shared the 
photograph with a comment that altered its meaning: “They can destroy tax payers’ 
sweat but can't fight insurgents nor find our girls ... Shame on you soldiers and you 
garrison commanders.”328 With these words, the conversation around the image 
shifted to the question of insurgency which at that time seemed to have gone 
beyond the power of the Nigerian army. The soldiers were ridiculed in the 
comments for having directed their aggressive energies towards the civilian 
population while they had failed to conquer Boko Haram militants.  
While the practice of making comments on Facebook posts reflects the expression 
of personal views that shape collective opinions, online activists use images in the 
process to illuminate the existence of the injustice they challenge. As the Nigerian 
army denied the allegation of setting fire to BRT buses, a Facebook comment on 
the story came as an edited image. A red circle is inscribed on the photograph to 
enclose and draw attention to a soldier throwing something at one of the buses. 
Although the image is not clear, it is a visual comment intended to support the 
thrust of a conversation that re-interprets a military expression of rage towards 
civilians as a demonstration of weakness. It can thus be argued that opinions are 
formed on Facebook through active interpersonal exchange. There is a sense in 
which Katz and Lazarsfeld’s notion of media influence is reconfigured. They 
identify a group called “opinion leaders” whose knowledgeability allows them to 
influence others. In the network of communication, these ones constitute a channel 
in their own right, and through it, media information is filtered and received by 
others. 329 In a social media age, the “opinion leadership” is diffuse. The users of 
the platform shape one another’s political view through commenting, in the context 
of which Hand writes: “Images become vehicles for often elaborate conversations 
                                                          
328 Moshood Emeka, “They Can Destroy Tax Payers Sweat,” Facebook, July 4, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/8122645454597
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329 Elihu Katz and Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the 
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about their meaning, their significance and, most interestingly, their contested 
nature as a reflection or representation of a person or event.”330 
As opposed to commenting, direct messaging and chatting are “one-to-one” modes 
of communication on Facebook,331 but they have their own distinct implications to 
virtual resistance and to research. If mobile phone text messaging is important in 
the mobilisation of protests, then Facebook direct messaging and chatting are 
pertinent as well. Through these more private forms of interaction, online friends 
raise each other’s consciousness and draw them to support the online civil 
resistance.  
However, the key drawback of this mode of communication in the Nigerian 
context is related to infrastructure. Disruptions in internet connectivity and electric 
power supply can interrupt chatting. A similar situation applies to the context of 
research. Some of the interviews I conducted with Facebook activists in Nigeria 
via the chatroom instant messaging were disrupted by the failure of internet access 
and the running down of the battery power of devices. Alternatively, “inboxing,”332 
was used to send interview questions in the likeness of an email attachment. The 
response was returned through the same means by the research participant. In a 
study like this one that involved semi-structured interviews, the limitation of 
inboxing is that it gives no room for prompts and probes. As a research method, 
interview is premised on the researcher’s anticipation of certain directions in the 
interviewee’s response to questions. It is through prompting that the interviewee is 
reminded of certain important things that seem to be missed out. Similarly, probing 
is used to elicit more information about a subject. Although it does not support 
prompts and probes, inboxing allows research participants some convenience in 
responding to interview questions. It can as well serve as a means to reach 
Facebook users who are not the researcher’s friends on the platform, but whose 
activities are relevant to the research. However, the response from such ones is 
usually problematical. The founder (a London-based Nigerian) of the Nigerian 
                                                          
330 Hand, Ubiquitous Photography, 180. 
331 Yoder, and Stutzman, "Identifying social capital in the Facebook interface." 
332 “Inboxing” is a term used here to describe the kind of email communication that Facebook 
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Global Awakening Day Protest group (whose activities were important to this 
research) declined my friend’s request in spite of my membership of the 
organisation. Several attempts to track her for interview through inboxing were 
also futile.  
The experience motivates us to ponder the concept of friendship on Facebook. 
“Facebook members can … join virtual groups based on common interests,”333 but 
that does not always translate into the kind of intimate relationship obtainable in 
real world situations or between individuals who already have offline ties. The 
more public forms of communication such as liking and commenting are more 
likely to be sustained among members than the two-person interaction which 
includes chatting and inboxing. Nonetheless I argue that virtual activism should 
not for this reason be perceived as weak. It is rather fascinating that relationships 
governed by immateriality have had the capacity to materialise the ambition of 
oppressed citizens to demand improved socio-political conditions.  
It has been argued above that the influence of Facebook as a medium of civil 
resistance draws from its structure that supports public dissemination of 
information and the discussion of it. The practices of content circulation are driven 
by the yearning for freedom of expression to challenge harsh social conditions. 
They are also motivated by cathartic desires against bottling up frustrations about 
tough socio-political realities. Once the contents are released into the virtual space 
of the social networking site, what follows is the exchange of thoughts about them. 
Each of the modes of circulation and negotiation has its peculiarities and impacts 
on the public culture of virtual resistance, on the production of meaning and on 
research through which a clearer understanding of them is sought. These complex 
transactions can be studied more carefully by historicising Facebook as a political 
tool.  
                                                          
333 Nicole B. Ellison, Charles Steinfield and Cliff Lampe, “The Benefits of Facebook ‘Friends’: 
Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network Sites,” Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication 12 (2007): 1143. Danah Boyd also interrogates the meaning of friendship 
on social media and its related practices. As virtual friendship for him is constructed by 
technological affordances, he in a sense warns that it could be misleading. See Danah Boyd, 
“Friends, Friendsters, and Top 8: Writing Community into Being on Social Network Sites,” First 
Monday 11, no. 12 (2006), http://www.firstmonday.org/ ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1418/1336. 
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Historical development of Facebook 
The historicisation of Facebook from the activist standpoint has not received much 
intellectual attention. Available historical writings are mostly blog articles that 
sketch out the founding of the platform and the key technological evolutions it has 
undergone. But there is more to the history of Facebook than these. This segment 
is about its historical reading as a political tool. I argue that the development in the 
technology, structure and application of Facebook portrays it as a contested space 
which, through resistance to political and public pressure, became in itself a 
medium of civil struggle. Here I review a range of disparate sources associated 
with Facebook, from its birthing to its confrontation with publics and constituted 
authorities and to its application in civil protests. 2011 saw the world’s most 
momentous wave of uprising since the advent of social media that had enormous 
influence on it. Examples are taken from the 2011 events and the periods before 
and after it, to argue for a historical development of Facebook in the context of 
civil movement. The various ways the virtual outlet has been deployed by 
dissidents are examined, as well as the reactions of the challenged authorities and 
the impact of the movements. It is crucial to understand how a forum conceived for 
social interaction among university students evolved into a powerful tool that has 
shaped momentous world political events.  
To begin with the origin of Facebook, it was created as “Thefacebook” in February 
2004 by Mark Zuckerberg while he was a student at Harvard University. Earlier in 
2003, Zuckerberg had written the software “Facemash…with the purpose of 
figuring out who was the most attractive person on campus.”334 It only supported 
the college network so that its use was dependent on possession of a Harvard 
University email account. When “Thefacebook” was launched, it maintained the 
restriction of use to an institutional connection to Harvard.  
The site was consequently criticised as “an intimate, private community.”335 
However by mid-2004, it began to be accessed by other universities in the United 
                                                          
334 Marcia Amidon Lusted, Mark Zuckerberg: Facebook Creator (Minnesota: ABDO, 2012): 28. 
335 Danah M. Boyd and Nicole B. Ellison, “Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
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States of America. The expansion took place in phases. Figure 4.4 shows the 
welcome page of the site when certain institutions became connected to it and 
users were prompted to check if theirs were included. On the internet, there are 
many such images indicating the institutions (later including those outside the 
United States) that got linked up at particular periods. The expansion accounts for 
the rise in the number of users to up to one million by the end of 2004. In 2005, 
Thefacebook became known as Facebook. The modification in name was 
accompanied by the introduction of picture display on the page. Reminiscent of the 
photographic practice that underpinned Facemash, the visual possibility would 
later evolve into a large-scale use of images in various contexts including the 
political. 
 
Figure 4.4: Thefacebook welcome page in 2004 
Retrieved from: Make Me Social, 17 February 2011  
URL: http://makemesocial.net/2011/02/17/where-were-you/ 
Retrieval date: 23 August 2015 
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Meanwhile, 2006 was a remarkable year for Facebook. Most of what made it a 
possible research platform and a site for civil mobilisation began to appear that 
year. It became globally accessible. So, anyone who had a functional email address 
and was over the age of 13 could open a Facebook account.336 The features that 
allowed the circulation of contents through posting and sharing of other posts and 
external links were created. Creation of groups and events became possible. It is 
difficult to make sense of the emergence of these features in their sequential order. 
They are numerous and emerged in quick succession. Tagging, chatting, friend 
search, request and listing, photo album, video call, timeline and a myriad other 
features were created on Facebook and were fine-tuned with time.  Rather than go 
into the detail of when each of the buttons was added, I trace the evolution of the 
use of the features in various places for civil purposes. The sociological history so 
to speak aids our understanding of how a platform which only supported college 
networks at the outset grew into a global phenomenon and began to shape the 
politics of societies. 
It would be fitting to begin the historical survey by considering the internal crises 
experienced by Facebook. The platform that has impacted immensely on the 
political evolution of the world through the sustenance of civil unrest has itself 
grappled with user discontent and in fact outright protest against it. The first 
resistance against Facebook was the closure of its precursor – Facemash – by the 
Harvard University executives in 2003. As predominantly a photographic image 
viewing website that showcased the portraits of Harvard students, Zuckerberg 
hacked into the university security network to enable him copy students’ ID 
pictures. As he was accused of breaking the security network and violating 
copyright and students’ privacy, Facemash was shut down by the authorities of 
Harvard University. It was later re-opened as the charges against Zuckerberg were 
dropped. After the launching of Thefacebook in 2004, another accusation came 
from Divya Narendra and the Winklevoss brothers – Cameron and Tyler. They 
alleged that Zuckerberg who once worked for them as a computer programmer had 
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stolen their ideas and coding system. Like the one preceding it, the case was later 
dropped.337 
The next remarkable crises experienced by Facebook were in connection with 
“third-party partnership” that raised concerns about privacy. Yasamine Hashemi 
discusses “public search,” “social ads” and “beacon” as features that emerged on 
Facebook in 2007 which led to public protest against the social networking 
website.338 Public search entails the availability of user information including 
posts, comments, images and videos to others who are not connected to Facebook. 
This feature is in contrast with the original mode of “public availability” of 
information where it was only accessible to those who had account with the site. In 
this case, while the user is logged on to Facebook, typing a word in the search field 
brings up a pull-down list of related names from which the item being searched for 
can be chosen. The notion of third-party partnership comes in with the availability 
of the listings (users and the information about them) on search engines such as 
Google and Yahoo.  One key reaction to the process is that users were not 
appropriately notified that the public could now have access to their information.339 
Another concern was in relation to advertising or “social ads.” It was conceived to 
enable users to connect to products, services and celebrities. It also provided the 
possibility to share with friends on Facebook the activities of the user on third-
party websites. Although advertisers had no access to the viewers of the ads, 
Hashemi once again draws attention to Facebook’s failure to communicate with 
users via email that their profile pages would be used as advert spaces.340 
Moreover, beacon is used to describe the process whereby Facebook tracks the 
activities of users of other websites (on concession with Facebook) and shares 
them with the friends of the users as news stories. In a general sense, the 
controversy generated by these features was associated with concerns about the 
public access to user information and activities. Such apprehensions have even 
                                                          
337 Sarah Philips, “A Brief History of Facebook,” The Guardian, July 25, 2007,   
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prompted the reading of Facebook as a “surveillance tool.”341 The outcomes 
include media agitation and virtual protest by users. The political group – 
MoveOn.org – for example provided a forum for the aggrieved to sign petitions 
against beacon and request “the ability to opt-out of the program completely with 
no more than one click of a mouse which the original version…did not allow 
for.”342  
Zuckerberg’s reaction was to issue public apologies to users.343 But given the 
importance of such products as sources of funds for Facebook, they were not 
withdrawn. Instead, modifications in privacy settings were made to enable users to 
opt-out at will. The issue with this is that users may be ignorant of such provisions. 
They may not always make time to get acquainted with the technicalities set out in 
the website’s settings. While users bear the responsibility for such an attitude, it 
can be argued that the “privacy setting politics” allowed Facebook to retain the 
features that would make it a site for activities subject to research and that in turn 
aid the scholarly process. 
To illustrate, the public search feature was useful in this study. The Facebook 
search field was used to locate pages especially the ones belonging to groups. It 
was found out that several groups could simultaneously bear a particular profile 
name. For instance, as will be shown in more detail in the next chapter, numerous 
groups are known by the profile name “Occupy Nigeria.” On the other hand, the 
Google search engine was useful for access to the Facebook discussions on certain 
subjects. A key word would be typed in the search field of the search engine, then 
followed by the word “Facebook.” From the list thrown up, the items relating to 
the subject and emanating from the Facebook website would be selected. Another 
form of public search I did was in relation to the background information about 
certain images circulated on Facebook. In the event when clues to the root source 
of a photograph were not readily available on the display space of Facebook, 
words relating to the context in which it was shared on the social networking site 
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were tried one after another on the Google image search field. Through this 
process, the website on which the picture was originally published would be 
located.  
Although these practices are useful to intellectual work, they have close 
association with the issue of privacy.  Grappling with the public dissidence about 
this and generally how user information is managed has rather “toughened” 
Facebook. The site has been able to maintain the features that have to do with 
public access to information and networking possibilities. This way, Facebook has 
established itself as a contested space where other forms of contestation are 
enacted. In what follows, the activist reading of the history of Facebook is 
advanced with selected important world revolutionary events involving the use of 
the medium.   
The use of Facebook in the context of civil struggle emerged not so long after 
access to the site became universal in 2006. The power to connect individuals for 
civil actions that was found earlier in text messaging344 came to be manifested in 
more diverse ways on Facebook and other social media sites. Inspired by the use of 
Facebook by tens of thousands of fans to support a football team in Egypt in 2007, 
Ahmed Maher began to consider applying the medium in the sense of a political 
movement. The following year (2008), he collaborated with Israa Abdel-Fattah to 
create “April 6 Youth” – a Facebook page dedicated to the mobilisation of an 
industrial action in Egypt. Following the offline projection of the virtual 
movement, the strike gave way to larger protests. But it later met with a crackdown 
as President Hosni Mubarak censored the activities of the group. 345  
In neighbouring Tunisia, President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali also sought to control 
Facebook in 2008 but the site was accessed through “proxy sites.”346 It was one of 
the tools deployed in the country to release information in the form of documents 
                                                          
344 Before the creation of Facebook and other social networking sites, text messaging was 
effectively used to organize protests. The protest that led to the ouster of President Joseph Estrada 
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and visuals to expose his tyrannical and corrupt government. The corruption and its 
connection with the Western world were brought to the limelight through the 
release of documents relating to dubious transactions between Ali and the United 
States government.347 The saga of the “European shopping junkets” of Ali’s wife 
was brought to public attention through the online monitoring of the First Lady’s 
use of her husband’s jet.348 It is no surprise that individuals whose governments are 
challenged on social media become apprehensive of the increasing public access to 
their actions. Engaging with Brigg’s concept of “conservative dilemma,” Shirky 
writes that “with the spread of such media, whether photocopiers or web browsers, 
a state accustomed to having a monopoly on public speech finds itself called to 
account for anomalies between its view of events and the public.”349 What usually 
follows the dilemma is censorship.  
The notion of censorship has been partly analysed with Ethan Zuckerman’s “cute 
cat” theory. “Popular sites where majority of the people engage in trivial activities” 
are hardly shut down by state authorities, but those used by dissidents to express 
discontent about the running of governments are usually under the threat of 
closure.350 In relation to social media activism, state control of the sites is one of 
the key factors responsible for what is usually regarded as “failed revolution.” But 
I suggest that we avoid the use of “failure” in the evaluation of the impact of cyber 
civil movement. A protest organised online should not be taken to have failed 
merely for the reason that there is no grandiose outcome such as the deposition of a 
tyrant.  Everything from publicity to psychological effects exemplified by the 
“conservative dilemma” ought to be viewed as accomplishments, thus “success.” 
Three years after the so-called “failed” protest of 2008 in Egypt, the leader referred 
to it as a remarkable achievement. This is because the government not only 
recognised the existence of the online group behind it, but realised that it was a 
threat to its legitimacy and resisted it.351 Accordingly, in historicising Facebook in 
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relation to civil movement, I am interested in the deployment of the tool whatever 
the level of its impact. 
In April 2009, what came to be recognised as the first major civil movement 
enacted on Facebook was in connection with the protest that took place in 
Moldova. Thousands of young citizens attacked state establishments and clashed 
with the police, poised to pull down the Communist Party that won a parliamentary 
election allegedly through rigging of votes.352 The goal was achieved in the end. 
Given that most cases of cyber protest involving the use of Facebook are usually in 
combination with other tools, the platform was deployed along with Twitter and 
mobile telephone text messaging in the organisation of the Moldova action. The 
virtual spaces became important for the formation and dissemination of political 
opinions among Moldovans. The condition that led to the protest – dissatisfaction 
with the electoral process – aroused the pent up anger about poverty with which 
the population was grappling. In search of better living conditions, the rate of 
migration had skyrocketed in Moldova. Shirky’s conclusion about social media 
activism comes to mind: that such practice “is more likely to emerge in a society as 
a result of dissatisfaction with matters of economics or day-to-day governance.”353   
Such dissatisfaction precipitated the world’s most recent historic civil movement – 
what many have called the “Arab spring” of 2011 – to which Facebook and other 
social networking sites were central. Prominent among the affected countries are 
Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Although marked by 
certain country-by-country specificities, it was a collective experience for North 
Africa and parts of Middle East. It occurred in a seemingly linear succession, 
connecting one state after another. Joseph puts it thus: 
Just as the iconic #jan14 and #sidibouzid hashtags for Tunisia led to #jan25 
trending for Egypt, Twitter hashtags for planned “days of rage” in other 
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States also began trending: #jan30 in Sudan, #feb3 in Yemen, #feb5 in 
Syria, #feb12 in Algeria, #feb14 in Bahrain, and #feb17 in Libya.354  
Hashtag is more associated with Twitter, but the platform was in most cases used 
alongside Facebook. So the trajectory of events drawn with the hashtag 
formulation is by extension of the application of Facebook in the protests. I use the 
social movement as enacted in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya to demonstrate the 
underlying patterns of the “Arab uprising” in terms of mobilisation, state responses 
and outcome. Other examples are taken from Nigeria and Uganda where the virtual 
practices on Facebook have cast light on the paradoxes of democracy. 
The civil struggle started in Tunisia. The aforementioned 2008 monitoring of and 
information leakage about Ben Ali’s deeds, and the videos of derision circulated 
about him gathered the clouds of anger among the Tunisian population. The 
downpour was to be triggered by a little more provocation that came with the self-
immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010. Bouazizi sought the 
intervention of the government following the illegal closure of his business in Sidi 
Bou Zid town by local authorities.355 The incident threw Sidi Bou Zid into mass 
protest whose photographs and videos were circulated on Facebook.356 Twitter 
hashtags and Facebook groups were created to facilitate the circulation and the 
mobilisation of broader protests. In fact, social media constituted the key platforms 
on which information about the Tunisian uprising was propagated. The unrest 
climaxed in the flight of Ben Ali from Tunisia. The world turned to Tunisia in 
contemplating the power of protest articulated on social media to overthrow 
autocratic and corrupt rulers. 
Neighbouring states were motivated by the Tunisian experience. As Sarah Joseph 
puts it, “a feeling of ‘we can do it too’ became immediately apparent.”357 That 
attitude coupled with the call on social media to awaken the consciousness of the 
region suggests some connectedness. Among other things it indicates that the 
countries had in common certain socio-political conditions that motivated the 
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uprising. In Egypt, the protests that usually marked the Police Day (January 25) 
escalated into larger events in 2011. Facebook and Twitter were at the core of the 
galvanisation of the public in favour of the demonstrations. They were as important 
as the mainstream media in the coverage of the civil movement.358 The platforms 
also turned to photography to enable the visual rendering of the historic moments. 
Joseph mentions the turning of the “cameras – which had not been allowed into 
prerevolution Tunisia – on Tahrir Square, the iconic site of the main protests, for 
the entire protest period” of more than two weeks.359 The reaction of the Egyptian 
government was severe. The media was not just censored; internet communication 
was disrupted for some days. But rather than deter the activists, the extreme 
measure fanned the flames of anger that translated into their perseverance. In the 
end, Hosni Mubarak was deposed. 
The fact that offline enactment of the Arab protest was prearranged on social 
media enabled some governments to prevent the actions from taking place. In 
Sudan for instance, the protests planned to start on 30 January 2011 never 
happened as they were prevented by President Al-Bashir. Shirky is right in his 
claim that not only the activists who employ social media in civil movement are 
convinced of its effectiveness. Governments are too.360 So, they make efforts to 
stop it, even before its commencement.  
Unlike in Sudan where the planned protest could not be carried out at all, in Syria, 
it started on 15 March 2011 as against the intended date – 5 February. Yet, the 
Syrian experience was unique. Both the activists and the repressive regime 
deployed social media differently in the revolution. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, 
Skype and mobile telephone technology were the most effectively used platforms. 
The deployment was marked by compelling forms of technological manipulation. 
The uprising started with a peaceful demonstration in Darra, the southern part of 
Syria and later spread to Homs in the north. The Syrian government responded by 
shooting into the crowd of protesters, killing tens, including 13-year old Hamzeh 
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Al-Khateeb.361 The spectacle of his brutalised body was harnessed to portray the 
violence of the Syrian government. Through the publishing of the video on 
YouTube and the creation of Facebook group pages such as “We are all Hamzeh 
Al-Khateeb,”362 the subjects of the Syrian regime were invited to see themselves as 
potential victims of its brutality. The social media dissemination of information 
about the uprising not only gave the world updates of what Syria was going 
through, it brought multitudes of people to join in the movement.  
Apprehensive of the overwhelming impact of social media on the protests, Bashar 
al-Assad’s government shut down mobile telephone and internet connections in 
Darra and Homs. The activists found alternative means of communication. They 
used modems and mobile phone sim cards smuggled into the country from 
elsewhere. Apparently as it became difficult for the state to defeat the activists’ 
technological appropriations, it considered withdrawing the crackdown and using 
the same social media platforms to track protest participants. Social media 
therefore became important to both the activists and the state. Ahmad Shehabat 
reads it as a virtual war in which “social media cyber-attacks, disinformation, 
propaganda and surveillance” were used by both the dissidents and the repressive 
regime “to win the online front line – an operation that (impacted) on the offline 
battle.”363  
The wave of protests also spread to other parts of the North Africa and the nearby 
Middles East, but Tunisia, Egypt and Syria provide the most intriguing examples 
of the application of Facebook in the uprising. While the experience of the two 
regions remains the most remarkable in Facebook and (more generally social 
media) activism, the year 2011 during which it occurred saw other instances in 
different parts of the world, including Nigeria. And this is where the history of the 
use of Facebook in Nigeria comes into focus.  
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It began between 2006 and 2007, but mainly for the purpose of socialising with 
friends. By 2008, the number of users had risen to 400,000. 364  By the end of that 
decade, the use of Facebook in relation to election had been demonstrated 
elsewhere as exemplified by the 2008 U.S election. Nigeria followed suit. In the 
2011 general election, Facebook along with other social media tools was used by 
politicians for declaration of interest in political positions and for campaigns. 
Goodluck Jonathan who took the seat as president through the election publicised 
his intention to run for the post on Facebook.365 While the cyber-based campaign 
was marked by acrimony between opponents, the political engagement engendered 
on the platform during and after the election took on activist dimensions. Smart 
phone applications and online platforms connected to Facebook were created to 
enable “citizens to report election-related incidences with pictures, videos, text 
messages and voicemail.”366 The activist underpinnings of these practices are 
expressed in the naming of the virtual platforms and the uses to which the 
circulated images were to be put. “Enough is Enough” and “ReclaimNaija” for 
instance encapsulate feelings of frustration about the country’s long history of 
political failure. Social media came to be conceptualised as a space that would be 
used to demand for change.   
Meanwhile, as Jonathan took up power in 2010, he continued to use the medium to 
communicate with Nigerian citizens. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
interaction was taken as an opportunity to critique his administration. Between 
2011 and 2015, strong public opinions were formed and expressed against 
Jonathan on Facebook.  In the next chapter, it is argued that the practice facilitated 
his defeat in the 2015 general election.  
Unlike Nigeria where Facebook has enjoyed considerable freedom so that it is 
heavily put to political use including during elections, it is censored in some other 
democracies. During Uganda’s general election in February 2011, the Ugandan 
Communication Commission (UCC) ordered the closure of “a DemGroup text 
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message relaying election-related reports.” Two months later, Facebook and 
Twitter were shut down for 24 hours, disrupting the post-election protest against 
the high cost of living.367 In the guise of forestalling violence, the UCC which was 
expected to promote freedom of expression in a democratic setup was used by the 
state to silence the citizens. The so-called democracies – and not only authoritarian 
regimes – demonstrate hostility to Facebook given that it exposes their failures. 
While the foregoing is a historical reading of how virtual protest on Facebook 
developed, it can be claimed that the medium can no longer be separated from the 
world’s day-to-day politics. There is hardly a media discussion of political issues 
that ignores how Facebook and other social media platforms come into play. It is 
interesting that as examined above, Facebook was not at the outset designed for the 
civil use in which it later began to be deployed. The medium has been historicised 
here as an activist tool which struggled its way through different forms of crises 
and became established as a means of civil resistance. It is used in various ways for 
information circulation. Users organise themselves through the medium for offline 
protests and disseminate real time coverage of the events. The circulated contents 
and the conversations around them constitute some kind of threat to the target 
authorities in both repressive regimes and democracies. The usual reaction is a 
crackdown which in some instances suppresses the uprising. In other cases, the 
dissidents devise alternative ways to sustain the civil movement. In yet other 
circumstances, there are extreme outcomes such as the reversal of situations and 
deposition of leaders. While these elements constitute an activist history of 
Facebook, some of them can be read further to argue for the site as archive. 
Facebook as archive 
The question of colonial experience is one of the key areas of intellectual enquiry 
in African historiography. Ann Laura Stoler has extensively explored the archive 
as a means of power in the colonial project. She argues that archives are not “sites 
of knowledge retrieval, but of knowledge production … the supreme technology of 
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the late nineteenth-century imperial state.”368 With the 21st century digital 
technology, new archival practices have emerged in more compelling ways than 
merely the appropriation of digital facilities by the analogue archive. Facebook is 
used here to demonstrate new archival possibilities and at the same time explore 
their limitations.  
The social media site simultaneously borrows from and alters the established 
formulations of the archive, and enables political dissention. Colonial archives 
helped to facilitate colonialism. But with reference to Nigeria, the Facebook 
archive aids in the mobilisation against the dubious politics that emerged in 
Nigeria after the end of colonialism. As a site of civil struggle, it is a space in 
which the history of a society in turmoil is being continuously documented in 
pictures and written words by the aggrieved citizens. The social networking site is 
analysed as an archive whose structure is akin to the physical architecture of the 
analogue archive, although digitally constituted. It holds in digital form the 
documents for which the analogue archive is known. In the context of activism, the 
power to accord value to the documents lies in the hands of the public and not the 
state. Accordingly, rather than allow itself to be used by the state for its own ends, 
the archive (Facebook) is deployed by the public to document the atrocities of the 
state against its citizens. Yet, at some levels, Facebook operates like the personal 
archive in the conventional archival practice (in parts of Africa) from which 
broader political narratives emerge. These reflections are crucial as they help us to 
understand why scholars are turning to Facebook and other social media sites for 
research materials, just as they use the analogue archive. 
Mbembe’s essay, “The Power of the Archive and Its Limits” greets readers with 
the photograph of the Cape Archives Repository in South Africa. The image is in a 
sense a pointer to the materiality of the archive where the “documents” are put on a 
par with the “building” that houses them. “There cannot … be a definition of 
archives,” Mbembe asserts, “that does not encompass both the building itself and 
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the documents stored there.”369 The assertion highlights the importance of space in 
the configuration of the archive. It is conventionally conceived as an architectural 
space complete with other built spaces such as cabinets and shelves. They are 
structured to accommodate documents organised in files and in other ways 
depending on the nature of the documents.  
One of the likely reactions to Mbembe’s presentation of architecture as crucial to 
the formation of the archive is that it has been overtaken by time. His writing 
appeared when the concept of the archive was restricted to materiality. Today, the 
idea of “vitual archive” has come with digital technology to disturb the notion of 
physical architecture. Yet, the virtuality of the archive does not suggest absolute 
loss of physicality. The devices (such as computers) on which digital documents 
are viewed and interacted with, the servers, cables, and other equipment through 
which internet signals are transmitted are material things that have to be located in 
actual space. On the other hand, Facebook is structured as architectural space, 
although a virtual variant. The configuration of the space is akin to the physical 
building that houses records of important human experiences. It also has a filing 
system and ways of managing the presence of visitors and recording their 
activities. In fact, the terms such as “file” and “document” which constitute the 
digital lexicon in which we read Facebook indicate that it borrows the language, 
concepts and structure of the analogue archive. The key difference is that while 
one is rooted in materiality, the other is immaterial and in “motion.” 
While I will return to the idea of “motion,” let us dwell for a moment on the 
immateriality of the “document,” which is the second component of the archive. 
Digital technology has afforded photography and film a dual position. They 
constitute archival documents in their own right and serve as the means through 
which other kinds of material documents are transformed into the form that makes 
them archivable in the digital archive. The analogue documents include textual 
materials (on paper and similar surfaces), two-dimensional images (such as 
photographs, drawings, prints and paintings), filmic materials, audio recordings 
                                                          
369 Achille Mbembe, “The Power of the Archive and Its Limits,” in Reconfiguring the Archive, ed. 
Carolyn Hamilton, et al (Cape Town: David Philip, 2002), 19. 
    
   198 
 
and three-dimensional artefacts. Similarly, Facebook as an archiving space is a 
repository of these forms of materials, but differently constituted. As a virtual 
space, only that which is digital is held in it. Derrida reminds us that “the technical 
structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable 
content.”370 Documents which are originally in hard format are digitised through 
such processes as scanning, photographic documentation and filming, to get them 
archived on Facebook. Thus, in addition to written words, the site renders time and 
events into digital photographs and films, and archives them as fundamentally 
visual impulses. So if “every photograph, every film is a priori an archival 
object,”371 then it is a two-fold document in the context of the new archival practice 
which Facebook demonstrates.  
On the other hand, the idea of “archive in motion” is the thrust of a volume edited 
by Eivind Røssaak in 2010. Digital technology and the internet are said to have 
enabled a condition “where constant and updating functions as well as ‘live’ 
communication and interaction redefine the temporality of the archival document 
itself.”372 That movement is experienced in everything including posting, re-
posting, sharing of links and chatting as examined in the earlier section. However, 
one key critique of Røssaak’s idea is his reading of the analogue archive as 
static.373 Jerslev and Mortensen argue that “the archive has always been dynamic 
and open-ended within the framework of an overall policy of collecting and 
organizing items according to different logistical, professional, political and 
ideological concerns and constraints.”374 They add that “the digital archive (rather) 
emphasizes and significantly intensifies the interactivity and flexibility that has 
always been an affordance of the archive.”375 The mobility of the digital archive is 
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so intense that not only are the documents in motion, the architecture is, after all it 
is accessed through devices that are themselves mobile. 
 
Figure 4.5: Spatial configuration of Facebook (for an individual page) 
While the analogue archive is situated is the geographical space, Facebook is 
located in the vast network of World Wide Web (WWW) from which pages are 
fetched through the technology of Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). To 
transport oneself to a Facebook archive, one is required to input in the address 
field, “https://www.facebook.com/” followed by the name in which the 
“repository” is constituted. Through that entrance, one enters the virtual space 
whose architectural structure is constituted in its User Interface (UI) as shown in 
figure 4.5 loosely labelled to show the key structure of a personal Facebook page. 
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The UI of Facebook has undergone a lot of modifications over time but has 
maintained the key components – the page cover, the profile information and the 
timeline also known as wall. The cover is so much like a banner on the façade of 
the building on which the name of the archive is conspicuously inscribed and 
which welcomes the visitor. It is designed as a space for presentation of 
photographic signs – cover and profile pictures – that are changeable according to 
the image desired to be projected of the archive at a given period. There is 
something of archival production that we can begin to explore with the 
photographic image here. 
A click on the cover or profile picture displays navigation buttons through which 
one chronologically flips through the images archived over time within the 
particular section. Facebook also supports the conscious creation of albums. I use 
the word “conscious” to establish a distinction between other forms of image 
organisation and the use of “Create Album” button on the website. Located under 
the “Photo” menu, “Create Album” allows for deliberate upload of photographs to 
Facebook for storage and public viewing purposes. Other albums are not created 
consciously. They are rather the outcome of the algorithmic actions of the website. 
A click on the “Albums” button under the “Photos” menu reveals photographs 
organised in sub-albums such as “Timeline Photos,” “Profile Pictures,” “Cover 
Photos” and “Mobile Uploads.” This archival ordering affirms Martin Hand’s 
observation that the device deployed and the websites involved in the online photo 
dissemination “are at the same time modes of storage and classification.”376  
Just like the cover and profile picture sections of the Facebook page, the “timeline” 
(where the user’s posts appear) is associated with a particular mode of 
archivisation. The most recent posts are displayed atop those preceding them. 
Through the mechanism of scrolling, one walks down the path of time to view the 
documents in the archive. That linearity of movement reminds us of the 
Heraclitean notion of time “as an unfolding sequence of events, as continuous like 
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a flowing river.”377 In keeping with that model, the documents on the timeline are 
archived chronologically. However, the chronology is only in relation to the time 
of the materials’ arrival to the virtual archive. In the manner in which photography 
as argued by Baer destabilised the Heraclitean idea of time, there is a different 
ordering of time within the documents archived on Facebook. The events they 
depict are splinters of different times and spaces difficult to make sense of in linear 
order.  
We can as well begin to think about the limits of Facebook as archive by reading 
the timeline in a more critical way. It is possible to access the posts of non-friends 
on the timeline, but not their activity log which is the repository of all that happens 
on and outside the timeline.378 Documents can also be lost from the timeline and 
other sections of Facebook. Given that the comments made on the photographs I 
downloaded from Facebook were important to my research, I returned to the URL 
of some of them to look up the newer comments on them. But some had 
disappeared with their accompanying comments. The deletion is connected to user 
action or the algorithmic processes of Facebook. But the loss does not occur is an 
absolute sense. Lost photographs have what I refer to as “after-loss existence.” By 
this I mean that images may disappear from the public domain of Facebook, but 
continue to exist in other digital spaces, such as private digital archives or the data 
bank of Facebook as a corporation.  
Both the loss and the after-loss have some implications. The loss creates what 
Martin Hand describes as “archive anxiety.” 379 Part of the anxiety is the 
devastation of losing one’s visual documents in the digital age which many 
embraced as a permanent solution to our quest to get our memory preserved. On 
the other hand, given the intrinsic cyclical circulation of new media contents, the 
lost photograph has the tendency to make an online reappearance, perhaps in 
different contexts that produce new meanings that could be politically charged. In 
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the context of civil resistance, the political force of photographs are important. And 
certain other features of Facebook communication produce political effects in 
nuanced ways.  
Consider the area I labelled “information section” in figure 4.5. It shows the 
descriptions of what the archive (the Facebook page) is about, the bio data, list of 
friends and other disparate items about the user. Where the page belongs to an 
individual, these pieces of information are as personal as date of birth, schools 
attended, places visited and romantic relationships. If it is a group page, the section 
shows a list of its members, the circumstances behind its formation, the goal and 
the group events scheduled to take place online or offline. There is a tendency to 
perceive the idea of personal information on Facebook pages as insignificant in the 
context of political mobilisation as investigated in this project. But I contend that 
while some materials presented on individual pages may be so personal that they 
are best understood in terms of self-presentation, others fit into the frame of civil 
engagement. Personal information could have its nuances that are utterly political.  
To illustrate, in May 2015, a young Nigerian university lecturer travelled to the 
United Kingdom for a two-week programme. He used the “Life Event” feature 
(with which Facebook users share their travel experiences) to make a political 
statement. His travel report transcended mere pronouncement of “being to a place.” 
It was a sarcastic foregrounding of the poor infrastructure in Nigeria as opposed to 
what he saw in the United Kingdom. He wrote: “I am happy to be getting back in a 
couple of hours. I miss Nigeria a lot.” Then followed a list of what he missed, 
moving from the personal to the politically forceful: “my beloved family,” “palm 
wine,” “potholes and bad roads,” “fuel scarcity,” “noise of generators,” “the 
stupidity of many Nigerian public officials.”380  
Such political nuances connect to the theorisation of archive as a means of power 
as championed by such scholars such as Foucault and Derrida. While the former 
views it as “the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique 
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events,”381 the latter in his Archive Fever establishes that the state and the archive 
are intertwined.382 Colonialism is the first key African experience in which the 
configuration of power through archival production is quite tremendous. Stoler 
explores the archive as “a process” and as “epistemological experiment” and 
(especially the colonial archive) as “technologies of rule.”383 As a process, the 
archive does not house documents to be retrieved as value-free knowledge of the 
world, but for the production of it. In the context of imperialism, the produced 
knowledge is essentially about social categorisation, stereotypical representations 
and domination. Following political independence in parts of Africa, the imperial 
archive is inherited as state institution. It is accorded recognition as repository of 
the historical record of domination from which the state has been set “free.” But 
the inheritance presents the challenge of how to use collections set up in the 
colonial context without reproducing the epistemological politics that formed 
them. Besides the relations with colonialism, the archive becomes for many 
African states the means to tell the story of nation and its “glory.” It is in this sense 
that the archive is deemed a “status” – “a matter of discrimination and selection, 
which…results in the granting of a privileged status to certain…documents, and 
the refusal of that same status to others, thereby judged ‘inarchivable.’”384 The 
“archivable” are so-called because they portray the state in a good light. They are 
“coded,” “classified” and “distributed according to chronological, thematic or 
geographical criteria.”385 Others are discarded when they do not fit into the frame.  
The archival production of Facebook is a reversal of that status. The state in this 
case lacks the power to determine the “archivability" of documents. What it 
considers “unarchivable” about its activities are deemed “archivable” by the 
citizens whose living conditions are shaped by such activities. The emergence of 
Facebook as an archiving space in which the public has a stake has a lot of 
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implications for Nigeria. To begin, it can be argued that the conventional state 
archive over which the state has absolute power (as it is usually about its own 
work) is being overtaken. 386  It is everything Enwezor says about “the standard 
view of the archive” – “a dim musty place full of drawers, filing cabinets, and 
shelves laden with old documents”387 open to all but oftentimes visited by select 
groups doing their research. In contrast, Facebook is a vibrant space regularly 
visited by lots of Nigerians. The visitors are actively engaged in the contestation of 
power that mark the space. As shown in this research, one key issue about the use 
of Facebook by Nigerians is the obsession with socio-political issues in the 
country. The political elites are confronted through the exposure of their excesses 
and the demand for more accountability from them.  This way, a contemporary 
history of Nigeria is being documented. The process is opposed to the version of 
“glorification” constructed by the state to anaesthetise harsh human experiences. 
Hence, if “an archive is, among other things, a repository of things that a culture 
deems valuable,”388 then Facebook is one. It is a space where the subjects of an 
activist digital culture deposit the documents they accord value, namely the 
depictions of their existence under failed governance.  
Although Facebook is located in the public domain, it operates at some level as 
personal archive in the way individuals make it particular to themselves, largely 
manage their own accounts, circulate, and store what they personally accord 
value.389 But the personal archive turns into something public, not only because of 
their location in the public platform, but due to how the personal posts connect to 
broader narratives of societal conditions. The personal-public link is characteristic 
of the analogue archival practice in African postcolonies as broadly explored in the 
book, The African Photographic Archive: Research and Curatorial Strategies 
edited by Christopher Morton and Darren Newbury. In the chapter by Richard 
Vokes, he examines the personal photo archive of Mr. Grace Bwire, the chairman 
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of the Bugamba Local Council in Uganda in the 1990s. Vokes analyses how the 
personal collection constructs wider visual narrative of postcolonial politics in 
South-western Uganda. Through the archive, Bwire sought to assert his “network 
of political influence,” but inadvertently revealed some of the socio-political 
tensions in postcolonial Uganda.390 Like Bwire’s personal archive, the individual 
Facebook pages of numerous Nigerians contain photographic documents through 
which the Nigerian postcolonial condition is read. 
Meanwhile, just as it operates in Nigeria beyond the power of the state, the 
archival production of Facebook dislodges the aura of archivists in the 
conventional sense in which they are known. Archivists are perceived as important 
“preservationists” – professional custodians of records who “rescue, restore and 
conserve them.” Terry Cook thinks of that characterisation as a “stereotype” 
apparently because archivists do more than those functions. They exert enormous 
power in the ways they mediate the organisation and production of knowledge in 
which the archive engages. But in the world driven by digital technology, their 
power is on the wane. Neither can archivists any longer “afford to be, nor be 
perceived as custodians.”391 To buttress that argument, Cook adds that “society’s 
collective memory” has been revolutionised in the electronic age during which  
we have business officers and professionals creating and storing their own 
records rather than relying on an army of secretaries, file clerks, and 
records managers to do this work for them. Most important, for the first 
time, we are not producing, managing, and saving physical things or 
artifacts, but rather trying to understand and preserve logical and virtual 
patterns that give electronic information its structure, content, and context, 
and thus its meaning as a “record” or as evidence of acts and 
transactions.392  
                                                          
390 Richard Vokes, “The Chairman's Photographs: Political and Visual Economies in South-Western 
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391 Terry Cook, “Electronic Records, Paper Minds: The Revolution in Information Management and 
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The issues raised by Cook affect how we think about photography in connection 
with Facebook and its related archival practices. First, there is no longer a stable 
figure of the archivist. The use of digital devices (such as computers, mobile 
phones, tablets, and memory discs) and online platforms (including Facebook, 
Google Drive, Dropbox, blogs and websites) constitutes all-inclusive forms of 
archival production. One takes up the role of the archivist by means of access to 
the necessary hardware, software and internet infrastructures, and knowledge of 
how to operate them. Cook also talks about evidence and how digital technology 
structures our perception of it. The earliest understanding of the archive is 
predicated upon the evidentiary drive to establish connection between record and 
event. Following the introduction and reception of photography as innocent 
representation of the world, the photographic image was taken in as an important 
archival document. Its life-likeness would help to make unequivocal connection 
with the past.393   
However, evidence as truth claim and photography as innocent form of evidence 
would later be challenged. This is not only due to the possibilities of altering the 
visual contents of photos, but because they get subjected to varying interpretive 
contexts. 394  What is spectacular about the new media age is the grand scale of the 
content- and meaning-related alterations of the photograph where certain 
technologies are specifically invented for that purpose. And they are made user-
friendly so that as many as possible would use them. This burning desire to get 
everyone to create, edit, disseminate, and archive photographs must be given 
attention by researchers who work with the medium. The scope of their work is 
really expanding. 
In the foregoing, I have argued for Facebook as archive. It has in digital form all 
the elements of conventional archive. But the virtuality also inverts some of the 
components. The architectural structure of Facebook is observable in its User 
Interface. Akin to the spatial configuration of the conventional archive, Facebook 
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is organised in different sections, each of which is important in the multiple 
relations it generates. The documents circulated on Facebook are similar to those in 
the analogue archive. But there are some marked differences. First, the virtual 
archive demands that documents be rendered in digital formats. Three-dimensional 
artefacts are digitally flattened into still photographs or animated in filmic form. 
Secondly, Facebook introduces different genres that did not really exist in the 
analogue archive. The posts are not reports, not letters, not diary, but their own 
genre. As regards the archive as an agent of power, there is a reversal in the 
authority of the state to determine what goes into the collection and to control how 
it is interpreted and used. The space affords the masses some agency and places 
them in a position to write a version of history that exposes the failure of the state 
rather than romanticising it. At any rate, the archival status of Facebook has its 
own problems. It loses its documents that take on another life, raising various 
concerns about the kind of archive Facebook is.  
Conclusion 
The structural configuration of Facebook has been argued as the force that governs 
the use of the platform as a political tool. The features of the site support public 
and more closed modes of content circulation and interaction among users. 
Through some of the communicative affordances of Facebook, the inaccessibility 
of the political elites by the citizens has been broken. The site becomes a meeting 
point for the two groups, affording the masses the opportunity to directly challenge 
their leaders and demand accountability from them. The history of Facebook is 
steeped in such political engagements. Since 2011, it has played significant roles in 
important civil uprisings in Africa. This political force is sequel to Facebook’s 
containment of its own crises in the formative years. So, its story is of the 
development of features which through the attraction of public and institutional 
confrontation became in themselves means of civil resistance. Given that Facebook 
was designed to hold the traces of the activities that take place on it, it constitutes a 
particular kind of archival production. It allows Nigerians to document their 
frustrations in an inclement political atmosphere. In this way, dissident citizens 
write a history that detracts from the state-constructed narratives of self-
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aggrandisement. In other words, a new form of archive has emerged, one which 
also gives agency to the ordinary people. These engagements as addressed in the 
chapter are important because they allow for reflection on Facebook as a space 
through which scholars try to understand how new media is shaping society. In the 
world of political turmoil in which we live, the image – one of the media objects 
circulated on social media including Facebook – is used to advance violence. 
Paradoxically, it is also deployed to counter the violence. The next chapter 
explores this precarious state of the image. 
    
   209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Insurgency constitutes a principal aspect of the insecurity examined in chapter 2 as 
one of the major concerns that drives online activism in Nigeria. Boko Haram, the 
most dreaded militant group in the country is associated with a culture of violence 
that has a complicated visual dimension. Dissemination of images is adopted as a 
major mode of operation by the insurgents. At the same time, soldiers and civilians 
fight back with images. Thus, the image is caught in a state of dilemma. This 
chapter argues that photographic imaging, whose circulation, re-circulation and 
nexus of meaning-making are defined by cyber technology, plays a simultaneous 
and oppositional role to advance violence, and to counter it. To develop this 
argument, I analyse the images associated with insurgency as circulated on the 
internet by Boko Haram, the Nigerian army, activist online platforms and virtually-
connected individuals. The pictures are read alongside their accompanying 
comments. Through the analysis, it is established that Boko Haram’s visual attacks 
launched through virtual photographic imaging, and the ensuing visual counter-
attack, result in a new mode of war. It is a war in which the image is played as a 
weapon, but in different ways in the hands of the insurgents, the state and the 
citizens.  At another level, pictures play an evidentiary role in the claim of state 
complicity in the insurgency and the violation of human rights perpetrated in the 
guise of counter-insurgency. The image that portrays Boko Haram violence is also 
used as a magical object whose destruction or online re-circulation has the capacity 
to subdue the militants.   
I draw on the writings that have explored the instrumentality of the visual image 
and the apparatuses of seeing in political violence. Allen Feldman and WJT 
Mitchell for instance have made important contributions to these debates. Feldman 
worked on the Northern Ireland conflict of the late 1960s to the 1980s. He 
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establishes that the optical surveillance set up by the state for the purpose of 
counter-insurgency produces visual realism that has devastating effects. It 
generates anxiety and fear of falling victim to violence, as vision and death become 
closely linked.395 In a more recent publication, Feldman critically explores what he 
calls “photopolitics” to theorise the violence of warfare in a more complicated 
way. Drawing on specific examples of political conflict, he shows that 
photography and new forensic technologies have taken precedence over 
conventional ethical witnessing such as “spoken testimony of eye- or 
earwitness.”396 They are deployed by the powerful individuals and constituted 
authorities to disavow, conceal, normalise, or justify violence.397 Mitchell for his 
part uses the concept “war of images” to describe “war on terror,” where images 
constitute the weapons, the targets and the victims of violence.398 With attention to 
the mediation of the internet, this visual economy of political violence is examined 
in relation to Nigeria. The Nigerian context is important because the digital culture 
is produced amidst a deficiency of the infrastructure required for the practice.  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first is a concise account of the 
contested genesis of Boko Haram.  The sect is widely believed to be founded by 
Mohammed Yusuf in the beginning of the 2000s. But it also connects to a longer 
history of intersection of religion and politics in Northern Nigeria. Challenging the 
political corruption in Nigeria and violently presenting Islamism as its recipe, 
Boko Haram attracted state hostility. The group reacted with violence and 
radicalised itself, attacking security personnel and state infrastructure. Once the 
militants affirmed their capacity to confront the army and the police, the rest of the 
Nigerian population became easy prey. The strategies of destruction developed in a 
quick succession, encompassing shooting, kidnapping, and diverse forms of 
bombing. In the second segment, visual production is interrogated as another kind 
of weapon. The deployment of images by Boko Haram insurgents gives a sense of 
the image terrorising viewers, threating to attack them and eventually doing so. 
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Hence in the context of insurgency, the image is not only a representation of 
violence but its producer. Lastly, the reaction of the Nigerian state to Boko 
Haram’s visual culture of violence is to also fight with images. The visual counter-
attack is used to assert the power of the army to curtail the insurgency. But relying 
on images too, civilians destabilise this claim. Their position is that the state itself 
is an ally of Boko Haram that can only be defeated if the co-operation is severed. 
They also believe that destroying or showing the insurgents the ghastly images of 
their violent acts has the capacity to weaken their power. These complex visual 
relations indicate that in the context of insurgency, the image is in a precarious and 
volatile situation. It both precipitates violence and is asked to undo the destruction 
it produces.  
The emergence of Boko Haram 
The origin of Boko Haram is contentious. There is no harmonious account of its 
founder, the time, the place, and the reason for its formation. Simeon Alozieuwa 
tries to give a sense of that controversy by rendering it into two broad categories. 
The first includes “internal forces (comprising) socio-economic factors, as well as 
deep-seated political, religious differences in the Nigerian society.” Others are 
“external forces” that derive from the international jihadist movement, but which 
locally play out to undermine the Nigerian sovereignty.399 Alozieuwa has tried to 
be comprehensive in his analysis, yet there are additional important accounts he 
fails to acknowledge. 
For instance, consider J.N.C. Hill’s perspective which in my view rather deepens 
the mystery of Boko Haram’s beginning. He writes that the group was founded as a 
“peaceful” organisation in 2002, with no “ambition…to impose their politico-
religious view on everyone else.” Its members would “live quietly and 
piously…removed from the rest of society,” and “they recreated the Prophet’s 
hijara, or flight from Mecca to Medina (by withdrawing) to a remote corner of 
Niger State in the north-west of the country.”400 Hill’s claim creates a certain kind 
                                                          
399 Simeon Alozieuwa, “Contending Theories on Nigeria’s Security Challenge in the Era of Boko 
Haram Insurgency,” The Peace and Conflict Review 7, no 1 (2012): 1.  
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of curiosity. The declaration of what the organisation’s intent was not tends to 
suggest a knowledge of what it was that transcended the religious practices of 
seclusion and meditation, and that changed only with time. But as Boko Haram has 
concealed what its goal was at the time of its formation, no research has made any 
definite claim in that regard. Researchers have only made deductions based on the 
transformation of the group over time and its later declaration of the move to 
Islamise Nigeria. Hill’s position is important because it prompts us to begin the 
examination of Boko Haram by thinking about the popular perspectives that 
foreclose deeper readings. For example, to settle with Mohammed Yusuf as the 
founder, and the early 2000s as the founding date of Boko Haram is to take the 
insurgency as a recent phenomenon. 
Some scholars argue that the sect is located within the broader Islamic movement 
of the second half of the 20th century that accounted for different organisations 
that were nonetheless linked together. Thus, Yusuf only cued into a long-standing 
framework. For instance, the Maitatsine group of the 1980s named after its founder 
Alhaji Marwa Maitatsine gave way to the Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization 
founded in 1995.401 Ajayi argues that the Shabaab “maintained a shadowy 
existence until around 1999 when… Mohammed Yusuf assumed the leadership of 
the group” and transformed it into what came to be called Boko Haram.402 Another 
account recognises 1995 as the actual founding date, but claims that it was 
established by Lawan Abubakar who handed it over to Yusuf before traveling to 
Saudi Arabia for higher education.403 Yusuf then radicalised the group in the 
beginning of the 2000s.  
In developing these perspectives, it is acknowledged that Yusuf was inspired by 
the Islamic revolutionist, Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817).404 In a way that resonates 
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with Alozieuwa’s notion of “internal forces,” Virginia Comolli begins her 
historical account of Boko Haram with the Fodio story. She states: “To better 
understand the evolution and maturation of Boko Haram’s insurgency, one has to 
look back at how the history of Islamist fundamentalism, anti-establishment 
revivalism, and religious identity in Northern Nigeria has influenced the 
emergence of violent contestation and insurgency.”405 Fodio was critical of the 
Islamic practices in the Hausa kingdom of his time and argued that the kings were 
false Muslims and oppressors of the poor. He described them as “apostates,” who 
allowed the persistence of “high level of taxation…oppression of the peasants, 
enslavement (of Muslims), the practice of cults, and the permissive environment 
where alcohol could be consumed freely and women were not required to wear the 
veil.”406 
Fodio created what he regarded as an ideal Islamic community where he preached 
and taught his followers. He sought to project his strict enforcement of the Sharia 
law to the larger Hausa kingdom. Given his radical views and actions, he was 
perceived as a threat that must be confronted. That confrontation which Fodio 
viewed as “persecution” drove him and his followers away. What followed was 
their mobilisation for a “holy war” (jihad).407 It was a war driven by the mix of 
religious sentiments and the argument for social justice. Fodio and his Fulani 
people came out victorious in 1809, deposing the Hausa kings to establish “the 
Sokoto Caliphate of which he became the first Sultan.”408  As the empire expanded 
to incorporate people from other parts of what later came to be known as Nigeria, 
Islam became a bonding agent that held them together. The bonding was fragile 
given its ethnic definition that privileged the Fulani Muslims over their non-Fulani 
counterparts.409 Still, the religious commonality ultimately managed to bring the 
Fulani and the Hausa into one group that today constitutes one of the largest in 
Nigeria. 
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I have dwelt on Comolli’s historical reading here because in its evolution, 
motivation and ideology, the Boko Haram insurgency has parallel relations with 
Usman dan Fodio’s jihad. Like Fodio, Yusuf accused the Nigerian political elites 
of fraud and disobedience to the Quran. Presenting himself as a preacher and 
advocate of fairness, he set up his own mosque in Maiduguri and galvanised public 
support through preaching.410 His evocation of state failure appealed to the 
common people: school dropouts, unemployed youths, poor women, and so on. 
They were persuaded to blame their indigent life on the exploitation by those in 
power. It does not however imply that only those in the margin of society were 
recruited into the sect. Others including the rich and intellectuals also joined the 
cause.411 Boko Haram marked the constituted authorities, and later, Christianity as 
its persecutors. In keeping with Fodio’s ideology, Yusuf conceived of jihad as the 
answer to the problem of state failure that he challenged. Hence, the group was 
known as Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (People Committed to 
the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad).412 This would later be 
affirmed in 2012 by Abubakar Shekau, the second leader of Boko Haram. The 
name “Boko Haram” is rather a sobriquet that came to describe the group’s 
hostility to secularism rooted in westernisation.413 It does not etymologically mean 
“Western education is forbidden,” as popularly believed. 
Apprehensive of Yusuf’s radicalism, state authorities became hostile to his group. 
The group withdrew to Yobe State where they prepared for the violence that they 
unleashed on state establishments including police stations between December 
2003 and early January 2004. For the rest of 2004, the military and the police 
engaged the militants in a struggle that led to the death of many of the insurgents 
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and the abduction of a dozen policemen.414 After that major face-off, Boko Haram 
went silent from 2005 until the first quarter of 2007. The group used the period to 
strengthen itself, “recruiting new members and shoring up its resources.”415 The 
combat resumed in April 2007 and in mid-2009, and a number of the militants 
were killed. Yusuf released a video in which he threatened to deal with the 
Nigerian government. In the fight that followed, Yusuf was arrested along with 
others. In July 2009, he was executed.416 While his death intensified the anger of 
the group, his use of video to address the state marked the entrance of visual 
production into the narrative of Boko Haram insurgency. Abubakar Shekau who 
took over the leadership of the group clung to the photographic weapon and 
committed Nigeria to a visual war. 
As shown above, there are different views about the beginning of Boko Haram and 
the organisation has failed to clearly state its founding goal. Researchers are 
therefore left with deductive readings based on the group’s evolution and quest to 
Islamise Nigeria. It sought to realise the goal through violence that has evolved 
strategically. It began with attacks on security personnel, as if to weigh the efficacy 
of its tactics against the “expertise” of trained military and police officers. Once it 
established the capacity to confront security agents, attacks on market places, 
schools, religious centres and other public spaces became rampant. The group was 
further emboldened by the improved weaponry that came with its military training 
programme and the production of improvised explosives.417 These possibilities 
were also believed to be aided by the sect’s link to international rebel organisations 
such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).418 With this 
expansion, the weaponry of Boko Haram advanced from abduction and the use of 
firearms to detonation of bombs. The bombing quickly diversified in form to 
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include suicide bombing that involves the use of allegedly conscripted women and 
children. Finally, there is another weapon that has hitherto been neglected by 
researchers: the photographic image. 
The image as perpetrator 
From the outset, Boko Haram has disseminated its messages through a variety of 
channels. Mohammed Yusuf’s sermons of the early 2000s (whose threatening tone 
was found disturbing by the Borno state government) were circulated as audio 
recordings, communiqués, videos and one undated book.419 After his death, 
Abubakar Shekau held on to the visual medium that he found highly effective as a 
weapon of violence. Emenike Ezedani brings the visual narrative to us through the 
book, Foto Haram: A Chronologic Pictorial of the Boko Haram Insurgency in 
Nigeria 2009-2015.420 It covers different facets of the militancy: the exploits of the 
group’s leaders, the encounter with the Nigerian state, the destruction, the 
displacements and the international interventions. However, the book is basically a 
photo album with no critical engagement with the images. In this section, the 
visual dimension of the Boko Haram movement is assessed. I explore the 
photographic image as simultaneously a weapon and a perpetrator of violence. Not 
only is it deployed to terrify viewers, it addresses them, and proclaims the coming 
of destruction. Therefore, the image does not merely depict violence; it causes it. 
These ideas are elucidated with Abubakar Shekau’s photographic performances. 
One of the earliest examples of Boko Haram’s use of images after Yusuf’s death is 
the video released at the beginning of January 2012 by Shekau.421  Although 
presented as a message to the then President Goodluck Jonathan, it raises a broad 
range of issues directed to a wider audience. It also gives us a glimpse of the 
militants’ grievances and demands, and how Boko Haram mirrors Usman dan 
Fodio’s jihad. Sitting between the camera and two rifles positioned behind him, 
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Shekau speaks in the likeness of an Imam delivering a sermon, but to an unseen 
audience. He deploys the camera to present himself as a preacher, as both Fodio 
and Yusuf were said to have done through writing and teaching actual audiences. 
The jihadist ambition of the sect begins to reveal itself more clearly with Shekau’s 
reiteration of his commitment to Mohammed’s teaching. In the video, he restates 
his repudiation of Western influences including education, democracy and 
Christianity. He threatens to avenge the murder of Yusuf, his predecessor, and 
what he regards generally as the mistreatment of Muslims by the state and 
Christian subjects. In this initial visual presentation, Boko Haram portrays itself as 
a body founded to peacefully advance the cause of Islam and to challenge the 
corruption of democracy, but which for no reason became the target of state 
security agents. This claim returns us to Usman dan Fodio’s logic of persecution in 
the 19th century.422 We are also prompted to ponder the political decadence in 
Nigeria that led to the call for jihad in the first place. Then, we need to examine the 
centrality of the image in these developments. 
The return of democracy to Nigeria in 1999 was accompanied by fraudulent 
practices such as financial and electoral crimes. Consequently, some Northern 
Nigerian elites proposed the institution of Sharia Law in the country. The move 
succeeded at various levels in the Northern states.423 But this intercourse between 
politics and religion is itself a dubious act. Firstly, aware of the force exerted by 
religion in Nigeria (but insensitive to its diversity), the Northern politicians drew 
on it to present themselves as vanguards of justice. Secondly, rather than helping to 
check the corruption of the political class, Sharia Law seemed to be constituted to 
oppress the common people. For instance, many helpless citizens had their limbs 
amputated for stealing as stipulated by the law.424 But state functionaries who 
looted the public treasury were not punished. When Boko Haram emerged, it 
challenged such hypocrisy and the corruption of the politicians generally. As a 
point to which I will later return, this move had the potential to win the sect wider 
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public support. But it fell back on the same religious framing (Islamisation) 
adopted by the Northern Nigerian politicians. 
Boko Haram’s attack on the political elites began in form of verbal abuse. In 2009, 
Ali Modu Sheriff granted one journalist a full-length interview, explaining how 
Mohammed Yusuf in an audio tape threatened him and the federal government of 
Nigeria:  
…I saw the tape of Yusuf’s sermon where he dared me and the Nigerian 
state, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of this country. He was daring 
every leader… He threatened that they knew where we slept, our route to 
the offices and therefore they would deal with us. He specifically 
mentioned my name and said I was the biggest Kafir, unbeliever who must 
be dealt with. 425 
Between 2003 and 2011, Sheriff was the governor of Borno State where Boko 
Haram had a base. Concern about the threat posed by Yusuf led to the state 
intervention that climaxed in his killing, which Abubakar Shekau threatened to 
avenge. The latter’s warning of vengeance was a photographic act that alters our 
understanding of the camera in relation to power. Reading Mary Ann Doane, 
Feldman speaks of the “politics of pose” in his description of “the camera/subject 
nexus (as one that) mobilizes relations of power, the authority of the distanced 
observer, or the offscreen or out-of-frame voice who commands and frames the 
scene, staging and molding the depicted.”426 The formulation contexualises the 
dictation of poses for bodies that never out of their own volition offered themselves 
to be photographed. Here, being photographed means to be subdued. But in the 
case of Boko Haram’s video, there is an inversion of Feldman’s articulation. The 
speaking subject – the sitter who posed before the camera – has actualised the 
camera/subject nexus in a deliberate way, and becomes an embodiment of power 
exercised over the viewer, 
Abubakar Shekau produced himself as an iconic image that also became the 
personification of Boko Haram. In its initial appearance in early January 2012, the 
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image revealed its intention to bring destruction upon Nigeria. A few days later 
(January 20), the actualisation of the violence began with the bombing of the Kano 
central police station, and sporadic shooting in parts of the city. Many died. Many 
more sustained injuries. A week later, Boko Haram released a video in which 
Shekau’s voice was heard over his still photograph. The image claimed 
responsibility for the act. This capacity of the image to proclaim mayhem in 
advance and then actualise it left many Nigerians with a fear of Shekau’s picture. 
For instance, one Facebook user posted the photograph of a piece of newspaper 
with which her meal of roast chicken called “suya” was wrapped (figure 5.1). As 
she started eating, she recoiled in horror when she noticed the image of Shekau on 
the paper.427 To rephrase Feldman, Shekau has transformed “being seen” into a 
performance that produces fear and “empowers the act of violence.”428  
The visual performance does not only involve the perpetrator of destruction. The 
victims are incorporated into it. This can be illustrated with the abduction that 
marked an important moment in the history of Boko Haram. The insurgents 
invaded a high school in Chibok, Borno State and kidnapped hundreds of female 
students in April 2014. Shortly after, the sect brought out a video through which it 
presented to the world the images of the kidnapped girls (Figure 5.2). They are 
seen in their number sitting and reciting passages from the Quran as moderated by 
their abductor. Here Shekau’s assumption of the role of a preacher and fighter of 
jihad is increasingly manifest. In a cut in the video, he says that the girls have been 
liberated, for the non-Muslims among them have been converted to Islam. Yet he 
threatens to keep them captive until his imprisoned colleagues are released, or to 
sell them off, if the government fails to co-operate.  
 
                                                          
427 Maie Okafor, “Wow...! What suya!” Facebook, August 12, 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=890290194353042&set=rpd.100001162104387&type=
3&theater. 
428 Ibid., 40. 
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Figure 5.1: “Suya” wrapped with a piece of newspaper that has the pictures  
of Abubakar Shekau and his fellow militants. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 13 August 2015, posted by Maie Okafor with the 
text, “Wow...! What suya!” 
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=890290194353042&set=rpd.10000116
2104387&type=3&theater 
Retrieval date:  15 August 2015 
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Figure 5.2: The abducted Chibok school girls.  
Retrieved from: YouTube, 12 May 2014, “Boko Haram Video Claims to Show 
Missing Nigerian Schoolgirls” by AFP News Agency (video still). 
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9sJnldKRg8. 
Retrieval date:  11 March 2015. 
 
Figure 5.3: The Boko Haram logo. 
Retrieved from: Wikipedia. 
URL: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram#/media/File:Logo_of_Boko_Haram.svg. 
Retrieval date: 11 May 2015. 
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Shekau attempts to make us accept liberation as a condition attained through acts 
of violence and captivity. We are prompted to ask what liberation means in the 
light of insurgency. In this regard, it would be insightful to examine the stamp 
mark that came with the cited video and would appear in subsequent clips as the 
logo of Boko Haram (Figure 5.3). Two AK-47 rifles facing opposite directions are 
positioned as if in use by imaginary hands. Above them are an open book 
(apparently the Quran) and a flag with Arabic inscriptions of the declaration, 
“There is no God but Allah and Mohammed is the messenger of Allah.” The two 
graphic elements help to further define the Islamic identity Boko Haram has 
constructed of itself. It becomes logical to believe, as Shekau has made known in 
his video messages that the core objective of the sect is to Islamise Nigeria. On the 
other side of the Islamisation move is the corrupt democratic government it seeks 
to depose.  
For Boko Haram, the deposition will mean liberation for the Nigerian citizens who 
live in poor socio-economic conditions occasioned by the duplicity of state 
functionaries. And indeed, if Boko Haram had distanced its ambition from 
religious framework and had exclusively gone after the fraudulent politicians, it 
would have garnered more support from many Nigerians. As noted earlier, many 
joined the group in its early days because it challenged the corrupt government that 
left them impoverished. I have interacted with individuals who confessed their 
willingness to back the uprising in various capacities but were dismayed that it was 
far from the revolution they thought it heralded. The abduction, killing and 
displacement of innocent citizens who are outside the echelons of power 
demonstrate either that the state is not its primary target, or that the sect has no 
distinctively clear goal.  
The Christian religion that was presented as the enemy did not remain its only 
target religious group. It also attacks mosques and Muslims, so that if it is really 
the Islamist movement it claims to be, it has turned against itself. One possible 
reading here is that the targets of the jihadists are not just non-Muslims but those 
they perceive as non-conformists to Quranic injunctions, whether they profess 
Islam or not. That has been the modus operandi of some major Islamic movements 
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in Nigeria, beginning with Fodio who is seen as a model by Shekau. However, one 
wonders whether the non-conformists are the only targets when the jihadists bomb 
a shopping mall in the country’s capital city Abuja. As the answer to this question 
is beyond the scope of this project, I return to the issue of liberation and consider 
how it is articulated through the visual language constructed by Boko Haram.  
The AK-47 rifles in the logo (Figure 5.3) are emblematic of the liberation question. 
There are two aspects to the iconography of the form. First, it borrows visually 
from one of the initial videos released by the group as cited earlier, in which 
Shekau sits before two AK-47 firearms in a kind of tableau, one to his left and the 
other to his right. On the other hand, the AK-47 historically enjoys a specific 
liberatory iconicity in Africa. When the Russian General Mikhail Kalashnikov 
invented the firearm between the Second World War and the Cold War, he could 
not have imagined the dynamic uses to which it would be put across the world and 
especially in the African continent.  
In the 20th century, African nationalists used it in the struggle against colonial 
rule.429 The adoption of the AK-47 in the flag of Mozambique and in the coat of 
arms of Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe is therefore not a surprise.  In the case of 
Boko Haram, the notion of liberation historically connects anti-colonial struggles 
with the Cold War which according to Mavhungu favoured the shipping of the rifle 
to parts of Africa, including Nigeria. The Soviet Union invented the weapon and 
offered it to Africa to fight the West – their colonisers and the “cold enemy” of the 
Soviet bloc. Today, Boko Haram lifts the same gun against democracy and the 
Christian religion – the legacies left in Nigeria by the West. The sect also 
challenges the United Nations, the United States of America, Britain and other 
significant Western powers that have continued to exert an influence on the 
country.  The logo with its graphic representational thread weaves together 
religion, questions of state failure and international politics. At another level, it is a 
symbolic reminder of the destruction that derives from this complex tapestry. 
Again, it indicates the importance of the technology of visual production in 
                                                          
429 Clapperton Mavhunga, "The Glass Fortress: Zimbabwe's Cyber-Guerrilla Warfare," Journal of 
International Affairs 62, no. 2 (2009). 
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insurgency. But the Islamic identity of the organisation raises questions about its 
use of the image.  
Islam stands in a certain relation to pictorial representation. The attitude as 
articulated in the concept of aniconism draws from the monotheist faith that 
considers it forbidden to associate divinity with any form through visual 
depiction.430 Drawing on the review of a broad range of literature on the subject, 
Ismail Soganci identifies the variation in the position of Islam in relation to 
images. The import of his analysis is that Islam permits the use of figural pictures 
in contexts not connected to divinity.431 Since Boko Haram presents itself as an 
Islamic organisation, its attitude to figural representation produces what can be 
called “aniconic paradox.” A sect engaged in Jihad, a divine cause as it were, is 
immersed in the production and circulation of not only still photographs of figures, 
but motions that bring the handiwork of Allah to a second life. While this issue 
requires a deeper interrogation which cannot be addressed here, it must be 
acknowledged that Boko Haram has transformed our understanding of vision and 
violence. 
In the context of insurgency, the image has become as powerful as other means of 
mass destruction. It does more than record acts of violence. It causes it. So we are 
consumed by fear of attack before it is unleashed. In this sense, the image is a 
perpetrator. In spite of the fear generated by this visual relation, disparate groups in 
Nigeria feel challenged to draw closer to it. In what seems like a return of the gaze, 
they respond to the violence with the same image that produces it. 
Fighting back 
As photographic imaging is fashioned into a weapon of rebellion in Nigeria, the 
same is used to fight back. Soldiers and civilians alike came to the realisation that 
the insurgency had taken a visual turn and had to be confronted as such. The use of 
the image by the Nigerian army is located within the frame of what it calls 
                                                          
430 Titus Burckhardt, “The Void in Islamic Art,” Studies in Comparative Religion, Vol. 4, no. 2 
(1970). 
431 Ismail Ozgur Soganci,"Islamic Aniconism: Making Sense of a Messy Literature." Marilyn 
Zurmuehlen Working Papers in Art Education, no. 1 (2004). 
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“counter-terrorism.” Photography became the means through which the state 
security institutions sought to regain the confidence the masses had lost in them. 
So, through images, they made claims to victory over Boko Haram. But the 
visuality of the so-called counter-terrorist efforts produced the Nigerian army as 
another perpetrator of violence. Then, to complicate things further, the networked 
public has found two ways to fight back. First, they challenge the state as complicit 
in the insurgency by visually articulating its connection with the militants. Thus, 
they insist that the solution lies in understanding and cutting that tie. Secondly, the 
horrible images produced and circulated by and in relation to Boko Haram are 
believed to possess some power that can weaken the group when re-circulated or 
destroyed. The dilemma of the image comes into full view here: it also has to 
destroy the violence it produces. Let us begin with the exploits of the Nigerian 
army to understand this quest to “destroy destruction.”  
Nigeria launched its own “war on terror” – a mimicry of the international “counter-
terrorist” operations initiated by the George W. Bush administration in the 
aftermath of the 11 September 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in the 
United States. Just as the policy occasioned the emergence of a new kind of war 
described by W.J.T. Mitchell as “the war of images,”432 the fight against Boko 
Haram took on a visual turn. The image war between the rebel group and the 
Nigerian military was ignited by the report published by the Cameroon Concord 
claiming that Abubakar Shekau had been killed by the Cameroonian army.433 A set 
of two portraits of Shekau were tendered as “evidence” (Figure 5.4). One shows 
him alive while the other purportedly presents him as dead. The claim which the 
Nigerian army denied seemed to affirm the growing public doubt in the capacity of 
the Nigerian troop to defeat Boko Haram.  
 
                                                          
432 Mitchell, Cloning Terror.   
433 “Cameroon Military Announces the Killing Of Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau,” 
Cameroon Concord, September 21, 2014, http://cameroon-concord.com/news/item/765-cameroon-
military-announces-the-killing-of-boko-haram-leader-abubakar-shekau. 
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Figure 5.4: Portrait of Abubakar Shekau in life and in death 1released by the 
Cameroonian army.  
Retrieved from: Cameroon Concord, September 2014, contained in the article, 
“Cameroon Military Announces the Killing of Boko Haram Leader Abubakar 
Shekau.” 
URL: http://cameroon-concord.com/news/item/765-cameroon-military-announces-
the-killing-of-boko-haram-leader-abubakar-shekau. 
Retrieval date:  15 November 2014.  
Given the trans-national expansion of the insurgency, the armies of neighbouring 
countries such as Cameroon and Chad joined in the counter-insurgency operations. 
At one point, the rate at which the Cameroonian soldiers were killing the 
insurgents dominated the news and created the impression that they were more 
proactive than their Nigerian counterparts. The Nigerian military also had some 
internal crises to grapple with. For instance, in 2014, there were allegations of 
    
   227 
 
mutiny that led to convictions and death sentences for soldiers.434 These were even 
preceded by alleged hesitancy to take part in certain military operations. That 
attitude was in turn prompted by the complaint that soldiers were supplied with 
ammunition inferior to that of the insurgents. The political corruption behind this 
claim was later exposed in 2015, when Retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki, the 
National Security Adviser during the Jonathan administration, was indicted for 
mismanagement of 2.1 billion dollars (630 billion naira). The sum was earmarked 
for purchase of arms for the so-called counter-terrorist operations.435  
 
Figure 5.5: Portrait of Abubakar Shekau in life and in death II released by the 
Nigerian army. 
Retrieved from: Punch, September 2014, contained in the article, “Military kills 
Abubakar Shekau ‘again.’”  
URL: http://www.punchng.com/news/military-kills-abubakar-shekau-again. 
Retrieval date:  15 November 2014.  
                                                          
434 “Nigerian Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram Sentenced to Death for Mutiny,” The Guardian, 
September 16, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/nigerian-soldiers-boko-
haram-sentenced-death-mutiny.  
435 “Buhari Orders Arrest of Ex-NSA Dasuki, Others Indicted in Arms Contract Report,” Premium 
Times, November 17, 2015, http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/193398-
%E2%80%8Bbuhari-orders-arrest-of-ex-nsa-dasuki-others-indicted-in-arms-contract-report.html. 
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In the midst of these issues, the purported killing of the leader of Boko Haram was 
proclaimed. The Nigerian military dismissed the declaration, but released videos 
and still photographs a few days later, also claiming to have killed Shekau. The 
still pictures (Figure 5.5) mirror the mode of presentation by the Cameroonian 
security personnel. In both instances, the images of “dead” Shekau share 
similarities: the exposed teeth, the hand position and the strip of cloth around the 
neck. The difference between them is mainly in the camera angle. What the 
Nigerian army has done differently is to introduce arrows into their images, 
inviting viewers to contemplate the facial features of the “dead” rebel leader. In 
this way, they can compare the image with the face that they have seen in his 
pictorial posts on the internet. There is no doubt about the difference between the 
depiction of the “living” Shekau in both groups of images. But the striking 
similarities tempt us to take the images as produced from the same source. Both 
sets of pictures reflect a similar visual quality and approach to presentation, namely 
the portrait format and arrangement in pairs.  
What is significantly foregrounded here is the status of the photographic image as a 
site for claims of success in counter-insurgency. John Tagg argues that the capacity 
of the image or the camera to perform such task is predicated upon on “the power 
of the apparatuses of the local state which deploy it and guarantee the authority of 
the image…to stand as evidence or register a truth”436 The power of the Nigerian 
army to declare victory over Boko Haram by means of Shekau’s portraits 
complicated the counter-insurgency programme.  Even if the rebel leader was 
killed in actual sense, it would not translate into the extermination of Boko Haram, 
just as the death of Mohammed Yusuf had failed to achieve this goal.  
Furthermore, Shekau responded by releasing a video in which he claimed to be 
alive.437 The video opens with what I describe as the “pageantry of militancy” that 
had become a paramount element of the group’s multimedia production. Islamic 
background tunes, the chanting of the Takbir (Allahu Akbar) and waving of the 
Boko Haram flag are accompanied by Shekau’s theatrical manipulation of heavy 
                                                          
436 Tagg, The Burden of Representation, 246. 
437 That was not Shekau’s only appearance in videos after his purpoted killing. Even in September 
2016, the rebel leader released a video of himself which further supported his claim to be alive. 
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ammunition. In the spatial configuration which also became emblematic of his 
video addresses, Shekau is surrounded by his armed colleagues, all in military 
attire. He talks to the viewer, with a pamphlet in his hand from which he 
occasionally reads.438 He brags that he is an invincible slayer. With the video, 
Boko Haram had committed the Nigerian army to intensive scrutiny of pictures as 
articulated in what Azoulay calls “professional gaze.” It is the kind of gaze that 
“allows the viewer to organize the visible world and to control it by means of 
knowledge.” It is “fundamental to…the regulation of certain kinds of action and to 
the analysis of situations and events.” 439 On its website, the army announced that 
it had embarked on a special task of visual analysis to understand the claim made 
by Shekau, thus advancing the war that had turned visual: 
The Defence Headquarters is studying the claims made in the video 
purportedly released by the terrorists showing their leader Abubakar Shekau 
as dismissing his death.  From immediate observation and what some online 
news outlets claimed to have seen, the video did not indicate when it was 
shot neither did it show any proof of life or currency such as screen time or 
date.  The video also did not make any reference to anything that has 
happened since the impostor’s reported death. It is also noteworthy that the 
air plane said to be mentioned in the video had been missing before he was 
killed. It should not surprise anybody if the terrorists decide to manipulate 
pictures, clone another Shekau or upload a pre-recorded video all in a bid to 
prove invincible. As far as we are concerned, the individual who was 
appearing in video and claiming to be the leader of the terrorist group was 
killed in the Kondunga battle in September.  The resemblance of the corpse 
and that of the eccentric character was incontrovertible. His identity was 
equally corroborated by people who knew him before we announced his 
death.440 
The passage evokes the Derridan notion of “artifactuality,” and “actuvirtuality,” 
which are concerned with the artificiality of “teletechnology.”441 The army reminds 
us that technologies of vision produce “naturalising effects” that seduce us into 
                                                          
438 Saharatv, “Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau Says He Is Alive and Well,” YouTube video, 14.35, 
October 5, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zC0GJtoTttM. 
439 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, 68. 
440 “The Purported Shekau Video in Circulation,” Nigerian Defence Headquarters, October 2, 
2014, http://defenceinfo.mil.ng/the-purported-shekau-video-in-circulation-2. 
441 Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television Filmed Interview, trans. 
Jennifer Bajorek (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
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accepting a simulacrum as an actual event. This mode of rejection of the image 
differs from that of Radovan Karadžić in the case of the Bosnia violence of 
1994.442 The Markele market explosion in Sarajevo that killed and injured many in 
February that year was dismissed by Karadžić (leader of the Bosnian Serbs who 
was later accused of war crimes) as a theatrical display conceived for the camera. 
His claim is a picture editing of another kind. It involves the manipulation of the 
narrative of the image. Digital technology enables even easier mutilation of both 
the narratives and the visual elements on an image. These possibilities appear to 
inform the Nigerian army’s refutation of a medium which it also deploys in its 
operations and in the declaration of victory over Boko Haram.  
The refutation points to a surge of anxiety heightened by the expansion of the 
visual war. The military was already grappling with the complexity of the visual 
exchange with Boko Haram and with the question of whether it was winning the 
war or not. But beyond this, the army and the state-endorsed Civilian Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) were accused of the brutalisation and gruesome murder of innocent 
civilians based on allegations of their connection with Boko Haram. Amnesty 
International produced filmic documentaries to corroborate this claim. For 
instance, the video entitled Nigeria: Gruesome Footage Implicates Military in War 
Crimes shows disturbing scenes of whipping, beheading and mass burial of 
victims.443  
The comments attracted by the video on YouTube show it as contentious. For 
some people, it is the same Boko Haram rebels acting in military attire. They argue 
that the use of pictures to traumatise is fundamental to contemporary insurgency. 
The circulation of beheading videos is integral to the operations of Al-Qaeda and 
ISIS to which Boko Haram claimed to be affiliated.444 Adoption of a similar mode 
of violence by the Nigerian sect would therefore not be unexpected. But on the 
other side of the debate, the military also perpetrates such atrocities. During the US 
                                                          
442 Feldman, Archives of the Insensible, 117. Karadžić is the former “head of the Bosnian Serb 
Republic” convicted of war crime. 
443 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Gruesome Footage Implicates Military in War Crimes,” YouTube 
video, 5.08, August 5, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA7SIbvEO64. 
444 Jay Sekulow, Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can’t Ignore (New York: Howard Books, 2014). 
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military occupation of Iraq in 2003, the soldiers committed gruesome acts 
(including torture and rape) against the Iraqis in the Abu Ghraib prison. The 
perpetrators photographed themselves in self-congratulatory gestures, thus 
heightening the sadistic effect of their horrific acts. The visual framing has 
sometimes been analysed in the light of using photography as “an integral part of 
torture” by the military.445 The Abu Ghraib scandal was not the last of its sort. 
Even a more gruesome incident took place in the Maywand district in 2010 during 
the war in Afghanistan. The US soldiers engaged in killing of unarmed civilians 
and tried to cover up the crime. Writing about this, Feldman concludes that 
counter-insurgency is associated with the tendency of turning unarmed citizens 
into terrorists through “a photopolitics of forensic phantasms.”446 Going by the 
negotiation around the video under discussion, Feldman’s conclusion applies to the 
Nigerian army although it denied the atrocity. Yet, many accepted it as testimonial 
to the replication of violence by the state security institution that has failed to 
combat insurgency.  
Photography also became a way to expand the narrative of complicity of the 
Nigerian political elites in the militancy. In Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff 
employed the insurgents as thugs during the 2003 governorship election that he 
eventually won. As previously agreed with the group, he appointed one of them 
(Alhaji Buji Foi) as Commissioner of Religious Affairs, but only allowed partial, 
rather than full implementation of the Sharia Law in Borno. Sheriff consequently 
fell out with Boko Haram which then withdrew Foi from the state cabinet.447 As 
Sheriff’s image became symbolic of the intercourse between Boko Haram and the 
Nigerian state, the members of the civilian population questioned the friendship 
between Sheriff and the then President Jonathan. Consider the photograph in 
Figure 5.6. 
 
                                                          
445 Kari Anden-Papadopoulos, “The Abu Ghraib Torture Photographs: New Frames, Visual Culture, 
and the Power of Images,” Journalism 9, no. 1 (2008), 13. 
446 Feldman, Archives of the Insensible, 86. 
447 Freedom Onuoha, “Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria,” in Boko 
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Figure 5.6: Sheriff at the meeting between the presidents of Nigeria (Goodluck 
Jonathan) and Chad (Idriss Deby) in 2014.  
Retrieved from: Sahara Reporters, 9 September 2014, contained in the article, 
“President Jonathan "Meeting Haram" With Alleged Boko Haram Financier, 
Former Borno Gov. Ali Modu Sheriff in Chad.” 
URL: http://saharareporters.com/2014/09/09/president-jonathan-meeting-haram-
alleged-boko-haram-financier-former-borno-gov-ali-modu. 
Retrieval date: 15 September 2014. 
In 2014, Jonathan (third figure from the left in the picture) met with the Chadian 
President Idriss Deby (figure on right) to discuss the Boko Haram menace. 
Although he was not a serving functionary in the Jonathan administration, Sheriff 
travelled to Chad to receive the then president and to attend the meeting. His 
appearance in the foreground of the photograph taken in the event is a visual 
parallel of the public attention and criticism brought by his participation in the 
session. Wole Soyinka wonders why Sheriff “had the confidence to smuggle 
himself into the welcoming committee of another nation,” and made himself “a co-
host with the president of that nation.”448 Jonathan’s relationship with Sheriff 
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corroborated the public suspicion of his administration as complicit in the Boko 
Haram insurgency. 
Meanwhile, the meeting also implicated Idriss Deby as commentators drew 
attention to links between his administration and Boko Haram. Pérouse de 
Montclos notes that “before 2008 …Chadian ministers of Finance and Transports, 
Abbas Mahamat Tolli (Deby’s nephew) and Abdelkerim Souleyman Terio, were 
said to attend Friday prayers at the Boko Haram mosque in Maiduguri and 
allegedly gave alms to Mohammed Yusuf.”449 In essence, those who interact with 
the images circulated in relation to insurgency in Nigeria bring their knowledge of 
these narratives to bear on how they interpret the photographs. Their position is 
that Boko Haram can only be defeated if the political elites cut their ties with the 
movement.  
The users of the online platform deploy the image to challenge Boko Haram in yet 
another way. They believe that the photographs with gory contents can be re-
circulated to return the horrible gaze back to those who produced it. Again, the 
destruction of the pictures would weaken the insurgents.  On Facebook, a 
photograph of bullet-ridden bodies suspected to be victims of a Boko Haram attack 
was shared and accompanied by the following lines:   
It’s time these sort of pics are viral for a change...it’s time we 
psychologically terrorise the terrorists and showcase them for what they are, 
as despicable barbarians, rather than boost their misplaced disgusting ego 
and infamous profile with pics of their exploits and murdered innocent 
victims.450 
These words reflect the conviction that to maintain a receiving stance in relation to 
the “visual terror” from Boko Haram is gratifying to the rebels. But if the gaze is 
returned through re-circulation of the images, the “terrorists” become the 
“terrorised.” The Facebook activist who posted the image told me that insurgents 
can be likened to the mythological vampires that cringe at the sight of their 
reflection in the mirror. They can be defeated with the same psychological 
                                                          
449 Pérouse de Montclos, “Boko Haram and politics,” 141. 
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devastation they bring upon people through the use of the image.451 A similar 
mode of thinking comes with the comments on the earlier cited picture of roast 
chicken packaged with a piece of newspaper bearing Shekau’s image. The 
Facebook user who posted the photograph is asked to eat both the chicken and 
Shekau’s picture. This would make the rebel leader fall into the hands of the 
military.452 Although laced with humour, there is something of photography 
working “as a fetish” here.453 Heike Behrend argues that both in the West and in 
Africa, photography is historically associated with magical practices of “healing” 
and “harming.”454 Drawing on her field research in Uganda and Kenya, what she 
calls “photo magic” drives witchcraft and certain Christian practices in Africa. As 
the image can act as a substitute for its referent, certain procedures involving the 
use of a photograph can heal the individual pictured in it. The mutilation or 
destruction of the image can hurt the photographed as well. The harming aspect of 
Behrend’s argument applies in some ways to the question of insurgency in Nigeria. 
The “destruction,” and “re-circulation” of Boko Haram-related images, to return 
the gaze to the producer of the depicted violence, constitute a form of photographic 
power or magic. The unarmed ordinary citizens are armed with “photo magic” with 
which they confront the “vampire” of Boko Haram.  
These instances indicate that the response to insurgency in Nigeria is pictorially 
constituted. Photography enables a kind of warfare in which both soldiers and 
civilians are privileged to fight. But each party is guided by a different purpose. 
The image is a site where the army strives to complete the unfinished war against 
militancy and declares itself triumphant. For the virtually networked civilians, they 
argue that the political elites and the army are complicit in the mayhem they claim 
to challenge. Thus, they demand that all ties with Boko Haram be cut. On the other 
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hand, they ascribe to the gruesome image the capacity to weaken its producer (the 
militants) when the image is destroyed or re-circulated.  
Conclusion 
The Boko Haram movement in Nigeria demonstrates how digital infrastructure 
shapes photography’s relation to political violence. The insurgents, the state, and 
the ordinary citizens enter a complex form of interaction through photographic 
production and dissemination. The interaction as argued in this chapter constitutes 
a new mode of war in which the image plays conflicting roles. It is deployed by the 
rebels to horrify the masses and to call down destruction upon them. The Nigerian 
military embarks on counter operations using the image as well, which also serves 
as the battleground where victory is declared against the militants. The rest of other 
digitally networked “fighters” perceive both the insurgents and the state as one 
entity that should be disentangled to defeat the militancy. That perception is 
informed by the narratives of patronage and complicity of politicians, and is 
visually articulated. The photograph is also treated as a fetish, imbued with the 
power to destroy Boko Haram. Considering these varied forms of deployment, I 
conclude that in the context of insurgency, the image is in a state of dilemma.  
This idea is an important new perspective in the debate around vision and violence 
in Africa. As contemporary political conflicts become intertwined with digital 
culture, it is important to examine how photography is implicated. It is no longer 
about the domination of visual production by few, such as the 20th century 
colonial authorities and the heads and military forces of embattled post-
independence states. The democratisation of image production and dissemination 
brings dissident groups, the state and ordinary people together in warfare. The 
enactment of a visual war of such magnitude amidst chronically poor infrastructure 
as discussed in chapter 2 is emblematic of the belief that the image can change the 
Nigerian situation. The next chapter examines the kind of change photographic and 
social media activism has brought to Nigeria. 
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Introduction 
The preceding chapters have dwelt on the various ways photography is used on 
Facebook and other social media sites to challenge injustice in Nigeria. A number 
of examples have also shown the reactions of the political elites who constitute the 
targets of the civil movement. Their most obvious response is to take part in the 
online conversations mainly to exonerate themselves. This chapter addresses the 
bigger question of whether the online activism has changed anything in Nigeria. 
The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions of the 2010s, the organisation of which 
depended profoundly on social media, provide us with examples of “extreme” 
possibilities. The presidents of both countries lost their positions in the course of 
the struggle.455 Nigeria has not had a revolutionary experience in the explosive 
sense it occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. But that does not suggest that online 
resistance has not had effects. This chapter establishes a “Nigerian revolution” 
founded on disparate examples of socio-political transformation that have direct 
links to social media mobilisations.  
To begin, the concept of civil struggle itself has been transformed. As found 
elsewhere, Nigerians can be sensitised online about injustice, and they organise 
themselves in geographical spaces to resist it. When the civil movement receives 
international support, it serves to reinforce the efforts of the activists. Possible 
interventions are brokered to address the unfavourable conditions behind the public 
agitation. These have collectively contributed to some shift in the structure of 
power in Nigeria. These possibilities speak to the debates around the convergence 
of collective action theory and the technologies of information and communication. 
In an age during which digital and internet-based practices mediate the enactment 
                                                          
455 The deposed president of Tunisia is Ben Ali Dégage and that of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. 
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of civil protest, we are drawn to the examination of how differently collective 
goals get actualised.  
Structured into four parts, the chapter begins with a section on “virtual public 
conscientisation.” It contextualises Facebook as a site of public enlightenment 
where individuals are made conscious of the inequalities to which they are 
subjected. Personal encounters of injustice are brought together to form a collage 
of experiences evaluated through conversation around them. The shared awareness 
of injustice shapes the understanding of what has to be resisted and what the 
protesters expect of the public officials. In the second section, it is argued that with 
its visuality, Facebook as a site of civil struggle aids social movement constituted 
in physically-enacted human actions. So, protests conceived in digital and 
photographic form materialise into real world events. In terms of articulating the 
driving force of the movement, understanding its expansion and addressing issues 
of crackdown, the organising is sustained through a digital structure of information 
flow. Next, the use of photographs on social media helps to bring the attention of 
the world to the challenges facing Nigerians. The image becomes a site in which 
individuals and institutions distanced from the site of conflict share the distress of 
the afflicted. As the image circulates on the internet, it mobilises different kinds of 
intervention. The humanitarian gestures have their own shortcomings, but they 
assure the Nigerian activists that their voice is heard. Lastly, the section on 
“disturbing the structures of power” accounts for the capacity of online protest to 
affect actual change on the Nigerian political landscape. Goodluck Jonathan’s 
failure in the 2015 election is used to illustrate this point. The issues addressed in 
this chapter are crucial because they help us to place the Nigerian experience in the 
larger picture of how social media impacts on contemporary politics. Again, the 
centrality of photography in the investigation adds to the scarce literature on online 
activism in Africa.  
Virtual public conscientisation 
Travelling in 2015 by a public bus along the Enugu-Onitsha high way, I witnessed 
a heated debate reflecting the diverseness of people’s perception of the Nigerian 
state failure. The argument was ignited by a passenger’s expression of frustration 
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for the terrible state of the road. While some supported him, others argued that it 
was not bad as such, a shocking view I must say. They remarked that some roads 
in other parts of Nigeria are even worse. Since it was in the dry season, we could 
travel on this one if the driver drove carefully. We would only have to content with 
dust and prolonged travel time. There are two possible explanations for the 
position of those on the defensive side. First, like the dubious politicians, it could 
be that they benefit from the pitiable state of the nation’s infrastructure. Second, 
perhaps born and brought up in an infrastructurally dilapidated Nigeria, they grew 
up with no idea of how else the world works. 
This anecdote is important to our diagnosis of the workings of social movement in 
Nigeria. It allows us to understand how the masses arrive at the collective decision 
to embark on protest. While many are consumed by agitation for a total revolution 
against the failed state, others do not show such concern. They tend to take the 
Nigerian situation as a model of how the world is organised. One significant 
impact of Facebook activism is that it helps to awaken the consciousness of the 
people to the need to demand change. The social networking site is a space where 
discontent about the state of the nation is made contagious. The networked public 
sensitises its members by first, sharing personal experiences of injustice articulated 
in photographic form. Second, they draw attention to how other societies are run 
and insist that the Nigerian political elites borrow a leaf from their book. Again, 
notable citizens who display attributes of integrity are identified and used to 
project the idea of what it means to be a public servant. 
In thinking about conscientisation, the work of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire is 
an effective point to start with. He coined the term "critical consciousness" in the 
course of his intellectual advocacy work on education as a revolutionary tool. He 
believes that education enables “a new awareness” of self and inspires individuals 
“to look critically at the social situation in which they find themselves.” Then, they 
are moved to act, to challenge the forms of denial in the society and to transform 
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it.456 Although Freire’s theory is epistemologically located in the field of 
education, it applies to a broad range of areas – including online resistance.  
Consider first the sharing of personal experiences. Facebook has emerged in 
Nigeria as a platform where individual encounters with acts of subjugation are 
brought into public discussion. Reading Arendt, Azoulay explores in the civil 
context the relationship between the private and the public. It is through one’s 
private space in the world that one enters the public domain.457 Accordingly, civil 
movement with its public face is partly a collection of personal agitations. I 
substitute the word “private” with “personal” to suggest how an event that may 
involve many and enacted not necessarily behind closed doors, is brought on to 
Facebook as an individual experience. On the virtual space, the reported events 
interact among themselves to produce a collective desire for revolt. If they 
originally occurred in public spaces, their enactment on Facebook becomes a 
movement from one form of public sphere to another. Further, as illustrated with 
figure 6.1, there is a complex connection between these forms of spaces. The 
image portrays a personal encounter (an act of harassment) in a public place that 
found its way to the public domain of Facebook. 
The photograph in which we see a long queue of cars at a fuel station relates an 
incident that occurred before the image was taken. The use of the picture to tell a 
story of what rather happened outside of its frame calls to mind Ariella Azoulay’s 
concept of “untaken photographs.” She argues that despite the ubiquitous presence 
of the camera to frame even fleeting events such as volcanic eruptions, certain 
atrocities committed by oppressive regimes are never photographed. The image 
available to the public could be that taken after the calamity. Thus, it is only 
through reconstruction that we get a glimpse of what actually occurred.458  
 
                                                          
456 Paul Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London: Penguin, 1993): 11. 
457 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, 139. 
458 “Untaken Photographs” was the title of the award-winning exhibition curated by Azoulay in 
2010 in Galeria Moderna, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Displayed were the archival photographs of six 
photographers that drew from the “regime-made” catastrophe in the 1948 Palestine. See “Untaken 
Photographs” Cargocollective, May 25, 2015, http://cargocollective.com/AriellaAzoulay/Untaken-
Photographs. 
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Figure 6.1: Queuing for fuel at the Oando Filling Station (Nsukka, Enugu State). 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 1 May 2014, posted by George Agbo with the text, 
“This photo was taken yesterday after I was accused of taking a shot at the Oando 
Filling Station, Nsukka, Enugu State Nigeria.”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=636598166422035&set=a.6081210059
36418.1073741825.100002155738514&type=1. 
Retrieval date: 20 May 2014. 
The concept was further developed in her later work. To reconstruct the story of a 
“photograph not taken,” “we would…have to practice civil imagination,” in 
addition to using “other visual and textual materials.” 459 The above photograph is 
about another which if taken would have shown us a personal experience 
associated with the crisis in the Nigerian oil economy.  
Fuel scarcity which has evolved into a perpetual crisis in the country struck in 
April 2014. It created pandemonium at a filling station at Nsukka in the South-east 
of Nigeria. The chaos and the act of injustice that produced it constitute the 
photograph that I could not take, but which plays rather as a cinematic form in my 
                                                          
459 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, 232. 
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mind. With my imaginative eyes, I can still see motor vehicles, rickshaws and 
motorbikes in long queues, some stretching up to a kilometre away from the fuel 
station. After some hours of waiting, people get off their vehicles and walk into the 
fuel station to find out why the queue has remained stagnant. The shortly 
constituted crowd is infuriated by the insistence of the pump attendants that 
motorists first purchase engine oil as the prerequisite to have fuel sold to them. 
Yet, the product is sold at a higher-than-the-official-price rate to other buyers who 
have come with gallons. This duplicity aggravates the exasperation of the crowd 
and heated scuffle ensues between the people and the staff of the fuel station. I 
bring out my camera phone and hardly have I aimed it at the scene when one of the 
pump attendants catches sight of me. I am immediately apprehended for a 
photograph not taken. The confrontation speaks to a number of issues. First, it 
buttresses the fact that the use of the camera generates fear in certain situations. It 
has as Azoulay puts it, the  
ability to create a commotion in an environment merely by being there – 
the camera can draw certain happenings to itself as if with a magnet, or 
even bring them into being, while it can also distance events, disrupt them 
or prevent them from occurring. The camera has the capacity through its 
sheer presence to set all of these effects in motion without even taking a 
single shot.460  
The fear expressed by the management of the filling station is apparently 
connected to how the photograph (if taken) of a scene created by its act of injustice 
would be used.  Secondly, the untaken photograph is no less powerful than that 
which is taken. The one described above had an enormous effect. The commotion 
it created pressured the Oando staff to drop their unfair condition for the sale of 
petrol. Further, the issue of harassment in the public space is foregrounded by the 
incident. Don Mitchell’s assertion that the “public space is increasingly (being) 
privatized (and) brought under greater control”461 is demonstrated at the filling 
station. Privatisation in this context underlines the sense in which individuals claim 
to have the power to determine what happens in certain spaces in Nigeria. They 
                                                          
460 Ibid., 19. 
461 Don Mitchell, "The End of Public Space? People's Park, Definitions of the Public, and 
Democracy," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 85, no. 1 (1995): 132. 
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subject others to various forms of intimidation. In another sense, such harassment 
results from the failure of the government to carry out its responsibilities. While 
the controversy in the filling station raged, fuel was sold to others in gallons at a 
black market price.462 Independent petroleum marketers operate outside the price 
regulation set up by the state. So, as the government fails to make them comply 
with the regulation, the associated injustices have also gone out of its control.  
The conversation on the above photograph indicates a collective sense of 
frustration around the oil crisis which has become part of Nigeria’s daily economic 
life. Ordinary Nigerians see themselves as hapless people suffering in every area of 
life under a group of selfish politicians. They demand accountability in governance 
and project that desire onto the photographs of exemplary public officials. And 
such ones are quite few. 
One of them is Late Dora Akunyili (figure 6.2). A professor of pharmacology, 
Akunyili was in 2001 appointed Director General of the National Agency for Food 
and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC). The appointment took place at 
a time Nigeria’s public health was under the threat of drug counterfeiting. In the 
course of that national assignment, Akunyili became an iconic figure, representing 
everything opposed to the personalities of the corrupt politicians. During her 
tenure, the sale and circulation of fake and substandard drugs in Nigeria dropped 
significantly. Writing on Akunyili’s profile, Anne Harding highlights her 
patriotism by stepping back to the antecedence that earned her the position as the 
head of NAFDAC. Her employment with the South Eastern Zone of the Petroleum 
Trust Fund (PTF) between 1997 and 2000 coincided with the time of the Obasanjo 
administration. PTF released some money for her medical bill in a hospital in 
London. As it was confirmed that she did not require surgery which was the main 
purpose for the financial support, she returned the money. Her boss was shocked at 
that gesture and recommended her to Obasanjo for the post at NAFDAC.463   
                                                          
462 The official price of a litre of fuel as at then was 97 Naira. The black market price was usually 
100 Naira and above. 
463 Anne Harding, “Profile: Dora Akunyili: Scourge of Nigerian Drug Counterfeiters,” The Lancet 
367, no. 9521 (2006). 
    
   243 
 
 
·  
Figure 6.2: Portrait of Dora Akunyili. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 7 June 2014, posted by Chidi Eze with the text,  
“Found this very difficult to believe; so this is life.” The portrait came with a  
Sahara Reporters article entitled, “Breaking News: Dora Akunyili is Dead.”  
URL: https://www.facebook.com/chidi.eze.566/posts/802816746396504. 
Retrieval date: 3 July 2014. 
The fascination with Akunyili’s integrity derived from the rareness of such 
personal traits among people in privileged positions in Nigeria. Undeterred by 
assassination threats, and without succumbing to bribery, Akunyili embarked on 
massive confiscation and destruction of counterfeit food and medicine. Sadly, in 
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June 2014, years after her service as Director of NAFDAC and later as the Minister 
of Information, the news of Akunyili’s death came like a bombshell. An online 
article that bore her portrait was shared on Facebook. She was presented as a 
model whom the activists would want other government officials to emulate.  
Akunyili’s portrait and an “untaken” photograph of an encounter at a fuel station 
have been used to show how conscientisation works in the context of activism in 
Nigeria. The starting point of civil protest is the realisation that there exists an 
unfair socio-political condition that has to change. Individual experiences of 
injustice are shared and discussed on the online platform. And the networked 
individuals contemplate the biography of selfless public figures (who are sadly 
quite few in Nigeria). These are done to achieve a considerably unanimous 
perception of inequality. The idea of mass protest is premised on the public 
acknowledgement of the existence of unfairness. Social media mobilisation has 
transformed how Nigerians perceive injustice. The online relation constitutes 
activism in its own right as generally argued in this writing. On the other hand, it 
influences how the conventional civil resistance is enacted. This is explored in the 
next section.    
Between materiality and immateriality  
Social media tools could serve as self-contained means of civil movement. Still, 
they “are not a replacement for real-world action but a way to coordinate it.” 464 
They have transformed the mobilisation of social movement known conventionally 
to be constituted through protest marches, burning of tyres, occupation of space, 
and similar activities. In 2012, the “suffering and smiling”465 Nigerians known for 
their capacity to cope with harsh living conditions took part in what became one of 
the largest protests in the history of the country.466 It was prompted by the removal 
of fuel subsidy by the Goodluck administration. The event is examined to show 
                                                          
464 Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media.” 
465 There is a popular perception among Nigerians that they are very resilient. They live in difficult 
socio-economic conditions that characterised decades of military rule and have continued in the so-
called democracy. They somehow find ways to cope. Even when they do protest, it is hardly 
sustained as to have revolutionary impacts. The Occupy Nigeria movement which came to break 
the jinx was made possible due to its link with social media.  
466 Branch and Mampilly, Africa Uprising.  
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how social media protest with its photographic practices activates and expands the 
conventional forms of civil movement. Defying the notion of resilience among the 
people of Nigeria, the event alerts the political elites to the transformation of the 
way their misrule is challenged. It is an intersection of materiality and 
immateriality in which the image plays a significant role. Drawing on the analysis 
of the Occupy protest, it can be claimed that social media activism operates as a 
means through which conventional protest activities are conceived and organised. 
On the virtual platform, images are the bearers of codes and signs that define the 
driving force of the struggle and the demand made by the participants. The online 
flow of information during the struggle helps to relate the progression of the 
movement and to sustain the steadfastness of the activists.   
To begin with the genesis of the Occupy Nigeria movement, the then President 
Jonathan on the first day of January 2012, presented to Nigerians what was 
sarcastically regarded as “a new year gift.”467 He announced the removal of fuel 
subsidy by his administration. The implication was the increase in the price of 
petrol from 65 naira to 140 naira per litre. As the petroleum products used in 
Nigeria were refined elsewhere, the government claimed that it subsidised their 
prices on their importation into the country. It argued that the huge amount of 
money spent on the subsidy in turn enriched the “cabal,” a few individuals 
controlling the oil sector. So, its removal “had become inevitable to avert the 
collapse of Nigerian economy” and would tackle the fraud in the sector.468 The 
funds recovered from the subsidy removal would be put into infrastructural and 
human capital development. That argument was severely criticised. For some 
critics, the policy was but a ploy by the government to enrich itself and further 
impoverish the poor masses. They insisted that there was no such a thing as fuel 
subsidy in the first place. Others argued that it was a scam closely linked to the 
                                                          
467 The idea of “gift” became common in the public, media and academic discussions of the 
incident as it occurred in a day marked by the exchange of material gifts as part of the New Year’s 
celebration. The sarcastic use of “gift” here underscores the insensitivity of the government to the 
plight of the masses. Rather than improve the economic life of the people, the Jonathan 
administration was perceived to have taken a step to make it more difficult.  
468 Anthony Obayi Onyishi, Okechukwu Innocent Eme, Ikechukwu Eke Jeffrey Emeh, “The 
Domestic and International Implications of Fuel Subsidy Removal Crisis in Nigeria,” Kuwait 
Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review 1, no. 6 (2012): 58.  
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corruption that had destabilised the local refineries so that Nigeria would rely on 
importation of refined petroleum products, thereby enriching the importers. With 
domestic refining, they maintained, there would be no need for subsidy or its 
removal, and the products would be available to Nigerians at reduced prices. These 
controversies began at the end of 2011 when the government made open its 
intention. Yet, the decision was not rescinded. Once it was announced on January 
1, the following day, a multitude of Nigerians took to the street in protest. The 
movement was dubbed “Occupy Nigeria.”  
The name alludes to the “occupy movement,” a wave of protest involving the 
occupation of public spaces by disenchanted masses. Acquiring global attention 
beginning from the Occupy Wall Street of September 2011 in New York City, it 
became a way in which protesters gather to make revolutionary demands. In like 
manner, beginning from 2 January 2012, Nigerians gathered en masse in Lagos 
and later in other parts of the country for protest. Labour organisations embarked 
on strike. Offices were shut down. The protest was enacted in geographical spaces, 
but it had a virtual dimension which is common to most occupy movements. 
Larkin notes that internet technology enables the mediation of “exchange over 
distance, bringing different people, objects, and spaces into interaction and forming 
the base on which to operate…social systems.”469 In a similar remark, Jeffrey Juris 
refers particularly to social media as crucial to the mobilisation of “#Occupy 
everywhere” as he puts it.470 While “everywhere” in that formulation suggests how 
widespread that mode of social movement has become, the hashtag (#) is a sign 
that has come to mark the connection with the virtual world. 
Such connection was explicit in the Occupy Nigeria movement. In the book in 
which Branch and Mampilly puts the movement within the broader context of 
uprising in Africa, they fail to acknowledge the online relations behind it. Moving 
back into the history of the Nigerian people’s frustration with the failure of the 
state, they regard the protest as a trigger that unleashed the accumulated anger. 
They also examine its organising, the coalition that enabled it, its fragility, and the 
                                                          
469 Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Review of Anthropology 43 
(2013): 330. 
470 Jeffrey S. Juris, Reflection on #Occupy everywhere,” 259. 
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ultimate failure of the protest.471 For me, it is a grave omission not to recognise 
how the online media and photography impacted on the uprising. The protest with 
its fascinating visual dimensions was not only largely organised and co-ordinated 
on social media, it was conceived on that platform. Certain Facebook groups 
named “Occupy Nigeria” were created a couple of months before the historic 
protest which took up the same name. By name, visual symbolism and purpose, 
they laid the foundation for the momentous event. The logos of the Facebook 
groups draw from the graphic rendering of the human fist, with only slight 
variations in form and colour (figure 6.3).  
Since the sixteenth century, the hand has been used as a political metaphor, created 
into different “agitational gestures,” to use Gottfried Korff’s phrasing.  Korff 
identifies three of such gestures: “the clasped hands,” “the clenched fist,” and “the 
Roman and German salute.”472 He analyses them in the historical context of 
workers’ struggle and political revolution in parts of Europe such as Germany in 
Hitler’s time and France during the revolution. The clenched fist in particular 
evolved to have close ties with forms of solidarity that underline strikes and 
protests. Actuated by rage and discontent, the struggle most often climax in 
violence either as a further expression of anger by the protesters or their encounter 
with the authorities they challenge. In the birthing of Occupy Nigeria on Facebook, 
the image of the clenched fist was mainly a representation of solidarity. It is 
“solidarity as group interaction based on shared values and beliefs.”473 
 
                                                          
471 Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly, Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change 
(London: Zed Books, 2015). 
472 Gottfried Korff, “From Brotherly Handshake to Militant Clenched Fist: On Political Metaphors 
for the Worker's Hand,” International Labor and Working-Class History 42 (1992): 70. 
473 Aafke Elisabeth Komter, “The Disguised Rationality of Solidarity: Gift Giving in Informal 
Relations,” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25 (2001):385. 
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Figure 6.3: Logos of different Occupy Nigeria Facebook groups. 
Retrieved from: Facebook. 
Retrieval date: 30 May 2015. 
Scholars acknowledge the role of the image in civil movements and the way it 
constructs group solidarity. In a lecture delivered by Jessica Winegar at the School 
for Advanced Research (SAR), Santa Fe, in 2011, she locates the image within the 
larger cultural productions that constitute the language of the Egyptian revolution. 
Like poetry, performance, music and humour (jokes), the image bears signs that 
organise the underlying sensibilities of the protest movement. It is used to show 
how the people articulate their exasperation, how they seek to mobilise others to 
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join in the cause, and how they bring attention to their demand.474 In addition, the 
image exposes the brutality of the state in reaction to the uprising. Counter-
resistance violence further corroborates the broader unfair treatment citizens 
receive in the hands of their leaders.475 When circulated on social media as part of 
civil struggle, the image plays all of these roles and even does more. As I will later 
explain with examples, the interaction engendered by the images on Facebook for 
instance indicates how the protesters strengthen their resolve to change the status 
quo even at the height of violent crackdown. For me, such mobilisation of firmness 
is at the core of the meaning of solidarity.  
The Occupy Nigeria online groups that heralded the offline enactment were created 
with such strong sense of solidarity that however transcended intra-protest group 
context. It rather drew on a broader international framework that marks the 21st 
century civil struggle. The first post of one of the earliest Occupy Nigeria 
Facebook groups appeared on 18 October 2011. It was an excerpt from the About 
page of the OccupyWall Street movement of September 2011, which in turn drew 
inspiration form the uprising called Arab Spring. The emergence of Occupy 
Nigeria a month after OccupyWall Street and the adaptation of its ideas speak of a 
shared concern about the avarice of global politics and capitalism. 476 In Nigeria, 
the oil sector is a site of that rapacity. Another Occupy Nigeria Facebook page also 
opened in October 2011 resisted the condition by directly addressing the removal 
of fuel subsidy: 
Fellow Nigerians, this is a wakeup call to you all of my generation, lets 
flow in to the street to tell our leaders that we (are) no longer going to be 
docile, we can no longer take everything they give, we must end the era of 
forcing iniquities down our throat. We must now stand up for our right and 
do what Libyans, Egyptians, Yemenis, Syrians, Americans, British, and 
recently Italians are doing to make their wish come through. We will decide 
                                                          
474 Jessica Winegar, “Creativity and Revolution: Egypt at a Crossroads,” SAR School for Advanced 
Research video, 01:05:36, October 6, 2011, 
https://sarweb.org/?membership_lecture_jessica_winegar. 
475 W. J. T. Mitchell, “Image, Space, Revolution: The Arts of Occupation,” Critical Inquiry 39, no. 
1 (2012). pp. 8-32 
476 Occupy Nigeria, “Occupy Nigeria is a people-powered movement that began on October 17, 
2011,” Facebook, October 18, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=161733580587708&id=160388144055585. 
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on a date and move to occupy any government installation. Do not let them 
force this bitter pill of Oil Subsidy down our throat.477 
A couple of thoughts can be drawn from these lines. First, the protagonists of the 
struggle were influenced by the wave of occupy movements that greeted the 2010s, 
spilling over from one country to another. The last line in the opening paragraph of 
Branch and Mampilly’s chapter on Occupy Nigeria is evocative of the seemingly 
infectious attribute of this mode of uprising. They write: “The Occupy movement 
had arrived in Nigeria.”478 Just as it happened in Egypt, Tunisia, and some other 
places, and this is the second point, it did arrive through the virtual space of social 
media. The Occupy Nigeria offline mass protest was initiated on Facebook. The 
group began to mobilise action against the government for the particular reason 
associated with fuel subsidy removal a few months before the public 
announcement of the policy and the resulting resistance. It was initiated at a time 
the government had publicised its plan as if to test the reaction of the masses about 
a decision that would not be withdrawn. In the midst of the controversy that 
erupted at that moment, the social media group was in essence inviting the masses 
to reject the move and to rise up in protest if their voice was not heard. The 
government remained resolute and implemented the policy. So, the masses took to 
the street as set out on Facebook. The civil movement adopted the same name – 
Occupy Nigeria – which was conceptualised and given to it on social media. More 
Facebook groups emerged, most of them named “Occupy Nigeria.”479 Some were 
created on the first day of the offline protest (January 2, 2012) and others a few 
days after. Images and texts pertaining to the civil movement began to be 
circulated from its inception and would subsequently continue to address broader 
socio-political concerns in Nigeria.  
Once the protest had begun, further activities were arranged on Facebook. On 3 
January 2012, a programme was drawn on one of the Occupy Nigeria pages with a 
                                                          
477 Occupy Nigeria, “Fellow Nigerians, this is a wake up call to you all of my generation,” 
Facebook, October 22, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/OccupyNigeriaGroup/posts/302275939786853. 
478 Branch and Mampilly, Africa Uprising, 86. 
479 Nationwide Anti-fuel Subsidy Removal: Strategy and Protest is an example of the groups with 
different naming. 
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list of eleven cities where the protest would be held. Date, time and the exact 
locations were stated.480 Through that medium, the spatial scope of the movement 
was defined. It was intended to spread across the major cities in the various regions 
of Nigeria. Indeed, in a couple of days, the protest that began in Lagos rapidly 
swept through the country. Facebook was used to report the expansion of the 
movement. The circulated reports indicate not only how the protest was 
territorially spreading in Nigeria and in the diaspora, they brought to public 
knowledge the groups of people in support of the movement. A photograph from 
Warri shows a group of protesters who represent the branch of the Nigerian Bar 
Association (NBA) in the city (figure 6.4). Similar images from other cities have 
shown that the union was among the key supporters of the struggle.481  
The photograph helps to show that the movement was not restricted to the urban 
poor whom Ruchi Chaturvedi has argued to be powerful agents of revolutionary 
actions in Africa.482 Indeed, the informal proletariats are so crucial that they most 
often champion the movement. But here, in addition to its circulation within the 
paradigm of citizen photojournalism through which updates about the protest are 
disseminated, the photographic image suggests the involvement of the elites in the 
struggle. In this regard, the Ojota Gani Fawehinmi Park was a remarkable site in 
relation to Occupy Nigeria. The park which was named after the late popular 
Lagos radical civil rights lawyer was the initial meeting point for the protesters. 
Then they flowed into the streets for the activist rallies. 483 There was a nationwide 
strike by the organised labour. Banks, airports, seaports, and other establishments 
                                                          
480 Occupy Nigeria Movement, Facebook, January 3, 2012, 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Occupy-Nigeria-Movement/318278821540428. 
481 The NBA is but a member of a larger organisation – the Trade Union Congress – that took part 
in the protests. Other mega groups include the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and civil society 
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483 Innocent Chiluwa, “Occupy Nigeria 2012: A Critical Analysis of Facebook Posts in the Fuel 
Subsidy Removal Protests,” CLINA 1, no.1 (2015): 51. 
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were shut down, resulting in “a complete paralysis of economic activities” in 
Nigeria.484 
 
Figure 6.4: The Occupy Nigeria protest by the Nigerian Bar Association (Warri 
Branch) 
Retrieved from:  Facebook, 6 January 2012, posted by Occupy Nigeria with the 
text, “Protesters take over Warri.” The picture came with a Vanguard newspaper 
article entitled, “Protesters take over Warri.”   
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=228271247250052&id=160
388144055585. 
Retrieval date: 31 May 2015. 
The enormous impact of social media on the civil movement motivates us to revisit 
Mancur Olson’s notion of collective action. In his conceptualisation of how 
common interests drive the goals of groups of individuals, he argues that the 
smaller the size of the group, the more effective it would be in organising itself and 
in pursuing its purpose.485 The Occupy Nigeria example destabilises Olson’s 
proposition. With social media, collective actions can be efficiently articulated and 
                                                          
484 Ibid., 51. 
485 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (New 
York: Schochen Books, 1965).  
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executed, with a large number of people involved. I concur with Bimber, Flanagin 
and Stohl’s thoughts in the article “Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the 
Contemporary Media Environment.” They ask us to rethink the “group theory” in 
an era when technology has transformed the ways groups organise themselves for 
action. As they put it, “scholars should be asking…whether the theoretical ideal 
(such as promoted by Olson) fits the rich array of collective actions now present in 
public life.”486 I think it does not. There has been a successful mobilisation of large 
groups of protesters in Egypt, Tunisia and in Nigeria as argued here. Even if 
Olson’s argument was relevant as at when it was made, times have changed. 
Digital technology and the internet have made it possible for multitudes of people 
to organise themselves effectively for a common cause. 
The effectiveness of social media in group action is located in its complex structure 
of the information economy. As shown above, it facilitates in significant ways the 
initiation, planning and real time update on the activities of activist movement. 
Through the information flow, expressions of solidarity come in various forms to 
boost the confidence of the protesters. The reports of the Occupy Nigeria protests 
as they took place in different locations came with commendation to the 
commitment of the participants. On 5 January 2012, the protest in Kano was 
reported to be “an inspiration to all of us.” The activists “occupied all day and 
night (leaving the comfort of their houses and beds) and forgetting ethnic and 
religious divides.” 487  
The protesters had more to contend with than ethnic and religious differences, and 
the discomfort of the weather in the outdoor spaces. They faced a more threatening 
situation – a violent crackdown by the government. Lives were lost allegedly to 
police firearms. Tensions were heightened. The protesters sought vengeance 
against the police in the case of the killing of Ademola Aderinto for instance. But 
they later retreated for fear of the escalation of violence.488 They eventually 
                                                          
486 Bruce Bimber, Andrew J. Flanagin and Cynthia Stohl, “Reconceptualizing Collective Action in 
the Contemporary Media Environment,” Communication Theory 14, no. 4 (2005): 366.  
487 Occupy Nigeria Movement, Facebook, January 5, 2012, 
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resorted to circulation of the images of the deceased as a means of self-consolation 
and reinforcement in the face of violent crackdown. This can be illustrated with the 
example of Muyideen Mustapha who was reported as the first victim of the police 
brutality that came with the Occupy Nigeria protest. A Facebook page was created 
to pay tribute to him: “R.I.P. Muyideen Mustapha – A Hero Of the Nigerian 
Revolution.”489 The heroism was articulated in visual form, used as the profile 
image and posted on the page. His corpse with blood on his chest is placed against 
a graphic representation created and circulated on Facebook at the beginning of the 
protest movement (figure 6.5). The graphic image like the fist of solidarity 
symbolises a collective ambition to change the status quo. The juxtaposition of 
Mustapha’s body with the symbol is in itself symbolic as can be deduced from the 
conversations it generated on Facebook. One thought-provoking comment refers to 
Mustapha as a “martyred hero” whose death became a “redemptive force that will 
bring new light to the darkness we face in this nation…The spilt blood… (will) 
cause the thieves in (government) offices to come to terms with their 
conscience.”490 
Besides the notion of martyrdom, Mustapha’s demise became a means through 
which exchange of encouragement among the protesters was facilitated. They 
resolved not to allow counter-resistance to dampen their determination. Nigerians 
in the diaspora also sent in words of support through Facebook and other online 
channels. At the places where the solidarity was demonstrated through the physical 
enactment of protests, photographs were taken and circulated online. In the United 
States, the protest took place in New York, California and Georgia. In the United 
Kingdom, the protesters marched to the Nigerian Embassy in London. Some of the 
photographs of these events that found their way to Facebook as the mark of 
diasporic solidarity were produced as part of articles published in other online 
platforms. 
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Figure 6.5: The body of Muyideen Mustapha who was shot on 3 January 2012 
during the Occupy Nigeria protest. It is also the profile photograph of the 
Facebook page set up in his honour: “R.I.P Muyideen Mustapha - A Hero of the 
Nigerian Revolution.” 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 4 January 2012, posted without any text by “R.I.P 
Muyideen Mustapha - A Hero of the Nigerian.”   
URL:  
https://www.facebook.com/311939162179813/photos/a.311968125510250.78217.
311939162179813/311968248843571/?type=1. 
Retrieval date: 31 May 2015. 
For instance, “Message of Support for the Ongoing Mass Protest” is the title of an 
article shared on Facebook from Sahara Reporters. It begins with the striking 
remark that “it is not every time one gets the opportunity to demand for a change in 
the political, social and economic situations in a country.”491 The author asks the 
activists to view the uprising as a “life-time opportunity” for a revolution that was 
long overdue in Nigeria given the enormity of state failure. He evokes the 2004 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jnr, to 
                                                          
491 Danboyi Gomsuk, “Message of Support for the Ongoing Mass Protest,” Sahara Reporters, 
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prove that the masses have the power to change how they are governed. He 
challenges the claim by the government that the money recovered through the 
subsidy removal would be reinvested into the economy and used to provide social 
amenities. The poor state of infrastructure in Nigeria does not result from lack of 
funds but the mismanagement of it. He also warns against compromise which 
could come in form of material enticement. No amount of bribes would match the 
better living conditions that would benefit all, should the revolution come true.  
However, there are contentions that the Nigerian Labour Congress was 
compromised in the end. Without including other groups involved in the struggle, 
NLC entered a negotiation with the government. A hurried decision was made, not 
to reverse to the original fuel price of 65 naira per litre, but to enforce a partial 
subsidy removal that left the price at 97 naira per litre.492 Nonetheless, I suggest 
that the Occupy Nigeria struggle should not be critiqued as a failure. At least, 
something was achieved. The success, however minimal, signals the possibility of 
social change which (most important to my argument) has a strong connection with 
social media mobilisation and photography. Facebook along with its visuality as 
shown in the case of the Occupy Nigeria protest of 2012 influences the 
conventional form of civil movements. Offline protests can be conceived and co-
ordinated on the online platform, which also helps to sustain the information 
dissemination structure. It is further deployed to attend to further disparate 
elements that emerge in the course of the struggle, such as the tendency to cower 
and back down due to state crackdown. Besides motivating offline mass protest, 
social media mobilisation, as demonstrated in the following segment, leads to 
different forms of intervention. 
Localised agitations – global responses 
Another significant impact of social media activism in Nigeria is that it gives the 
agitations of the people a global reach. Through photographic acts, circulation and 
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withdraw the subsidy completely, leaving the price of fuel at 146 naira per litre. NLC went on strike 
again, but amidst division. Only a fraction of the organisation did. And other groups of people in 
the country did not join, owing to what they perceived as betrayal by NLC during the 2012 event. 
 
    
   257 
 
interpretation of images on social media, Nigeria’s socio-political concerns 
become internationally shared experiences. In the aftermath of the Chibok 
kidnapping examined in chapter 5, the #BringBackOurGirls movement rumbled 
across the world. The campaign as produced through the convergence of 
photography and social media is used here to demonstrate that the world hears the 
voice of the Nigerian activists. And it responds with different forms of 
intervention. Although the interventions have their own controversies, they help to 
bring succor to the victims of injustice, and to pressure the Nigerian government to 
respond to the demands of its citizens. The deployment of photography in the 
mobilisation of support for victims of violence in Nigeria and elsewhere is not 
new. Photography was central to the narrative of international humanitarian 
interventions during the Nigeria-Biafra war (1967-1970). What the 
#BringBackOurGirls campaign demonstrates is that digital infrastructure has 
increased the speed at which the photographic mobilisation is produced, and 
facilitates deeper entanglement of the image. The genesis of the 
#BringBackOurGirls campaign that is sketched out below amply demonstrates 
these new features that come with the digital. 
Oby Ezekwesili, Nigeria’s Minister of Education from 2006 to 2007 fervently 
criticised the Jonathan administration, demanding more accountability from it. She 
was disappointed at the attitude of the Nigerian army following the Chibok 
abduction. The army was inconsistent in its reports about the crime. At one time, it 
withdrew the official statement it had issued as if denying that the kidnapping 
occurred. Nonetheless, ignoring the implied denial, Ezekwesili insisted that 
everyone – both soldiers and civilians – mobilise efforts to rescue the girls.493 She 
intensified her campaign on Twitter and offline. On 23 April 2014, she delivered a 
speech at the UNESCO World Book Capital programme in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. 
In the address, she drew attention to the kidnapped students and used the 
expressions “bring back our daughters” and “bring back our girls” to galvanise 
support for rescue efforts. Soon after, the Abuja-based lawyer, Ibrahim M. 
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Abdullahi tweeted with hashtag the two of Ezekwesili’s expressions (figure 6.6). 
With the hashtag (#), the campaign went viral, while “#BringBackOurGirls’” 
dominated “BringBackOurDaughters.”  
 
Figure 6.6: The first hashtag tweet of the BringBackOurGirls campaign.  
Retrieved from: Twitter, 23 April 2014, posted by Ibrahim M. Abdullahi. 
URL: https://twitter.com/Abu_Aaid/status/458935571076100096. 
Retrieval date: 15 June 2015. 
The movement continued on Twitter, and more than a hundred 
#BringBackOurGirls pages were created on Facebook. Obiaso has examined how 
hashtag as a tool drove the protests, prompting international and offline 
mobilsations.494 He however fails to acknowledge the importance of the 
photographic image in the movement. Through the use of the camera, the hashtag 
itself was turned into a photographic image that inspired a multitude of others. In 
what follows, I analyse the photographic practices that got produced on the online 
platforms, from the rendering of the hashtag sign into digital photographic form to 
other visual productions. Emphasis is placed on how all these moved the distress of 
                                                          
494 Uche Emma Obiaso, “The Hashtag as a Channel of International Communication: A Study of 
the #BringBackOurGirls Hashtag,” Communication Panorama African and Global Perspectives 1, 
no. 1 (2015). 
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one nation – Nigeria – to the international front burner, resulting in various kinds 
of intervention.  
  
Figure 6.7: Michelle Obama’s tweet of the photograph of herself holding the 
#BringBackOurGirls sign. 
Retrieved from: Twitter , 7 May 2014, posted by Michelle Obama with the text, 
“Our prayers are with the missing Nigerian girls and their families. It's time to 
#BringBackOurGirls. -mo.” URL: 
https://twitter.com/flotus/status/464148654354628608. 
Retrieval date: 15 June 2015. 
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On the internet, #BringBackOurGirls turned into an iconic sign through a 
photograph that also became iconic by representing it. Michelle Obama posed in a 
pensive mood before the camera, holding up the sign (figure 6.7). Once the 
photograph was taken and tweeted, it reverberated the cyberspace: the US First 
Lady had joined in the campaign in search of the missing Chibok girls. 
Nonetheless, critics argued that the Boko Haram militants would not be moved by 
people standing before the camera lens to say, “Bring back our girls.” Some of 
them who are Obama’s fellow Americans – Ann Coulter, George Will and 
Christine Sisto for example – called for actions that would transcend what they 
regarded as a selfie. They suggested financial support, meeting with the parents of 
the kidnapped girls and with the Nigerian authorities to pressure them to action.495 
The criticism first foregrounds one key position in the debate around social media 
activism, namely, that it lacks the capacity to transform society. Second, it tends to 
trouble the place of photography as a site of complex social relations that have 
serious implications for civil resistance.  
The reaction to Mrs. Obama’s tweet is tied to the position that social media is a 
weak mode of civil movement. On the other hand, the tweet being a photographic 
sign calls to mind Susan Sontag’s argument in Regarding the Pain of Others. 
Exploring war photography as a genre, she presents an in-depth analysis of how 
the technologies of vision have given rise to the proliferation of the images of 
suffering. The pain of others is brought to the sight of viewers at their homes in 
safe distances. Still, Sontag concludes that it is impossible for the act of seeing to 
produce in the viewers the actual experience of violence. 496 Susie Linfield shows a 
similar attitude in her reading of the concept of solidarity in relation to the image. 
She remarks that solidarity possesses inspirational force. It “maintains the hope 
that a powerful human connection… against fragmentation…posits unity; against 
loneliness, brotherhood; against abandonment, support; against weakness, 
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strength.”497 But she asks what it would “mean to create solidarity with Memuna 
Mansarah” whose body was mutilated by the army during the Sierra Leonean war 
in 2000. She argues that solidarity will not restore Memuna’s arm.498 The concerns 
raised by Sontag, Linfield and the critics of social media protest are in some ways 
addressed by the international humanitarian supports garnered through the 
#BringBackOurGirls online movement. 
The production and online circulation of the Obama image were not an end in 
themselves. They were part of complex civil relations of photography theorised by 
Azoulay. She reads photography as a space in which individuals identify with 
others who are going through critical conditions in nearby or distant places.  The 
two parties come to constitute the citizenry of photography. The citizenship is not 
“imprinted with the seal of belonging to a sovereign… (It is) a partnership of 
governed persons taking up their duty as citizens and utilizing their position for 
one another, rather than for a sovereign.”499 The portrait taken in faraway USA by 
Mrs. Obama, a non-Nigerian, resonates with emotional connection to the victims 
of mayhem so as to put the self in their situation. The expression, “Our prayers are 
with the missing Nigerian girls and their families”500 helps to frame the connection. 
Akin to the Palette of Narmer that served as the blueprint for the rendering of the 
human form in the ancient Egyptian art, Obama’s photograph defined how a 
multitude of individuals across the world would pose with the #BringBackOurGirls 
sign. They expressed through photography that in some ways they were victims of 
the circumstance that made the Chibok girls captives. The civil relations enacted in 
photographs are as Azoulay puts it, “performed in different places and by different 
people who are bound together in association on account of photography, but not 
necessarily with an explicit connection on the basis of a nation, race, or gender.”501  
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This kind of photographic performance constitutes a particular way to understand 
contemporary humanitarian photography and the impact of new media on its mode 
of circulation. In Lasse Heerten’s comparative reading of the Holocaust and the 
Nigerian civil war through the lens of humanitarian photography, he notes that 
horrific photographs of starving Biafran children were at the core of the visual 
production through which international support was mobilised for the people of 
Biafra.502 Here, photographs serve to ameliorate the suffering of those represented 
in them. In the case of the photographic performance initiated by Obama in the 
wake of #BringBackOurGirls, portraits of people in safe distances – those who 
have no direct connection to the violence – are used to express solidarity and 
solicit support for the actual victims. The sheer speed at which photographs travel 
in this context constitutes another marked difference that digital infrastructure 
affords. The images in Heerten’s study were brought to the Western audiences 
through mainstream journalism, and through humanitarian efforts of individuals 
who actually travelled out of Biafra to seek aid. 
The visuality of the #BringBackOurGirls movement was experienced with great 
speed. Emanating from Ezekwesili’s spoken words, it was produced visually as a 
harshtag sign (a tweet by Abdulahi) that became iconic. Then in a photographic 
staging by Obama, another iconic representation emerged as a blueprint for many 
more. Individuals took and circulated photographs with the hashtag sign, and some 
embarked on further initiatives to address the conditions of the kidnapped girls. 
Chiluwa and Ifukor argue that the online campaign would have been a mere act of 
clicking virtual signs if it had not led to interventions in actuality.503 They however 
fail to examine how photography played out in the humanitarian discourse. One of 
the recurring elements of protest photography is the tendency to push its reformist 
undertaking beyond the pictorial exposure of injustice. Michelle Bogre reviews the 
portfolios of resistance photographers who literally provided materially for the 
helpless subjects they photographed. To illustrate, American activists and 
photojournalists Donna Ferrato and Stephen Shames founded non-profit 
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organisations to help provide succor to those who suffered from the social 
conditions they challenged. Ferrato set up the Domestic Abuse Awareness (DAA) 
to raise funds for female victims of domestic violence in Tribeca, New York City.  
Shames’ was LEAD Uganda through which he financially assisted “forgotten 
children in Uganda who show(ed) the potential to become entrepreneurs and 
innovators.”504  
Young Malala Yousafzai from Pakistan is not a photographer like Ferrato and 
Shames. But she is the subject of photographs whose relevance to the 
internationalisation of Nigeria’s story of insurgency cannot be denied. She is one 
of the famous individuals who responded promptly to Mrs. Obama’s tweet. In 
keeping with what emerged as the conventional pose from the Obama image, 
Malala took a portrait with the hashtag sign (figure 6.8). It was widely circulated 
on Twitter, Facebook and other online platforms. The photograph is evocative of a 
feeling other than sadness as expressed by Mrs. Obama. Being a child herself, her 
face resonates with child innocence that reminds one of the kidnapped girls.  
Meanwhile, Malala’s photograph tells two stories. The one readily visible to the 
viewer is the Chibok abduction. The other is her own experience as once a victim 
of violence. In 2009 at the age of 12, she and two of her friends were shot in a 
school bus by the Taliban militants in Pakistan. She survived the attack and later 
turned into an icon of activism against insurgency and advocacy for children’s 
right to education.505 She co-founded the Malala Fund foundation to "empower 
girls through quality secondary education to achieve their potential and inspire 
positive change in their communities.”506 By reacting to the Chibok violence in the 
photographic act, in the circulation of the image and in literally travelling to 
Nigeria, Malala established a strong form of connection with the girls. She told 
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CNN: “The girls in Nigeria are my sisters and it’s my responsibility that I speak up 
for my sisters.”507 
        
Figure 6.8: Malala Yousafzai holding the #Bringbackourgirls sign. 
Retrieved from: CNN, 13 April 2015, as part of the article, “Malala's Letter to 
Nigeria's Abducted Schoolgirls: 'Solidarity, Love, and Hope.'”  
URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/13/world/malala-nigeria-schoolgirls-
abducted-boko-haram/. 
Retrieval date: 3 July 2015. 
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Figure 6.9: Malala Yousafzai meets President Goodluck Jonathan in July 2014. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 15 July 2014, posted by “Bring Back Our Girls” with 
the text, “President Jonathan welcomes 
Malala Yousafzai.” The image is a shared Twitter post. 
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1443126529288376&id=14
19935701607459. 
Retrieval date: 6 June 2015. 
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On 14 July 2014, Malala travelled to Nigeria to meet and express solidarity with 
the few kidnapped students who had escaped captivity, the parents of the girls, and 
then Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan. The photograph of Malala’s meeting 
with Jonathan (figure 6.9) was shared on Facebook. The camera froze the moment 
when the president had a handshake with his young guest looking directly into his 
face. The innocent but bold look suggests the ability to act which is intrinsic in 
children in spite of the abuse they face in many societies. They are brutalised, 
objectified and denied voice and agency.508 Malala’s mission in Nigeria is from all 
perspectives an expression of children’s capacity to effect change in society. She 
pressured Jonathan to take more proactive action to save the kidnapped girls and to 
meet with their parents.  
The meeting took place at a time the president was already facing severe criticism 
for mishandling the situation and for the failure to have a chat with the parents of 
the girls. As reported in The Guardian newspaper regarding Malala’s meeting with 
the president, “Goodluck Jonathan had promised that for the first time he would 
meet parents of the missing students.”509 Indeed, one week later, he did. Whether 
Jonathan was already contemplating the action or not, it is reasonable to conclude 
that Malala’s visit played a key role in making that happen.  
The Malala Foundation also took up funding of the remaining part of the secondary 
education of the five girls who escaped the abduction.510 During the one year 
anniversary of the incident, Malala wrote an open letter to the girls, among other 
things assuring them: “Our campaign will continue until you and all girls and boys 
around the world are able to access a free, safe and quality secondary 
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education.”511 Malala’s interventions demonstrate how activist photographic 
representations portray the sharing of the suffering of others and provoke further 
actions to ameliorate it.      
Mindful of that possibility, some other individuals embarked on photographic 
projects intended to provoke more compassion for the girls. American 
photographer, Glenna Gordon, worked within that framework. In a broader sense, 
she is interested in stories of distress that make global news headlines. She 
documents epidemics, kidnapping, insurgency, hostages, wars, and executions, by 
photographing the objects that have metonymic relations to them. She has worked 
in different regions of the world on subjects such as hostages by ISIS and Al 
Qaeda, post-war Liberia and Ebola in West Africa.512 In the aftermath of the 
Chibok abduction, Gordon travelled to Nigeria. She conceived of a 
representational strategy for the story that would be more forceful than 
photographing protests and other events which according to her rather detract from 
the victims of the abduction.  
Through individuals who had access to the parents of the kidnapped girls, she got 
their personal belongings – school uniforms, other cloths, notebooks, footwears 
and jewellery. For her, the objects represented the absence of the girls while at the 
same time standing in for them. Her intention was to tell the story in a manner that 
would connect people to the victims of abduction. She successfully worked out the 
connection with the use of the camera to render, as Seremetakis would put it, “the 
imperceptible perceptible.”513 The presence of the missing girls could be felt 
through their absence and their disrupted youthful ambitions made to be perceived 
in sensorial form. Gordon reports that when she had some of the belongings of the 
girls in her suitcase, she felt as if she was “carrying around corpses.”514 While 
unpacking the objects to photograph them, she could feel the power embodied in 
them. “Each item” she says, “had the distinct smell of the owner…and the 
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notebooks felt so deeply personal, with their doodles and school lessons and letters 
to relatives.”515 The short descriptions of some of the photographs indicate the 
owners of the pictured items, their family backgrounds, likes, dislikes and career 
goals. This mode of representation is so powerful that we feel as though the girls 
are just around us.  
Gordon’s work which won a World Press Photo prize in 2014 illustrates how 
historicity, cultural representation and the jolting of memory can be produced in 
compelling ways through modes of sensory perception.516 Gordon uses the sense of 
vision – via the photographic medium – to activate other senses in narrating the 
story of violence. But the question is whether her project had more compelling 
impact or merely typified the “unequal exchange” characteristic of the civil 
contract of photography.517 The photographed victims of injustice, whose 
situations inform other photographic productions do not always have their 
circumstances transformed. The photographer might turn out to be the beneficiary. 
Azoulay paints out the scenario: 
The photographer makes a living, and in some cases may even become 
wealthy; the photographer wins fame and prizes, is a member of 
organizations that defend his or her interests, is protected by publication 
contracts and agreements. The photographed individual, on the other hand, 
is abandoned.518  
I think that formulation does not always apply. Consider some developments 
relating to the rescue of the abducted girls. In May 2016, one of the girls named 
Amina Ali Nkeki was “found” with her baby and “Boko Haram fighter-husband” 
(Mohammed Hayatu) outside the insurgents’ camp.519 “Found” is an appropriate 
word here given that it was uncertain whether Amina fled with baby from captivity 
or was rescued. For Hayatu the militant, he cannot be said to have fled or been 
rescued from his own stronghold unless he had revolted against the sect. Yet his 
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519 Omeiza Ajayi, “Amina Ali Nkeki: Rescued but still ‘Missing’ Chibok Girl,” Vanguard, June 26, 
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status as a militant was a speculation informed by the view that while under the 
custody of Boko Haram, Amina could not have been married to anyone other than 
a member of the militant group. In any case, the Chibok abduction was followed 
by the threat to marry off the kidnapped girls. While Amina and her baby were 
given a state reception, Hayatu was arrested by the security personnel who are 
investigating his case. 
Some five months after the Amina story, 21 of the abducted girls were released, 
this time, following the Nigerian government’s negotiation with Boko Haram, as 
mediated by the International Red Cross and the Swiss government. For many, this 
was the most significant effort by the Nigerian government towards the rescue of 
the girls.520 As I write, it is on news that further negotiations are underway for the 
release of more 83 of the girls.521 The rescue of the 21 girls took place in October 
2016 under the new Buhari administration, nearly a year after Gordon’s project. So 
there is a tendency to argue that there is no connection between the rescue and 
Gordon’s work. But I suggest that we read the photographic project not as 
“unequal exchange” but as part of the broader visual productions which as I have 
argued all along helped to bring the attention of the world to the Chibok crime. 
Whatever negotiations and mediations (incidentally involving international 
organisations) leading to the release of the girls cannot be detached from the wide 
publicity that brought global awareness to abduction.  
The United States’ mediation in the crisis demonstrates another form of 
international intervention worth exploring here. Within the framework of the non-
violent approach to counter-insurgency, USA provided support in terms of funds, 
intelligence, surveillance, military training, and relief supplies.522 The non-violent 
strategy may be a bit strange given that in different crisis-inflicted areas, USA has 
                                                          
520 Cletus Ukpong, “Red Cross Speaks: Our Role in Release of 21 Chibok Girls,” Premium Times, 
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deployed force in its interventions. As mentioned in chapter 5, the “war on terror” 
launched by the George Bush administration in the aftermath of the 11 September 
2001 attacks in the USA, was premised on the use of military force to fight against 
“terrorism” as it is more commonly known. Writing on how images played in the 
war, W.J.T. Mitchell condemns that approach. He contends that “terrorism” is a 
tactic, and “terror” the emotion it produces. So, it is futile to wage war against 
tactic and emotion that are imaginary phenomena. “Terrorists” mingle with the rest 
of the people and keep some in their camps as captives and human shields. Any 
attack on this mixed population does not kill the violence. The innocent are the 
principal victims.523 Such is the case with the Chibok kidnapping and the general 
operations of Boko Haram.    
As if working with Mitchell’s idea, the USA subscribed to non-violence in its fight 
against Boko Haram. That approach implicated the Nigerian government and 
strengthened the local activists’ agitation for political accountability in the country. 
It was necessitated by studies that linked militancy in Nigeria to state failure. As 
Onuoha and Ugwueze put it, “the Boko Haram insurgency is a mere expression of 
grievance against the non-performance of the Nigerian government and therefore, 
its fight should not attract direct confrontation from the United States 
government.”524 The non-violence includes among other things the establishment 
of the United States /Nigerian Bi-National Commission. It demands from the 
Nigerian government transparent governance, promotion of regional co-operation 
and development, improvement in energy supply and food security.525 These are 
some of the key concerns that fuel civil resistance in Nigeria. Hence, international 
interventions become a means by which the Nigerian state is persuaded to listen to 
the demand of the angry masses. Currently, under the leadership of the new 
president Mohammadu Buhari, the Nigerian government continues to use force to 
fight Boko Haram even as it also engages in negotiation with the sect. This has not 
                                                          
523 Mitchell, Cloning Terror. 
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eradicated the group and more militant sects have also emerged among the Fulani 
herdsmen and the people of Niger Delta. Socio-economic hardship has also 
increased.  
At any rate, despite the limitations of the international interventions, we should 
recognise the power of photography and social media to internationalise localised 
struggles. The image brings together as its citizenry the victims of injustice and 
those who express concern about them. And the virtual platforms on which the 
image circulates help to facilitate the international outreach. Yet, at the local level, 
the online activism in Nigeria has brought significant changes in the country’s 
politics as discussed below. 
Disturbing the structures of power 
Writing on the documentary genre, Martha Rosler expresses skepticism about the 
effectiveness of photography as a tool for social change. She argues that it 
“assuages any stirring of conscience in its viewers the way scratching relieves an 
itch and simultaneously reassures them (the powerful) about their relative wealth 
and social position.”526 In an age when photography is supported by digital 
technology for its reformist agenda, Rosler’s sentiment can be extended to social 
media. It would be taken to apply especially in societies like Nigeria where the 
political elites are perceived as obdurate. In any case, that view does not hold in 
Nigeria’s case. Activism as articulated in photographic practices produced on 
social media does not boost the ego of political leaders as such. It rather shakes up 
the positions they occupy. Although not to the extreme point of forceful overthrow, 
the virtual visual practice has had significant impacts on key political changes in 
Nigeria.  
The defeat of Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 general election is used to buttress 
the claim. It is analysed as a remarkable national experience that owes much to the 
virtual resistance enacted on Facebook. With rising dissatisfaction with the 
Jonathan administration, the then president was constructed as an incompetent 
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leader. The online activists argued that he did not deserve to be returned as 
president, and voted against him in the election. He was eventually defeated. 
Before we explore that example in detail, let us consider another that even 
preceded it.  
Shem Obafaiye became an object of derision on Facebook and other virtual and 
offline spaces following his inept television interview in 2013. He could not state 
the website of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), 527 the 
Lagos State Command of which he was the head. Again, he had implied that 
NSCDC had a different website dedicated to the job recruitment exercise about 
which he was interviewed. As if the site was something of a secret, he said: “I 
cannot categorically tell you one now…The one we are going to make use of will 
be made known by my oga at the top.” 528  That moment in the video was frozen 
and produced as an image whose iconic status is located in the interviewee’s pose 
(figure 6.10). The picture in combination with the inscription – “oga at the top” – 
was reproduced in different formats, both in digital and traditional media. It 
appeared on different surfaces: bandanas, notebook covers, T-shirts and on 
Facebook.  Obafaiye’s utterances in the interview were also rendered into musical 
productions. Parts of the video were integrated with other hilarious clips on other 
public figures in a similar context of political satire.  
Such humour is one of the ways civil activism is produced in Nigeria. It is meant to 
portray in a bad light public officers and the institutional powers they represent. 
Apparently embarrassed by the saga, the authorities of NSCDC transferred 
Obafaiye to the Oyo State Command of the organisation.  
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Figure 6.10: “My Oga at the top (Full Interview of Lagos Commandant)” – video 
still.  
Retrieved from: YouTube, March 14, 2013, posted by Akande Kareem. 
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJ3nHdBnPE4. 
Retrieval date: 4 July 2014.  
Although Obafaiye did not lose his job, his relocation marked a structural shift in 
the power of NSCDC. It validated the power of visuality and social media to 
change things in Nigeria. Another instance is the case of Adams Oshiomhole who 
went into the street in 2013 to supervise the Edo State environmental sanitation. In 
his capacity as the governor of the state, he mistreated a widow selling things by 
the roadside. The subsequent massive criticism of the act on social media moved 
Oshiomhole to apologise to the woman. He also offered her 2 million naira (about 
6,666 dollars) and a job.529 So, the Nigerian political elites actually care about what 
happens on social media.   
The most recent incident to compellingly validate the influence of virtual activism 
in Nigeria is the 2015 election, which the then President Jonathan lost. It all began 
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with dissatisfaction with his administration. The discontent was motivated by two 
factors. First, the key concerns that drive online activism in the country as analysed 
in chapter 2 are not necessarily new. But two of them – political corruption and 
insecurity – escalated during Jonathan’s tenure. Granted, while the rate of looting 
of public resources was extraordinarily high during the previous military regime, it 
was in Jonathan’s time that democracy in Nigeria proved to be as fraudulent as 
military rule. On the other hand, Boko Haram which came to constitute the greatest 
security threat in Nigeria emerged before Jonathan ascended to power in 2010. But 
it was during his time that the violence by the militant group reached startling 
proportions, and became intractable. The other factor is that Jonathan’s 
administration coincided with the rise of internet-based activism not only in 
Nigeria but across the world. The digital infrastructure gave Nigerians 
unprecedented access to information about the activities and the excesses of state 
functionaries. “Things got in the open,”530 as one Facebook activist puts it in an 
interview. So, the citizens became better informed and would actively take part in 
debates about socio-political issues that affect them. The Facebook-based 
conversations that contributed significantly to the formation of unfavourable 
opinions about Jonathan could be first read from the sociolinguistic perspective. 
Platt and Williams have explained the ideological use of language in the context of 
social movement. They argue that “language discourse orients moral, cognitive and 
emotive processes responding to and interpreting the experiences of failures and 
absences of cultural doctrines and structural circumstances.”531 On Facebook, 
Nigerians developed a language to describe Goodluck Jonathan during his tenure 
as president. The description touches on his character, personal life and what he 
stood for politically. Through a particular set of vocabulary, dissatisfaction with his 
personality and performance in office was expressed. His policies were criticised. 
His public actions were analysed and questioned. The language developed in these 
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531 Gerald M. Platt and Rhys H. Williams, "Ideological Language and Social Movement 
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instances is charged with symbolic and pejorative meanings. Consider the reaction 
to Jonathan’s interview at the African Security Summit in France in May 2014.  
Jonathan was asked why he had not visited the families of the abducted Chibok 
girls. After replying that a visit would not make any impact, he added his intention 
to “rebuild the school with good walls” to guarantee the students’ protection.532 
Shared on Facebook, the video elicited abusive comments directed to Jonathan. 
The idea of wall building was read as a shallow understanding of how to forestall 
abduction and confront the insurgency that produced it. He was thus described as 
one who in spite of holding a PhD lacked the intellectual capacity required of 
someone in his position. Other users of the virtual platform articulated their 
comments in pictorial form. They produced and circulated images composed of 
Jonathan’s portrait blended with zoomorphic forms. Inscribed on them were 
expressions taken from the derogatory vocabulary developed to ridicule the then 
president. They include “clueless,” “brainless” and “shoeless.” The Nigerian 
activists connected to social media have a shared understanding of the contextual 
meanings of these expressions. Sociolinguistic theorists would assert "that shared 
communication is accomplished among interacting speakers within the context of 
their settings. Background experiences plus context are the local extralinguistic 
features that are used as pragmatic discourse strategies to achieve shared 
meanings."533 
“Shoeless” for instance was coined on social media against the backdrop of a 
specific shared knowledge. In a speech he gave in September 2010 to declare his 
candidacy in the presidential primary election of the People’s Democratic Party, 
Jonathan painted a picture of his humble beginning. He was born and brought up in 
a rural settlement of Otuoke in Bayelsa State where he lacked access to basic 
infrastructural facilities both at home and at school. “In my early days in school,” 
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he said, “I had no shoes, no school bags.  I carried my books in my hands…”534 He 
remarked that these circumstances did not deter him from pursuing his educational 
goal, but not everyone has the capacity to make headway in the face of such odds. 
So an enabling environment was crucial for the crowd of Nigerians endowed with 
different potentialities. He promised such enabling conditions. In his biography – 
Against the Odds – Mark Hillingsworth and Von Kemedi describe him as a 
“reluctant politician.” They read the personal history relayed by Jonathan as devoid 
of any “sign of political ambition.”535 The picture that further emerges is that of 
unpreparedness to face the task that came with the political position he later 
attained. So for the social activists, his utterances, decisions and actions became 
something of a “brainless” and “clueless” man. They further imply that while in a 
position to change the life of others, he seemed to forget the harsh realities that 
attended his own life. 
Facebook is an effective space for the dissemination of this discontent. When the 
speech cited above was shared on the social networking site, the majority of the 
comments it attracted affirmed support for him. The commentators assured him of 
their vote in the general election if he made it in the primaries. In the end, he 
succeeded in both. Although one cannot deny the malpractices in the 2011 general 
election, he enjoyed massive support connected to what I call the “Jonathan myth.” 
The construction of the myth followed public fascination with the circumstances 
surrounding his success in politics. In 1999, the governor of Bayesla State, 
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha picked him to serve as his deputy, a position he accepted 
reluctantly.536 Alamieyeseigha was impeached in 2005 on charges of corruption 
and Jonathan took over as governor of the state. In the general election of 2007, the 
People’s Democratic Party picked him as Musa Yar’Adua’s presidential running 
mate. The victory of his party in the poll meant for him the position of vice 
president. In the beginning of 2010, he was sworn in as acting president because of 
the worsening health condition of Yar’Adua. Few months later, Yar’Adua died and 
he became the president. At the expiration of that tenure in 2011, Goodluck 
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Jonathan was to take part in his first election ever. His political career became 
somewhat a demonstration of the belief among many Nigerians that name has the 
tendency to materialise into the meaning it encapsulates. So in the election, a lot of 
individuals supported him with a sense of obligation to a divine assignment 
believed to have been given to him.  
The public support later fizzled away. Facebook was deployed as well to 
deconstruct the Jonathan myth and to express resistance against his government. 
He was aware that the public was losing confidence in him. Throughout his time as 
president, he was an active user of social media. He has been described as “the 
Facebook president,” who employed social media as “a means to monitor national 
sentiment.”537 As noted in the introductory part of this thesis, he invited Nigerians 
in 2011 to have conversation with him on Facebook on the subject of his 
“transformation agenda.” But the exchange took a different direction “with the 
President’s Facebook page becoming a forum for dissention by his ‘friends’ and 
other Nigerians protesting against the…security situation in the country.”538 The 
resentment kept building up as insurgency, corruption and infrastructural failure 
developed into definite features of his government. In the article “Goodluck 
Jonathan: From Affection to Rebellion, from Beloved to Villain,” Taiwo Ogunjimi 
makes a strong argument about how the loss of public support played out on 
Facebook. During the fuel subsidy removal crisis in 2012, nearly all his “friends” 
turned against him on Facebook and abused him. He became “the most cursed 
President ever on Facebook,”539 Ogunjimi concludes.  
The defamation continued. As the 2015 general election drew close, there were 
concerns among many Nigerians that Jonathan’s re-election would mean another 
four years of subjection to misrule. The sentiment was manifest in the 
conversations around the myriad of images created in relation to him and 
circulated on Facebook as exemplified by the above-cited African Security Submit 
video. Many commentators regretted voting for him in 2011 and resolved not to 
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support his re-election bid in 2015. The longing for political change became 
intense in Nigeria. The then opposition party – All Progressives Congress (APC) – 
tapped into the sentiment. It took up the concept of “change,” fashioned it into a 
weapon of sort and used it to wage war against Jonathan’s government and his 
People’s Democratic Party. APC mobilised an intensive campaign to sensitise the 
public about the need for change and presented itself as its agent. They organised 
rallies in public spaces and deployed the media and the internet to disseminate the 
idea. Consider the social media example. 
The website – APC Mobilization for Change – was created along with Facebook 
pages to harness the power of the internet in the propagation of the “change 
ideology.” The purpose of the group was “to mobilize and campaign nationally and 
globally for All Progressives Congress,” in support of its quest for change.540 A 
different online protest group – Nigerian Global Awakening Day Protest – created 
in October 2011 synchronised its objectives with those of APC Mobilization for 
Change which was formed much later. The Global Awakening group was initiated 
with the goal of “positive change” but not in the context into which it 
metamorphosed as APC’s catch phrase. It began with agitation for good 
governance, economic and infrastructural development, and the eradication of 
corruption.541 Later, the intensification of efforts against Jonathan’s government 
drew the group to also use the forum for that purpose. With time, the castigation of 
Jonathan on social media gave the indication that he had lost the support of many 
people. So arose the assumption that he would be defeated if the 2015 election was 
not rigged. The APC Mobilization for Change and the Nigerian Global Awakening 
Day Protest groups further became concerned with how to contribute in making the 
election free and fair.  
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https://www.facebook.com/groups/380102332101468/?fref=ts. There are different Facebook pages 
for the various branches of the group across Nigeria and abroad. Both APC Mobilization for 
Change and Nigerian Global Awakening Day Protest were created by Mirian Awolowo. 
541 The demands are stated on the “Description” panel of the group’s Facebook page 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/?fref=ts.  
    
   279 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Action against rigging of election. 
Retrieved from: Facebook, 22 December 2014, posted by Marian Awolowo with 
the text, “New alert shared by Sulaiman Mahir Badamasi.”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Nigerianglobalawakeningdayprotest/permalink/
908214882531338/. 
Retrieval date: 22 December 2014. 
The image above (figure 6.11) was shared on the Facebook page of each of the two 
groups. It was accompanied by the short description of an incident considered 
disturbing by members. It states that members of People’s Democratic Party in 
Yobe State were collecting the details of people’s voter’s cards. Questioning the 
motive behind such action, the protest groups read it as a strategy to rig the 
gubernatorial election in the state. The evidentiary power of photography would be 
used to address the concern. Individuals were to use the camera to photograph or 
video incidents of electoral crime. They would “raise alarm” by reporting to APC 
officials and by sharing the visuals on Facebook. The image would serve as 
“evidence” against the perpetrator(s). The power of the camera “to see and record; 
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(the) power of surveillance that affects a complete reversal of political axis of 
representation” 542 does not exclusively belong to the state as John Tagg would 
suggest. The virtual protesters believe that they have some agency: the power to 
observe with the camera the very process that ultimately determines their living 
conditions. Granted, it is the institutional framework – the electoral body in this 
context – that “guarantee(s) the authority of the image …to stand as evidence or 
register a truth,”543 that process cannot take place in the absence of the image. The 
Nigerian Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) can only cancel election if 
there is a proof of malpractice. The image constitutes such “evidence” which the 
activists could present, should Jonathan’s party commit electoral fraud. All these 
mobilisations were intended to reduce his chances of emerging victorious in the 
2015 presidential election. 
Another strategy adopted for the same purpose is associated with the notion of 
enticement as a means to influence voter decision. McClosky and Dahlgren argue 
that people’s “political beliefs and affiliations,” and the shifts in these are most 
often influenced by “those small, face-to-face solidary, informal and enduring 
coteries that we commonly experience as family, friendship and occupational peer 
groups.”544 In Nigeria, political loyalty is influenced differently; it is commodified. 
Due to the enormous material enrichment that comes with political positions in the 
country, the “power of incumbency”545 also means financial power to win the 
loyalty of avaricious or deprived electorates. The social media protest group 
reminded its members that Jonathan and his party had that power. They were 
therefore urged to resist the tendency of being lured into voting for him. The 
party’s tactic of enticement articulated through the “stomach infrastructure” was 
criticised as the exchange of public infrastructure for the satisfaction of the 
mundane needs of citizens. The concept which has become popular in the Nigerian 
political lexicon is credited to Governor Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State.  
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American Political Science Review 53, no. 3 (959): 757. 
545 As obtainable in other parts of the world, the Nigerian political system allows one to vie for 
another political position while occupying one. Such is what Nigerians refer to as the “power of 
incumbency.” 
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Figure 6.12: Distribution of “stomach infrastructure” rice in Ekiti State in June 
2014. 
Retrieved from: 22 June 2014, posted by Nura Abubakar with the text, “If this 
happens in Ekiti, with all the PhD holders, why not somewhere else?”  
URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/occupy.naija/permalink/764110980300270/. 
Retrieval date: 3 July 2014. 
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Prior to the June 2014 election that brought him into power, Fayose distributed rice 
and other foodstuff to electorates (figure 6.12). He strongly defended his action as 
a generous gesture which once elected as governor, would be consolidated by the 
appointment of a special adviser on “stomach infrastructure.”546 
In Nigeria, the use of food and other material things to buy political support can be 
traced back to Lamidi Adedibu who joined the Action Group party under Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo in the 1950s. In his post-independence career, Adedibu became 
a “political patron,” a success achieved through “his philosophy of amala-gbegiri 
politics.”547 Adedibu turned his residence in Ibadan into a refectory of sorts, 
serving his loyalists the much-desired amala-gbegiri meal. The practice was read 
as philanthropy so that Adedibu endeared himself to the people and commanded 
unimaginable respect. Abubakar Olusola Saraki who served as a senator in the 
second republic (1979-1983) adopted a similar practice and became a political 
stronghold in Kwara state. “Stomach infrastructure,” is a recent adaptation of the 
“amala politics.” By September 2014, President Jonathan had proclaimed the 
subscription of his party to the concept, insisting that “any leader who claimed not 
to believe in stomach infrastructure was not ready to lead, as ‘you cannot lead 
hungry people.’”548 
Omobowale and Olutayo invite us to read this political idiom as a characteristic of 
“societies bedeviled by a high degree of poverty with the quest for daily survival 
being the major concern, (where) goods in the form of food and/or access to the 
means of production/survival may readily attract the attention of a large number of 
potential and actual clients.”549 This is precisely what Jean-François Bayart 
explores with “the politics of the belly.”550 It is a particular mode of politics in 
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Africa predicated upon the struggle to eat for survival, because “‘to eat’ is a matter 
of life and death.”551 The underlying social condition is that of inequality about 
which the failure of the post-colonial African states has made the common people 
obsessed. In the public imaginary, the idea of “national cake” is used to describe 
state resources as what belong to all. Politics of the belly is also about the struggle 
against the monopoly of the right to the resources by the powerful class.552 But in 
in this process, there is a tendency for the loyalty of the people to be bought over 
by the same group that strives to maintain the inequality. The social media activists 
warn that to allow oneself to be bought is to be complicit to the power relation that 
substitutes the creation of conducive socio-political atmosphere for the satisfaction 
of the mundane needs of the people.  
Through these forms of mobilisation, a negative image of Goodluck Jonathan was 
constructed. The one perceived once as a “divine gift” became for many a 
“badluck” to the nation. It began with dissatisfaction with his administration which 
came to be characterised by a high rate of insecurity and corruption. He also 
happened to be in power when it had become difficult to conceal the frivolities of 
those in power. On the social media platform, a language of derision was 
developed to create and sustain the perception that he lacked the art of governance. 
His utterances, his deeds and his policies became somewhat repudiated and there 
was a dramatic public craving for change. The change would begin with voting 
against him in the presidential election of 2015. The aggressive galvanisation 
against him on Facebook, I have argued, contributed immensely to his defeat. 
Conclusion 
Explored in the chapter are the various ways the possibility of socio-political 
transformation through online photographic civil struggle presents itself in Nigeria. 
The mobilisations on social media enable the internationalisation of localised 
anxieties. The underlying visual economy of this process transcends the notion of 
pictorial representation of upheavals. The photographic image becomes the site of 
relations where individuals perform the expressions of feelings towards the harsh 
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living condition of others. People across geographical distances demonstrate their 
belonging to the space provided by the image. Such space emerges from the civil 
engagement of the photograph. This “citizenship of photography,” as Azoulay calls 
it, works for digital, more than the analogue she proposes. It becomes something of 
“global citizenship”553 as the image gets into the circuit of the cyber world.  The 
produced relations in turn beget interventions where individuals, institutions and 
governments of other nations are moved to do something about the injustices 
suffered among distant populations. The interventions have their own limitations. 
Still, it does not dismiss the key point, which is that cyber platforms with their 
visuality broaden the scope of civil struggle. The activism begins with the creation 
of civil consciousness among the citizenry. The attention of individuals is directed 
to acts of injustice and they are motivated to see why it is imperative to challenge 
them. The virtual movement materialises into protests enacted in geographical 
spaces. It brings people into physical contact with one another in pursuit of the 
common goal of transforming the socio-economic conditions in which they live. It 
shapes and diffuses public opinions that in turn transform democratic processes. 
Before the 2015 Nigerian general election, opinion polls were carried out on social 
and mainstream media between Goodluck Jonathan and Mohammadu Buhari, the 
contenders for the presidential position. Jonathan lost. The defeat materialised in 
the actual world as he and his People’s Democratic Party failed in the election. 
That was the first time a sitting government lost an election at the federal level in 
Nigeria. The strong link between social media and that historic event (including 
others that have even a wider reach) shows that online activism with its 
photographic practice is transforming Nigeria.
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. 
The Ariaria market located in Aba, Abia State, is one of the largest in Nigeria. It is 
a space for various forms of business transaction, an assemblage of individuals 
highly skilled in different trades such as shoe and dress-making. But, like other 
public infrastructure including roads, electricity, and hospitals, the market is in a 
dilapidated state. The space on which a large population of Nigerians relies for 
economic survival, has been allowed to degenerate into a slum by the government 
for which it is also a source of revenue. In September 2014, a set of photographs 
depicting different views of the ghetto-like market were posted on Facebook with 
the comment:  
After over a decade I visited the famous Ariaria International Market Aba 
to pick some materials for my travelling. What I saw shocked me. This is 
the famous Faulks Road that linked the market with the Enugu-Port 
Harcourt Express. May I and my generation be cursed if I didn't take this 
picture today and may they be blessed if I did. Likewise, anyone that will 
come here to say it is not Aba or a recent picture, may his or her generation 
be blessed if he or she is saying the truth.554   
The picture of a different view posted by another Facebook user attracted 
comments that affirmed the pitiable condition of the market: “I couldn’t believe it 
was that bad until someone from Abia started showing us pictures of the state of 
affairs there.”555  Another user says: “We cannot just look away,” adding that it 
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should be taken as a “responsibility” to raise the consciousness of the masses about 
the official corruption that produces the infrastructural failure in Nigeria.556 
The photographs and the comments raise crucial questions that string together 
photography, social media, and civil resistance in Nigeria. Frustrated with the level 
of the Nigerian state failure, the ordinary people demand social change. The 
photographic image for them possesses evidentiary power that makes it a crucial 
site for the struggle. Again, they recognise Facebook as an important space for the 
deployment of the image. This thesis has engaged with civil resistance as enabled 
by the convergence of those two sites – the visual and the virtual. It gives us 
insight into the complexity of the socio-political tensions in Nigeria and how they 
have evolved since independence in 1960. On the other hand, it draws us to how 
various theoretical formulations of photography work in the context of civil 
resistance in an African postcolony, and in a digital age. Still, we are prompted to 
rethink certain other theories and assumptions about the image. 
To begin with the history of photography in Nigeria, it is predominantly read 
within the paradigm of fine art and news media (especially photojournalism). This 
is not in itself out of place. The problem is the way political readings are occluded 
such that the photographic image is on the one hand treated as a work of art to be 
enjoyed only for its aesthetic qualities, and as mere illustration of news stories on 
the other. More than such genres as family photography and studio portraiture, 
there is a public face to art photography and photojournalism that enables a critique 
of the public discontent that dominates the relation of ordinary Nigerians to the 
state. So in a project that explores the activist use of photography on Facebook, I 
began with the claim that historically, photography in Nigeria cannot be separated 
from politics. But the activist engagements of artists and photojournalists are 
constituted differently.  
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The post-independence tensions in Nigeria commenced as early as the mid-1960s. 
The response of art photographers in condemnation of the socio-political 
conditions was not often overt. In the beginning of that decade, the photographers 
were as overwhelmed by the euphoria of colonial independence as they were by 
the thrill of a technology that enabled a life-like depiction of the world. So, they 
invested their creative energies in the documentation of socio-cultural experiences 
in ways that foregrounded self-presentation and construction of identity. This 
convention flourished in Nigeria even when intense plotical crisis had set in by 
1966. During the military tyranny of the 1980s, art photographers became 
conscious of the atrocities of the state, but subtle in their response due to fear of 
oppression. In the instance of no explicit political attributes in the image, I have 
brought out the political by examining the incidents that marked the time of its 
production. In that way, we get a sense of the living conditions that escaped 
explicit depiction. However, things have changed since the beginning of the 21st 
century. Democracy came with disappointment that turned art photographers into 
strong activists in an unconcealed sense. The same democracy is responsible for 
the considerable freedom of expression that has allowed its own critique.  
Unlike art photography, photojournalism was at the outset open in its response to 
the Nigerian crisis. Since the 1960s, newspapers and magazines that operate 
outside state control have used images strategically to expose inequality. Beyond 
careful choice of images for the basic need of body text illumination, they have 
over the years put photography to radical use. For instance, images are used 
independent of body texts or along with evocative headlines to draw attention to 
serious socio-political issues. Documentary approaches are also adopted to follow 
stories that highlight harsh living conditions. An example is Peter Obe’s coverage 
of the Nigeria-Biafra war (1967-1970) for the Daily Times newspaper.  
In the argument for the activist history of photography in Nigeria, I drew on the 
work of Ariella Azoulay with which I have more broadly worked as my theoretical 
frame. She notes that the image should not be taken to be political in a self-evident 
sense.557 One can choose to read it as political. This project is mainly about digital 
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photography. But the reading of the evolution of analogue practices helps us to 
appreciate that activist photography in Nigeria did not begin with the digital. The 
new media only ensures a continuation of the visual resistance, but in more radical 
and fascinating ways. Picturing devices have not only become highly accessible, 
they are connected to the vast networks of World Wide Web. The networks 
connect people and enable them to share media contents and to have conversations 
about them. Thus, the photographic image enters a complex circuit of sociality that 
resonates with Azoulay’s civil discourse theory of photography.558 It posits that 
photography is an event that brings different people together, all of whom are 
important in the interpretation of the image. In other words, there is no single 
meaning of the photograph to be attributed to a particular individual. Azoulay was 
working with an analogue photography archive when she developed that idea. I 
have argued that the formulation works even more appropriately with digital 
photography produced on social media.  
The structure of Facebook supports the democratised circulation of images and the 
discussion of their meanings. Posting, sharing, commenting, liking, and chatting 
are associated with various interactive possibilities that produce the image as a 
multiple story. Once a photograph arrives on the Facebook page, the context in 
which it was originally produced changes with the kind of comments that go with 
it. This sociality is crucial to the political force that marks the convergence of 
photography and social networking. The once unreachable Nigerian government 
officials can now be accessed virtually by the ordinary people who make demands 
for better living conditions.  
Such political interchange dominates my reading of the history of Facebook. I see 
the crisis encountered by Facebook in its early years as an experience that prepared 
it for the revolutionary task ahead of it. Beginning especially in 2011, Facebook 
became a site of civil struggle, mobilising momentous world events. The political 
engagement is not a one-directional movement. The platform simultaneously 
serves for protest and counter-protest. Images are central to these exchanges, 
although not hitherto well explored in scholarly literature. In the context of 
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activism, Facebook takes on the status of the archive in the way it organises the 
traces of resistance against inequality. In structure and content, it borrows from the 
analogue archive, although digitally constituted. On the other hand, it makes us 
rethink some conventional notions of the archive. For example, it challenges the 
power of the state to monopolise the production of state-related narratives. The 
ordinary citizens have got the agency to document and interpret the injustices of 
the state.  However, Facebook has its own limits as an archive. It is not a 
homogenous site, but a conglomeration of spaces managed by individuals and 
groups. Access to certain documents is consequently limited to the logic of 
network and of access to the management of pages. Documents can also be deleted 
from the site. It could be a page administrator’s decision, or an outcome of 
complex workings of Facebook algorithm and the cyber world. It could as well be 
connected to issues that are themselves as political as censorship and reports 
directed to Facebook as an institution. 
In any case, in the context of activism in Nigeria, Facebook is an important site 
where Nigerians archive the records of the country’s post-independence 
conditions. Although the practice may not be acknowledged as a form of 
archivisation by the online activists, the photographs they circulate and discuss are 
archived virtual placards. They reflect the agitations of the online protesters 
namely, corruption, poverty, insecurity, infrastructural failure and power tussles. 
These are not the only questions that confront Nigeria, but they manifest in ways 
that shed light on others. They also overlap in certain ways. High-profile 
corruption transferred from one administration to another is sustained by impunity 
and ethnic sentiments. Through fraudulent practices, the political elites create and 
maintain poverty among the greater population of Nigerians. The dilapidated 
condition of public infrastructure is an outcome of the unaccountability of the 
leaders.  
The Nigerian state is complicit with violence, not only due to the weakness of the 
security system but because government officials at times get directly involved in 
crime. This is demonstrated by the various forms of co-operation between Boko 
Haram and state functionaries. Crime in Nigeria also manifests in form of 
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resistance against the injustices of the government. Again, violence, fraud and 
egoism mark the struggle for power among the political elites. Through the 
photographic practices on Facebook, Nigerians express their worries about these 
situations. They see themselves as luckless people who live behind time and whose 
leaders have lost their humanness. With a sense of commitment to photography to 
which they ascribe evidentiary power, they pressure for social transformation.  
The image becomes for them a language of revolution and the language 
community is constituted on Facebook. Incidentally, there is public access to 
devices that have the capacity to take photographs, such as digital cameras, 
computers, tablets, iPads, and smart phones. There is something revolutionary in 
the ubiquity of these devices and the way they are used in Nigeria. The 
Foucauldian order of surveillance has been destabilised. With the ubiquitous 
camera, members of the public have got the capacity to return the gaze of the state. 
The picturing devices are at times used surreptitiously to expose the fraudulent life 
of the political elites and to counter the false presentation of themselves as selfless.  
Meanwhile, much of the power of the visual economy is located in the mutability 
of the image. Through various forms of editing, the photographs circulated on 
Facebook produce their activist effects. Such practice is questioned by those 
obsessed with the realist understanding of photography. Realism can be traced to 
the early history of photography when its inventors proclaimed the medium as an 
innocent depiction of the world. That claim is problematic because it tends to 
overlook the human and technical mediations that come into play in the production 
of the image. In the political use of photography, picture manipulation, whatever 
negative connotation it evokes among realists, is crucial for adequate 
representation of the realities of life in Nigeria.  
In the visual production, a set of technological tools are deployed – digital 
hardware and software applications. The camera devices are not only used for the 
taking of photographs. They are compatible with various types of image-editing 
software whose use does not necessarily require special enterprise. But this 
presents another question. Trained photographers are critical of photographic 
democratisation in the digital age. A lot of the images circulated on Facebook are 
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of low resolution and thus described as amateur, or grainy. Such description 
implies an understanding of the image as merely about the visual qualities that 
appeal to our sense of aesthetics. But there is more to photography than that. In the 
context of activism, the political force of the image is important and is not 
undermined by its poor resolution. As exemplified by the eye witness report of the 
South Asian tsunami of 2004, the so-called grainy images and shaky videos are at 
times the only testimony of significant world events. Such visual productions 
undertaken with the ubiquitous camera have been used to call attention to the 
dubiousness of Nigerian public officials. 
To further appreciate the political force of the image, one has to ponder the 
circumstances in which they are produced. There is a sense of commitment that 
drives ordinary Nigerians to expose the inequality in which they live. Even in 
difficult circumstances, that is, when the mere presence of the camera and its use 
pose some kind of risk, many strive to take photographs that call attention to 
injustice. Such efforts should not be dismissed as worthless merely because the end 
products are images of low visual quality. So, it is not only about the photograph 
itself but what can be termed “civil attitude” that organises its production. The civil 
attitude manifests in yet another fascinating way. In the face of infrastructural 
limitations, Nigerians put a lot of resources and energy to sustain the online 
struggle. Electricity and internet connection which are fundamental to the virtual-
visual practice are inadequate. So, individuals resort to various forms of 
appropriation and improvisation to power their digital devices and to access the 
internet. 
Apart from the above questions of social and technological modalities of image 
production, we can contemplate the power of the photograph in terms of the tasks 
assigned to it. In a world of widespread resistance against injustice, which 
produces cycles of violence, the photographic image is confronted with two 
opposing tasks. It is asked to produce violence and to counter it. The Boko Haram 
militancy in Nigeria appropriately illustrates this. Although connected to religious 
radicalism, the insurgency is framed as a revolutionary response to state fraud and 
the state reacts with force. The militants fashioned the image into a weapon 
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comparable to the firearm and the bomb, deploying it in the advancement of 
brutality. The parallelism of gun and camera is not necessarily new. In his essay on 
the role of photography in the making of the empire in Africa, Paul Landau 
connects the two by reading “snapping a shot” and “to snipe” as both denotative of 
“shooting at a…target.”559 Like the firearm, the camera was a tool of colonial 
domination. In the post-colonial Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency involves a 
similar deployment of the camera, but also in intriguingly different ways. The 
militants make “political demands” in “direct-address videos and photos.”560 
Reversing the direction of power as what is exercised by the photographer through 
the camera and over the photographed, the image in the context of insurgency 
harasses us. It talks to us, threatening to cause violence and eventually does so. On 
the internet, there are many videos in which the Boko Haram leader Abubakar 
Shekau takes responsibility for attacks before and after their execution. In this way, 
our understanding of the image as a representation of events is altered. The image 
can cause or come before the event.561 
The response of the Nigerian army to Boko Haram’s use of images was to fight 
back with the same. As part of what was termed “counter-terrorism,” images were 
presented to claim that the military had killed Shekau. It was a victory declared 
over the image that perpetrated violence. But afterwards, the picture of the 
ringleader reappeared, claiming invincible. It is an unresolved visual war that 
validates photography’s relation to political violence. Although the territories once 
occupied by Boko Haram have been recaptured, the group has not been defeated. It 
has continued to launch gun and bomb attacks on both soldiers and civilians. New 
militant groups have also emerged in Nigeria.562 One is therefore prompted to ask 
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if the online activism is changing anything in Nigeria. The answer would be “yes,” 
although not in the extreme sense of the revolution that took place in Egypt for 
instance, where President Mubarak stepped down in February 2011.  
The impact of social media mobilisation in Nigeria is first demonstrated in how it 
has changed the notion of civil struggle. On the one hand, it is a form of activism 
where the protesters operate outside actual spaces where they could be hunted 
down by the challenged authorities. Not only is it difficult for the Nigerian political 
elites to ignore the online criticism against their excesses, they are drawn into the 
conversations. While they may try to exonerate themselves, the ordinary people 
directly communicate with them, castigate them and demand accountability from 
them. On the other hand, while the virtual practice is a mode of civil resistance in 
its own right, it impacts on how offline protests are organised. Through the 
interactive processes of Facebook, multitude of Nigerians raise the consciousness 
of one another about socio-political realities they already know or may have taken 
for granted. The online conscientisation develops into mass mobilisation that 
materialises in actual spaces. The materialisation is not only about the mass protest 
within the Nigerian territory. It is also about how the concern for the Nigerian 
condition crosses national boundaries, so that localised struggles become 
internationalised. Here, another theoretical formulation by Azoulay is 
foregrounded: “citizenship of photography.”563 She uses the concept to explain 
how the image provides a space to which people belong outside the constraints of 
nationality. The individuals insert themselves into the living condition depicted in 
the photography of which they are citizens.  
The citizenship transcends the expression of sympathy for the distress of others. It 
translates into various forms of intervention. For instance, the world responded to 
the movement against Boko Haram’s student abduction, not only by condemning 
the crime, but doing something about it. The Nigerian government was given 
financial and military supports, and pressurised to intensify efforts for the rescue of 
the kidnapped girls and for the counter-insurgency project. Apart from the fact that 
some of the kidnap victims have been freed, the interventions reassured the 
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Nigerian activists that their agitation for social change was not unnoticed. The 
greatest impact of the social media movement in the country is that it contributed 
to the defeat of Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 general election. Irresponsible 
leadership is at the centre of the concerns that drive online activism in Nigeria. The 
Jonathan administration (2010-2015) coincided with the period during which social 
media protest shaped world politics (and the practice continues). So, more than 
previous governments which also lacked accountability, Jonathan’s was under 
severe attack which social media helped to intensify. The desire of his critics was 
to have him overthrown to give way to a leadership that would bring socio-political 
transformation. That position was shared by multitude of Nigerians who 
consequently withdrew their support for him in the election, leading to his defeat. 
This historic experience leaves one with some sense of curiosity about how Nigeria 
has fared since the beginning of the Mohammadu Buhari administration. It would 
be fascinating to return to the same social media platform to see what Nigerians 
make of the change for which they voted.    
Meanwhile, this thesis demonstrates how to read the tensions in an African 
postcolony through the visual-social practice of the ordinary people. It makes a 
photography-related contribution to the literature on social media activism on the 
one hand, and its impact on African politics on the other. The ideas advanced 
through the analysis of images in the thesis motivate us to think and rethink the 
established notions of photography. We are prompted to ponder how digital 
facilities and practices affect the political use of the image. 
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